

U.S. Interests and Resource Needs in Latin America and the Caribbean

By

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A key element of this Administration's foreign policy has been the recognition of the importance to our national security of our own hemisphere. We cannot effectively deal with the challenges to our interests in other parts of the world if we are unable to cope with problems in nearby areas of great strategic importance. Many of our allies in Latin America at the present time do not have the resources to provide simultaneously for their own security and basic economic needs of their people. Because we know they must do both if they are to survive and prosper, and if democracy is to be given a chance to flourish, we must help make up the shortfall. Congress has supported these policies with increased funding, but the resources made available to us in FY 1986 and 1987 are not sufficient to pursue essential U.S. interests.

We have taken great satisfaction in the remarkable trend toward democracy taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean. We have supported this trend, not only because it is in accord with our deepest values but also because we believe it is in our interest. We have found that we have the most stable long-term relationships with countries where government is founded on the consent of the governed. However, although the seedlings of democracy have appeared in several nations, the roots of the tree are not yet deep enough to protect it from being uprooted by violent storms, nor the trunk thick enough to withstand the chops of wayward axmen. Our assistance programs can help provide the protection this tree needs to reach maturity.

Without adequate economic aid to assist several of these democratic countries to recover and realize the economic betterment of their people, the odds for sustaining democracy will become much less favorable. Moreover, we have an economic stake in the prosperity of our neighbors. We cannot afford the loss of our hemispheric markets tomorrow through failure to stimulate development of viable trading partners today.

Request for \$300 Million for the Central American Democracies. On March 3, President Reagan sent to Congress a message requesting an additional \$300 million in economic assistance for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to be dealt with under the expedited procedures set forth in title II of the act making appropriations for military construction for FY 1987. This message was accompanied by transmission to the Congress of the report called for by that same legislation on fully funded assistance to the Central American democracies as proposed in the January 1984 report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

The report reviewed the progress that has been made but concluded that a continuing U.S. commitment was needed and set forth a plan for stretching out the Central America Initiative an

additional three years--until 1992--with total assistance of \$6.9 billion over eight years instead of \$6.4 billion over five years. The President noted that Congress last year approved an additional \$300 million in economic assistance for the Central American democracies through transfer from unobligated funds, but the legislative requirement that this sum be regarded as part of the worldwide FY 1987 Economic Support Fund (ESF) meant that, in practice, this sum was not available as additional assistance. The President concluded that \$300 million was urgently needed now, and indicated the amounts made available for this additional assistance would be transferred from unobligated balances in existing accounts. We urge prompt enactment of a joint resolution expressing approval of this request, as called for in the expedited procedures laid down by Congress in the legislation.

FY 1987 Supplemental. The major request in the supplemental for Latin America and the Caribbean was \$300 million in economic assistance for the Central American democracies. The Administration has proposed that that sum be treated separately, as stated above. However, I urge your favorable consideration of the remainder of our request. An additional \$40 million of military assistance is badly needed to sustain El Salvador against the Marxist guerrillas, to support Honduras in the face of the Nicaraguan arms buildup, and to help consolidate democracy in Guatemala. We also are requesting an additional \$10 million to support the fight against narcotics in the Andes. Bolivia, in particular, is ready to undertake a program of assistance to farmers who voluntarily eradicate coca crops, and we need additional resources to help support the transition to lawful economic activity in that nation.

The FY 1988 Requests. For FY 1988, we are requesting for Latin America and the Caribbean a total of \$271.575 million in military assistance--\$275.5 million for the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and \$14.075 million for International Military Education and Training (IMET)--and \$1,324.6 million in economic assistance (\$700 million in ESF, \$401.4 million in development assistance (DA), and \$223.2 million in P.L. 480). In recognition of the need for austerity, our request for economic assistance is down 20 percent from last year's request, and our military assistance proposal is 24 percent less. I urge your support for this minimal request.

Let me turn to the subregions now, to describe for you what we have achieved so far, and the specifics of our proposals for FY 1988.

SOUTH AMERICA

The Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are making valiant efforts to deal with economic problems, leftist insurgencies, and, most of all, illegal narcotics production and trafficking. Stemming the flow of narcotics to the United States is a major priority for all Americans. But this is a costly undertaking. You cannot just force farmers to stop growing their most rewarding crop without offering them economic alternatives. You cannot expect the governments of these countries to undertake the politically and economically risky initiative of launching major counter-narcotics programs without the economic resources to sustain them. And you cannot expect drug traffickers and narco-terrorists to give up their very lucrative business without putting up a fight--and, in fact, they are working overtime to elude interdiction efforts and undermine democratic institutions by intimidation, corruption, and violence. Thus, if we are serious about cutting down on drugs, we must be prepared to use every resource at our command--economic and military assistance as well as narcotics control funds.

Bolivia. President Paz Estenssoro has been especially courageous in his narcotics control and economic reform policies. Bolivia's cooperation with the U.S. military in fighting illicit drug trafficking with operation Blast Furnace last year, is unprecedented in the history of international drug interdiction. We expect to sign an agreement in the next few days whereby the Bolivian Government will undertake to destroy all illegal coca production. MAP funds for Bolivia will be used to support military training and provide equipment, much of which is to be used by the

Bolivian military to provide logistical support in the anti-narcotics programs. Our request is heavily weighted, however, in favor of economic assistance to encourage Bolivia to follow through on important economic reforms, to support domestic stability, and to improve living standards, which are the lowest on the South American Continent.

Colombia. Colombia faces the too frequently related evils of narcotics trafficking and a violent insurgency driven from the left. Colombian drug traffickers are among the most ruthless criminals in the world. The toll they have extracted on Colombian society has been heavy: one Minister of Justice assassinated, another recovering from his wounds; Supreme Court judges brutally murdered; prominent journalists and scores of policemen and other officials gunned down because of the firm stand they have taken against lawlessness and crime. Colombians are proving that the traffickers are not supermen, and that honest men and women can and will stand up to them. Just recently, the Barco Administration dramatically demonstrated its adherence to the U.S.-Colombia extradition treaty by extraditing to the United States Carlos Lehder, one of the top traffickers in the world. Despite the high price paid, and still being paid, Colombia has some of the most productive anti-narcotics programs in the area.

The largest guerrilla group in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--general known by its Spanish acronym, FARC--continues to abide generally by a cease-fire, but other insurgent groups do not. MAP funds for Colombia strengthen the government's anti-narcotics programs and at the same time assist it in dealing with the increasingly violent insurgents who have rejected the government's peace initiatives.

Ecuador. Ecuador is a strong supporter of U.S. political and economic goals in South America. Under President Febres Cordero, decisive free market economic measures have been instituted which could serve as a model for the rest of Latin America. The \$17.5 million requested in ESF will help maintain internal stability by helping meet the country's balance-of-payments needs and assist economic development projects. The military assistance program will improve military training and provide required materiel to the armed forces. This will enable the Government of Ecuador to maintain effective pressure against a small urban terrorist band, improve the pursuit of narcotics traffickers, and heighten the level of assistance Ecuador provides to the United States in anti-drug efforts.

Peru. For over a year, Peru has carried on a serious and successful campaign against narcotics traffickers. But this campaign draws on scarce resources. Both our military and economic assistance requests are essential if we are to achieve cooperation on the anti-narcotics front and improve our dialogue with Peru on the management of its economic and debt crises. By improving our overall relationship with Peru, this assistance will act to counter Soviet influence, particularly with the military.

Uruguay. In another South American democracy, Uruguay, President Sanguinetti is consolidating that country's return to democratic rule. He faces a number of hurdles in this effort, including the need to bolster the economy and redirect the military toward support for civilian rule. We are proposing a MAP program of \$1.5 million which would be used to purchase a helicopter, truck parts, and maintenance support equipment. Equally important, this program would expand our access to key mid-level officers and facilitate cooperation and mutual understanding between our armed forces.

THE CARIBBEAN

Our stake in peace and economic development in the Caribbean requires that we continue to demonstrate our long-term commitment to the strengthening of democratic institutions in the region and willingness to make a major contribution to their development. The Grenada experience has demonstrated that we must not neglect our friends in this area. Our programs consist primarily of

economic assistance because of adverse development in markets for the region's principal exports, heavy debt burdens, and internal economic imbalances.

Haiti. Our request consists mainly of economic assistance. The primary use of ESF will be to finance balance-of-payments support for the economic reform program. Some funds will also be used to develop activities with non-governmental organizations and to improve the Haitian public sector's ability to attract and support private sector investment. By FY 1988, Haiti plans to have a newly elected civilian president, and our small proposed program of military assistance will enhance military support for democracy, help maintain internal security against threats from the right or left, and permit greater anti-narcotics efforts.

Jamaica. The economic situation calls for a firm commitment on our part to support the essential but politically difficult adjustment programs the country is undertaking to correct the severe imbalances arising in large part from the drastic declines in bauxite/alumina exports and other traditional exports. ESF funds will help to stimulate the recovery and development of this valuable trading partner and complement the tremendous efforts Jamaica is making to combat narcotics trafficking. The modest military assistance program will continue the ongoing modernization of the Jamaican Defense force and contribute substantially to improving coastal patrol capabilities and overall force mobility, which are essential to effective anti-narcotics programs.

Dominican Republic. This friendly nation, the most populous democracy in the Caribbean, is facing serious economic problems. Reductions in the U.S. sugar quota and low world prices for sugar and other primary products have led to a large trade deficit and a serious shortage of foreign exchange. By helping to bridge the foreign exchange shortfall during the economic adjustment period, U.S. assistance allows the continued flow of necessary imports. The small military assistance program will provide needed supplies and training to further professionalize and depoliticize the Dominican Armed Forces.

Eastern Caribbean. Our assistance to these island nations will continue to support the Regional Security System, especially the joint training program we have established with the United Kingdom. ESF funds will be geared toward infrastructure development, diversification away from traditional agricultural exports, and attracting new private investment.

CENTRAL AMERICA

Nearly two-thirds of the funds we are requesting will go to Central America--\$216 million in military assistance and \$826.6 million in economic assistance. As usual, by far the larger portion of our request is for economic aid--about four times the request for military assistance. The rationale for devoting such a large percentage of our resources to this region is clear. The problems in Central America require patient, sustained U.S. efforts. Over the past three years, with the help of Congress, we have begun to implement the comprehensive program recommended by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We believe this program will be successful, because it addresses all of the causes of conflict currently gripping Central America.

The policy we are implementing supports social and economic reform to allow elements of society traditionally unable to benefit from economic growth to participate in Central America's future. It supports defense of democratically elected governments from internal and external subversion. It supports the strengthening of judicial systems--the backbone of a democracy. And it supports the maintenance of a military capable of meeting internal or external threats, yet supportive of the democratic system. The amounts of financial, economic, and military assistance requested are needed to sustain this strategy. At a time when the Soviet bloc is increasing its efforts, when the Soviet bloc tonnage of military equipment delivered to Nicaragua has reached the unprecedented level of 23,000 metric tons in 1986, we must meet the challenge to democracy.

This year's request will support a record of major accomplishments that would have been difficult, if not impossible, without our assistance. The severe economic slide in Central America that was evident in 1980-83 has been arrested and reversed in every democratic country in the region. Private capital has begun to return, and private investment has begun to recover. Non-traditional exports are expanding in most countries, dramatically in Costa Rica. Infant mortality rates are dropping more rapidly than anticipated and primary school enrollments are increasing.

There has been a fundamental change in the attitudes of the armed forces toward human rights, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala. Civilian control of the armed forces in El Salvador is now a fact. Furthermore, battle field performance has improved. The guerrillas now generally operate secretly in small units against economic targets rather than attempting direct conflict with the military. Guerrilla strength is believed to have fallen to about 6,000 from a high of 9,000-11,000. In Guatemala, the military ensured a fair, open political campaign and election in 1985. A code of military conduct has improved civil-military relations to the point that the rural civilian population now participates in the defense of their villages. The Honduran Armed Forces has successfully used U.S.-provided training and equipment to detect and defeat terrorist and guerrilla elements that have surfaced sporadically since 1982.

El Salvador. Our security assistance has and will continue to help the government of President Duarte defend itself against a communist insurgency supported by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Bloc. The vast majority of the Salvadoran people have rejected the insurgents and demonstrated at the ballot box their support for President Duarte's appeal to addressing the problems of that nation through democratic processes. Our ESF program of \$200 million is designed to counter insurgent destruction of production and economic infrastructure, to provide emergency assistance to families displaced by the insurgents, to maintain employment and productivity, and to increase economic growth. The military assistance program provides the equipment, ammunition, and training needed by government forces to foreclose military victory to the insurgents and bring them into the democratic process. The program will continue the development of an efficient, professional military force respectful of human rights and the democratic process.

Honduras. Honduras is the key player in U.S. and regional efforts to promote democracy and economic development in Central America. In March and December 1986, Sandinista military aggression escalated with major incursions into Honduran territory. In addition, the Nicaraguan Government has attempted to create insurgencies in Honduras on at least two occasions in the last three years. Our request for \$80 million in MAP funds will enhance the Honduran Armed Forces' ability to deter Nicaraguan aggression and to carry out their defense responsibilities.

In the shadow of the Sandinista threat, the Honduran people are building and strengthening democratic institutions. Vigorously contested elections in 1981 and 1985 brought civilian governments back to power in Honduras. Continued U.S. support for economic policy adjustments will help President Azcona make strides toward achieving long-term, stable economic growth, which fosters democracy and makes insurgent alternatives unappealing; \$100 million in ESF is needed to support President Azcona's ambitious and, so far, successful economic stabilization program.

Guatemala. For decades, Guatemala has been fighting an insurgency. A poor country ruled for almost 30 years by military governments, it is now a struggling democracy. The government of Vinicio Cerezo has made steady progress in reducing human rights abuses, promoting economic growth, and creating the conditions for greater citizen participation in government. It is in our national interest that the civilian government complete its term in office and make headway in solving the problems it faces. The \$80 million ESF program will help the government address the basic socio-economic inequalities that fed the insurgency and help stabilize Guatemala's international financial accounts while continuing a highly effective economic policy reform dialogue. We are also requesting \$7 million for MAP which will be used to improve the ground and air mobility of the Guatemalan forces.

Costa Rica. Our main objective in Costa Rica is the maintenance of a free, stable, democratic society. Substantial economic assistance is necessary to help Costa Rica adjust to the efforts of the recent worldwide recession and severe deterioration of its terms of trade. The \$90 million ESF request will help finance importation of U.S. machinery, raw materials, and spare parts needed for production, employment, and exports. Limited military assistance (\$2.45 million) to Costa Rica's small security forces is also needed to enable the Costa Rican Government to police its borders and counter the internal security threat posed by continuing Nicaraguan troublemaking.

Panama. Our proposed military assistance of \$3.6 million continues our treaty-related commitment to help the Panama Defense Forces prepare for their future role of defending the canal. Our long-term goal is the uninterrupted, secure use of the canal. To help in this, we seek a professional, apolitical military that is friendly to the United States. In 1986, partly in response to our economic assistance covenants, Panama passed substantial reform legislation setting the stage for a program of economic adjustment and greater reliance on market forces. To help the government achieve the goals of this program we are asking for \$10 million in ESF.

Belize. Belize is a peaceful, stable democracy in a turbulent region. Our policy goals include preserving Belize's democratic institutions, suppressing narcotics production and trafficking, and creating substantial economic growth. We have proposed \$2 million in ESF to help sustain the economic stabilization thus far achieved. Our modest military assistance (\$1 million in MAP and \$70,000 in IMET) is designed to provide support to the Belize Defense Force and complements British training efforts. Our assistance also aids Belize's efforts to combat drug production and trafficking.

REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Central America Regional and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Regional Programs. In addition to the country-specific programs, there are activities such as institution-building and civic training that are carried out through either the LAC Regional Programs or Central America Regional Program. For FY 1988 we are asking \$61 million for Central America Regional and \$32 million for the LAC Regional Programs.

One of the major programs to which these funds will be devoted is the Administration of Justice program, which supports national initiatives to carry out judicial reforms, including training for judges, prosecutors, and other legal personnel; to improve court administration; to reproduce and disseminate legal materials; to train criminal investigators; to modernize law codes and strengthen case reporting; and to support local bar associations. Other funds for democratic development are used to improve legislative capacity, provide press training, support the development of electoral institutions, and improve civil-military relations. In addition, the LAC regional account provides funding to the American Institute for Free Labor Development and to other projects which provide special training. Finally, Central America regional funds support a number of activities in agriculture, education, health, and industry designed to encourage long-term growth.

International Military Education and Training (IMET). IMET-funded training is a particularly important aspect of our military assistance programs. Throughout this hemisphere we rely heavily on the special people-to-people relationships that have developed as a result of IMET training. Many former IMET students now occupy positions of high responsibility in their own countries, and our access to them is directly attributable to relationships and viewpoints established during the time they studied in the United States. IMET training is not just a professional military training program, it is also a kind of cultural exchange program because it gives foreign and American officers exposure to each other's ideas, beliefs, and customs, and fosters mutual understanding. It exposes foreign officers to democratic ideals and practices. IMET programs are

especially important to the development and continuation of good military-to-military relationships with countries where we do not have large military assistance programs. Mexico and Venezuela are examples of countries where our access to the military results from and depends largely on IMET programs. Full funding of our IMET programs will benefit all of us, as well as the next generation.

FY 1988 Legislation. The Administration's FY 1988 foreign assistance legislative proposals were recently transmitted to Congress. I would like to mention some of particular importance to my area of responsibility.

- ***Administration of Justice.*** Strengthening of the administration of justice in many democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean is a long-term goal. The range of activities already initiated has been very encouraging. The amendments proposed by the Administration would remove the terminal date of the program, signifying our long-term commitment, and would clarify and broaden authority for the program. We believe this program is an important means for improving the observance of political and human rights.

- ***Assistance for Police of Democratic Governments.*** This amendment provides that Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits police training, will not apply to a country which has a democratically elected government, which seeks to strengthen democratic institutions, and which does not have a record of gross abuse of internationally recognized human rights. A number of exceptions to Section 660 are contained in existing legislation, and this fragmented approach is not adequate to meet current needs. Improved law enforcement professionalism increases the observance of human rights. The amendment also would enhance the ability of foreign governments to protect American citizens living abroad who are frequently targets of criminal and terrorist threats. We hope any congressional concerns will be allayed by the provision of prior notification.

- ***Restrictions on Training Assistance.*** This proposal would permit military and economic assistance for training to Argentina or Brazil, provided that these countries continue to have democratically elected governments and subject to existing legislative provisions with regard to human rights and police training. We believe training should be considered comparable to programs such as the Peace Corps and United States Information Agency (USIA) exchanges which are in the U.S. interest and are, therefore, not subject to most legislative restrictions. Training provides the United States with access to current and future leaders in these two countries, which are increasingly significant in Latin America and on the world scene. A similar proposal was approved by the Senate in 1985 but failed in conference; we hope on further consideration it will be approved by both Houses.

- ***Safety-of-Flight Items for Chile.*** An unintended consequence of legislative restrictions on military sales to Chile is the negative impact on the safe operation of U.S. aircraft sold to the Chilean Government years ago. Recognizing the problem, in 1985 Congress exempted ejection seat devices and related manuals from the ban. This eased an acute program. To eliminate the remaining threat to safety of aircrews and civilians alike, we propose allowing the transfer of additional safety-of-flight items, keeping off limits sale of weapons or other non-safety items. This would ensure that we avoid an unwanted disaster caused by avoidable aircraft failure and generate some good will and enhanced access for the United States among the Chilean Air Force. In view of the Chilean military's key role for Chile's hoped-for transition to democracy, such a limited step is fully consistent with U.S. policy of support for a democratic transition and increased respect for human rights in Chile.

- ***Narcotics-Related Requirements.*** The proposed amendments to Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act modifications would apply worldwide but would be important to our relations with a number of Latin American and Caribbean countries. Based on our experience with

applications of the omnibus drug act so far, they would focus the impact of sanctions on the 30 most significant drug producing and transit countries, provide the means to administer the sanctions more effectively through proper identification of transit countries, and provide leverage for obtaining the cooperation of such countries in narcotics control activities before the sanctions actually take effect. I am convinced the effect will be to enhance cooperative efforts with Western Hemisphere countries in narcotics control. We encourage Congress to repeal Section 2013 of the omnibus drug act, which is duplicative of the section 481 certification process.

CONCLUSION

In designating 1987 as the National Year of the Americas, Congress and the President have recognized the special relationship that we have and want to maintain with Latin American and Caribbean nations. To put it plainly, these countries are our neighbors. It would be inconsistent for us as a nation to proclaim a year dedicated to the renewal of mutual understanding and at the same time refuse to provide the same neighbors we are singling out for recognition with the resources they need to meet the objectives we agree are as essential to our future as theirs.

As part of the National Year of the Americas, public and private organizations throughout the hemisphere are planning special activities to celebrate the achievements we have made together and to explore ways in which we can continue to assist each other and develop better relationships. In our own country, in August of this year, some 20 nations from all over our hemisphere will gather in Indianapolis [Indiana] for the 10th Pan American Games. This is an event which participants and spectators agree leaves a lasting impression of good will, and contributes to friendships whose value over time is incalculable. Let us not forget that the actions we take as a government also leave lasting impressions. An unwillingness to stand by our neighbors and friends when they need our assistance also has incalculable long-term effects. Congress can make a meaningful contribution to the National Year of the Americas by acting positively on our assistance request. I urge you to provide full funding for the programs we have outlined. They are necessary to sustain democracy, to expand economic and social reforms, and to protect our common security interests.

**Latin America and the Caribbean:
FY 1988 Foreign Assistance Request**
[Dollars in millions]

	Economic Assistance				Military Assistance			
	ESF	DA	PL 480	TOTAL	MAP	FMS	IMET	TOTAL
Central America	502.0	230.1	94.5	826.6	211.0	0.0	5.125	216.125
Belize	2.0	7.3	0.0	9.3	1.0	0.0	0.070	1.070
Costa Rica	90.0	12.9	15.0	117.9	2.0	0.0	0.450	2.450
El Salvador	200.0	75.6	40.9	316.5	120.0	0.0	1.875	121.875
Guatemala	80.0	33.3	23.9	137.2	5.0	0.0	0.600	5.600
Honduras	100.0	40.4	14.7	155.1	80.0	0.0	1.530	81.530
Panama	10.0	19.4	0.0	29.4	3.0	0.0	0.600	3.600
Regional Programs	20.0	41.2	0.0	61.2	NA*	NA	NA	NA
Andean	57.0	53.8	47.1	157.9	26.0	0.0	3.650	29.650
Bolivia	30.0	22.6	28.5	81.1	8.0	0.0	0.400	8.400
Colombia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.5	0.0	1.400	8.900
Ecuador	17.0	17.0	0.4	34.4	7.5	0.0	0.950	8.450
Peru	10.0	14.2	18.2	42.4	3.0	0.0	0.700	3.700
Venezuela	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.200	0.200
Caribbean	135.0	91.6	81.4	308.0	19.0	0.0	2.500	21.500
The Bahamas	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.100	0.100
Dominican Republic	35.0	20.0	21.3	76.3	2.0	0.0	1.000	3.000
Eastern Caribbean	25.0	21.0	0.0	46.0	7.0	0.0	0.400	7.400
Guyana	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.050	0.050
Haiti	30.0	32.0	25.8	87.8	4.0	0.0	0.550	4.550
Jamaica	45.0	18.6	30.3	93.9	6.0	0.0	0.300	6.300
Suriname	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.050	0.050
Trinidad/Tobago	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.050	0.050
Other	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	1.5	0.0	0.700	2.200
Argentina	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.050	0.050
Brazil	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.050	0.050
Chile	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.050	0.050
Mexico	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.275	0.275
Paraguay	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.150	0.150
Uruguay	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.125	1.625
Latin America and Caribbean Regional Programs	6.0	25.9	0.0	31.9	NA	NA	NA	NA
Panama Canal Military Schools	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.0	0.0	2.100	2.100
TOTAL: Latin America & the Caribbean	700.0	401.4	223.2	1324.6	257.5	0.0	14.075	271.575

*NA = not applicable