Planning is an essential step in all military operations or activities, security cooperation (SC) included. At its simplest, planning is the process by which one understands where they are, where they want to be, and how best to get there. The plan is the product; how one intends to get from “A” to “B.”

At the operational level, planning focuses on ends, ways, and means. Planning allows the military professional to clearly identify where the command wants to go—the ends. Through operational art and design, the planner pinpoints how best to get there—the ways. Finally, the resources are identified and applied—the means. While the plan directs action to achieve the ends, it also serves as the justification for resourcing; planning is how the Department of Defense (DoD) rationalizes SC.

What is different between operational planning and SC planning? In SC, the political and military realms are one, and the planner must be an expert in all aspects of the Partner Nation (PN) and on the U.S. Government (USG) policy towards it. Also, SC is not war fighting, and SC officers and NCOs are not traditional soldiers. The metaphorical weapons in SC are the SC programs—each with highly specific engagement criteria (i.e., the law); hence, it is important to know the rest of this textbook.

This chapter does not represent doctrine, but it does reference current joint doctrine and DoD guidance and instruction documents to put together a process that can be used to conduct planning for SC. If unfamiliar with the Joint Planning Process (JPP), operational art and design; readers should review JP 5.0, Joint Planning 16 June 2017 prior to reading further. If unfamiliar with Theater Campaign Planning, readers should review the Theater Campaign Planning: Planners’ Hand Book, February 2012. If new to SC, review the various SC guidance and instruction documents listed at the back of this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to present the highlights of whole of government security cooperation planning considerations and suggest a methodology.

**Theater-Level SC Planning**

Introduction

Security cooperation planning, like all joint planning, is conducted using the JPP within the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system, as described in JP 5.0. For the Combatant Command (CCMD), strategic guidance is stipulated in national-level strategy and defense planning documents. The intent of this section, is to illustrate how national-level guidance from the President flows logically down the chain-of-command, though the various documents and plans, to direct security cooperation efforts with partner nations. These guidance documents provide the “Ends”. CCMD planners determine how the CCMD is going to achieve these “Ends”. During development of the Theater Strategy and the CCMD Campaign Plan (CCP) the “Ways” are identified. Finally, the “means”, individual activities, events, operations, and investments are programmed by various planners and managers and laid out in the Country-specific Security Cooperation Section (CSCS) of the CCP.
Security Cooperation planning requires an understanding of the operational and security environment in the theater and the role the USG expects the different PNs to play. If SC funds are being expended on a PN, SC planning is required. CCMDs and Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) must prioritize requirements identified for SC activities and investments. The CCMD SC planners must justify the prioritization of SC activities for the collective group of PNs in the area of responsibility (AOR). Some PNs may receive more SC assistance than others across the theater. The funding process is the more challenging aspect of long-term SC planning since most SC funding is short term by statute. Once SC activities are authorized and funded through coordination with OSD and Department of State (DoS), SC planning for each PN takes the form of mission planning among the geographic CCMD, DSCA, the applicable SCO and country team, the Service and special operations component(s), and the PN representatives. The figure below shows the flow of national planning guidance.

**Figure 19-1**

**DoD/DoS Side-by-Side Comparison**

CCMD Campaign Planning

**Analysis of Higher Level Guidance**

Security Cooperation planning begins at the national level with the National Security Strategy (NSS). The President periodically produces the NSS to inform Congress, the public, and foreign constituencies about the Administration’s vision of how to deal with potential national security concerns. The NSS then drives a series of strategies and actions throughout the Executive branch, prompting development of various Department level strategic planning documents. Supplementing the NSS, the 23 April 2013 Presidential Policy Directive number 23 (PPD-23) on Security Sector Assistance (SSA), directs that executive branch agencies work together to maximize the effect of limited resources in achieving the NSS goals.
Three presidential guidance documents provide direction to the DoD. These are National Security Strategy, Unified Command plan, and the Contingency Planning Guidance. The Secretary of Defense provides strategic direction to the DoD and the Joint Force primarily through the National Defense Strategy, the Defense Planning guidance and force employment guidance. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also provides SC planning guidance to the Combatant Commands (CCMDs). This strategic guidance provides the foundation for National Military Strategy (NMS) development.

The NMS is the Chairman’s central strategy and planning document. It translated policy guidance into Joint Force action and assists the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces by providing guidance regarding plans force employment, posture and future force development. It provides the strategic framework for the prioritization of planning, resources allocation and the distribution of risk.

Part of the Chairman’s Title 10 responsibilities is to review contingency plans and prepare joint logistics and mobility plans. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary method by which the Chairman fulfills his Title 10 responsibilities, maintains a global perspective and provides military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President. The JSPS document aligned with this function is the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

The JSCP is a 5-year global strategic plan (reviewed every 2 years) that operationalized the NMS. It is the Chairman’s primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of Joint Force campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles and responsibilities to integrate the Joint Force’s global operations, activities, and investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies. The JSCP directs development of four types of campaign plans: Global Campaign Plans (GCP), Regional Campaign Plans (RCP), Functional Campaign Plans (FCP) and Combatant Command (CCMD) Campaign Plans (CCP).

In his role as the global integrator, the Chairman determines which challenges require GCPs. A GCP will address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains. GCPs look across geographic and functional CCMDs seams. Each GCP has an assigned coordinating authority that is the Combatant Commander (CCDR) with the preponderance of responsibility for a GCP.

RCPs are assigned to geographic CCMDs and address regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple CCMDs.

FCPs are assigned to functional CCMDs and address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordination across multiple CCMDs.

CCPs replace Theater Campaign Plans. These are the primary plans through which the CCMDs execute day-to-day campaigning. CCPs address theater objectives as well as objectives directed by GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs.

The JSCP also directs contingency planning, consistent with the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which expands on the CPG with specific objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP also delineates support plans to foster Joint Force collaboration and coordination in time, space and purpose.

Executive Branch guidance also flows to the DoS, from the National Security Strategy (NSS), where DoS and USAID jointly develop their Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) and Joint Regional Strategies (JRS). The DoS also has Functional Bureau Strategies. These Department and bureau level strategies, together with national level guidance and the strategies of interagency partners, inform the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), produced by the country team under the direction of the Chief of Mission.
(COM). Per PPD-23 the COM serves as the lead in-country integrator for Security Sector Assistance (SSA), overseeing the development of country-level plans and leading in-country bilateral discussions on SSA. Thus the ICS is also the critical whole-of-government document for the SCO as it details the direction for SC with the partner nation, and serves as the USG’s whole-of-government strategy for engagement with that country. As U.S. foreign policy is the domain of the DoS, the well-informed planner will have reviewed the relevant DoS Joint Regional Strategy and Functional Bureau Strategy as part of the analysis. A fuller discussion of DoS planning can be found later in the chapter.

Per PPD-23, the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) participate in interagency SSA strategic planning, assessment, program design, and implementation processes, and coordinate the content of their SSA programs with DoS. Based upon the analysis of higher level guidance, the CCMD develops a theater strategy. The theater strategy is a broad statement of how the CCMD intends to achieve planned goals and objectives and thus serves as a link between the national guidance documents and the CCMD Campaign Plan (CCP). It is only after the CCMD has developed the broad operational approach that the CCMD starts detailed planning for the CCP.

For SC purposes, the CCMD must integrate Phase 0 of any contingency plans (CONPLAN) into the CCP. Said differently, theater steady-state activities, e.g., mil-to-mil events planned by the SCO, incorporate the Phase 0 actions of CONPLANs to be executed later. If the U.S. or PN has identified a ‘capability gap’, and the U.S. wants or needs that PN to develop a certain capability as part of a CONPLAN then development of that capability needs to be part of the respective CSCS. Ultimately, the plan to interact with partner nations (derived from the CCP), known as the CSCS, should guide the SCO in its engagement with the PN.

Initial Assessment of Operational and Security Environment

When seeking to understand the operational and security environment, the theater-level planner should focus on regional dynamics. What are the challenges to the Theater Strategic End-States and what are the roles of regional actors in the strategic balance of power? What are some of the area of responsibility (AOR) relevant factors that could serve as restraints or constraints on the CCMD’s efforts? Detailed looks at these issues are important and country-level experts throughout the CCMD will be central to the planning team during this phase. Fitting these pieces together and figuring out the optimal strategy to influence the situation is the result of operational art and design. There are many different ways to identify challenges and opportunities, several of which are below:

- Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats (SWOT)
- Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL)
- Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Culture, Technological, and Physical Environment (PMESII-CTP)

In addition to the overall operational and security environment, planners need to look to the PNs for their desired role. This will be covered in more detail later.

Planners should also consider how the national interests of countries both in and outside the AOR compete with or support U.S. objectives in the AOR. Further more, planners should take into account challenges found outside the AOR that can affect the achievement of theater strategic end states, such as transnational threats (e.g., WMD proliferation, illicit trafficking, etc.). Real world issues do not respect CCMD AOR boundaries. Thus, for a genuine whole-of-Government approach, during their analysis planners must account for regional and transnational issues as well as U.S. and PN equities and sensitivities outside their respective AORs.
This initial assessment will not only provide a baseline against which to track progress in the development of capabilities and capacity, it is required by statute and DoD Policy. For more information on the DoD Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation requirements, see DoDI 5132.14 Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise.

Identify Key Planning Assumptions

Planners will never have all the information required, and planning relies heavily on assumptions. To ensure planning can continue under these circumstances, planners need to fill in their “knowledge gaps” with explicit assumptions. Assumptions should be both valid and necessary. Valid assumptions must by logical and realistic. A necessary assumption is one that is essential to continue the planning process. The planner must ask “Is it impossible to continue planning without the assumption?” Assumptions can span a wide range of topics, including the political conditions and military capabilities of countries in the region as well as timelines of events. Planners must continually review assumptions to ensure validity. Planners must also capture within their plan all assumptions so that future planners know what the previous assumptions were.

Identify Resources Available

Before detailed planning begins, planners should have an understanding of the resources available to the CCMD to support the implementation of the CCP. The CCMD campaign planning construct should provide a framework that allows commanders to identify and articulate resource requirements to execute the SC activities needed to implement the theater strategy. A thorough understanding of the types and quantities of resources available should inform, but not constrain, planning. Planners should proceed with developing a CCP that seeks to achieve the theater strategic end states and identify any discrepancies between current or projected resource availability and what is needed to implement the CCP. CCMDs should then communicate need for additional resources, and the risks associated with resource shortfalls, through the appropriate venues.

Identify Intermediate Objectives/Focus Areas that Support Desired End States

Conducting SC without connecting it to strategic objectives leads to uncoordinated programming and ineffective use of resources. The process of translating theater strategic end states into intermediate military objectives (IMO) as stepping stones and then further dissecting those objectives into activities and events is complex. Decision-makers and planners at all levels must understand this process to ensure successful integration of a wide range of activities.

SC Planning Guidance goals and objectives are the most specific description of the national strategic objectives presented to the CCMD, or in operational art parlance, the “Ends.” Based on the SC Planning Guidance, the CCMDs develop IMOs. IMOs must demonstrably move the CCMD toward strategic end states. It may only take one IMO to reach a strategic end state, but more commonly there will be multiple IMOs over the three- to five-year time frame of the CCP. The planners should also develop ways to properly evaluate Measures of Performance (MOP), Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) or both as ways to determine achievement of the IMO.

In general, MOPs are quantitative, but can also apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. Simply put, MOPs measure what the partner nation is doing but encourage the planners to ask whether the partner nation doing the right things to achieve the desired effect.

MOEs assess the impact of the actions of the partner nation on the effectiveness of achieving the IMOs. These measures assess changes in behavior, capability, or operational environment; MOEs do not measure task performance. MOEs measure what is accomplished and help verify whether objectives, goals and end states are being met. MOEs are typically more subjective than MOPs and can be defined as either qualitative or quantitative measures. For instance, a MOE may be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward an IMO.
IMOs must be specific and achievable to ensure that the CCMD measures progress. In preparing IMOs, the acronym “SMART” (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Results-oriented, Time-bound) should be observed:

- Specific—the reader knows exactly must be done
- Measurable—empirically measurable so the CCMD knows when it achieves the IMO MOP/MOE
- Achievable—practicable within the time and resources provided
- Relevant—focused on an objective that moves the CCMD toward the end states
- Results-oriented—Focused on the results of actions, not on the process of doing the actions
- Time-bound—a clear deadline within the planning horizon

Lines of Effort (LOE) and Lines of Activity (LOA) are concepts referenced in other documents under a different terminology that align and synchronize the IMOs in logical sequence, driving toward a desired endstate.

**Theory of Change and Logic Framework**

While not yet fully implemented, and not yet required for all SC activities, the requirement for SC personnel to develop a theory of change and a logic framework for planned capability and capacity development of a partner nation are growing. A theory of change is a statement of expectations regarding the process by which planned activities will lead to stated objectives. It articulates assumptions and plans about how and why a set of activities and actions are expected to evolve in the future, including causal linkages through which early and intermediate outcomes will lead to long-term results. A theory of change is intended to make implicit assumptions more explicit, which describes why certain actions will produce a desired change in a given context, and clearly states what the intended outcome of the initiative will be and how it will be achieved. As SC personnel are monitoring the capability or capacity development they will then be able to validate the theory of change make informed decisions as to the likelihood that the partner nation will achieve the expected results. If the partner nation is not progressing as expected then the theory of change can be used to help SC personnel may informed decisions on corrective actions.

The logic framework maps goals and “SMART” objectives to the activities necessary to achieve desired changes. The logic framework visually describes activities and the planned process of contributing to initiative goals and achieving objectives. Figure 19-2 is an example of a logic framework.

**Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives and Lines of Effort**

Based upon SC goals and objectives, as outlined in SC planning guidance, Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs) are identified and generally led by the CCMDs. The SSCIs are coordinated with OSD Policy and Joint Staff and involve the application of multiple security cooperation tools and programs, which may be overseen and managed by various DoD Components and the Department of State, over multiple years to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective such as maritime security or counterterrorism. An SSCI could even involve several interagency actors or other partner nations. Often the SSCI is articulated as specific LOEs in the country-specific SC sections of a CCP.

An LOE or SSCI links related IMOs by purpose, in order to focus efforts toward the SC Planning Guidance End State(s). This approach allows planners to bundle various activities, events, operations, and investments, thereby logically linking more specific planning detail to strategic end states. Thus within an SSCI or LOE, IMOs step, in demonstrable ways, toward the “Ends.” SSC/LOEs are useful
By 2030, PN has reliable and persistent maritime security and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) of surface and air activity throughout its coastal areas, and has the ability to intercept, apprehend and prosecute the violators under international law.

By 2023, PN maritime forces have necessary agreements, infrastructure and systems to sense surface and air activity within its coastal areas and share that information internally with other agencies and with regional partners.

By 2023, PN maritime forces conduct maritime security operations within their coastal areas.

PN maritime forces monitor and track surface and air activity with its coastal area.

PN maritime forces share maritime information with regional and domestic stakeholders.

PN maritime forces and agencies maintain sufficient data collection, reporting.

PN maritime forces and agencies conduct effective maritime ISR and MDA operations.

PN maritime forces and agencies leverage a variety of complex tools for comprehensive data analysis/fusion and dissemination to support operations.

PN maritime forces and agencies conduct effective near-, mid- and long term planning.

Competency tracks developed and deployed for maritime forces C2 center, IT personnel: personnel are trained and certified.

PN officials demonstrate explicit national will to contribute to regional security and stability operations.

PN maritime forces, agencies and ministries maintain credible regional maritime response force capability.

PN Maritime forces, agencies, and ministries collaborate and provide complex and comprehensive support to regional Maritime Security and stability operations.

Regional C2 structure codified and effective in managing maritime operations.

PN policies and procedures enable domestic and regional information sharing across service and agency lines.

PN maritime forces and agencies participate in regional exercises and training events.

PN maritime forces, agencies and ministries collaborate and provide complex and comprehensive support to regional Maritime Security and stability operations.

PN maritime C2 center infrastructure supports both domestic and regional information sharing.

PN maritime forces and agencies maintain credible regional maritime response force capability.

PN maritime forces and agencies contribute to regional Maritime Security and stability operations.

PN maritime forces, agencies and ministries maintain sufficient data collection, reporting.

PN maritime forces and agencies conduct effective maritime ISR and MDA operations.

PN maritime forces and agencies contribute to regional Maritime Security and stability operations.

Regional C2 structure codified and effective in managing maritime operations.

PN maritime forces, agencies and ministries maintain sufficient data collection, reporting.

PN maritime forces and agencies conduct effective maritime ISR and MDA operations.

PN maritime forces and agencies contribute to regional Maritime Security and stability operations.

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to group near-term and long-term IMOs that must be completed simultaneously or sequentially. For an example of an SSCI/LOE, see Figure 19-3. For more information on the relationship between SSCIs and LOEs, see DoDI 5132.14 Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise.

**Lines of Activity**

Lines of Activity (LOAs) more clearly define the activities, events, operations, and/or investments supporting a particular IMO. LOAs become the “ways” to advance the strategy. LOAs thus allow the planner to dive down in increasing detail to answer the question, “What activities, events, operations, and/or investments are needed to achieve the IMO?” The individual activities are therefore the “means” to achieve the LOA. Figure 19-3 illustrates the relationship between LOEs and LOAs.

**ends—ways—means**

End States are achieved by moving along the SSCI/LOE, from IMO to IMO. IMOs are achieved by following LOAs (depicted as small white lines inside the larger SSCI/LOE in Figure 19-3, and are, defined by a sequence of specific activities, events, operations, and investments. Just as this process of increasing detail provides the planner a logical way to think through the problem, the plan will provide the program manager justification as to resourcing specific events, i.e., how a particular three-day event fits into the overall plan to achieve strategic end states. Hence, the CCP (and, by extension, the pertinent CSCS) provides justification for the “means” of the “ways” to achieve the “ends.”

**Assess Theater Strategic End States and Intermediate Objectives**

At this stage, the planners need to go back and reassess the Theater Strategic End States and IMOs; they need to review their previous gap analysis. Planners need to assess what constitutes success in
achieving the desired end state and re-determine the current “baseline”. Next, planners then need to assess the IMOs, make sure the IMOs are properly sequenced, and that the cumulative effect of the IMOs will achieve or at least make progress toward the achievement of the desired end state.

**COUNTRY-LEVEL SC PLANNING**

**Introduction**

It is important to note theater level and country-level SC planning are not conducted separately; they inform each other, and are developed concurrently and in unison with each other. Without conducting an in-depth analysis of the PN, how can the CCMD develop IMOs and the SSCI/LOE?

Country-level planning refers to the planning for SC with a particular nation-state or international organization. Tempering the focus on DoD processes, in support of PPD-23, country-level planning must coordinate with interagency counterparts in the DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other agencies with equities in the country of interest. Country-level planning does not necessarily mean “in-country” planning. Country-level planning can be done at the CCMD headquarters, in-country by the SCO, and preferably a combination of both. How and where country-level planning occurs depends on the CCMD; each is different. This section orient joint country-level planners, typically the CCMD J-5 country desk officers, to the overall process and suggests a methodology that is proven to be successful.

**From CCMD Campaign Plans to Country Plans**

The CCP describes how the theater is going to achieve its Ends, but by definition, the CCP is too general to provide a starting point for scheduling specific SC events. With over fifty countries in some CCMDs, the CCMD will sometimes prepare sub-regional CCMD Campaign Plans to provide increasing detail on how it achieves the Ends in a sub-region of the CCMD AOR. It is important not to confuse sub-regional CCMD Campaign Plans with the Regional Campaign Plans (RCP) assigned to geographic Combatant Commands and address regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple Combatant Commands.

Below the sub-regional CCMD Campaign Plans the CSCS manifests concrete action. Theater planners should work with service components and SCO personnel brainstorming and developing specific activities to achieve progress on lines of activity in a particular PN. The goal of country-level planning is not just the CSCS, but to develop the activities, events, operations and investments that program budgets and schedule on events.

**Analyze Higher Level Guidance**

For country-level planning, higher level guidance comes from the SC Planning Guidance, JSCP, CCP, and, where applicable, Contingency Plans (Phase 0). In addition to DoD documents, planners should look at the DoS ICS, the USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) and other agency/partner plans for PN. The ICS provides the Ambassador’s goals, the relationships between Mission goals and broader USG regional goals, discusses of the current operating environment, and informs the DoS budget submission (FY+2). It is important to note that the ICS is an interagency document containing goals and objectives from every agency that has an interest or equity in a particular PN. As mentioned previously, planners should closely examine the CCP, the Phase 0 objectives and tasks contained in relevant contingency plans. These objectives may contain important implications and requirements for steady-state activities.

**Assessment of the Operational and Security Environment of the Partner Nation**

Planners should examine various aspects of the operational and security environment as it pertains to the PN for which the plan is being developed. Planners should study relevant geopolitical trends
or conditions that influence key audiences in the partner nation. In fact, in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, reference 10 U.S. Code § 333 - Foreign security forces: authority to build capacity Congress wrote “In developing and planning a program to build the capacity of the national security forces of a foreign country… the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State should jointly consider political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical factors, if any, of the foreign country that may impact the effectiveness of the program.”

Planners should also assess significant internal and external threats to the partner and neighboring nations in the region. Another important consideration is the breadth and complexity of operational demands that these threats impose on partner nation national security capabilities. Planners should identify key security-related opportunities for cooperation, such as the partner nation’s role in regional organizations. The planners should assess the capabilities and resources of the PN, including its force structure, defense budget, and expenditures on weapons system purchases from the international market. The planners also need to conduct an assessment of the various institutional capabilities of the partner nation. Finally, planners should consider the goals and activities of other USG agencies and other countries and DoD’s role with respect to their efforts. Planners may want to use some of the tools previously mentioned (SWOT, DIMEFIL, PMESII-CTP). Once again, this assessment will not only provide a baseline against which to track progress in the development of capabilities and capacity, it is required by statute and is DoD Policy.

**Define the Desired Security Role(s) the USG Would Like the Partner Nation to Play**

Based upon higher-level guidance and assessment of the PN’s environment the planners need to determine what the U.S. wants and does NOT want the country to do. What is the desired End State? Does the U.S. want the PN to take (or not take) a certain political action? Does the U.S. need access to their territory, resources, information and/or intelligence, research and development? Does the U.S. want the PN to develop and use a certain capability or capacity? Does the U.S. need the PN to conduct peacekeeping, coalition, or expeditionary operations or does the U.S. need the PN to focus first on their own internal defense? Planners should determine and prioritize which of these (or other) roles a country needs to play to support CCP objectives. Planners should identify the risks to the CCP and U.S. strategy if the partner does not play the desired role(s). Fundamental to effective analysis is heavy consideration and nuanced understanding of the PN’s political will to play the identified role; is it a goal or objective that the U.S. and the PN have in common?

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Figure 19-4

**Common Goals and Objectives**

- CCMD
- CSCS
- Embassy Integrated Country Strategy
- Common Goals & Objectives
- Partner Nation Goals & Objectives
Not every country can or should play every role. Perhaps one country could play a role in its own internal stability, while another might be looked at as troop contributing country for the United Nations; it all depends on how the CCMD sees these various parts fitting together to achieve the ends. The country planner must also reach out to other country planners in the region to understand how strategies for one PN can affect another. Particularly, in light of current fiscal realities, careful consideration must be given to this question.

**Determine Required Condition of Partner Nation to Perform Desired Role(s)**

Planners must now look at the institutional and operational capacity and capability of the PN military to play the desired role. At this point, this does not require a detailed assessment, but a general military capabilities study: What is their operational history? Can the PN self-deploy? Can it even leave garrison? Does it have a joint planning staff? How robust is its logistics? Does the PN have a respect for rule of law and human rights? Can the U.S. work with this nation?

Planners need to assess the PN’s political will and stability as well as capability required to perform the desired role(s). What is the necessary degree of consensus among the political leadership and, more broadly, among civil society for the country to contribute forces to coalition operations or to conduct operations to deter potential aggressors in the region? What operational capability and capacity does the PN require for it to perform these and/or other desired roles? Finally, what institutional capability is needed to sustain the required operational capability and capacity? Specific institutional factors to consider include: degree of legitimacy and legal status; leadership and planning capability; decision making; resource management; human resources; equipment and logistics; and integrating mechanisms. Planners should use the DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities & Policy) framework to identify specific operational capability and capacity requirements. DOTMLPF-P will be explained in more detail later in this chapter.

**Assess Partner Desire to Play That Role**

Planners need to assess a PN’s overall strategic willingness to play the desired role. Does the PN have both the political and civil society consensus? Critical factors include political leanings of political and military, public opinion vis-à-vis the role, national priorities, fiscal realities, security interests, military and political aspirations, and historic role in the region. Additionally, the degree of political accountability of the government and civilian control of the military will bear on the problem. In an often ironic manner, the less accountable the government or military, the more likely it is to act in the desired role. Conversely, if the desired role is counter to the national interests of the PN (from the PN’s perspective), the plan must take this into account; wishing will not change nation-states. There is no need to expend limited USG resources on roles for which the PN has no desire.

**Identify Resources Planned or Available**

The final step is to identify existing or programmed resources. While country-level planning is not “resource constrained,” it must be “resource informed” if it is to have any basis in reality. Remember, there is always something currently planned. What are the current program budgets and manpower directed by the USG at the PN forces? What other resources are available? When considering this, look not only at DoD programs but also at DoS Title 22-funded programs, and in light of PPD-23, examine with the help of the SDO/DATT the activities of other executive agencies. Equally, what actions are the PN or third parties already planning? If another country is already planning to address a capability, then this should limit the resources the USG plans to expend. Perhaps more importantly, assess whether the PN has the resources and will to maintain the capability for the desired security role over the long term.

In accordance with PPD-23, it is important to remember that DoS is the lead agency responsible for the policy, supervision, and general management of USG SSA to include integration of interagency
efforts between related assistance activities. DoS leads the processes for conducting interagency assessments; synchronizes SSA, and coordinates interagency planning at the country level. The Chief of Mission serves as the lead in-country integrator for SSA, overseeing the development of the ICS and leading in-country bilateral discussions on SSA. DoD, the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as USAID all participate in interagency SSA strategic planning, assessment, program design and implementation processes, and are required to coordinate the content of their SSA programs with DoS. As such, DoD is responsible for ensuring U.S. defense strategy and policy priorities are closely synchronized with SSA efforts, especially where a key objective is to strengthen the capacity and willingness of foreign security forces to operate alongside of, in lieu of, or in support of U.S. forces. Law enforcement, border security, counterterrorism are just a few areas where the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security are the presumptive implementers of SSA.

Keep in mind, the National Security Council (NSC) is the organization that oversees the interagency process, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are both members of the NSC, and that during deliberations OSD Policy and Joint Staff J-5 do most of the work for DoD. Also, currently each CCMD has what equates to an interagency directorate. At the CCMD level this is a very good place to start exploring opportunities to coordinate SSA activities. The embassy country team is the best place to start at the Embassy level.

**Capabilities-Based Analysis**

Capabilities-Based Analysis (CBA), as presented here, is a modification of the doctrine used within the DoD, but significantly streamlined and re-focused on SC with foreign security forces, especially in light of new authorities granted by Congress. This is not by any means the only way planners analyze problems and recommend solutions, but this method has been successful.

For many SCOs, this may be (or seem to be) a daunting task. Indeed, many SCOs consist of only one or two military service members. It is entirely possible that the partner nation needs assistance with one of their services for which the SCO is understaffed. The first stop, of course, is to reach out to the SDO/DATT and the military attachés in the DAO who understand the partner nation’s military and security forces. SCO can also reach out to the CCMD and its components to bring in experts to help with analysis. The SCO may also need to reach out to interagency partners for those with the needed subject matter expertise. It is not uncharacteristic for U.S. military officers to have just a cursory knowledge of the other services. Trying to determine strengths and weaknesses requires a more finely-tuned analysis. If part of the reason for their capability gap is resource management, most planners do not have the background to help a partner nation set up a Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system to improve their resource management. If the partner nation has a human resource management issue, most planners are not qualified to help a partner nation revamp their personnel system. Also, how many planners can design a Professional Military Education (PME) system for a partner nation? Often planners will need to be able to bring in experts to help develop a plan.

**Problem Analysis**

Problem Analysis seeks to understand the situation in ever greater detail. It starts with clearly defining the “desired role,” and asking what tasks are needed to achieve that role. Perhaps the CCMD wants the PN to focus on providing peacekeepers to UN missions in the region. One military task for such a role may be “Conduct Stability Operations.” Next, capabilities needed to execute this task are listed out in priority order. In order to accomplish this the planners could follow the process laid out in the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) Development Handbook.

**Needs Analysis**

Needs Analysis takes the generic capabilities determined in Problem Analysis, and determines
the actual needs of a particular PN in a specific situation. This process begins with Assessing Current Capabilities. Comparing the generic needs to the current capabilities identifies.

**Assess the Current Capabilities and Identify “Gaps”**

While SCO and DAO personnel can provide general assessments, the service component commands play a central role assessing current capabilities. The Services have technical expertise and resources to provide detailed assessments of PN capability. During the planning process, a significant effort should be made to understand the operational environment, to include PN forces, but this usually takes a more academic look focusing on open sources and intelligence information. During these assessments, service component commands should apply detailed standards evolved from their own operations (while recognizing varying tactics, techniques, and procedures) to conduct a detailed on-the-ground evaluation of each capability. The delta between required capabilities and those present in the PN forces are the “gaps.”

While assessments are often central to wise investment, the country-level planner needs to keep the scale of effort and priority of a particular country relative to the CCP in mind. First, it is common that U.S. forces apply U.S. standards (i.e., mirror-image) against the PN operations. Planners and SCOs must carefully determine the extent of the desired assistance in order to limit excessive resource expenditures. The needs, as determined in previous steps, drive the assessments. All operations by U.S. forces are expensive, to include assessments, and these assessments will usually consume the same program funds as the eventual assistance. Additionally, if the program is small, the planner must be wary of raising expectations of the PN too high; as if the USG was promising to address all the gaps. Lastly, assessments can wear on the patience of those being assessed; who likes inspections? If the scale of the overall effort is modest, it may not be cost effective or wise to conduct detailed, service-specific assessments. Perhaps in these smaller cases, if the expertise exists in-country, the assessment could be left to the SCO and attachés resident in-country.

**Assess the Risks**

Once these gaps have been identified, a thorough assessment of risk must be performed. When looking at risk, the military planner must first assess the risk posed to the U.S. strategy, i.e., the planned role for the PN if the capability gap persists. If it presents little risk, there is little point in providing the capability, so limited USG resources should be applied elsewhere. If this capability gap presents a major risk to the success of U.S. strategy for the proposed PN role, this indicates a higher priority for resourcing.

In addition to this operational risk, the planner must also consider political risk. In the case of political risk, a planner must not only be concerned with the fallout from not providing a capability, but also the risk from providing one, e.g., future atrocities by “U.S.-trained” personnel. While the military planner might be reluctant to incorporate political concerns, the U.S. Ambassador to the PN will put these foremost when looking at how the CCMD’s country plan fits into the DoS overall strategy for U.S. relations with the PN.

This provides yet another example of the importance of country-level planning. It is at this level where the military and diplomatic planning efforts come together and must be synchronized.

**Solutions Analysis**

**Identify Alternate Solutions**

Solutions Analysis is the longest phase of planning. There are two primary methods for working through a capability to identify alternative solutions to filling the capability gaps. The first is DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy).
The second relates to the Joint Functions (command & control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, and information). In either case, each serves as a paradigm by which to logically work one’s way through each proposed capability. In each case, the results of this brainstorming effort will be a list of complementary or alternative activities, events, operations, and investments that improve PN capability and move the PN toward playing the role described during Step 1 of CBA. Both methods are outlined below.

**DOTMLPF-P**

**Doctrine:** The doctrine analysis examines the way the military fights its conflicts with emphasis on maneuver warfare and combined air-ground campaigns to determine better methods to solve capability gaps.

- Is there existing doctrine that addresses or relates to the business need? Is it Joint? Service? Agency?
- Are there operating procedures in place NOT followed thereby contributing to the identified need?

**Organization:** The organization analysis examines how the military is organized to fight: divisions, air wings, Marine-Air Ground Task Forces and other. It looks to see if there is a better organizational structure or capability that can be developed to solve a capability gap.

- Where is the problem occurring? In what organizations does the problem occur?
- Is the organization properly staffed and funded to address the issue?

**Training:** The training analysis examines how forces are prepared to fight tactically. The analysis may cover basic training, advanced individual training, unit training, joint exercises, and other training to determine if improvements are needed to offset capability gaps.

- Is the issue caused, at least in part, by a complete lack of or inadequate training?
- Does training exist which addresses the issue?

**Materiel:** The materiel analysis examines all the necessary equipment and systems that are needed by military forces to fight and operate effectively and if new systems are needed to fill a capability gap.

- Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inadequate systems or equipment?

**Leadership and Education:** The leadership and education analysis examines how leaders are prepared to lead from tactical to strategic levels, including overall professional development.

- Does leadership understand the scope of the problem?
- Does leadership have resources at its disposal to correct the issue?

**Personnel:** The personnel analysis examines availability of qualified personnel for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations to support a capability gap by restructuring.

- Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inability or decreased ability to place qualified and trained personnel in the correct occupational specialties?
- Are the right personnel in the right positions (skill set match)?

**Facilities:** The facilities analysis examines military property, installations and industrial facilities (e.g. government owned ammunition production facilities) that support military forces to see if these can be used to fill in a capability gap.
• Is there a lack of operations and maintenance?
• Is the problem caused, at least in part, by inadequate infrastructure?

Policy: Any DoD, interagency, or international policy issues that may prevent effective implementation of changes in the other seven DOTMLPF-P elemental areas.

Joint Functions

Command & Control—develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control

Movement and Maneuver—tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy

Intelligence—tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations

Fires—tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process

Sustainment—tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance

Protection—tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission

Information—management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support human and automated decision making

DISCS recommends the DOTMLPF-P method to provide the planner the most clear and concrete answers to providing a capability. To apply this paradigm, planners work through each part of DOTMLPF-P asking what is needed within each domain. For example, to provide a reconnaissance capability; “What additional doctrine is needed? Do PN forces need to be reorganized? What training is needed? What equipment is needed?” One major benefit of methodically working through DOTMLPF-P is that lower cost solutions may be identified before resorting to sometimes costly and perhaps inappropriate hardware solutions. The U.S. military leverages Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), for developing solutions to capability gaps, and DOTMLPF-P analysis is also required by DSCA (Chapter 15 of the SAMM) for all Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs. If the desired partner role also requires the partner nation to develop additional defense institutional capabilities this will also have to be addressed.

Recommend Solutions

In analyzing alternative solutions, the planner must assess each solution to determine if it is affordable, feasible, and responsive. Thus, often in real-world application, this step becomes very iterative with the next step, resourcing, as possible solutions fail or succeed to secure funding or manpower.

In the end, the planner may find there is not an effective way to address the capability gap. In this case, two policy solutions may be available. First, change or drop the desired role of the PN in the CCP (i.e., change the CCP). Second, it might be necessary to change the rules for a program or create a new program to address the gaps over the long term (e.g., propose changes to legislation) which is how so many programs have now come to exist.
**Putting the Pieces Together in a CSCS**

Before reading further, please review the Figure 19-5. This is an example of a Synchronization Matrix. The figure provides a simplified example of how a country-level planner might pull together various SC programs into a synchronized plan to achieve a country level objective (CLO). In this example, the CLO is seeking to help Bandaria secure its border. The matrix focuses only on that one objective, which was an identified gap in this scenario. Notice how it has incorporated Defense Institution Building programs so that the partner nation can sustain this capability in the long run.

**Figure 19-5**

**Notional Synchronization Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>Exchanges</th>
<th>Train-and-equip/SA</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Exercises</th>
<th>Operational Support</th>
<th>Defense Institution Building</th>
<th>Activities by other SC Providers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
<td>Facility Upgrades</td>
<td>SF Qualification Course</td>
<td>Unit Designation</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Doctrine Development</td>
<td>Partner B Equipping with Country X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Staff Talks</td>
<td>Military Staff Talks</td>
<td>SOF Equipping</td>
<td>Fl. Bragg</td>
<td>ACSA Development</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Country X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCT</td>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Logistics and Sustainment Training</td>
<td>Intel Integration</td>
<td>Partner A Exercise with Country X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>DVOT</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exercise</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exercise</td>
<td>SOF Certification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment Conference</td>
<td>Exchange of SOF Officers</td>
<td>Unit Exchanges</td>
<td>Senior Leader CT Training</td>
<td>NATO Training School</td>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security Cooperation Objectives:** The Special Operations Forces (SOF) of Country X will conduct (number) counterterrorism missions independently (i.e., without embedded U.S. support) within (number) months in contested territory in Afghanistan.

In the example, initially the SCO, or SDO/DATT, and the Law Enforcement Working Group needs to build support among the players to support and participate in the effort to build this capability. To do this, they conduct a Key Leader Engagement (KLE) to make sure all sides have buy-in and to set realistic expectations. The U.S. may need interagency staff talks to get everyone “on board” and to gather more support or information, if not already accomplished, or not accomplished in enough detail an additional assessment may need to be conducted. Can the selected unit pass vetting requirements? The country may need to change some policies or even laws. If the planner is contemplating on using a BPC program Congressional Notification will need to take place. Also, are there any foreign disclosure or technology transfer issues that will need to be addressed before moving forward? Finally, the planners might need to work with industry and the implementing agencies to determine production lead times.

During the second phase, the PN needs to continue with individual training and equipment acquisition begins in earnest; FMF, FMS, DCS, BPC or from other agencies. The U.S. may need to...
conduct Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tours to get PN senior civilian and military personnel to understand the program and cement their buy-in. The PN may need human resources help attract and retain quality personnel. The PN may need budgeting training to learn how to budget for this. This is where institutional capability building comes in. This could culminate with the PN participating as observers in a Joint Interagency Exercise.

During the third phase, the PN may need some advanced training. The PN may need logistics and sustainment training to sustain their force. Their support elements might need equipment and training. At this point, the U.S. and PN could set up exchanges. This phase could culminate with the PN participating, at a higher level, in another Joint Interagency Exercise.

Additional KLE and military staff talks are conducted during the fourth and fifth phases. These highlight the program’s progress, sustaining support within the PN and the U.S. Simultaneously the U.S. continues working on interoperability as the PN goes through a certification process and conducts detailed planning for interagency operations.

All LOEs or Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives require this process. Please note that in this example the planners identified approximate costs and programs that they would like to use to achieve the desired end state five years out. It is a mix of Interagency and PN funding. Planners need a baseline knowledge of the different programs in order to identify potential funding sources. If the planners are not sure of existing funding streams, they need to at least estimate potential costs and work with higher level policy personnel to identify and forecast resources.

**Resourcing**

Resourcing is a highly iterative process where the country-level planners determine what will fill gaps. This can be very challenging due to competition from higher priority efforts, missed deadlines due to compressed submission timelines, legislative limitations on lifespan of resources, or because the program is simply a poor fit to the specified program. There are currently more than 100 SC programs to resource solutions to capability gaps. Each program is specifically designed to address a particular need. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, its authorities and prohibitions. It is critical that planners understand these programs and the timelines for submission in order to apply the programs effectively. These programs are the “weapon systems” of SC; if planners do not understand them, they will never employ them effectively.

**U.S. Investment Considerations**

DoD wants to achieve the greatest overall improvement in the specified capabilities with the lowest possible investment. When looking here to invest, the country planner must consider the factors listed below. Key among these factors is priority; priority based on risk and based on urgency. Risk represents the likelihood of an outcome with negative consequences for shared objectives if resources are not provided, while urgency represents the importance of the resources based on time.

Deriving — What strategy and environment are the missions and capabilities designed to address?
Prioritizing — What shortfalls are most important and pressing? (based on risk and urgency)
Integrating — Have all services made an investment, maximizing effectiveness as a joint force?
Balancing — Are investments and attendant risk balanced across all the capabilities needed during the planning period?
Sequencing — What is needed now? What can wait until later? Is there a logical order in which investments should be made?
Resourcing — How much can the USG afford during the planning period?
Requirements Coordination and Integration

In the end, the PN must consolidate and prioritize these capabilities across all of the military services. The ability of PNs to conduct CBA and requirements integration varies widely across the globe. Many PNs will not present the SCO with a coherent plan and capability requirements. It will often be left to the country-level planner (CCMD or SCO) to integrate PN joint requirements and determine which best fulfills the strategic requirement.

As with competing PN requirements and priorities, competing priorities occur within the USG. To avoid competition, it is important for the country planner to remember the concept of the “sweet spot”—where the interests of DoD, DoS (or other agencies), and the PN overlap. Which investments have the broadest payoff, and hence, the most support among the interested parties?

If the planning was done correctly and logically, it will also serve as solid justification for program requests as they move up the chain of command. The country planner should remember that this same prioritization takes place across the theater, and at the national level. Over 100 SCOs all compete for scant resources.

At this point, proposed activities, events, operations, and investments need to be laid out (synchronized) over time, up to five years into the future. This serves many purposes. As a planner, it will help to determine sequencing and identify critical paths. For the program manager, it will help them request resources in the three- to five-year window, as illustrated in Figure 19-6.

Figure 19-6
Resourcing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Cooperation Objectives: The Special Operations Forces (SOF) of Country X will conduct (number) counterterrorism missions independently, i.e., without embedded ILSS support with...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjust Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current country planning window is about 2 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whole of Government Security Cooperation Planning 19-18
Ideally, the planning timelines will take Global Force Management timelines into account, but not always. Often plans are made and events scheduled well after the point that forces are requested. Either the event adapts to available forces or, ideally, planning timelines are moved a year to allow for the Request for Forces (RFF) process.

**Country-Specific Security Cooperation Section (CSCS) Development**

In many ways, CSCS development is relatively straightforward and not really that difficult. However, cutting corners during the initial assessment phase leads to serious conflicts with stake-holders not addressing the actual problem or by doing so in an unacceptable manner. This is particularly true in countries with developing militaries or a weak political system, leaving an assessment of the plan more open to interpretation.

Plan development is, at its heart, the simple act of writing the plan. Currently, joint doctrine does not exist for the format of a CSCS. A notional CSCS format developed by the former Joint Forces Command is at Attachment 1 to this chapter. Typically, CSCSs are found as an appendix to the CCP. While currently there is no set doctrine for a CSCS, some of the recommended components of a CSCS are:

- Country Assessment
- Country Objectives
- Reference to the CCP and Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) directly
- Concept of Engagement
- Synchronization Matrix
- Coordinating Instructions

PPD-23 requires SC planning to be fully integrated with other DoD agencies, DoS, and the executive branch. The CSCS should both inform and be informed by the embassy’s ICS, thus demonstrating interagency integration. Likewise, the DoD country-planning process forms a significant input to the embassy’s ICS and supporting Mission Resource Request (MRR), which feed Title 22 program requirements into the Foreign Operations budget. Plans are assessed periodically for effectiveness and relevance. Updates are produced as strategic conditions or funding changes.

**Annual Planning Meetings**

While the frequency of updates to formal, written CSCSs generally occur on an annual basis, country-level planning is continual. Of particular importance is the series of planning meetings that take place during the course of the year. While the particulars of each meeting vary by CCMD and by country, each CCMD generally meets annually to accomplish the function described.

**Theater Strategy Conference**

The CCMD hosts the Theater Strategy Conference to discuss policy direction and initiatives. It is attended by personnel from the embassies, typically the SDO/DATTs and the Deputy Chiefs of Mission, as well as policy makers from CCMD HQ, OSD, DoS, and the military services components who have a role as implementers of the strategy.

**Regional Working Group**

Where the Theater Strategy Conference focuses on direction and policy, the Regional Working Group (RWG) focuses on SC activities. Attendees include personnel from the SCO, the service
components, OSD, CCMD, and the services. Work should focus on detailed event planning and program by program reviews.

**Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group**

The Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG) is an annual meeting hosted by CCMD, usually between the months of March and June, to project training requirements one and two years out. Members of the SCO, DoS, and the services attend in order to coordinate and approve PN training requirements (See Chapter 14, “International Training,” of this textbook for further details).

**Annual Planning Conference**

The exact nature of these conferences varies widely, but all coordinate activities directly with PN militaries. The conferences occur in-country or at the CCMD headquarters. These conferences typically focus on coordinating military-to-military events, but could also cover training. During these meetings security cooperation plans are finalized and the PN buys-in (See Chapter 1, “Introduction to Security Cooperation,” of this textbook for further discussion).

**IN-COUNTRY EVENT PLANNING**

Many military personnel find embassies a confusing place. For example, if one is trying to move equipment, the General Services Officer (GSO), a logistics officer-equivalent, is the person to see; for a funds transfer, the Management Officer. Despite the DoS capabilities in country, SCOs must work closely with the components and CCMD to understand the availability of DoD assistance. Embassies are normally small and ill-equipped to deal with large DoD forces working with the PN, so keeping the balance of the workload on DoD is preferred. That said, the embassy can be a challenging environment, but the in-country planning event is designed to reinforce DoS foreign policy.

As with operational considerations, detailed knowledge of the PN, its military, its bureaucracies, and USG policy considerations will be critical. Knowledge of the PN allows the SCO to have a deep understanding of how the PN military operates. This allows the SCO to play a central role in getting things done. For example, if PN battalions are to rotate through American training, the SCO knows to work with the PN and USG J-3 planners to ensure the deployment dates and third-country training all are coordinated.

SCOs also ensure political support continues within the PN and within the country team. The Ambassador is very important in this issue. It is critical he/she supports the concept and the details of the proposed event. Ambassadorial support is garnered by successfully coordinating with the rest of the country team. The country team “buy-in” paves the way for the Ambassador’s consent. Ambassador transitions are especially challenging as the embassy organizational culture differs from a DoD unit Change of Command. New ambassadors need briefings on proposed activities. A lack of deference to the primacy of DoS in executing foreign policy has spelled trouble for many a DoD hard-charger. It is a test of military diplomacy and good communication skills on the part of DoD personnel on the country team to ensure all are comfortable with supporting military activities as a means to an ambassador supported foreign policy end; not a military objective in a vacuum. See Chapter 4 for related examples on personnel, aircraft, and ship visits.

**Common Considerations**

**Size**

One of the first questions a SCO must ask is “Can I, or should I, support this event internally within the office or do I need DAO or embassy assistance?” Also, “What support is needed from the CCMD, (e.g., public affairs or contracting officers)?”
Itinerary

Itineraries have multiple lines of operation (LOO) and multiple phases. The itinerary must take into account LOO for separate and simultaneous elements of the event noting, logistics support, and preparation for future portions of the event. Plans must take into account overlapping phases: preparation, pre-advance party, advance party, main body, trail party, and cleanup.

Local customs

At every step, keep the local culture in mind; the SCO and SDO/DATT should be experts. The SCO may need to guide U.S. planning toward more locally acceptable implementation, e.g., avoiding local holidays or greeting the appropriate official.

Office calls

Even simple events will often require a certain amount of formalities and pleasantries. Talking points and notes on customs are required for planned and ad hoc office calls.

Social events

As with office calls, social events are often planned even for tactical-level activities, e.g., an ice breaker social at the start of a course, or a cookout at the end of an exercise. Larger events may have a Distinguished Visitors (DV) day, which can add a higher level of complexity in arranging and managing DVs and their schedules.

Press

Have a proactive plan to deal with the press. Not only can unplanned press coverage create a problem, but lost press opportunities will cost the overall USG effort. Get the embassy Public Diplomacy Officer (or Public Affairs Office) and the CCMD public affairs office involved. Talking points for planned and ad hoc press events require clearance.

Clothing/uniform requirements

Be sure to determine uniform policies and requirements for each element of an itinerary. Consider when civilian attire is needed or required.

Medical

Keep local medical, hygiene, food concerns in mind. Is drinking water safe?

Interpreter support

Few Americans will speak the local language. SCO personnel should not attempt to serve as an event interpreter. Not only is interpreting a particular skill that SCOs are not trained to do, but SCO personnel need to focus on the event. Likewise, if the senior military officer needs to participate in discussions, he/she should bring an extra person along to serve as a note taker.

Logistics

Customs Clearance

Often equipment brought into country has to clear customs. Coordinating no-cost clearance with the proper PN authorities need to be done in advance. Shipping goods in advance requires special attention. Arranging Customs Clearance is particularly critical when advance teams for DVs arrive with weapons (or any unit bringing weapons into the PN).
**Contracting Support**

Many in-country events require the contracting of PN goods and services. For large military activities, a CCMD contracting officer should be sent into country well in advance of the event. For smaller events or TDYs, the embassy may provide contracting support.

**Travel Services Support**

If the need for travel services is limited to that of typical TDY personnel, e.g., a rental vehicle or a room, the embassy travel office may be willing to support such routine travel. If the scale of the visit or event grows to the point where one is essentially talking about contracted service, the above contracting support applies.

**Funding**

If the embassy is going to procure any goods and services for the event, fiscal data is required as early as possible. Keeping this business relationship between the embassy and the events’ participants cordial will go a long way to ensuring embassy support for the next event. SCOs must ensure TDY teams bring their own International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) accounting codes so that the embassy does not assume or subsume the TDY costs into the SCO’s annual bill. It is also important to confirm exactly which type of money the SCO or SDO/DATT can or should use to fund their participation (see Chapter 17, “Resource Management”).

**Security**

**Weapons Clearance**

If weapons are required, get the Regional Security Officer (RSO) involved early. Many countries will require permits for USG personnel to carry weapons in the country, particularly concealed weapons.

**Local Law Enforcement**

Discuss any law enforcement liaison requirements with the RSO. In addition to weapons, issues of traffic control, security, border control are often complex depending on the PN.

**Classified Information**

Carrying classified information requires unique handling and storage. Do visiting U.S. DVs and participants need access to classified computers for communication back to their headquarters?

**Contingencies**

- Remain flexible
- Remain in communication. Charge your cellphone. Bring a two-way radio
- Remain mobile. Have your own vehicle standing by
- Delegate. For larger visits, create a team of action officers. Delegating frees the senior person to perform their function and enables a successful visit.

**Department of State (DoS) Planning**

The Department of State’s Managing for Results (MfR) framework is designed to create important feedback loops among the Department’s ongoing management processes. The process includes strategic planning, budgeting, program design, monitoring, evaluation, and learning through use of data and evidence. The MfR framework establishes bureau and mission strategic objectives as the building blocks against which resources are requested and activities are managed and reviewed. This
integrated approach helps the Department effectively manage its resources and inform taxpayers and Congress of progress towards carrying out its mission. The DoS Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) in partnership with the Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP) develop and administer the guidance and tools necessary for the Department to implement MfR.

**Figure 19-7**

Managing for Results

Strategic planning ensures that U.S. foreign assistance helps to achieve the broad foreign policy objectives. It gives the Secretary of State the ability to evaluate effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance and to make strategic decisions to advance diplomacy. DoS follows a three step, “top down” approach to planning:

1. **Agency planning** allows the DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to guide the direction and priorities of foreign assistance, and determines how the agencies will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance for the coming years.

2. **Bureau planning** provides the DoS and USAID Regional Bureaus a process for longer term planning that is predictable, uniform, and conceptually rigorous. Bureau planning informs budget decisions and mission strategic planning.

3. **Mission planning** provides a multi-year overarching strategy that encapsulates USG policy priorities and objectives, and outlines how projects and programs will use foreign assistance and other tools to achieve these goals.

Agency level planning is the first of three steps in the Department’s strategic planning process. The requirement to develop an agency plan is mandated by the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) and the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRA-MA). For the DoS and the USAID, the agency
level plan is known as the Joint Strategic Plan (JSP). The planning process starts with the National Security Strategy, from which the DoS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) (https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277156.pdf) is derived and defines the national strategic priorities that guide global engagement jointly for DoS/USAID. The JSP is a four-year joint plan that serves as the primary State and USAID strategy setting forth the direction and priorities for both organizations presenting how the Department and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance for the coming years. Once published, the JSP informs the development of bureau level plans known as the Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) and Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS). DoD planners must be aware of the goals and objectives listed in the JSP, as many of the exigent objectives touch on areas in which DoD will be engaged (e.g., stability/conflict resolution, human rights, rebalancing, security cooperation, among others). From JSP guidance, the regional bureaus at DoS and USAID (e.g., the Bureau of African Affairs) prepare a Joint Regional Strategy (JRS), and the functional bureaus at DoS prepare a Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS) laying out their plan to achieve their part of the JSP. Both types of bureau strategies are four-year plans designed to articulate priorities within a region, bureau or office and lay out specific tradeoffs necessary to bring resources in alignment with highest potential for impact. The strategies are also used to inform budget decisions, advise Integrated Country Strategies, and shape performance reviews. For the JRS, the Department partners with USAID to develop a joint strategy that articulates shared State-USAID priorities to guide missions as they prioritize engagement and resources, and respond to unanticipated events. Bureau strategies can be found at the DoS’s Managing for Results intranet site: http://cas.state.gov/managingforresults/. The redacted versions of the regional strategies can be found in the CAC enabled https://max.gov/ website. The JSP, JRSs, and FBSs then collectively inform the development of mission-level strategies known as the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS).

The country team, under the direction of the Ambassador, creates the ICS. The ICS is the four-year strategy that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country and is led by the Chief of Mission. The ICS develops a common set of mission goals and objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort among DoS and other USG agencies with programming in-country. Once completed, the ICS frames and informs the annual Mission Resource Request (MRR) and Mission-level performance management requirements. The ICS serves as an essential policy and management tool for missions, bureaus, and interagency partners and as the tool through which the mission directs office activities, measures progress, and conducts regular reviews. The SDO/DATT and SCO will, of course, be an integral part of the ICS and MRR, in both the development and implementation of the strategy. The following description of the DoS planning process is meant only as a cursory overview of the process as it might impact the DoD elements in the embassy, and in no way covers the full extent of the DoS activity.

Separately, USAID also prepares the USAID Policy Framework (https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning), to provide its staff and partners with USAID’s core development priorities as well as operational principles. USAID also develops, for some countries, Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) which are typically a five-year strategy that defines a USAID’s chosen approach in a country, providing the context for USAID-implemented programs and expected results. As appropriate, CDCS objectives are integrated into the ICS. These documents can be found at the www.usaid.gov USAID website: https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/country-strategies-cdcs.

After the ICS’s are completed, plans start to flow back up the “chain-of-command” as resource requests. Individual embassies and missions send consolidated MRRs to bureaus, who prioritize and prepare a Bureau Resource Request (BRR). At the department level, DoS consolidates priorities and submits their budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget.
The DoS and DoD requests flow through the White House and become part of the President’s proposed budget which is submitted to the relevant committees in Congress for consideration. The document sent annually by the President is called the Congressional Budget Justification—DoS, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/c6112.htm. The CBJ details the operating expenses of the DoS, and all of the foreign assistance accounts requested for the upcoming year. The SDO/DATT and SCO will most likely have a hand in drafting part of the embassy’s submission to the CBJ.

To supplement the multi-year strategies, DoS publishes an Annual Performance Plan and Report (APP/APR) (https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/index.htm), describing the agency’s progress on achieving the goals and objectives in the JSP, including progress on strategic objectives, performance goals and Agency Priority Goals, and the level of performance expected against the performance goals and Agency Priority Goals for the next two years. In countries receiving foreign assistance from the U.S., the SCO will be involved in compiling data for the embassy’s input to the APP/APR, the annual December data call for performance information. In the APP/APR, the Ambassador describes qualitative and quantitative results achieved against performance goals and associated measures and indicators. This information is submitted to the President, the Congress, and the public. Additionally, halfway through the fiscal year, the SCOs will also be asked for data for the Operational Plan, which provides State and USAID with a tool for integrated planning and execution of foreign assistance funds and in-depth activity detail.

While DoS plans are coordinated with DoD plans (and vice-versa), it is important to remember that the planning process is only hard-wired together at the National Security Strategy and the ICS. It
is vital all planners along both planning chains keep their counterparts aware of institutional direction and planning intentions.

For the SCO or SDO/DATT, this system places a heavy burden of responsibility on their shoulders. It can be said that these two formal planning chains come together at the SCO and the President. In regards to SC, SDO/DATTs and SCOs must be extremely adept at keeping all parties informed, facilitating cooperation, and deconflicting priorities of the various departments, agencies, and commands involved.

**PLANNING TOOLS AND INFORMATION RESOURCES**

**Security Assistance Network and the Combined Education and Training Program Plan**

The Security Assistance Network (SAN) is a multi-faceted database and resource. A portion of the SAN is used for managing international training; the Security Cooperation-Training Management System (SC-TMS) is discussed in Appendix 1 of this book. In the SC-TMS, the SCO prepares the Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP).

For the country-level planner, the majority of actions taken with the PN will consist of education and/or training events or activities. The annual CETPP clearly spells out the timing of U.S. training courses, the attendees, and a wide variety of PN-related training information. The SCO Training Officer will have access, as should the SCO Chief, and the CCMD SC training officer. Most of planning is simply the synchronization of multiple events; the CETPP provides the information to create such a training synchronization matrix.

This CETPP focuses on the goals and objectives for DoD-sponsored education and training for the PN. Guidance for preparation is contained in the SAMM, paragraph C10.5 and Figure C10.F3. The SCO uploads the draft plan electronically onto the SAN for review and approval by the CCMD. The approved plan is used each spring during the CCMD’s Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG). Further training program details are in Chapter 14 of this textbook, “International Training.” It is critical that the SCO develop a solid working relationship with the training departments of the PN military services early in the tour so PN desires can be incorporated into the CETPP.

**Security Assistance Program & Budget Web Tool**

The SAMM provides guidance on Security Assistance Planning in C2.1.3 to include discussions on FMF and IMET. If the PN receives, or is proposed to receive, appropriated funds through FMF or IMET, the SCO will also make an annual submission and justification for these funds. This request is submitted electronically through the Security Assistance Program & Budget Web Tool, and can be found in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). This document is forwarded upward through channels for endorsement and comment, i.e., to the CCMDs staff, the Joint Staff, DSCA and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSDP) offices, where a final DoD position is developed for each country. This position is then used by DoD representatives in round table discussions with DoS in the development of an eventual Congressional Budget Justification to be submitted, as mentioned previously, by the Secretary of State to the relevant committees in Congress.

With that in mind, the SDO/DATT and SCO need a solid relationship with the embassy Political Section. The DoD submissions occur in the September/October timeframe, but the Ambassador’s MRR is submitted in the February/March timeframe (four months after the DoD submission). Obviously, there must be some discussion between the two embassy elements in the month leading up to the DoD submission. For the embassy to present a unified front to the “round table,” DoD and DoS elements must coordinate their submissions (both the amounts of aid requested and the justification) with those in the MRR, because it is the MRR that will form the basis of DoS’ proposed budgets. The SAMM
C2.1.3.4 offers points on constrained and unconstrained requests. SCO FMF/IMET submissions for DoD should be in concert with DoS submissions or risk possible exclusion from the final budget.

Access to the SA Program & Budget Webtool is through the DSCA community in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) and limited to the SCO Chief and those SCO-designees ready to assist in completing the database submission. The Documentation section of the Webtool is superb and not only offers help guides on how to use the Webtool, but also offers examples of “good” FMF and IMET submissions, and the annual associated guidance from DoS and DoD.

SCO Chiefs must keep in mind that the Webtool displays all the Foreign Assistance funds received by the PN and indicate the amount of “uncommitted funds.” SCO Chiefs must indicate each year the PN’s plan for using the uncommitted funds. As stated in the SAMM C2.1.3.4.3, “Funding provided under FMF grant-aid is obligated upon apportionment and the funds remain available in the country’s FMF Trust account indefinitely. However, annual budget submissions must explain the accumulation of uncommitted funds in the trust account. Uncommitted funds can weaken SCO justification for future FMF. SCOs should monitor and manage SA programs to insure against the accumulation of uncommitted funds.”

**Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS)**

As noted in SAMM Chapter 12, humanitarian assistance (HA), foreign disaster relief (FDR), and humanitarian mine action (HMA) are SC programs designed to improve DoD access, visibility, and influence in a PN or region, and build the capacity of the PN government while addressing a humanitarian need. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds are Title-10 funds administered by DSCA for these SC projects. OHDACA-funded activities are executed across the combatant commands, offering DoD the ability to promote regional stability and security to achieve CCP objectives to reach theater strategic end states.

OHASIS is the DSCA ‘System of Record’ for OHDACA-funded activities listed above, as well as the JCS-approved Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) program, and other project types. OHASIS is a cradle-to-grave tracking system that incorporates information flow from project initiators to approval authorities starting with the country team (e.g., the Ambassador and the USAID representative) and working its way through the CCMD to DSCA for funding approval. It offers a variety of exportable products for presentations. Planning and Execution cycles are found in the SAMM Chapter C12.3.5. Access to OHASIS is found at http://www.ohasis.org and requires user registration.

The savvy country-planner will realize that access to partner nations is aided by building relationships. These OHASIS-tracked HA, FDR, HMA, and HCA projects are excellent methods of building a broad public appeal for U.S. action in country, which may lead to easier access for strategic goals and end states.

**Security Cooperation Information Portal**

An increasingly powerful database in the SCO’s planning toolkit is the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). SCIP is a secure, controlled, unclassified DoD web-based computer information system that provides authorized users with access to FMS cases and BPC programs case-related data and reports to support management responsibilities for those cases.

SCIP is an asset to the country-level planner as it provides insights into the timing of the PN’s FMS acquisitions, allowing the planner to develop training requirements for the pre- and post-equipment delivery. All SCOs should have SCIP accounts and access the system regularly or risk having their account suspended. Non-access for 180 days will result in account deletion. SCOs can find answers to many questions (not all) raised by the partner nation regarding FMS cases. As well, for SCOs in countries with FMS cases, the SCIP End-Use Monitoring (EUM) Community needs to be accessed at least quarterly to upload routine EUM reports.
**SCO Annual Forecasting Documents**

SCO annual forecast documents require SCOs to annually submit to DSCA, OSD, and DoS a forecast for possible future arms transfers to the partner nation. It is important to note the distinction between planning documents and forecasting documents. The planning documents listed earlier all reflect a goal which is intended to be achieved. Conversely, a forecasting document simply reflects the SCO’s best estimate of what defense articles and services the PN may be considering for purchase from the U.S.

For the two separate forecasting reports below, DSCA sends a tasking message to SCOs (and other organizations) each April with input due in June; submitted by the SCO to the CCMD en route to DSCA’s Directorate of Strategy, then State, and ultimately, to the Congress. SCOs submit a single input covering the material necessary for the two separate reports. Then DSCA extracts (and analyzes) the Sales Forecast Report and necessary Javits data from the single submission. As the criteria varies for the two reports, it is important for SCOs to be as thorough and as accurate as possible in this submission. SCOs should consider historical FMS activity by the PN, current economic trends, and the availability of unexpended and anticipated FMF grant monies. It may well be appropriate to contact PN counterparts to obtain their estimates of essential and likely FMS sales, but it is important to avoid any “false impression” that the USG will approve (or has already approved) a future request.

**Javits Report**

Named after former U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits, the report is required annually by the AECA. The classified Javits Report is the President’s estimate to Congress of potential or proposed arms transfers during a given calendar year. The Javits Report is designed to identify potential sales by country, whether FMS or DCS. The two thresholds for reporting are $7M of major weapons or weapons-related equipment, or any proposed weapons or weapons-related sale of $25M or more. DSCA will also ask the military services to submit lists of equipment that is expected to be declared Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The sum total of the Javits Report is the FMS, DCS, and EDA estimates. The DoS submits the Javits Report to Congress by February 1st each year. The Javits Report is not binding on PNs and is submitted to Congress as an advisory document. Congress uses the document to begin discussions on approval or denial of transfer requests.

**FMS Sales Forecast Report**

A companion document to the Javits Report, the FMS Sales Forecast Report helps DSCA determine the resource requirements for FMS implementing agencies. The document when collated is also kept in a classified status, though individual country input is unclassified (unless requested for classification by the PN). Its reporting requirements are separate from, but largely overlap, those of the Javits Report. This report is a two-year projection by fiscal year (vice one calendar year for Javits) but only addresses potential FMS sales. Unlike Javits, it has no dollar thresholds, so all highly probable FMS sales (which DSCA defines as a 90 percent likelihood of occurring) should be listed. DSCA collates the data submitted by the SCOs, briefs the DSCA Director, and in January sends the FMS data to DoS for inclusion in the Javits Report to Congress in February. See Chapter 2.1.3.5 and Chapter 14 of the SAMM for more information on both reports.

**Summary**

Planning is an essential step in all military operations, including security cooperation. This chapter revealed how country-level SC planning flows from the NSS through DoS and DoD. On the DoS side, strategic planning takes place within the Joint Strategic Plan. Correspondingly, DoD turns the NSS and other strategies into the NDS, NMS and the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). The SCO, working with the CCMD and Embassy staffs, collates those overarching goals and objectives and develops the SC portion of the Ambassador’s ICS/MRR and the CCMD’s country plan. The country plan then drives events, activities, programs, operations, and investments in order to make progress for USG strategy.
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