

# The **DISAM** **Annual**

Annual, Vol. 1

A Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

## Looking to the Future



## Remembering the Past

# ***The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management***

With the advent of the online *DISAM Journal*, which is continually updated, I don't have as many opportunities to send periodic updates to our journal subscribers, and much has happened since the last hard copy printed journal.

Let me first address the successes regarding the online *DISAM Journal*. We continue to push subscriptions to what we believe is a better publication. The "instantaneous" e-mail notifications to our subscribers when a major new article is posted is a terrific feature and facilitates the receipt of information more quickly, while also allowing any subscriber to delete those notifications dealing with areas not relevant to them. If you aren't yet an online subscriber, it's easy to do via our journal webpage. That said, as we publish this initial "Annual" printed edition, I'm hopeful that it also meets the needs of our community in its content of both original and "highlighted" articles from the past year online. With each year's annual, we plan to have our traditional Security Cooperation legislation and policy for the year—an article that is one of our most popular in "rolling up" particulars of various programs that spread across our environment between a number of organizations, funding streams and with a variety of conditions for their application and use. In addition the numerous other articles in this publication span the various constituencies of DISAM—so enjoy the reading!

At the last printed version of the journal, DISAM was in the middle of an immense task contained within a DEPSECDEF High Priority Performance Goal—a top ten DOD initiative to ensure that at least 95 percent of the SC workforce has their appropriate level of DISAM (SC) training by the end of FY2011. We did exceed that goal, achieving 98.3 percent as we ended FY11, due to the combined efforts of GCCs, military services, and other defense agencies. I continue to thank all involved as it truly was a community wide achievement.

Over the past twelve months, there have been many changes to DISAM courseware. If you intend to register for a class, check our website for particulars on any course—online, resident, or on-site offerings are all included there and don't take anything for granted—we continue to enhance all of our courses and if it's been a while since you reviewed our Course Catalog, it could be significantly different. Our traditional cornerstone courses for both CONUS (SAM-C) and Overseas (SCM-O) have both changed dramatically. The SAM-C is now a one-week resident or on-site offering preceded by approximately a week's worth of online prerequisites that must be completed before attending the resident portion. The SCM-O is now a longer course, more fully encompassing the security cooperation environment (not simply the more traditional Security Assistance piece). That course is now three weeks with an additional week of tracks based on the position requirements of the individual Security Cooperation Officer attending. The tracks may be similar; however, the core portion is a week longer (from the previous two-week stint). For more details on DISAM courses and updates, you can view information on each course or review DISAM's most current Curriculum Review Minutes (currently finalizing this past February's session) at our website.

DISAM online options continue to grow based on your needs. Whether it's the short SC Familiarization Course, the longer Security Cooperation Orientation Course, International Programs Security Requirements Course, or other modules of instruction or practical applications, there are numerous opportunities that will continue to grow in both number and scope in the future. You also might take a look at the assorted publications available online through DISAM—it's more than the "Greenbook" and "Redbook" that we use these days in a number of classes.

Let me close with this: DISAM continues to be committed to meeting the education and training needs of the Security Cooperation Community, which numbers over 10,500 positions. More than DISAM courses, we continue to stress the Global Master of Arts Program, the International Affairs Certification and additional initiatives stemming from the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force to prepare the SC workforce for the challenges of tomorrow. As part of that commitment, DISAM will host a Council on Occupational Education Accreditation Reaffirmation Visit in CY2013—happening about every six years—which helps us ensure we're taking the right academic steps to meet the needs of the security cooperation workforce.

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS  
*Commandant*

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# Fiscal Year 2012

## Security Cooperation Legislation

By Kenneth W. Martin  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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**Please note that this summary is not legal advice and may not be relied on for official purposes. The reader should confer with one's assigned general counsel for any related legal analysis or advice.**

### Introduction

Each year, the *DISAM Annual* publishes a summary of the legislation that impacts US security assistance, security cooperation, and other related international programs. This report is intended to alert all security assistance and security cooperation community members to the collective changes or continued requirements in legislation that will influence program planning and implementation for the coming years. As has been done in the past, the report is in outline form, with key topics highlighted to facilitate locating specific statutory references.

This article does not include the initial funding allocations for FY2012 security assistance programs since the required Department of State report for the allocations to Congress in accordance with section 653(a), FAA, is not yet available. This report is normally to be completed no later than thirty days after enactment of the Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (S/FOAA) which for FY2012 was enacted on 23 December 2011 as Division I, P.L.112-74. However, the Department of State congressional budget justifications (CBJ) for FY2013 provided the estimated FY2012 allocations along with the requests for FY2013 and are used within this article.

The FY2012 appropriations season included five continuing resolutions with the last, P.L.112-68, 17 Dec 2011, lasting through midnight, 23 December 2011. The S/FOAA for FY2012 was one of the nine required annual appropriations in P.L.112-74. The DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, was included as Division A.

The defense authorization act, the major source for DOD security cooperation authorities, was enacted as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011. As was the case for the last several years, there was no annual or biennial foreign relations or foreign affairs authorization act for FY2012.

The following three pieces of legislation are to be further summarized in this article as they relate to US security assistance and security cooperation. The highlights of the three laws are provided.

- Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012, Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011.
  - ◊ With prior consultation with Congress, most FY2012 military assistance funding programs may be used for the enhancement of foreign security forces in addition to military forces.
  - ◊ “Graduating” from DOD funding assistance, Iraq is to receive significant foreign military financing program (FMFP) and international narcotics control and law enforcement (INCLE) funding assistance to use with Iraqi national funds.
  - ◊ Using \$100,000,000 from the FMS Admin Fund, the special defense acquisition fund (SDAF) is reinstated.
  - ◊ The use of FMFP funding continues to be prohibited for the sustainment of DOD “1206” initiated programs.
  - ◊ \$4,000,000 of IMET funding is to remain available through FY2013. In the past, this funding remained available until expended.
  - ◊ The former section 620J, FAA, Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces [Leahy Amendment], is now section 620M, FAA.
  - ◊ Several countries are to be determined, certified, and reported by the Secretary of State to Congress to be in compliance with acceptable human rights standards prior allocation of FY2012 funding assistance.

- ◇ Emergent funding for Oversea Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism is provided in title VIII of the S/FOAA for assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012, Division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011
  - ◇ Appropriations for the following programs:
    - » \$47,026,000 for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)
    - » \$107,662,000 for the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDCA)
    - » \$508,219,000 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Account
    - » \$235,700,000 for the Israeli Cooperative Program
    - » \$15,000,000 for the Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) Program
    - » \$1,690,000,000 to reimburse key cooperating countries in South West Asia
    - » \$400,000,000 for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)
    - » \$11,200,000,000 for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
    - » \$200,000,000 for DOD contribution to the new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
    - » \$400,000,000 in Army O&M for the Commanders' Emergency Response Fund (CERP)
    - » \$524,000,000 in Air Force O&M to fund operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq
  - ◇ Prohibits FY2012 funding for IMET, FMFP, EDA, "1206" assistance, licensing for DCS, and PKO for Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Burma to support any military training or operations that include child soldiers.
  - ◇ National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011
    - » Amends 10 U.S.C. 151 (a) adding the chief of the National Guard Bureau as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    - » Extends the section 1022 authority for joint task forces to provide support to law enforcement agencies conducting counterterrorism through FY2012
    - » Extends the section 1004 authority of DOD providing support for counter-drug activities of other government agencies through FY2014
    - » Extends the section 1033 authority of DOD to provide additional support for counter-drug activities by other governments through FY2013 and adds thirteen additional countries to be eligible
    - » Extends the section 1021 authority of DOD to support counter-drug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia through FY2012
    - » Provides authority through FY2014 for the assignment of DOD civilian employees as advisors to foreign country ministries of defense
    - » Amends 10 U.S.C. 407 to include DOD assistance in the clearance of stockpiled conventional munitions
    - » Extends section 1202 authority for DOD to provide through FY2014 the no-cost loan of certain SME to coalition forces in Afghanistan
    - » Extends section 1208 authority for DOD to provide support not to exceed \$50,000,000 annually through FY2015 to forces supporting or facilitating ongoing US special forces operations
    - » Extends section 1206 authority for DOD to provide support through FY2013 for building the capacity of foreign military forces
    - » Establishes a two-year program at \$35,000,000 annually through FY2013 to support forces participating in operations to disarm the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
    - » Establishes the joint DOD/DOS Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to be annually funded by DOD at \$200,000,000 and DOS at \$50,000,000
      - ◆ Until the GSCF is determined operational, authorizes a FY2012 GSCF Transitional program to provide up to \$75,000,000 overall in counterterrorism assistance to military and security forces in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the African Union Mission participants in Somalia.

- ◆ Also until the GSCF is determined operational, authorizes a similar FY2012 GSCF Transitional program to provide up to \$75,000,000 in counterterrorism assistance for the Yemen Ministry of Interior.
- » Amends the section 1234 logistics support program to coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan authorizing up to \$450,000,000 through FY2012.
- » Extends section 1216 authority in DOD annual support of \$50,000,000 through 31 Dec 2012 for the reintegration of former terrorists in Afghanistan
  - ◆ However, prohibits the use of 50 percent in funding until determined and reported that women in Afghanistan are an integral part of the reconciliation process
- » Amends section 1217 authority for \$400,000,000 in DOD support of the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) through FY2012
- » Amends section 1224 authorizing the use of DOD funding within the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) through FY2012.

## Reference Sources

The following abbreviated titles will assist in identifying principal sources of information used in this article. The laws and associated congressional reports can be viewed at the Library of Congress “Thomas” webpage located at <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

- SAMM: *Security Assistance Management Manual*, DOD 5105.38-M, 3 October 2003, with changes. It is maintained electronically and can be viewed on the DSCA webpage at <http://www.dscamilitary.com/samm/>.
- FAA: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Public Law (P.L.) 87-195, 4 September 1961 [22 U.S.C. 2151, et seq.].
- P.L. 87-510: Migration and Refugee Act of 1962, P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962 [22 U.S.C. 2601]
- AECA: Arms Export Control Act, as amended, P.L. 94-329, 30 June 1976 [22 U.S.C. 2751, et seq.].
- P.L. 96-8: Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 10 April 1979.
- P.L. 96-533: Peace Corps Act, Title VI, P.L. 96-533, 16 December 1980.
- P.L. 99-239: Compact of Free Association, P.L. 99-239, 14 January 1986.
- P.L. 99-415: Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986, P.L. 99-415, 19 September 1986.
- P.L. 101-179: Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179, 28 September 1989.
- P.L. 101-510: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 1990.
- P.L. 102-484: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484, 6 October 1992.
- P.L. 102-511: Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L. 102-511, 24 October 1992.
- P.L. 103-160: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-160, 30 November 1993.
- P.L. 104-164: To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act to make improvements to certain defense and security assistance provisions under those Acts, to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign countries, and for other purposes, P.L. 104-164, 21 July 1996.
- P.L. 104-201: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, 23 September 1996.
- P.L. 105-85: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1998, 18 November 1997.
- P.L. 106-113: Making Consolidated Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2000, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 106-113, 29 November 1999.
- P.L. 106-429: Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 106-429, 6 November 2000.
- P.L. 107-115: Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002.
- P.L. 108-136: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2004, P.L. 108-136, 24 November 2003.

- P.L. 108-287: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-287, 5 August 2004.
- P.L. 108-375: Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004.
- P.L. 109-163: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006.
- P.L. 109-364: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, 17 October 2006.
- P.L. 109-472: Department of State Authorities A.P.L. 110-116: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008, Division A, P.L. 110-116, 13 November 2007.
- P.L. 110-161: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008, Division J, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 2007.
- P.L. 110-161: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 2008, Division L, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 2007.
- P.L. 110-181: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008.
- P.L. 110-417: Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, 14 October 2008.
- P.L. 110-457: Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, Title IV, P.L. 110-457, 23 December 2008.
- P.L. 111-08: Department of State, Foreign Operation, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009, Division H, P.L. 111-08, 11 March 2009.
- P.L. 111-32: Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-32, 24 June 2009.
- P.L. 111-73: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, P.L. 111-73, 15 October 2009.
- P.L. 111-84: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009.
- P.L. 111-88: Further Continuing Resolution, 2010, Division B, P.L. 111-88, 30 October 2009.
- P.L. 111-117: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, Division F, P.L. 111-117, 16 December 2009.
- P.L. 111-118: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Division A, P.L. 111-118, 19 December 2009.
- P.L. 111-383: Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383, 7 January 2011.
- P.L. 112-10: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2011, Division A, P.L. 112-10, 15 April 2011.
- P.L. 112-10: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2011, division B, Title XI, P.L. 112-10, 15 April 2011.
- P.L. 112-74: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012, Division A, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2011.
- P.L. 112-74: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012, Title XI, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2011.
- P.L. 112-81: National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011.

### **Legislation for Fiscal Year 2012**

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (S/FOAA), Division I, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2011

- The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) never passed an S/FOAA for FY2012 while the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) passed S1601 on 21 September 2011 with S.Rpt. 112-85 published on 22 September 2011. The bill was never acted upon by the Senate.
- The final S/FOAA was incorporated into HR2055, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, as Division I. HR2055 was originally introduced and passed months earlier by both houses as the Military Construction and Veteran's Affairs Appropriations Act, 2012. HR2055 became the vehicle used by the conference committee to amend into the needed consolidated appropriation for the outstanding nine appropriations remaining for FY2012. The conference report was filed on 15 December 2011 as H.Rpt 112-331 and immediately passed by both houses, on 16 December by the House and 17 December by the Senate. The final omnibus appropriation was enacted on 23 Dec 2011 as P.L. 112-74.

- Table 1 provides an overview for FY2012 security assistance funding to include the final appropriation for FY2010 and the proposed request for FY2013.

**Table 1**  
**Security Assistance Appropriations**

Program	FY 2011 Appropriation	FY 2012 Appropriation	FY 2013 Request
FMFP	\$5,374,230,000	\$6,312,000,000	\$6,383,320,000
IMET	105,788,000	105,788,000	102,643,000
PCCF	297,220,000	800,000,000	800,000,000
ESF	5,931,714,000	5,796,207,000	5,886,442,000
PKO	304,390,000	383,818,000	249,100,000
INCLE	1,593,806,000	2,004,705,000	2,506,502,000
NADR	738,520,000	710,770,000	635,668,000

Note: The FY2011 PCCF was a transfer from the DOD PCF account, and the FY2012 PCCF includes \$50M which was transferred to the new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 February 2012.

**Title IV, International Security Assistance,  
Funds Appropriated to the President:  
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)**

- Appropriated \$5,210,000,000 in grant assistance to carry out the provisions of section 23, AECA.
  - ◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, appropriated an additional \$1,102,000,000 in FMFP grant assistance but to remain available only through 30 September 2013.
- Following consultation with the appropriations committees and regular committee notifications, these funds may be used to procure defense articles and services to enhance the capacity of foreign security forces.
- The following earmarks are included:
  - ◊ Not less than \$3,075,000,000 for Israel of which not less than \$808,725,000 shall be available for procurement in Israel to include research and development.
    - » FY2012 is the fourth year in which the US will provide \$30 billion overall in FMFP assistance during a ten year period to Israel.
  - ◊ \$1,300,000,000 for Egypt to include border security programs and activities in the Sinai.
  - ◊ \$300,000,000 for Jordan

- The Secretary of State is to submit a report to the appropriations committees detailing any crowd control items, including tear gas, made available with appropriated funds or through export licenses to foreign security forces that the Secretary has credible information have repeatedly used excessive force to repress peaceful, lawful, and organized dissent.
  - ◊ The Secretary is to consult with the appropriations committees prior to obligating funds for such items to governments of countries undergoing democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa
- No FY2012 FMFP funds shall be made available to support or continue any program initially funded under the section 1206, NDAA, FY2006, as amended, P.L.109-163, 6 January 2006, unless the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, has justified such program to the appropriations committees.
- FY2012 FMFP funds may be used for demining, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related activities and may include activities implemented through nongovernmental and international organizations.
- Not more than \$62,800,000 may be obligated for necessary expenses, including the purchase of passenger motor vehicles for replacement only

for use outside of the US, for the general costs of administering military assistance and sales.

◇ Not more than \$4,000 may be available for entertainment expenses and not to exceed \$130,000 may be available for representation allowances.

- And finally, not more than \$836,900,000 of funds realized pursuant to section 21(e)(1)(A), AECA [admin fund], may be obligated for DOD expenses during FY2012 pursuant to section 43(b), AECA [recovery of admin expenses].

◇ Section 7080 of this act allows for up to \$100,000,000 in the Admin Fund to be transferred to the section 51, AECA, Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to remain available for obligation through FY2015.

- Table 2 provides the estimated FMFP funding allocations for FY2012 along with actual allocations for FY2011 and requested funding for FY2013.

**Table 2**  
**Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

Program	FY2011	FY2012	FY2013
<b>Africa</b>	<b>\$19,098</b>	<b>\$16,118</b>	<b>\$15,971</b>
Botswana	339	200	
Chad	399	200	
Cote d'Ivoire			200
DR of the Congo	300		200
Djibouti	1,996	1,500	1,000
Ethiopia		843	
Gabon	200		
Ghana	449	350	350
Guinea			200
Kenya	998	1,500	1,096
Liberia	7,173	6,500	6,500
Mali	200	200	
Mauritania	200	200	
Nigeria	1,212	1,000	1,000
Rwanda	300	200	200
Senegal	399	325	325
South Africa	798	700	700
South Sudan			200
Tanzania	200	200	200
Uganda	300	200	200
Africa Regional	3,635	2,000	3,400

<b>East Asia &amp; Pacific</b>	<b>\$39,202</b>	<b>\$35,658</b>	<b>\$35,488</b>
Cambodia	748	800	1,000
Indonesia	19,960	14,000	14,000
Mongolia	2,996	3,000	3,000
Philippines	11,970	14,555	13,500
Thailand	1,568	988	988
Vietnam	1,960	2,315	3,000
<b>Europe &amp; Eurasia</b>	<b>\$131,171</b>	<b>\$106,865</b>	<b>\$102,000</b>
Albania	3,992	3,000	3,000
Armenia	2,994	2,700	2,700
Azerbaijan	2,994	2,700	2,700
Bosnia & Herzegovina	4,491	4,500	4,500
Bulgaria	9,481	8,500	7,800
Croatia	3,493	2,500	2,500
Czech Republic	5,988	5,000	5,000
Estonia	2,695	2,400	2,400
Georgia	15,968	14,400	14,400
Hungary	998	900	900
Kosovo	5,000	3,000	3,000
Latvia	2,794	2,250	2,250
Lithuania	2,994	2,550	2,550
Macedonia	2,992	3,600	3,600
Malta	399		
Maldives	1,497	1,250	1,250
Montenegro	1,472	1,200	1,200
Poland	33,932	24,165	20,000
Romania	12,974	12,000	12,000
Serbia	1,896	1,800	1,800
Slovakia	1,397	1,000	1,000
Slovenia	748	450	450
Ukraine	8,982	7,000	7,000
<b>Near East</b>	<b>\$4,470,177</b>	<b>\$4,813,650</b>	<b>\$4,836,150</b>
Bahrain	15,461	10,000	10,000
Egypt	1,297,400	1,300,000	1,300,000
Israel	2,994,000	3,075,000	3,100,000
Jordan	299,400	300,000	300,000
Lebanon	74,850	75,000	75,000
Libya		150	150
Morocco	8,982	8,000	8,000
Oman	13,000	8,000	8,000
Tunisia	17,124	17,500	15,000

Yemen	19,960	20,000	20,000
<b>South &amp; Central Asia</b>	<b>\$305,652</b>	<b>\$107,625</b>	<b>\$360,330</b>
Bangladesh	2,957	1,500	1,650
Kazakhstan	2,395	1,800	1,800
Kyrgyz Republic	1,496	1,500	1,500
Maldives		400	400
Nepal	898	940	845
Pakistan	295,408	98,000	350,000
Sri Lanka	998	500	450
Tajikistan	750	800	1,500
Turkmenistan	750	685	685
Uzbekistan		1,500	1,500
Western Hemisphere	84,477	67,284	62,381
Belize	200	200	200
Colombia	47,904	37,000	30,000
Costa Rica	349	315	1,402
Ecuador	499	450	450
El Salvador	1,247	1,250	1,800
Guatemala	499	500	750
Haiti	1,597		1,600
Honduras	998	1,000	3,000
Mexico	7,984	7,000	7,000
Nicaragua	339	399	399
Panama	2,096	1,840	2,800
Paraguay	399	350	350
Peru	3,500	1,980	1,980
Uruguay	399		
West Hemi Reg	16,467	15,000	10,000
<b>FMFP Admin</b>	<b>\$54,453</b>	<b>\$62,800</b>	<b>\$60,000</b>
<b>Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)</b>		<b>\$1,102,000</b>	<b>\$911,000</b>
Iraq		850,000	900,000
Pakistan		197,408	
FMFP Admin			11,000
Unallocated		54,592	
<b>Total FMFP</b>	<b>\$5,374,230</b>	<b>\$6.312,000</b>	<b>\$6,383,320</b>

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 release 13 February 2012.

**Title IV, International Security Assistance,  
Funds Appropriated to the President:  
International Military Education and  
Training (IMET)**

- Appropriation of \$105,788,000 in grant assistance to carry out the provisions of section 541, FAA, of which up to \$4,000,000 may remain available through FY2013 and may only be provided through regular congressional appropriations committees notification procedures.
- The civilian personnel to receive training funded by FY2012 IMET may include civilians who are not members of a government whose participation would contribute to improved civil-military relations, civilian control of the military, or respect for human rights.

- The Secretary of State shall provide a report not later than forty-five days of enactment of this act to both appropriations committees to include proposed uses of all IMET programs on a country by country basis with a detailed description of proposed activities.
- Not more than \$55,000 of FY2012 IMET funding may be available for entertainment allowances.
- Table 3 provides the estimated IMET funding allocations for FY2012

**Table 3**  
**International Military Education and Training (IMET) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

<b>Program</b>	<b>FY2011</b>	<b>FY2012</b>	<b>FY2013</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>\$16,110</b>	<b>\$14,315</b>	<b>\$13,255</b>
Angola	418	365	280
Benin	236	230	210
Botswana	685	655	575
Burkina Faso	246	225	200
Burundi	352	325	275
Cameroon	285	270	250
Cape Verde	123	120	100
Cen Afr Rep		115	100
Chad	391	340	300
Comoros	125	100	90
Cote d'Ivoire	89		200
DR of the Congo	50	450	400
Djibouti	372	335	315
Ethiopia	650	575	500
Gabon	248	200	170
Ghana	825	765	700
Guinea	48	100	200
Guinea-Bissau	10	65	
Kenya	929	890	750
Lesotho	186	100	90
Liberia	522	490	450
Malawi	400	285	270
Mali	397	350	350
Mauritania	184	150	150

Mauritius	155	120	90
Mozambique	402	385	370
Namibia	204	125	100
Niger	66		115
Nigeria	1,013	870	750
Republic of the Congo	123	110	90
Rwanda	559	500	500
Sao Tome & Principe	180	100	100
Senegal	1,026	850	750
Seychelles	94	100	90
Sierra Leone	394	375	350
South Africa	820	815	750
South Sudan	763	800	750
Swaziland	199	100	90
Tanzania	455	390	375
The Gambia	120	100	90
Togo	286	140	120
Uganda	608	600	550
Zambia	422	335	300
<b>East Asia &amp; Pacific</b>	<b>\$9,291</b>	<b>\$8,740</b>	<b>\$8,135</b>
Cambodia	260	260	260
Indonesia	1,811	1,800	1,610
Laos	200	200	200
Malaysia	956	825	700
Marshall Islands	45	55	50
Mongolia	997	875	750
Philippines	1,971	1,850	1,665
Samoa	113	40	40
Thailand	1,568	1,325	1,250
Timor-Leste	297	300	300
Vietnam	476	650	750
E.Asia & Pacific Reg	597	560	560
<b>Europe &amp; Eurasia</b>	<b>\$30,287</b>	<b>\$29,425</b>	<b>\$28,600</b>
Albania	1,064	1,000	1,000
Armenia	449	700	600
Azerbaijan	943	700	600
Bosnia & Herzegovina	986	1,000	1,000
Bulgaria	1,778	1,700	1,800
Croatia	956	900	900
Czech Republic	1,992	1,900	1,800
Estonia	1,143	1,125	1,100
Georgia	1,895	1,900	1,800

Greece	1,895	1,900	1,800
Hungary	1,077	950	900
Kosovo	678	700	700
Latvia	1,135	1,150	1,150
Lithuania	1,143	1,125	1,100
Macedonia	1,041	950	900
Malta	153	150	150
Moldova	898	750	750
Montenegro	455	500	500
Poland	2,090	2,100	2,00
Portugal	93	100	100
Romania	1,750	11,750	1,700
Serbia	893	900	900
Slovakia	950	900	900
Slovenia	712	675	650
Turkey	3,990	3,800	3,600
Ukraine	1,925	1,900	1,900
<b>Near East</b>	<b>\$17,294</b>	<b>\$18,009</b>	<b>\$18,945</b>
South Sudan	763	800	750
Swaziland	199	100	90
Tanzania	455	390	375
The Gambia	120	100	90
Togo	286	140	120
Uganda	608	600	550
Zambia	422	335	300
<b>East Asia &amp; Pacific</b>	<b>\$9,291</b>	<b>\$8,740</b>	<b>\$8,135</b>
Cambodia	260	260	260
Indonesia	1,8111	1,800	1,610
Laos	200	200	200
Malaysia	956	825	700
Marshall Islands	45	55	50
Mongolia	997	875	750
Philippines	1,971	1,850	1,665
Samoa	113	40	40
Thailand	1,568	1,325	1,250
Timor-Leste	297	300	300
Vietnam	476	650	750
E.Asia & Pacific Reg	597	560	560
<b>Europe &amp; Eurasia</b>	<b>\$30,287</b>	<b>\$29,425</b>	<b>\$28,600</b>
Albania	1,064	1,000	1,000
Armenia	449	700	600

Azerbaijan	943	700	600
Bosnia & Herzegovina	986	1,000	1,000
Bulgaria	1,778	1,00	1,800
Croatia	956	900	900
Czech Republic	1,992	1,900	1,800
Estonia	1,143	1,125	1,100
Georgia	1,895	1,900	1,800
Greece	98	100	100
Hungary	1,077	950	900
Kosovo	678	700	700
Latvia	1,135	1,150	1,150
Lithuania	1,143	1,125	1,100
Macedonia	1,041	950	900
Malta	153	150	150
Moldova	898	750	750
Montenegro	455	500	500
Poland	2,090	2,100	2,000
Portugal	93	100	100
Romania	1,750	1,750	1,700
Serbia	893	900	900
Slovakia	950	900	900
Slovenia	712	675	650
Turkey	3,990	3,800	3,600
Ukraine	1,925	1,900	1,900
<b>Near East</b>	<b>\$17,294</b>	<b>\$18,009</b>	<b>\$18,945</b>
Algeria	953	1,225	1,150
Bahrain	435	700	725
Egypt	1,275	1,400	1,800
Iraq	1,736	2,000	2,000
Jordan	3,760	3,700	2,800
Lebanon	2,476	2,375	2,250
Libya		200	50
Morocco	1,989	1,805	1,710
Oman	1,622	1,650	2,050
Saudi Arabia	4		10
Tunisia	1,950	1,854	2,300
Yemen	1,094	1,100	1,100
<b>South &amp; Central Asia</b>	<b>\$13,088</b>	<b>\$14,040</b>	<b>\$14,259</b>
Afghanistan	1,555	1,950	1,500
Bangladesh	994	950	900
India	1,601	1,330	1,260
Kazakhstan	876	785	707

Kyrgyz Rep	820	1,000	1,000
Maldives	179	190	176
Nepal	1,010	950	900
Pakistan	4,055	5,000	6,000
Sri Lanka	952	665	626
Tajikistan	469	570	540
Turkmenistan	288	350	350
Uzbekistan	289	300	300
<b>Western Hemisphere</b>	<b>\$14,458</b>	<b>\$15,700</b>	<b>\$14,446</b>
Argentina	297	750	544
Belize	190	190	180
Bolivia	198	230	200
Brazil	631	640	625
Chile	821	855	810
Colombia	1,695	1,665	1,575
Costa Rica	394	375	350
Dominican Republic	600	810	765
Ecuador	400	380	360
El Salvador	1,521	1,050	1,000
Guatemala	192	760	720
Guyana	386	315	300
Haiti	220	220	220
Honduras	765	700	650
Jamaica	739	700	398
Mexico	1,006	1,635	1,549
Nicaragua	538	790	700
Panama	738	760	720
Paraguay	407	380	360
Peru	619	620	585
Suriname	251	240	225
The Bahamas	201	190	180
Trinidad & Tobago	253	180	180
Uruguay	590	465	450
Barbados & E. Carib.	806	800	800
<b>IMET Admin Exp.</b>	<b>\$5,260</b>	<b>\$5,559</b>	<b>\$5,003</b>
<b>Total IMET</b>	<b>\$105,788</b>	<b>\$105,788</b>	<b>\$102,643</b>

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 February 2012.

**Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, International Security Assistance, Funds Appropriated to the President: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)**

- \$850,000,000 to remain available through FY2013 for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of part I, chapter 8 (INCLE); and part II, chapters 2 (Military Assistance), 5 (IMET), 6 (PKO), and 8 (Antiterrorism), FAA, and section 23 (FMFP), AECA, for the purpose of providing assistance for Pakistan to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistani security forces (including the Frontier Corps), to include program management, training in civil-military humanitarian assistance, human rights training, and the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, and facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.

- Notwithstanding any other provision of law except section 620M, FAA, such funds shall be available to the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.
- Such funds may be transferred by the Department of State to the Department of Defense or other federal departments or agencies to support counterinsurgency operations.
- Section 8004 of this Title VIII authorizes the Secretary of State to fund the new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) with \$50,000,000 from INCLE, FMFP, or PCCF appropriations within Title VIII of this Act. The Secretary opted to use the PCCF account.
- The GSCF was later authorized by section 1207, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011.
- Table 4 provides the estimated PCCF funding allocations for FY2012 along with actual allocations for FY2011 and requested funding for FY2013.

**Table 4  
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

Program	FY2011	FY2012	FY2013
<b>PCCF</b>	<b>\$297,220</b>	<b>\$800,00</b>	<b>\$800,00</b>

Notes: The FY2011 amount is from the DOD PCF and the FY2012 amount includes a \$50M transfer to the new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 February 2012.

**Title III, Bilateral Economic Assistance, Fund Appropriated to the President: Economic Support Fund (ESF)**

- Appropriation of \$3,001,745,000 in grant assistance to carry out the provisions of Part II, Chapter 4, FAA, to remain available through FY2013.
  - ◊ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, Bilateral Economic Assistance, Funds Appropriated to the President*, appropriated an additional \$2,761,462,000 in ESF grant assistance also to remain available through FY2013.
- \$250,000,000 shall be available for Egypt, including not less than \$35,000,000 for education programs of which not less \$10,000,000 is for scholarships at not-for-profit institutions for Egyptian students with high financial need.

- Any funds made available for Cyprus shall only be used for scholarships, administrative support for the scholarship program, bicomunal projects, and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.
- \$12,000,000 shall be for assistance for Lebanon for use in scholarships at not-for-profit institutions for students in Lebanon with high financial need.
- Not less than \$360,000,000 shall be for Jordan.
- Up to \$30,000,000 of the ESF funds previously appropriated by section 2109, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Appropriations Act, 2011, division B, title XI, P.L.112-10, 15 April 2011, may be made available for the costs of loan guarantees for Tunisia.

- ◇ This amount for the costs of loan guarantees shall not be considered “assistance” for the purposes of provisions of law limiting assistance to a country.
- Not less than \$179,000,000 shall be apportioned directly to USAID for alternative development/ institution building programs in Colombia.
- Not less than \$7,000,000 of FY2012 ESF that is available for Colombia, shall be transferred to the heading “Migration and Refugee Assistance” and shall be made available only for assistance to nongovernmental and international organizations that provide assistance to Colombian refugees in neighboring countries.
- In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State may transfer up to \$200,000,000 in FY2012 ESF to funds appropriated under the heading “Multilateral Assistance, Funds appropriated to the President, International Financial Institutions” for additional payment to such institutions. Prior to exercising this transfer authority, the Secretary of State shall consult with the congressional appropriations committees.
- Table 5 provides the estimated ESF funding allocations for FY2012

**Table 5**  
**Economic Support Fund (ESF) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

Program	FY2011	FY2012	FY2013
<b>Africa</b>	<b>\$297,220</b>	<b>\$800,00</b>	<b>\$800,00</b>
Cote d'Ivoire	14,715	14,715	13,500
DR of the Congo	45,915	47,915	50,100
Liberia	124,532	124,276	105,200
Sierra Leone	6,500	4,500	5,000
Somalia	19,627	19,627	19,400
South Sudan	223,431	305,360	288,499
Sudan	26,393	30,000	37,600
Uganda		5,000	
Zimbabwe	25,578	25,578	23,600
African Union	760	760	900
Africa Regional	16,089	20,000	18,400
E.Africa Regional		10,000	
<b>E.Asia &amp; Pacific</b>	<b>\$90,892</b>	<b>\$88,115</b>	<b>\$55,800</b>
Burma	6,427	35,100	27,200
Cambodia	12,000	7,000	5,000
China	5,000	10,500	4,500
North Korea	3,493		
Timor-Leste	2,994	1,000	
Vietnam	18,463	15,000	7,100
E.Asia & Pac Reg.	12,515	12,515	12,000
Reg Dev Mission-Asia		7,000	
<b>Europe &amp; Eurasia</b>	<b>\$15,852</b>	<b>\$6,000</b>	<b>\$358,077</b>
Albania			10,025
Armenia			27,219
Azerbaijan			11,029
Belarus			11,000

Bosnia & Herzegovina			28,556
Cyprus	8,362	3,500	3,200
Georgia			42,660
Kosovo			42,544
Macedonia			9,812
Moldova			14,050
Montenegro			335
Poland			3,000
Russia			36,229
Serbia			19,913
Ukraine			53,957
Eurasia Reg	2,495		21,137
Europe Reg	2,495		20,911
Intl Fund for Ireland	2,500	2,500	2,500
<b>Near East</b>	<b>\$1,675,925</b>	<b>\$1,539,430</b>	<b>\$1,394,350</b>
Egypt	249,500	250,000	250,000
Iraq	325,700	299,400	262,850
Jordan	362,274	360,000	360,000
Lebanon	84,725	84,725	70,000
Morocco	2,281		
Tunisia	5,000	5,000	10,000
West Bank & Gaza	395,699	395,699	370,00
Yemen	26,606	26,606	38,00
Egypt Debt Relief	100,00		
ME Multilaterals	1,140	1,500	1,000
ME Partnership Init	80,000	70,000	
ME Reg Cooperation	3,000	5,000	2,500
ME Reg Democracy	35,000	35,000	30,000
Trans-Sahara C/T		1,500	
ME Regional	5,000	5,000	
<b>South &amp; Central Asia</b>	<b>\$2,906,927</b>	<b>\$32,003</b>	<b>\$1,839,195</b>
Afghanistan	1,967,509		811,399
Kazakhstan			6,892
Kyrgyz Rep			32,819
Nepal	16,979	26,979	17,000
Pakistan	918,904		928,250
Tajikistan			19,125
Turkmenistan			4,640
Uzbekistan			5,512
Cen Asia Reg			2,358
S & Cen Asia Reg	3,535	5,024	11,200
<b>Western Hemisphere</b>	<b>\$435,130</b>	<b>\$466,541</b>	<b>\$434,200</b>

Colombia	184,426	179,000	155,000
Cuba	20,000	20,000	15,000
El Salvador		2,000	
Haiti	131,000	148,281	141,000
Mexico	18,000	33,260	35,000
Venezuela	5,000	5,000	3,000
Western Hemisphere Reg	76,704	79,000	85,200
<b>Other</b>	<b>\$303,448</b>	<b>\$253,925</b>	<b>\$204,750</b>
Asia ME Reg	5,000		
Counterterrorism		5,000	10,500
Demo, Conf, & HA	30,458	27,900	
Demo, HR & Labor		6,000	64,000
Edu & Cultural Affairs		5,000	
Eco Grow, Agr & Trade	15,352	15,352	13,500
Energy Resources		8,000	14,250
ME Response Fund	135,000	50,000	
Ocean & Intl Environ	105,552	115,552	101,000
Policy Plan & Learning	1,000		
Unallocated	9,836	13,521	
Spec Repts	1,250	7,000	1,500
FA Prog Eval		600	
<b>Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)</b>		<b>\$2,801,462</b>	<b>\$1,037,871</b>
Afghanistan		1,936,762	1,037,871
Pakistan		864,700	
<b>Total ESF</b>	<b>\$5,931,714</b>	<b>\$5,796,207</b>	<b>\$5,886,442</b>

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 February 2012.

**Title IV, International Security Assistance, Department of State: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)**

- An appropriation of \$302,818,000 for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 551, FAA.
  - ◊ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism*, appropriated an additional \$81,000,000 in PKO assistance but to remain available only through 30 September 2013.
- These funds may be used to provide assistance to enhance the capacity of foreign civilian security forces, including gendarmes, to participate in PKO.
- Not less than \$28,000,000 shall be used for the US contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai.
- Up to \$91,818,000 may be used to pay assessed expenses of international peacekeeping activities in Somalia, but to remain available through FY2013.
- No funding appropriated in this Act should be used to support military training or operations that include children soldiers.
- No FY2012 PKO funding shall be obligated or expended except as provided through regular notification procedures with the congressional appropriations committees.
- Table 6 provides the estimated PKO funding allocations for FY2012 along with actual allocations for FY2011 and requested funding for FY2013.

**Table 6**  
**Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

<b>Program</b>	<b>FY2011</b>	<b>FY2012</b>	<b>FY2013</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>\$159,650</b>	<b>\$182,968</b>	<b>\$132,000</b>
Cote d'Ivoire			2,000
DR of the Congo	21,520	19,000	15,000
Liberia	5,000	5,000	2,000
Somalia	73,300	91,818	51,000
South Sudan	41,870	58,000	40,000
Africa Regional	15,960	9,150	22,000
<b>Near East</b>	<b>26,000</b>	<b>28,000</b>	<b>26,000</b>
MFO-Sinai	26,000	28,000	26,000
State/PM	\$118,740	\$91,850	\$91,100
Trans-Sahara C/T	19,940		16,100
GPOA	98,800	91,850	75,000
<b>Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)</b>		<b>\$81,000</b>	
Somalia		51,000	
Africa Regional		10,000	
Trans-Sahara C/T		20,000	
<b>Total PKO</b>	<b>\$304,390</b>	<b>\$383.818</b>	<b>\$249,100</b>

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 February 2012.

**Title IV, International Security Assistance,  
Department of State: International  
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement  
(INCLE)**

- Appropriation of \$1,061,100,000 for necessary expenses to carry out section 481, FAA, to remain available through FY2013.
  - ◊ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism*, appropriated an additional \$983,605,000 in INCLE assistance likewise to remain available through 30 September 2013.
- Secretary of State is authorized during FY2012 IAW section 608, FAA, to receive excess property from an USG agency for the purpose of providing the property to a foreign government or international organization under part I, chapter 8, FAA, International Narcotics Control, subject to regular notifications procedures to the congressional appropriations committees.
- The Secretary of State shall provide a report to the congressional appropriations committees not later than forty-five days after enactment of this act and prior to the obligation of any funds. This report is to include proposed uses of FY2012 INCLE funds on a country by country basis for each proposed program, project, or activity.
- The provisions of section 482(b), FAA, regarding the prohibition for the procurement of weapons and ammunition, shall not apply to FY2012 INCLE funding.
- No FY2012 INCLE funding shall be made available for assistance for the Bolivian military and police unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that such funding is in the US national security interest.
- \$5,000,000 should be used to combat the piracy of US copyrighted materials, consistent with the requirements of sections 688(a) and (b), S/FOAA, 2008, Division J, P.L.110-161, 26 December 2007.

- ◇ Sections 688(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary of State, in consultation with the World Intellectual Property Organization, to provide equipment and training for law enforcement, provide training for judges and prosecutors, and providing assistance in complying with obligations under applicable international treaties and agreements on copyright and intellectual property.
- The reporting requirements of section 1404, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L.110-252, 30 June 2008, shall apply to the funds made available by this Act. This report is to now include a description of modifications, if any, to the security strategy of the Palestinian Authority.
  - ◇ Section 1404 requires a semi-annual report from the Secretary of State to the congressional appropriations committees on US provided assistance for the training of Palestinian security forces to include detailed descriptions of the training, curriculum, and equipment provided; an assessment of the training and the performance of the forces after training has been completed; and description of the assistance that has been pledged and provided to the Palestinian security forces by other donors.
- The provision of assistance which is comparable to assistance made available under INCLE but which provided under other provision of law shall be provided IAW the provisions of sections 481(b) and 622(c), FAA.
  - ◇ Section 481(b), FAA, states the Secretary of State shall be responsible for coordinating all USG assistance to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or trafficking.
  - ◇ Section 622(c), FAA, states the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs to include but not limited to determining whether there shall be such assistance for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and aboard and the US foreign policy is best served thereby.
- Table 7 provides the estimated INCLE funding allocations for FY2012 along with actual allocations for FY2011 and requested funding for FY2013.

**Table 7**

**International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

Program	FY2011	FY2012	FY2013
<b>Africa</b>	<b>\$61,368</b>	<b>\$85,900</b>	<b>\$74,947</b>
DR of the Congo	6,000	6,000	5,250
Ghana	500		
Guinea	500		
Kenya	2,000	2,000	1,800
Liberia	16,000	17,000	15,662
Mozambique	500	500	500
Nigeria	1,250		
Somalia		2,000	1,800
South Africa	2,000	3,000	2,000
South Sudan	15,000	32,000	27,404
Sudan	2,000		2,000
Tanzania	450	450	450
Uganda	235	600	581
Africa Regional	4,933	22,350	17,500
<b>E.Asia &amp; Pacific</b>	<b>\$17,885</b>	<b>\$24,645</b>	<b>\$18,682</b>

China	800	800	800
Indonesia	10,520	11,550	10,066
Laos	1,000	1,000	1,000
Malaysia			800
Philippines	2,065	2,450	2,450
Thailand	1,740	1,740	1,466
Timor-Leste	660	660	660
Vietnam		550	450
E.Asia & Pac Reg	1,100	5,895	990
<b>Europe &amp; Eurasia</b>			<b>\$48,633</b>
Albania			4,450
Armenia			2,824
Azerbaijan			1,226
Bosnia & Herzegovina			6,735
Georgia			4,000
Kosovo			10,674
Macedonia			1,663
Moldova			3,230
Montenegro			1,826
Russia			4,182
Serbia			3,000
Ukraine			4,100
Eurasia Reg			323
Europe Reg			400
<b>Near East</b>	<b>\$290,340</b>	<b>\$135,395</b>	<b>\$107,894</b>
Egypt	1,000		7,894
Iraq	114,560		
Jordan	250	500	
Lebanon	19,500	25,000	15,500
Morocco	750	1,500	1,500
Tunisia	1,500		8,000
West Bank/Gaza	150,000	100,000	70,000
Yemen	1,750	7,395	4,000
Trans-Sahar C/T	1,030	1,000	1,000
South & Central Asia	\$522,558	\$12,814	\$554,619
Afghanistan	400,000		400,000
Bangladesh	350	674	674
Kazakhstan			1,471
Kyrgyz Rep			6,156
Nepal	3,700	3,700	3,330
Pakistan	114,298		124,000
Sri Lanka		1,440	1,440

Tajikistan			7,255
Turkmenistan			550
Uzbekistan			743
South & Central Asia Reg	4,210	7,000	9,000
<b>Western Hemisphere</b>	<b>\$506,220</b>	<b>\$568,270</b>	<b>\$476,450</b>
Argentina	300	300	
Bolivia	15,000	7,500	5,000
Brazil	1,000	3,000	2,000
Colombia	204,000	160,600	142,000
Ecuador	4,500	4,500	4,500
Guatemala	3,992	5,000	2,000
Haiti	19,420	19,420	17,500
Mexico	117,000	248,500	199,000
Paraguay	500	500	150
Peru	31,500	28,950	23,300
Western Hemi Reg	109,008	90,000	81,000
<b>Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons</b>	<b>\$16,233</b>	<b>\$18,720</b>	<b>\$18,720</b>
<b>INCLE Affairs</b>	<b>\$179,202</b>	<b>\$190,356</b>	<b>\$156,557</b>
Alien Smuggling	1,000	1,000	750
Anti-Moey Laund	4,150	4,150	3,600
Critical Flt Safety	16,250	16,250	12,385
Civilian Policing	4,000	4,000	3,800
Crim Youth Gangs	7,000	7,000	3,000
Cyber Crime	3,750	5,000	3,500
Demand Reduction	12,500	12,500	12,500
Fighting Corruption	4,750	5,004	3,900
Intl Law Enf Acad	34,000	31,300	24,000
Inter-reg Aviation	57,052	53,652	46,322
Intl Organizations	4,500	5,000	4,500
Intl Org Crime	1,000	1,000	750
Intl Police PKO		10,000	5,000
Prog Dev & Support	29,250	34,500	32,500
<b>Mid East Resp Fund</b>		<b>\$25,000</b>	
<b>Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)</b>		<b>\$943,605</b>	<b>\$1,050,000</b>
Iraq		500,000	850,000
Yemen		3,605	
Afghanistan		324,000	200,000
Pakistan		116,000	
<b>Total INCLE</b>	<b>\$1,593,806</b>	<b>\$2,004,705</b>	<b>\$2,506,502</b>

**Title IV, International Security Assistance, Department of State: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) Programs**

- Appropriation of \$590,113,000 for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of part II, chapter 8, FAA, for anti-terrorism assistance; part II, chapter 9, FAA, for nonproliferation and Export Control assistance; section 504, FREEDOM Support Act (FSA); section 23, AECA; or the FAA for demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small arms, and related activities, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including activities implemented through nongovernmental and international organizations; and section 301, FAA, for a voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and for a US contribution to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Preparatory Commission.
  - ◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, appropriated an additional \$120,657,000 in NADR Programs assistance to remain available through 30 September 2013.

- FY2012 NADR funding available for Antiterrorism Assistance and Export Control Assistance shall remain available through FY2013.
- Not more than \$30,000,000 may be available for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and remain available until expended subject to prior consultation and regular notification procedures to the congressional appropriations committees.
  - ◊ Such funds may also be used for such countries other than the Independent States of the former Soviet Union and international organizations when it is in the US/national security interest to do so.
- FY2012 NADR funds may be made available to the IAEA unless the Secretary of State determines that Israel is being denied its right to participate in the activities of that agency.
- FY2012 NADR funds may be made available for public-private partnerships for conventional weapons and mine action by grant, cooperative agreement or contract.
- Table 8 provides the estimated NADR Program funding allocations for FY2012 along with actual allocations for FY2011 and requested funding for FY2013.

**Table 8**

**Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) Allocations [\$ in thousands]**

<b>Program</b>	<b>FY2011</b>	<b>FY2012</b>	<b>FY2013</b>
<b>Nonproliferation Programs</b>	<b>\$309,758</b>	<b>\$293,829</b>	<b>\$281,360</b>
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund	53,263	30,000	30,000
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance	59,984	60,909	55,000
Global Threat Reduction	70,088	68,978	63,560
IAEA Contribution	79,500	85,900	90,000
CTBT Intl Monitoring System	33,000	33,000	33,000
WMD Terrorism	2,000	6,042	5,000
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Fund	3,000	1,5000	1,1350
CTBTO Preparatory Commission-Special Contributions	8,923	7,500	3,450

<b>Anti-Terrorism Programs</b>	<b>\$286,691</b>	<b>\$146,284</b>	<b>\$228,308</b>
Antiterrorism Assistance	199,691	79,284	166,380
Countering Violent Extremism	15,000		4,500
Terrorist Interdiction Program	42,500	42,000	34,341
CT Engagement with Allies	9,500	8,000	7,000
Counterterrorism Financing	20,450	17,000	16,087
<b>Regional Stability and Humanitarian Assistance</b>	<b>\$142,071</b>	<b>\$150,000</b>	<b>\$136,000</b>
Conventional Weapons Destruction	135,247	150,000	126,000
International Trust Fund	6,824		
<b>Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)</b>		<b>\$120,657</b>	
<b>Total NADR</b>	<b>\$738,520</b>	<b>\$710,770</b>	<b>\$635,668</b>

### **Other S/FOAA for FY2012**

The following includes FY2012 appropriations for programs also funded by division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, that may be of interest to the security cooperation community.

#### **Title I Department of State and Related Agency, Department of State, Administration of Foreign Affairs**

##### **Diplomatic and Consular Programs**

- \$6,550,947,000 for necessary expenses of the Department of State and the Foreign Service not otherwise provided for, of which up to \$1,355,000,000 is to remain available until expended for Worldwide Security Protection.
  - ◊ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, Department of State*, appropriates an addition \$4,389,064,000 for Diplomatic and Consular Programs to remain available through FY2013, of which however \$236,201,000 is to remain available until expended for Worldwide Security Protection.
- The heading of “Civilian Stabilization Initiative” in titles I and II of prior S/FOAAs is to be retitled

“Conflict Stabilization Operations,” with up to \$35,000,000 in FY2012 funding for Diplomatic and Consular Programs to be available until expended may be transferred and available within this new heading of Conflict Stabilization Operations.

##### **Payment to the American Institute of Taiwan**

\$21,108,000 for necessary expenses to carry out the Taiwan Relations Act, P.L.96-8, 10 April 1979.

##### **International Organizations**

###### **Contributions to International Organizations**

- \$1,449,700,000 for necessary expenses not otherwise provide for to meet annual obligations of membership in international multilateral organizations pursuant to treaties ratified pursuant to the advice and consent of the Senate, conventions or specific acts of Congress.
  - ◊ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, Department of State*, appropriates an additional \$101,300,000 under this heading.

### **Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities**

- \$1,828,182,000 for necessary expenses to pay assessed and other expenses of international peacekeeping activities directed to the maintenance or restoration of international peace of which 15 percent shall remain available through FY2013.

### **Title III, Bilateral Economic Assistance, Funds Appropriated to the President**

#### **Development Assistance**

- \$2,519,950,000 for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of sections 103, 105, 106, and 214, FAA; sections 251-255, FAA; and part I, chapter 10, FAA, all to remain available through FY2013.

#### **International Disaster Assistance**

- \$825,000,000 to remain available until expended for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 491, FAA, for international disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance.
  - ◇ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, Department of State*, appropriates an additional \$150,000,000 under the same heading but to remain available only through FY2013.

#### **Transition Initiatives**

- \$50,141,000 to remain available until expended for necessary expenses for international disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance pursuant to section 491, FAA, to support transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis
  - ◇ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, Department of State*, appropriates an additional \$6,554,000 under the same heading but to remain available only through FY2013.

#### **Complex Crises Fund**

- \$10,000,000 to remain available until expended for necessary expenses to carry out the provision of the FAA enabling the Administrator, USAID, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to support programs and activities to prevent or

respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas.

- ◇ *Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, Department of State*, appropriates an additional \$30,000,000 under the same heading but to remain available only through FY2013.

#### **Democracy Fund**

- \$114,770,000 to remain available through FY2013 for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of the FAA for the promotion of democracy globally.
  - ◇ \$68,000,000 of this amount shall be made available for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
  - ◇ The remaining \$46,770,000 shall be made available for the Office of Democracy and Governance of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance within USAID.

#### **Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)**

- \$626,718,000 to remain available through FY2013 to carry out the provisions of the FAA, the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L.102-511, 24 October 1992, and the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L.101-179, 28 September 89, for assistance and for related programs for countries identified in section 3, FREEDOM Support Act, and section 3(c), SEED Act.

#### **Department of State, Migration and Refugee Assistance**

- \$1,639,100,000 to remain available until expended for necessary expenses enabling the Secretary of State to carry out the provisions of sections 2(a) and (b), Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962, and other activities to meet refugee and migration needs
  - ◇ \$20,000,000 of this amount shall be made available for refugees resettling in Israel.

- ◇ Not less than \$35,000,000 of this amount shall be made available to respond to small-scale emergency humanitarian requirements.

### **US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund**

- \$27,200,000 to remain available until expended for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 2(c), Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962.

### **Title VII, General Provisions**

#### **Unobligated Balances Report (Section 7002)**

- Any USG department or agency to which funds are appropriated or otherwise made available by this act shall provide a quarterly accounting to the congressional appropriations committees of cumulative unobligated balances and obligated, but unexpended, balances by program, project, and activity, and Treasury Account Fund Symbol of all funds received by such agency in FY2012 or any previous fiscal year.

#### **Prohibition against Direct Funding for Certain Countries (Section 7007)**

- None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to Title III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria.

#### **Coups d'Etat (Section 7008)**

- None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree or, after the date of enactment of this act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role. Such assistance may resume if the President determines and certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance, a democratically elected government has taken office.

### **Reporting Requirement (Section 7010)**

- The Secretary of State shall provide a quarterly written report, starting not later than 1 April 2012, to the congressional appropriations committees on the uses of FMFP, IMET, PKO, and PCCF funds. The report shall include a description of the obligation and expenditure of funds, and the specific country in receipt of, and the use or purpose of the assistance provided by such funds.

### **Availability of Funds (Section 7011)**

- No funding appropriated by this act shall remain available for obligation after FY2012 unless expressly so provided in this act.
- However, FY2012 funds for the purposes of, inter alia, part II, chapter 8 (INCLE), part I, chapters 4 (ESF), 5 (IMET), 6 (PKO), 8 (Antiterrorism), and 9 (NADR), FAA, section 23 (FMFP), AECA, and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia shall remain available for four years from the date on which the availability of such funds would have otherwise have expired, if the funds are initially obligated before their respective periods of availability contained in this act.

### **Limitation on Assistance to Countries in Default (Section 7012)**

- No part of any appropriation in titles III through VI in this act shall be used to furnish assistance to any country which is in default during a period in excess of one calendar year in payment to the US of principal or interest on any loan made to the country by the US pursuant to a program for which funds are appropriated under this act unless the President determines following consultations with the congressional appropriations committees that such assistance for the country is in the US national interest.

### **Prohibition on Taxation of US Assistance (Section 7013)**

- None of the funds appropriated by titles III through VI of this act may be made available to provide assistance to a country under a new bilateral agreement governing the terms and conditions under which such assistance is to be provided unless such agreement includes a provision stating that US assistance shall be exempt from taxation, or reimbursed, by the government. The Secretary of State shall

expeditiously seek to negotiate amendments to existing bilateral agreements, as necessary, to conform to this requirement.

- An amount equivalent to 200 percent of the total taxes assessed during FY2012 by a government or entity against commodities financed under US assistance programs for which funds are appropriated by this act, either directly or through grantees, contractors, and subcontractors, as of the date of enactment of this act, shall be withheld from obligation from funds appropriated for assistance for FY2013 and allocated for the central government of that country and for the West Bank and Gaza Program to the extent that the Secretary of State certifies and reports in writing to the congressional appropriations committees that such taxes have not been reimbursed to the US.
- Foreign taxes of a “de minimis” nature [so insignificant or minimal that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case] are not subject to these reimbursement provisions.
- Funds withheld from obligation for each country or entity shall be reprogrammed for assistance to countries which do not assess taxes on US assistance or which have an effective arrangement that is providing substantial reimbursement of such taxes.
- The provisions of this section shall not apply to any country or entity the Secretary of State determines does not assess taxes on US assistance or has an effective arrangement that is providing substantial reimbursement of such taxes, or US foreign policy interests outweigh the policy of this section.
- The Secretary of State shall issue rules, regulations, or policy guidance, as appropriate, to implement the prohibition against the taxation of US assistance.
  - ◊ DSCA Policy Memo 04-32, 21 August 2004, Subject: Prohibition on Taxation of US Assistance, was published as SAMM E-Change 19 to DOD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) providing a mandatory prohibition note for FMS case LOAs, amendments, and modifications financed with any type of US assistance funding. This same memo also provided a sample contract clause to be used

for direct commercial sales (DCS) contracts that are financed with US assistance funding.

- ◊ DSCA Policy Memo 10-10, 01 December 2010, Subject: Update of Letter Of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms and Conditions, was published as SAMM E-Change 139 to DOD 5108.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM), updating the standard terms and conditions in figure C5.F3, SAMM, effective 1 January 2011 on FMS LOAs. This includes standard term and condition 4.4.11 within the financial section exempting the FMS sale funded by the USG from all value added taxes and customs duties imposed by the country or for a required reimbursement by the purchasing country.
- The terms “taxes” and “taxation” refer to value added taxes (VAT) and customs duties imposed on commodities financed with US assistance for programs for which funds are appropriated by this act.

#### **Reservations of Funds (Section 7014)**

- Funds appropriated under titles II through VI of this act, which are specifically designated, may be reprogrammed for other programs within the same account notwithstanding the designation if compliance with the designation is made impossible by operation of any provision of this or any other act. Any such reprogramming is subject to regular notification procedures of the congressional appropriations committees.

#### **Notification Requirements (Section 7015)**

- None of the funds made available under Titles II through VI and VIII to include, inter alia, INCLE, Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, ESF, PKO, FMFP, IMET, and PCCF shall be available for obligation for activities, programs, projects, type of material assistance, countries, or other operations not justified or in excess of the amount justified to the appropriations committees for obligation under any of these specific headings unless the congressional appropriations committees are notified fifteen days in advance.
- The President shall not enter into any commitment of any FMFP funds for the provision of major defense equipment (MDE) other than conventional ammunition, or other major defense

items defined to be aircraft, ships, missiles, or combat vehicles, not previously justified to Congress or 20 percent in excess of the quantities justified to Congress unless the congressional appropriations committees are notified fifteen days in advance of such commitment.

- ◊ This notification requirement or any other similar provision of any other act shall not apply to any reprogramming for an activity, program, or project for which funds are appropriated under titles II through IV of this act of less than 10 percent of the amount previously justified to Congress for such obligation for current fiscal year.
- ◊ Further, this notification requirement or any other similar provision of any other Act may be waived if failure to do so would pose a substantial risk to human health or welfare. However, the required notification shall be provided as early as practicable but in no event later than three days after the waiver action.
- None of the funds appropriated under titles III through VI and VIII of this act shall be obligated or expended for assistance for **Serbia, Sudan, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Cuba, Iran, Haiti, Libya, Ethiopia, Nepal, Colombia, Honduras, Burma, Yemen, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Russian Federation, Somalia, Sri Lanka, or Cambodia** except as provided through congressional appropriations committees regular notification procedures.

#### **Notification on Excess Defense Equipment (Section 7016)**

- Prior to providing excess defense articles (EDA) in accordance with section 516(a), FAA, the DOD shall notify the appropriations committees to the same extent and under the same conditions as are other committees pursuant to section 516(f), FAA.
- Before issuing a letter of offer (an FMS LOA) to sell EDA under the AECA, DOD shall notify the appropriations committees in accordance with the regular notification procedures of such committees if the defense articles are significant military equipment (SME) or valued (in terms of original acquisition cost) at \$7,000,000 or more, or if the notification is required elsewhere in this

Act for the use of appropriated funds for specific countries that would receive such EDA. The notification is to include the original acquisition cost of such defense articles.

#### **Allocations (Section 7019)**

- Funds provided in this act shall be made available for programs and countries in the amounts contained in the respective tables included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying this act.
  - ◊ These tables are included in the conference report Division I, H.Rpt. 112-331, 15 December 2011.
  - ◊ Any proposed deviations are subject to the regular notification procedures of the appropriations committees.

#### **Prohibition of Payment of Certain Expenses (Section 7020)**

- No FY2012 appropriations or otherwise made available for FFMP, IMET or ESF may be obligated or expended to pay for:
  - ◊ Alcoholic beverages
  - ◊ Entertainment expenses for activities that are substantially of a recreational character, including but not limited to entrance fees at sporting events, theatrical and musical productions, and amusement parks.

#### **Prohibition on Assistance to Governments Supporting International Terrorism (Section 7021)**

- Within section 7021(a)
  - ◊ None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by titles III through VI of this act may be available to any foreign government which provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for the purposes of section 6(j), Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979.
  - ◊ This prohibition shall terminate twelve months after that government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section applies with respect to lethal equipment provided under a contract entered into after 1 October 1997.
  - ◊ The prohibition may be waived if the President determines that such assistance is important to

the US national interest. When exercised, the President shall submit to the appropriations committees a report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance detailing the assistance to be provided, including the estimated dollar amount of the assistance, and an explanation of how the assistance furthers US national interests.

- Within section 7021(b):
  - ◊ Funds appropriated for bilateral assistance in titles III through VI of this act and funds appropriated under any such title in prior S/FOAAs shall not be made available to any government which the President determines:
    - » Grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism,
    - » Otherwise supports international terrorism
    - » Is controlled by an organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219, Immigration and Nationality Act.
  - ◊ This prohibition is waiverable if the President determines that national security or humanitarian reasons so justifies. Each waiver such waiver is to be published in the Federal Register and notified to the congressional appropriations committees at least fifteen days prior to the waiver takes effect.

### **Authorization Requirements (Section 7022)**

- Funds appropriated by this act, except under the Trade and Development Agency heading, may be obligated and expended notwithstanding section 10, P.L.91-672, section 15, State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, section 313, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, P.L.103-236, and section 504(a)(1), National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 414(a)(1)].

### **Definition of Program, Project, and Activity (Section 7023)**

- For the purposes of title II through VI of this act, “program, project, and activity” shall be defined at the appropriations act account level and shall include all appropriations and authorizations Acts funding directives, ceilings, and limitations with the exception that the ESF and FMFP accounts shall also be considered to include

country, regional, and central program level funding within each account, either as:

- ◊ Justified to the Congress or
- ◊ Allocated by the Executive Branch IAW a report to be provided to the congressional appropriations committees within thirty days of enactment of this act as required by section 653(a), FAA.

### **Eligibility for Assistance (Section 7027)**

- Restrictions contained in this act or any other act with respect to assistance for a country shall not be construed to restrict assistance in support of programs of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from funds appropriated by this act to carry out provisions of part I, chapters 1, 10, 11, and 12, FAA; part II, chapter 4 (ESF), FAA; and from funds appropriated under “Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia.”
- However, before using this authority to provide assistance to NGOs, the President shall notify the appropriations committees using regular notification procedures.
  - ◊ This section shall not apply with respect to section 620A, FAA, prohibiting assistance to governments supporting terrorism.
  - ◊ This section shall not apply with respect to section 116, FAA, prohibiting assistance to governments that violation internationally recognized human rights.

### **Financial Management and Budget Transparency (Section 7031)**

- Within section 7031(b), National Budget and Contract Transparency:
  - ◊ None of the funds appropriated under titles III and IV of this act may be made available to the central government of a country that does not meet minimum standards of fiscal transparency as developed, updated, and strengthened by the Secretary of State.
    - » The Secretary of State may waive this transparency requirement on a country by country basis if the Secretary reports to the congressional appropriations committees it is important to US national interests.
    - » This waiver is to identify any steps taken by the government of that country to publicly disclose its national budget and contracts which are in addition to those which were

undertaken in previous fiscal years. Also include specific recommendations of short and long-term steps such government can take to improve budgetary transparency, and identify benchmarks for measuring progress.

- Within section 7031(c), Anti-Kleptocracy:
  - ◊ Any officials of a foreign government and their immediate family members who the Secretary of State has credible information having been involved in significant corruption, including corruption related to the extraction of natural resources, shall be ineligible for entry into the US.
  - ◊ This prohibition is waivable by the Secretary of State if determined to serve a compelling national interest or that the circumstances have significantly changed.
  - ◊ Individuals shall not be ineligible if entry into the US would further important US law enforcement objectives or is necessary to permit the US to fulfill its obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement.

### **Multi-Year Commitments (Section 7033)**

- None of the funds appropriated by this act may be used to make a future year funding pledge for any multilateral or bilateral program funded by titles III through VI of this act, unless such pledge was:
  - ◊ Previously justified in a congressional budget justification,
  - ◊ Included in the Act making the appropriations for the S/FOAA or previously authorized by an act of Congress
  - ◊ Notified IAW regular notification procedures of the congressional appropriations committees, or
  - ◊ The subject of prior consultation with the congressional appropriations committees and such consultation was conducted at least seven days in advance of the pledge.

### **Special Provisions (Section 7034)**

- Within section 7034(d), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
  - ◊ Funds appropriated by this Act and prior S/FOAAs under the headings of ESF, PKO, International Disaster Assistance, and Transition Initiatives should be made available

to support programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former members of foreign terrorist organizations into civilian society.

- Within section 7034(f), Contingencies
  - ◊ During FY2012, the President may use up to \$50,000,000 under the authority of section 451, FAA, which already authorizes the use of up to \$25,000,000 in a fiscal year for unanticipated contingencies.
- Within section 7034(k), Modification of Amendment.
  - ◊ Redesignates section 620J, FAA, Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces, originally from section 651, P.L.110-61, 26 December 2007, to now section 620M, thus removing duplication with the “first” section 620J, Depleted Uranium Ammunition, originally placed into the FAA by section 149, P.L.104-164, 21 July 1996.
    - » The new section 620M is often referred to as the “Leahy Amendment” requiring the vetting of individuals or units for possible human rights violations prior to receiving US assistance.
    - » The new section 620M, FAA, was also amended to read as follows:

“Section 620M, Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces.

(a) In General.—No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.

(b) Exception.—The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

(c) Duty to Inform.—In the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the Secretary of State shall promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for

such action and shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice.

(d) Credible Information.—The Secretary shall establish, and periodically update, procedures to—

(1) ensure that for each country the Department of State has a current list of all security force units receiving United State training, equipment, or other types of assistance;

(2) facilitate receipt by the Department of State and United States embassies of information from individuals and organizations outside of the United States Government about gross violations of human rights by security force units;

(3) routinely request and obtain such information from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, and other United States Government sources;

(4) ensure that such information is evaluated and preserved;

(5) ensure that when vetting an individual for eligibility to receive United States training the individual's unit is also vetted;

(6) seek to identify the unit involved when credible information of a gross violation exists but the identity of the unit is lacking; and

(7) make publicly available, to the maximum extent practicable, the identity of those units for which no assistance shall be furnished to subsection (a).”

- Within section 7034(1), the following older FAA sections are repealed:
  - ◊ Section 494, Disaster Relief Assistance.
  - ◊ Section 495, Cyprus Relief and Rehabilitation.
  - ◊ Section 495B, Italy Relief and Rehabilitation.
  - ◊ Section 495C, Lebanon Relief and Rehabilitation.
  - ◊ Section 495D, Romanian Relief and Rehabilitation.

- ◊ Section 495E, Turkey Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction.

- ◊ Section 495F, African Rehabilitation and Resettlement.

- ◊ Section 495G, Special Caribbean Hurricane Relief Assistance.

- ◊ Section 495H, Cambodian Disaster Relief Assistance.

- ◊ Section 495I, Assistance for Displaced Persons in Central America.

- ◊ Section 495J, Lebanon Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction Assistance.

- ◊ Section 495K, African Famine Assistance.

- Within section 7034(o), Government Expenditures, no funds appropriated under title III and under INCLE in this act, should not be made available for assistance for any government for programs or activities in FY2013 if the Secretary of State or the Administrator, US AID, has credible information that such government is reducing its own expenditures for such programs or activities as a result of the assistance provided and for reasons that are inconsistent with the purposes of such assistance.

#### **Limitations on Assistance for the Palestinian Authority (Section 7040)**

- No FY12 ESF funding may be obligated or expended with respect to providing funds to the Palestinian Authority.
  - ◊ This prohibition shall not apply if the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the appropriations committees that a waiver is important to US national security interests. This waiver shall be effective for no more than six months at a time and shall not apply beyond twelve months after enactment of this act.
    - » Any such waiver shall include a report to the appropriations committees detailing waiver justification, purposes for the fund, and the accounting procedures to be in place to ensure funds are properly disbursed. This report shall also detail the steps the Palestinian Authority has taken to arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons, and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.

- » Any such waiver shall also include a certification and report from the Secretary of State to the appropriations committees prior to obligation of funds that the Palestinian Authority has established a single treasury account for all Palestinian Authority financing and all financing mechanisms flow through this account, no parallel financing mechanisms exist outside of the Palestinian Authority treasury account, and there is a single comprehensive civil service roster and payroll.
- None of the funds appropriated in titles III through VI of this act may be obligated for salaries of personnel of the Palestinian Authority located in Gaza or may be obligated or expended for assistance to Hamas or any entity effectively controlled by Hamas, any power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which Hamas exercises undue influence.
  - ◊ If the President certifies and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that all of its ministers or such equivalent has publicly accepted and is complying with the principles contained in sections 620K(b)(1) (A) and (B), FAA, assistance may be provided to a power-sharing government.
- None of the funds appropriated under titles III and VI of this act may be obligated for assistance for the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

#### **Near East (Section 7041)**

- Within section 7041(a), **Egypt.**
  - ◊ None of the funds appropriated under titles III and IV of this act and in prior acts making appropriations for the Department of State may be made available for assistance for the central government of Egypt unless the Secretary of State certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.
  - ◊ Prior to the obligation of FY2012 FMFP funds, the Secretary of State shall certify to the congressional appropriations committees that Egypt is supporting the transition to civilian government including the holding of free and fair elections, implementing polices to protect freedom of expression, association and religion, and due process of law.
- Within section 7041(d), **Iraq.**
  - ◊ The Secretary of State may waive these prohibitions if determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees with detailed justification that it is in the US national security interest to do so.
  - ◊ The Secretary of State is to consult with the congressional appropriations committees prior to the transfer of FY2012 FMFP funds to an interest-bearing account for Egypt.
- Within section 7041(d), **Iraq.**
  - ◊ Funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this act for Iraq assistance shall be made available in a manner that uses Iraqi entities to the maximum extent practicable and IAW the cost-sharing and other requirements in the Department of State's 9 April 2009 "Guidelines for Government of Iraq Financial Participation in United States Government-Funded Civilian Foreign Assistance Programs and Projects."
  - ◊ Funds appropriated by titles III and VI for Iraqi assistance may be made available for Iraq notwithstanding any other provision of law except this subsection and new section 620M, FAA, Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces.
  - ◊ FY2012 ESF funding assistance for Iraq shall be made available for programs and activities for which policy justifications and decisions shall be the responsibility of the US Chief of Mission in Iraq.
- Within section 7041(e), **Lebanon.**
  - ◊ No FY2012 funds appropriated by this act may be made available for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) if it is controlled by a terrorist organization as defined by section 219, Immigration and Nationality Act.
  - ◊ FY2012 FMFP funds for assistance to Lebanon may be made available only to professionalize the LAF and to strengthen border security and combat terrorism. These funds may not be made available for obligation until the Secretary of State submits a detailed spending plan to the congressional appropriations committees not to be submitted later than 30 September 2012.
  - ◊ Funds appropriated by titles III and VI for Iraqi assistance may be made available for

Lebanon notwithstanding any other provision of law except this subsection and new section 620M, FAA, Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces.

- Within section 7041(f), **Libya**.
  - ◊ Of the funds appropriated by this act and prior S/FOAAs, up to \$20,000,000 should be made available to promote democracy, transparent and accountable governance, human rights, transitional justice, and the rule of law in Libya and for exchange programs between Libya and American students and professionals. Such funds shall be made available, to the maximum extent practicable, on a cost matching basis.
  - ◊ No funds appropriated by this act may be made available for infrastructure projects in Libya except on a loan basis with terms favorable to the US and only after consultations with the congressional appropriations committees.
- Within section 7041(g), **Morocco**.
  - ◊ Prior to the obligation of FY2012 FMFP funds for Morocco, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the congressional appropriations committees on steps being taken by the government of Morocco to:
    - » Respect the right of individuals to peacefully express their opinions regarding the status and future of the Western Sahara and to document human rights violations, and
    - » Provide unimpeded access to human rights organizations, journalists, and representatives of foreign governments to the Western Sahara.
- Within section 7041(h), **Syria**.
  - ◊ FY2012 funds shall be made available to promote democracy and protect human rights in Syria, a portion of which should be programmed in consultation with governments in the region as appropriate.
- Within section 7041(i), **Yemen**.
  - ◊ No funds appropriated by this act may be made available for the armed forces of Yemen if such forces are controlled by a foreign terrorist organization as defined by section 219, Immigration and Nationality Act.

### **Serbia (Section 7042)**

- The Secretary of State is to submit a report to the congressional appropriations committees that the government of Serbia is cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to include apprehending and transferring indictees and providing investigators access to witnesses, documents, and other information.
  - ◊ Except for humanitarian assistance or assistance to promote democracy, funds appropriated by this act may be made available for assistance to the central government of Serbia after 31 May 2012 if the referenced report has been submitted.
  - ◊ After 31 May 2012, the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the US executive directors of international financial institutions to support loans and assistance to the government of Serbia subject to the condition for submitting the referenced report.

### **Africa (Section 7043)**

- Within section 7043(a), Conflict Minerals.
  - ◊ FY2012 FMFP may be available for assistance to Rwanda or Uganda unless the Secretary of State has credible information that the governments of Rwanda or Uganda is providing political, military, or financial support to armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are involved in the illegal exportation of minerals out of the DRC or have violated human rights.
- Within section 7043(b), Counterterrorism Programs.
  - ◊ Of the funds appropriated by this act, not less than \$52,800,000 should be made available for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program and not less than \$21,300,000 should be made available for the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism program.
- Within section 7043(d), Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET).
  - ◊ FY2012 IMET for **Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Zimbabwe** are to be only used for training related to international peacekeeping operations and E-IMET. This limitation is not to apply to courses that

- support training in maritime security for Angola and Cameroon.
- ◊ No FY2012 IMET may be made available for **Equatorial Guinea** or **Somalia**.
  - Within section 7043(e), **Ethiopia**.
    - ◊ No FY2012 FMFP funding shall be available for Ethiopia unless the Secretary of State:
      - » Certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that the government of Ethiopia is implementing policies to respect due process and freedoms of expression and association, and is permitting access to human rights and humanitarian organizations to the Somalia region of Ethiopia, and
      - » Submits a report on the types and amounts of US training and equipment proposed to be provided to include steps to ensure that such assistance is not provided to military units or personnel that have violated human rights and steps taken by the government of Ethiopia to investigate and prosecute members of the military who have been credibly alleged to have violated such rights.
    - ◊ This prohibition shall not apply to assistance to the military efforts in support of international PKO, counterterrorism operations along the Somalia border, and for assistance to the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College.
  - Within section 7043(f), **Sudan** Limitation on Assistance.
    - ◊ None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for the government of Sudan.
      - » This prohibition shall not apply to humanitarian assistance, assistance for the Darfur region, Southern Korofan/Nuba Mountain State, Blue Nile State, other marginalized areas and populations in Sudan, and Abyei.
      - » Likewise, this prohibition does not apply to assistance to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), mutual arrangements related to post-referendum issues associated with the CPA, or to promote peace and stability between Sudan and South Sudan, or any other internationally recognized viable peace agreement in Sudan.
  - Within section 7043(g), **South Sudan**.
    - ◊ FY2012 funds should be made available for assistance to South Sudan including increasing agricultural productivity, expand educational opportunities especially for girls, strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, and enhance the capacity of the federal legislative assembly to conduct oversight over government revenues and expenditures.
  - Within section 7043(h), **Uganda**.
    - ◊ Funds appropriated by this Act should be made available for programs and activities in areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
  - Within section 7043(i), War Crimes in **Africa**.
    - ◊ Funds appropriated by this act may be made available for assistance for the central government of a country in which individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) are credibly alleged to be living if the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that such government is cooperating with the ICTR and SCSL.
      - » This subsection shall not apply to assistance provided IAW section 551, FAA (PKO), or to project assistance under title VI of this act.
      - » This prohibition may be waived on a country by country basis if the President determines it is in the US national security interest and prior to the waiver reports to the congressional appropriations committees to include justifications for the waiver, the steps being taken to obtain any cooperation of the government, and a strategy for bringing the indictee before such a court.
  - Within section 7043(j), **Zimbabwe**.
    - ◊ None of the funds appropriated by this act shall be available for assistance for the central government of Zimbabwe except for health, education, and macroeconomic growth assistance.
      - » This prohibition may be set aside if the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that rule of law has been

restored in Zimbabwe including respect for ownership and title of property, freedom of speech, and association.

### **Asia (Section 7044)**

- Within section 7044(a), **Tibet.**

- ◊ FY2012 ESF assistance shall be made available to nongovernmental organizations to support activities which preserve cultural traditions and promote sustainable development and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China.

- Within section 7044(b), **Burma.**

- ◊ FY2012 ESF assistance may be available for Burma except no such funds are to be available to the State Peace and Development Council, or its successor, and its affiliated organizations.

- ◊ ESF assistance shall be made available for programs along Burma's borders and for Burmese groups and organizations located outside Burma, and may be available to support programs in Burma.

- ◊ In addition to assistance for Burmese refugees appropriated under the Migration and Refugee Assistance heading in this act, funds shall be available for community-based organizations operating in Thailand to provide food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance to internally displace persons in Eastern Burma.

- Within section 7044(c), **Cambodia.**

- ◊ Funds made available in this Act for a US contribution to a Khmer Rouge tribunal may only be made available if the Secretary of State certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that the UN and the government of Cambodia are taking credible steps to address allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the tribunal.

- Within section 7044(d), **Indonesia.**

- ◊ Of the FY2012 FMFP appropriations available for assistance to Indonesia, \$2,000,000 may not be obligated until the Secretary of State submits a report to the congressional appropriations committees required by S.Rpt 112-85, 22 September 2011, under the FMFP heading regarding Indonesia. This report is to include:

- » Steps taken by Indonesia in the previous twelve months to revise its Code of Military Justice, Uniform Criminal Code, and other relevant statutes to deny promotion, suspend from active service, and/or prosecute and appropriately punish military officers credibly alleged to have violated human rights, and to refine further the missions and develop an appropriate national defense budget to carry out that mission;

- » Efforts by the military in the previous twelve months to cooperate with civilian judicial authorities to resolve cases of violations of human rights;

- » Efforts by the military in the previous twelve months to implement reforms that increase the transparency and accountability of the military's operations and financial management and concrete steps taken to achieve divestment of all military businesses; and

- » Whether the government of Indonesia is allowing public access to Papua, including foreign diplomats, NGOs, and journalists, and respecting due process and freedoms of expression and association in Papua.

- Within section 7044(e), **North Korea.**

- ◊ No FY2012 ESF funding may be used for energy-related assistance for North Korea.

- Within section 7044(f), **People's Republic of China.**

- ◊ No funds appropriated under the Diplomatic and Consular Programs heading in this act may be obligated or expended for processing licenses for the export of US-origin satellites, including commercial satellites and satellite components, to the PRC unless the congressional appropriations committees are notified of the proposed action at least fifteen days in advance.

- ◊ The terms and requirements of section 620(h), FAA, shall apply to foreign assistance projects or activities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to include such projects or activities by any entity that is owned or controlled by or an affiliate of the PLA.

- » Section 620(h), FAA, directs the President to adopt regulations and establish procedures to ensure that US foreign aid

is not used in a manner which, contrary to the best interests of the US, promotes or assists the foreign aid projects or activities of any communist country.

- ◇ No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to finance any grant, contract, or cooperative agreement with the PLA or any entity that the Secretary of State has reason to believe is owned or controlled by the PLA or any of its affiliates.
- Within section 7044(g), **Philippines.**
  - ◇ Of the FY2012 FMFP appropriations available for assistance to Philippines, \$3,000,000 may not be obligated until the Secretary of State submits a report to the congressional appropriations committees required by S.Rpt 112-85, 22 September 2011, under the FMFP heading regarding the Philippines. This report is to include that:
    - » The government of the Philippines is taking effective steps to prosecute those responsible for extra-judicial executions (EJE), sustain the decline in the number of EJEs, and strengthen government institutions working to eliminate EJEs.
    - » The government of the Philippines is implementing a policy of promoting military personnel who demonstrate professionalism and respect for internationally recognized human rights, and is investigating, prosecuting, and punishing military personnel and others who have been credibly alleged to have violated such rights, and
    - » The Philippine military does not have a policy of, and is not engaging, acts of violence or intimidation against members of legal organizations who advocate for human rights.
- Within section 7044(h), **Vietnam.**
  - ◇ ESF funds shall be made available for remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam, and may be made available for assistance for the government of Vietnam including the military for such purposes.
  - ◇ Development Assistance funds shall likewise be made available for related health/disability activities.

## **Western Hemisphere (Section 7045)**

- Within section 7045(a), **Colombia.**
  - ◇ Funds appropriated by this act and made available to the Department of State for assistance to the government of Colombia may be used to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, illegal armed groups, and organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations, and successor organizations, and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations.
    - » No US armed forces personnel or US civilian contractor employed by the US will participate in combat operations in connection with assistance made available by this act for Colombia.
  - ◇ Rotary and fixed wing aircraft supported with INCLE funds for assistance to Colombia may be used for aerial or manual drug eradication and interdiction including to transport personnel and supplies and to provide security for such operations.
    - » Such aircraft may also be used to provide transport in support of alternative development programs and investigations by civilian judicial authorities.
    - » The President shall ensure that if any helicopter procured with funds in this Act or prior S/FOAAs is used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense group, paramilitary organization, or other illegal armed group in Colombia, such helicopter shall be immediately returned to the US.
    - » Any complaints of harms to health or licit crops caused by aerial eradication shall be thoroughly investigated and evaluated, and fair compensation paid in a timely manner for meritorious claims.
    - » Funds may not be made available for aerial eradication unless programs are being implemented by USAID, the government of Colombia, or other organizations in consultation and coordination with local communities to provide alternative sources of income in areas where security permits for small-acreage growers and

communities whose illicit crops are targeted for aerial eradication.

- » Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used for aerial eradication in Colombia's national parks or reserves unless the Secretary of State certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that there are no effective alternatives and the eradication is IAW Colombian laws.
- ◇ No funds appropriated by this act or prior S/FOAAs may be made available for assistance for the Colombian Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad or successor organizations.
- ◇ No funds appropriated by this act for assistance to Colombia shall be made available for the cultivation or processing of African oil palm, if doing so would contribute to significant loss of native species, disrupt or contaminate natural water sources, reduce local food security, or cause the forced displacement of local people.
- ◇ Of the funds appropriated by this Act for assistance for the Colombian armed forces, 25 percent may be obligated only after the Secretary of State consults with and subsequently certifies and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that the government of Colombia and the Colombian armed forces are meeting the conditions that appear under this section in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanied this Act.
  - » This withholding action does not apply to FY2012 INCLE funding for continued support for Critical Flight Safety Program or for any alternative development programs in Colombia administered by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs within the Department of State.
- ◇ No visas are to be issued to any alien determined to have willfully provided any support or benefitted from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) or other illegal armed groups. Also, no visa is to be issued to any alien who has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise

participated in the commission of a human rights violation in Colombia.

- » The Secretary of State may waive this prohibition if certified to the congressional appropriations committees on a case-by-case basis that issuance of the visa is necessary to support the peace process in Colombia or for urgent humanitarian reasons.
- Within section 7045(b), **Guatemala.**
  - ◇ FY2012, FMFP and IMET funding assistance may only be available for the Guatemalan Air Force, Navy, and Army Corps of Engineers.
  - ◇ FY2012 Expanded IMET may be made available for assistance for the Guatemalan Army.
- Within section 7045(c), **Haiti.**
  - ◇ The government of Haiti shall be eligible to purchase defense articles and services IAW the AECA for the Coast Guard.
- Within section 7045(d), **Honduras.**
  - ◇ Prior to the obligation of 20 percent of the funds appropriated by this Act that are available for the Honduran military and police forces, the Secretary of State shall report in writing to the congressional appropriations committees the government of Honduras is implementing policies to protect freedom of expression and association, and due process of law; and is investigating and prosecuting in civilian justice system, IAW Honduran and international law, military and police personnel who are credibly alleged to have violated human rights, and the Honduran military and police are cooperating with civilian judicial authorities in such case.
  - ◇ This subsection restriction is not to apply to assistance to promote transparency, anticorruption, and the rule of law within the military and police forces.
- Within section 7045(e), **Mexico.**
  - ◇ Identical to the previous Honduran restrictions, prior to the obligation of 15 percent of the funds appropriated by this act that are available for the Mexican military and police forces, the Secretary of State shall report in writing to the congressional appropriations committees the government of Mexico is implementing policies to protect freedom of expression and association, and

due process of law; and is investigating and prosecuting in civilian justice system, IAW Mexican and international law, military and police personnel who are credibly alleged to have violated human rights, and the Mexican military and police are cooperating with civilian judicial authorities in such case.

- ◊ This subsection restriction is not to apply to assistance to promote transparency, anticorruption and the rule of law within the military and police forces.
- Within section 7045(f), Trade Capacity.
  - ◊ Not less than \$10,000,000 of FY2012 appropriations for Development Assistance and not less than \$10,000,000 of FY2012 appropriations for ESF shall be made available for labor and environmental capacity building activities relating to free trade agreements with countries of **Central America, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.**
- Finally, within section 7045(g), **Aircraft Operations and Maintenance.**
  - ◊ To the maximum extent practicable, the costs of operations and maintenance, including fuel, of aircraft funded by this fund should be borne by the recipient country.

### **South Asia (Section 7046)**

- Within section 7046(a), **Afghanistan.**
  - ◊ No FY2012 ESF or INCLE funding may be obligated until the Secretary of State, in consultation with Administrator, USAID, certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that:
    - » The funds will be used to design and support programs IAW the June 2011 “Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance for USAID in Afghanistan.”
    - » The government of Afghanistan is:
      - ◆ Reducing corruption and improving governance
      - ◆ Taking credible steps to protect the human rights of women, and
      - ◆ Taking steps to facilitate active public participation in governance and oversight.
    - » Funds will be used to support and strengthen the capacity of Afghan public and private institutions and entities to reduce corruption and to improve transparency

and accountability of national, provincial, and local governments.

- » Representatives of Afghan national, provincial, or local governments and local communities and civil society organizations, including women-led organizations will be consulted and participate in the design of programs, projects, and activities.
- ◊ Funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for Afghanistan made be available as a US contribution to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that the World Bank Monitoring Agent of the ARTF is unable to conduct its financial and audit responsibilities due to restrictions on security personnel by the government of Afghanistan.
- ◊ ESF and INCLE funds that are made available for Afghanistan:
  - » Shall be made available to the maximum extent practicable in a manner that emphasizes the participation of Afghan women, and directly improves the security, economic and social well-being, and political status, and protects the rights of Afghan women and girls and complies with later sections 7060 and 7061 of this act.
  - » May be made available for a US contribution to an internationally managed fund to support the reconciliation with and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into Afghan society of former combatants who have renounced violence against the government of Afghanistan, but only if:
    - ◆ Afghan women are participating at national, provincial, and local levels of government in the design, policy formulation and implementation of such programs and such process upholds steps taken by Afghanistan to protect the human rights of Afghan women, and
    - ◆ Such funds will not be used to support any pardon or immunity from prosecution or any position in the

- government of Afghanistan or security forces for any leader of an armed group responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, or acts of terrorism, and
  - ◆ May be made available for a US contribution to the NATO/ISAF post-operations Humanitarian Relief Fund.
  - » The authority within section 1102(c), P.L.111-32, 24 June 2009, allowing the purchase of Afghanistan-origin products and services, shall continue to apply to funding from this act.
  - » Not less than \$50,000,000 in funds appropriated by this Act for Afghanistan assistance shall be available for rule of law programs.
- Within section 7046(b), **Nepal**.
  - ◇ FY2012 FMFP funding assistance for Nepal may only be made available if the Secretary of State certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that the Nepal Army is:
    - » Cooperating fully with investigations and prosecutions of violations of human rights by civilian judicial authorities, and
    - » Working constructively to redefine the Army's mission and adjust its size accordingly, implement reforms including strengthening the capacity of the civilian ministry of defense to improve budget transparency and accountability, and facilitate the integration of former rebel combatants into the security forces including the Army, consistent with the goals of reconciliation, peace and stability.
  - ◇ This funding prohibition shall not apply to humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities in Nepal.
- Within section 7046(c), **Pakistan**.
  - ◇ No FY2012 ESF, INCLE, FMFP, or PCCF may not be made available for assistance to Pakistan unless the Secretary of State certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that the government of Pakistan is:
    - » Cooperating with the US in counterterrorism efforts against specified terror groups, including steps to end support for such groups and prevent them from basing operating in Pakistan and carrying out cross border attacks in neighboring countries;
  - » Not supporting terrorist activities against US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, also that military and intelligence agencies are not intervening extra-judicially into political and judicial processes in Pakistan;
  - » Dismantling improvised explosive devices networks and interdicting precursor chemicals use in their manufacture;
  - » Preventing the proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;
  - » Issuing visas in a timely manner for US visitors engaged in counterterrorism efforts and assistance programs; and
  - » Providing humanitarian organizations access to detainees, internally displaced persons, and other Pakistani civilians affected by the conflict.
  - ◇ The Secretary of State may waive the requirements of this certification if to do so in the in the US national security interest.
  - ◇ FY2012 FMFP funding assistance is only to support counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities in Pakistan subject to the Leahy vetting requirements of new section 620M, FAA.
  - ◇ FY2012 ESF for Pakistan should be made available to interdict precursor materials from Pakistan to Afghanistan that are used for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. This is to include support programs for training border and customs officials in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for agricultural extension programs that encourage alternative fertilizer use among Pakistani farmers.
  - ◇ \$10,000,000 of FY2012 ESF shall be made available through the DOS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for human rights and democracy programs in Pakistan.
  - ◇ Funds appropriated under titles III and IV of this act for assistance to Pakistan may be available notwithstanding any other provision of law except the Leahy vetting requirements of new section 620M, FAA.
- Within section 7046(d), **Sri Lanka**.
  - ◇ No FY2012 FMFP funding assistance, no DCS export license may be issued, and no military equipment or technology may

be made available to Sri Lanka unless the Secretary of State certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that the government of Sri Lanka is:

- » Conducting credible, thorough investigations of alleged war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law by government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam;
  - » Bringing to justice individuals who have been credibly alleged to have committed such violations;
  - » Supporting and cooperating with any UN investigation of alleged war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law;
  - » Respecting due process, the rights of journalists and the rights of citizens to peaceful expression and association, including ending arrest and detention under emergency regulations;
  - » Providing access to detainees by humanitarian organizations; and
  - » Implementing policies to promote reconciliation and justice including devolution of power.
- ◇ This prohibition shall not apply to assistance for humanitarian demining and aerial and maritime surveillance.
  - ◇ Once the certification is provided, FY2012 FMFP funding assistance should be used to support the recruitment and training of Tamils into the Sri Lankan military, Tamil language training for Sinhalese military personnel, and human rights training for all military personnel.
- Within section 7046(e), Regional Cross Border Programs.
    - ◇ FY2012 ESF for assistance to **Afghanistan** and **Pakistan** may be provided notwithstanding any other provisions of law that restricts assistance to countries for cross border stabilization and development programs between the two countries, or between either country and the Central Asian republics.

### **War Crimes Tribunals Drawdown (Section 7048)**

- If the President determines that doing so will contribute to a just resolution of charges regarding

genocide or other violations of international humanitarian law, may direct a drawdown IAW section 552(c), FAA, of up to \$30,000,000 of commodities and services for the **UN War Crimes Tribunal** established with regard for the former Yugoslavia or other such tribunals or commissions as the UN Security Council may establish or authorize without regard to the ceiling limitation (\$25,000,000) contained in section 552(c)(2), FAA.

- This determination is in lieu of any determinations required under section 522(c), FAA.

### **Community-Based Police Assistance (Section 7050)**

- Funds made available by titles III and IV of this act to carry out the provisions of title I, chapter 1 (development assistance), and title II, chapters 4 (ESF) and 6 (PKO), FAA, may be used, notwithstanding Sec. 660, FAA (prohibiting police training), to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of **civilian police** authority through training and technical assistance in human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, strategic planning, and through assistance to foster civilian police roles that support democratic governance including assistance for programs to prevent conflict, respond to disasters, address gender-based violence, and foster improved police relations with the community.

### **Attendance at International Conferences (Section 7051)**

- No funds made available by this act may be used to send or otherwise pay for the attendance of more than fifty US government employees stationed in the US at any single **international conference** occurring outside the US unless the Secretary of State reports to the congressional appropriations committees at least five days in advance that such attendance is important to US national interest.

### **Aircraft Transfer and Coordination (Section 7052)**

- Notwithstanding any other provision of law or regulation, aircraft procured with funds appropriated by this Act or prior Acts for S/FOAAs for Diplomatic and Consular Programs, INCLE, Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI),

and Andean Counter-drug Programs may be used for any other program and in any region, including for the transport of active and standby Civilian Response Corps personnel and equipment during a deployment.

- The responsibility for policy decisions and justification for the use of this transfer authority shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State and not further delegated.
- This authority shall only apply after the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees that the equipment is no longer required to meet programmatic purposes in the designated country or region.
- The **uses of aircraft** purchased or leased by the DOS or USAID with funds made available by this Act or prior S/FOAAs shall be coordinated under the authority of the applicable Chief of Mission.
- Such aircraft may be used not a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis to transport federal and non-federal employees supporting DOS and USAID programs and activities.
- Official travel for other agencies for other purposes may be supported on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis when traveling on a space available basis.
- This limitation shall only apply to aircraft which the primary purpose is the transport of personnel.

#### **Parking Fines and Real Property Taxes Owed by Foreign Governments (Section 7053)**

- The terms and conditions of section 7055, S/FOAA for FY2010, Division F, P.L.111-117, 16 December 2009, regarding the same subject, are extended through FY2012 prohibiting FY2012 funding assistance to countries owing **unpaid parking tickets and property taxes** in New York City and Washington DC.

#### **Landmines and Cluster Munitions (Section 7054)**

- Within section 7054(a).
  - ◊ Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, demining equipment available to DOS and USAID and used in support of the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance for

humanitarian purposes may be disposed of on a grant basis in countries

- Within section 7054(b).
  - ◊ No military assistance shall be furnished for **cluster munitions**, DCS licenses for cluster munitions may be issued, and no cluster munitions or technology shall be sold or transferred unless:
    - » The sub-munitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than one percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments, and
    - » The agreement applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such munitions or technology will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.

#### **Programs to Promote Gender Equality (Section 7060)**

- Programs funded under title III of this act shall include, where appropriate, efforts to improve the status of women, including through gender considerations in the planning, assessment, implementation, monitoring, and evaluations of such programs

#### **Gender-Based Violence (Section 7061)**

- FY2012 funds appropriated for, inter alia, ESF and INCLE shall be made available for gender-based violence prevention and response efforts.
- Programs and activities funded under Titles III and IV of this Act to train foreign police, judicial, and military personnel, including international peacekeeping operations, shall address, where appropriate, prevention and response to gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.

#### **Central Asia (Section 7063)**

- The terms and conditions of sections 7075(a) through (d) and 7076(a) through (e), S/FOAA for FY2009, Division H, P.L.111-8, 11 March 2009, are to apply for FY2012.
  - ◊ Section 7075(a)-(b), P.L.111-8, applies to assistance for **Kazakhstan** only after the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees of significant improvements in human rights,

civil liberties, elections procedures, media freedom, freedom of religion, free assembly, and minority rights.

- » This prohibition may be waived with US national security determination by the Secretary.
- » Section 7075(c)-(d), P.L.111-8, applies to a required report regarding the use of defense articles and services and financial assistance provided by the US for units of the armed forces, border guards, or other security forces of countries in Central Asia to include **Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.**
- ◇ Section 7076(a)-(e), P.L.111-8, applies to the central government of Uzbekistan requiring the Secretary of State to determine and report to the congressional appropriations committees regarding meeting commitments under the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the US before any US assistance is provided.
  - » This prohibition may be waived by the Secretary for six months periods through FY2013 if determined to be in the national security interest of the US and is necessary in obtaining access to and from Afghanistan.
  - » Also, if the Secretary has credible evidence that any current or former official of the government was responsible for the deliberate killings of civilians in Andijan in May 2005, or for other violations of international recognized human rights in Uzbekistan, the individual shall be ineligible for entry into the US.
    - ◆ The Secretary may waive this entry prohibition if it is determined that it is necessary for the individual to attend the UN, or to further US law enforcement objectives.
  - » US assistance is to also include no provision of excess defense articles; however, the provision of E-IMET is now acceptable.

### **Extradition (Section 7068)**

- Other than INCLE, NADR, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Migration

and Refugee Assistance; no funds in this Act may be used for assistance to the central government of a country which has notified the DOS of its refusal to extradite to the US any individual indicted for a criminal offense for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or for killing a law enforcement officer.

- The Secretary of State may waive this prohibition on a case by case basis once certified to the congressional appropriations committees that such a waiver is important to US national interests.

### **Commercial Leasing of Defense Articles (Section 7069)**

- Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to regular notification procedures of the congressional appropriations committees, FMFP funding may be used to finance commercial leases by Israel, Egypt, NATO and major non-NATO allies from US commercial suppliers.
  - ◇ This may include leasing with an option to purchase.
  - ◇ Other than helicopters and other types of aircraft having possible civilian application, this may not include major defense equipment (MDE).
- The President must determine that there is a compelling foreign policy or national security reasons for such a lease.

### **Prohibition on First-Class Travel (Section 7073)**

- No funds made available in this act may be used for first-class travel by employees of agencies by this Act in contravention of 41 CFR 301-10.122 through 301-10.124.

### **Operating and Spend Plans (Section 7078)**

- Not later than thirty days of enactment of this act, each department, agency, or organization funded in titles I through III of this act, shall submit to the congressional appropriations committees an operating plan for the appropriated funds or funds otherwise available for obligation in FY2012. The plan is to provide details of the use of such funds at the program, project, and activity level.
- Prior to initial obligation of funds, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, shall submit a detailed spend plan for the following:

- ◇ Funds appropriated under Democracy Fund,
- ◇ Funds made available in titles III and IV of this act for assistance for Iraq, Haiti, Colombia, and Mexico and for the Central American Regional Security Initiative and for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
- ◇ Funds made available for assistance for countries or programs and activities referenced in the following sections of this Act:
  - » Section 7040–Palestinian Authority.
  - » Section 7041(a), (e), (f), and (i)–Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen.
  - » Section 7043(b)–Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism Program.
  - » Section 7046(a) and (c)–Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  - » Funds appropriated in title III for food security and agriculture development programs and for environment programs.
- ◇ The spend plans required by this section shall not be considered as meeting the notification requirements of section 7015 of this act or section 634A, FAA.

### **Rescissions (Section 7079)**

- Of the prior S/FOAAs, the following amounts are rescinded:
- \$13,700,000 from Diplomatic and Consular Programs, of which \$8,000,000 shall be from Worldwide Security Protection.
- \$400,000,000 from unexpended balances of Export and Investment Assistance, Export-Import Bank of the US, subsidy Appropriation.
- \$100,000,000 from unexpended balances of ESF.

### **Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) (Section 7080)**

- \$100,000,000 from the FMS Administrative Fund authorized for obligation by title IV, FMFP, of this act pursuant to section 21(e)(1)(A), AECA, may be transferred to the SDAF pursuant to section 51, AECA.
- Not more than \$100,000,000 may be obligated pursuant to section 51(c)(2), AECA, for the purposes of SDAF to remain available for obligation through FY2015.

- The provision of defense articles and services to countries or international organizations from SDAF shall be subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

### **Limitations (Section 7086)**

- No FY2012 ESF funding assistance may be made available to the Palestinian Authority if the Palestinians obtain, after enactment of this Act, the same standing as member states or full membership as a state in the UN or any specialized agency thereof outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.
- The Secretary of State may waive this prohibition if certified to the congressional appropriations committees that to do so is in the US national security interest and submits a report detailing how the waiver and the continuation of assistance would assist in furthering Middle East peace.

### **Use of Funds in Contravention of this Act (Section 7087)**

- If the Executive Branch makes a determination not to comply with any provision of this Act on constitutional grounds, the head of the relevant federal agency shall notify the congressional appropriations committees in writing within five days of such determination, the basis for such determination, and any resulting changes to program and policy.

### **Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations/ Global War on Terrorism**

- Table 9 provides the additional FY2012 appropriations made in support of requested Overseas Contingency Operations.

**Table 9**  
**Overseas Contingency Operations Appropriations**

Program	Funding
Diplomatic and Consular Programs	\$4,389,064,000
Worldwide Security Protection (\$236,201,000)	
Avail for transfer for ops and assistance in Afghanistan (\$230,000,000)	
Conflict Stabilization Operations	8,500,000
Office of Inspector General	67,182,000
Iraq reconstruction oversight (\$19,545,000)	
Afghanistan reconstruction oversight (\$44,387,000)	
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs	15,600,000
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance	33,000,000
Contributions to International Organizations	101,300,000
International Broadcasting Operations	4,400,000
US Institute of Peace	8,411,000
USAID Operating Expenses	255,000,000
USAID Inspector General	4,500,000
International Disaster Assistance	150,000,000
Transition Initiatives	6,554,000
Complex Crises Fund	30,000,000
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	2,761,462,000
Migration and Refugee Assistance	229,000,000
International Affairs Tech Assistance	1,552,000
Int'l Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	983,605,000
Nonproliferation, A/T, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR)	120,657,000
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	81,000,000
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)	1,102,000,000
Pak Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)	850,000,000

**General Provisions**

**Section 8001**

- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated under this title are in addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise made available in this act for FY2012.

**Section 8002**

- Unless otherwise provided for in this act, the additional amounts appropriated by this title to appropriations accounts in this act shall be available under the authorities and conditions applicable to such appropriations accounts

**Section 8003**

- Funds appropriated by this title under the headings, inter alia, ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, FMFP, and PCCF, may be transferred to, and merged with, funds appropriated by this title under such headings.
- Such transfers are subject to the regular notification procedures of the congressional appropriations committees.
- The transfer authority in this section is in addition to any transfer authority otherwise available under any other provision of law, including section 610, FAA.

## **Section 8004**

- If authorized during FY2012, there shall be established in the US Treasury the **Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)**.
- The GSCF was later authorized by section 1207, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011.
- Notwithstanding any provision of law, during FY2012, not to exceed \$50,000,000 from funds appropriated under INCLE, FMFP, and PCCF under Title VIII of this Act may be transferred to the GSCF.
- This authority is to be implemented with the transfer of \$50,000,000 from the FY2012 INCLE, FMFP and PCCF appropriation.
- Not later than fifteen days prior to such transfer, the Secretary of State is notify the congressional appropriations committees to include the source of funds and a detailed justification, implementation plan, and time line for each proposed project.

## **Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012, Division A, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2011**

- The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) originally passed and reported out the DOD appropriations bill as HR2219 on 14 June 2011 with H.Rpt. 112-110, later to be passed by the House on 8 July 2011. The Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) passed and reported out HR2219 on 15 September 2011 with S.Rpt.112-77. The Senate never took action on HR2219.
- Similar to the S/FOAA for FY2012, the final DOD appropriations bill was incorporated in HR2055, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, as Division A, to be finally enacted on 23 December 2011 as P.L.112-74.

## **Title II, Operation and Maintenance**

### **Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide**

- \$47,026,000 may be used for the **Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)** authorized by 10 U.S.C. 166a.

## **Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid**

- \$107,662,000 to remain available through FY2013 for expenses related to the **Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDCA)** programs provided under 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561.

## **Cooperative Threat Reduction Account**

- \$508,219,000 to remain available through FY2014 for assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union and, with appropriate authorization by DOD and DOS, to countries outside the former Soviet Union for the elimination, demilitarization, transportation, safe storage, and/or nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and its components and technology.
  - ◇ \$13,500,000 shall be available only to support the dismantling and disposal of nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East and North.

## **Title VI, Other Department of Defense Programs**

### **Defense Health Program**

- Of the total appropriation of \$32,482,059,000, an amount of \$8,000,000 shall be available for **HIV prevention educational activities** undertaken in connection with US military training, exercises, and humanitarian assistance activities conducted primarily in African nations.

### **Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense**

- \$1,209,620,000 for DOD drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.

## **Title VIII, General Provisions**

### **Foreign National Employee Compensation (Section 8002)**

- During FY2012, provisions of law prohibiting the payment of compensation to, or employment of, any person not a citizen of the US shall not apply to DOD personnel.
- Salary increases granted to direct and indirect hire DOD **foreign national employees** funded by this Act shall not be at a rate in excess of the percentage increase authorized by law for DOD civilian employees whose pay is computed under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 5332, or at a rate in

excess of the percentage increase provided by the appropriate host nation to its own employees, whichever is higher.

- This section shall not apply to DOD foreign service national employees serving at US diplomatic missions whose pay is set by the Department of State under the Foreign Service Act of 1980.
- The limitations of this provision shall not apply to DOD foreign national employees in the **Republic of Turkey**.

### ***Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (Section 8011)***

- Within the funds appropriated for the operation and maintenance of the armed forces, funds are hereby appropriated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401 for humanitarian and civic costs under 10 U.S.C. chapter 20. Such funds may also be obligated for **humanitarian and civic costs** incidental to authorized operations and pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401. These obligations shall be reported as required by 10 U.S.C. 401(d).
- Funds available for operation and maintenance shall be available for providing humanitarian and similar assistance by using Civic Action Teams in the **Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and freely associated states of Micronesia** pursuant to the Compact of Free Association authorized by P.L.99-239.
- When determined by the Secretary of the Army that such action is beneficial for graduate medical education programs conducted at army medical facilities located in Hawaii, the Secretary may authorize the provision of medical services at such facilities and transportation, on a non-reimbursable basis, for civilian patients from **American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and Guam**.

### ***Contributions from the Government of Kuwait (Section 8021)***

During FY2012, DOD is authorized to incur obligations not to exceed \$350,000,000 for purposes specified in 10 U.S.C. 2350j(c) in anticipation of receipt of contributions only from the government of **Kuwait**. Upon receipt of such contributions, the funding shall be credited to the appropriations or fund which incurred such obligations.

### ***Congressional Defense Committees (Section 8025)***

- For the purposes of this act, congressional defense committees include the armed services committees of the House (HASC) and Senate (SASC) and the appropriations subcommittees for defense of the House (HAC-D) and Senate (SAC-D).

### ***Assistance for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Section 8042)***

- No funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this act may be obligated or expended for assistance to the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** unless specifically appropriated for that purpose.

### ***Drug Interdiction or Counter-Drug Activities (Section 8045)***

- No funds available to DOD for any fiscal year for drug interdiction or counter-drug activities may be transferred to any other US department or agency except as specifically provided in an appropriations law.
- No funds available to the CIA for any fiscal year for **drug interdiction or counter-drug activities** may be transferred to any other US department or agency except as specifically provided in an appropriations law.

### ***Defense Funding for the Transfer of Defense Articles or Services to another Country or International Organization (Section 8049)***

- No FY2012 DOD funds may be obligated or expended to **transfer defense articles or services** (other than intelligence services) to another country or international organization for below specified activities unless the defense and foreign relations committees are notified fifteen days in advance of the transfer.
  - ◊ The specified activities include any **international peacekeeping, peace-enforcement or humanitarian assistance operation**, or similar UN activities under an authority of the UN Security Council resolution or any other international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian assistance operation.
- This notification shall include a description of the transfer, value of the transfer, a statement whether

the inventory requirements of all elements of the US armed forces, including the reserve components, for the type of transfer have been met; and whether the items to be transferred will have to be replaced. If replacement is required, how does the President propose to provide the funds for such replacement.

### ***F-22A Advanced Tactical Fighter (Section 8056)***

- No FY2012 DOD funds may be used to approve or license the **sale of the F-22A** advanced tactical fighter to any foreign government.
- DOD may conduct or participate in studies, research, design and other activities to define and develop a future export version of the F-22A that protects classified and sensitive information, technologies and US war fighting capabilities.

### ***Procurement from Foreign Sources (Section 8057)***

- The Secretary of Defense, on a case by case basis, may waive with respect to a foreign country each limitation on the procurement of defense items from foreign sources provided in law, if determined that the application of the limitation with respect to that country would invalidate cooperative programs entered into between DOD and the foreign country, or would invalidate reciprocal trade agreements for the procurement of defense items entered into under 10 U.S.C. 2531, and the country does not discriminate against the same or similar defense items procured in the US for that country. This Section applies with respect to:
  - ◇ Contracts and subcontracts entered into on or after enactment of this act, and
  - ◇ Options for the procurement of items that are exercised after such enactment date under contracts that were entered into before such enactment if the option prices are adjusted for any reason other than the application of this waiver authority.
- This waiver authority does not exist for certain listed items.

### ***Training with Foreign Security Force Units (Section 8058)***

- No FY2012 DOD funds may be used to support any **training program involving a unit of the security forces** of a country if the Secretary

of Defense has received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.

- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall ensure that prior to a decision to conduct any such training, full consideration is given to all credible information available to the Department of State relating to human rights violations by foreign security forces.
- After consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense may waive this prohibition if determined such waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.
- Not more than fifteen days after such waiver, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees describing the extraordinary circumstances, the purpose and duration of the training program, US and foreign forces involved in the training, and the information relating to human violations that necessitated the waiver.

### ***Israeli Cooperative Programs (Section 8071)***

- \$235,700,000 of the FY2012 DOD funds appropriated under Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-Wide shall be made available for the **Israeli Cooperative Program**.
  - ◇ \$110,525,000 shall be for the Short Range Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD) program, including cruise missile defense research and development
    - » \$15,000,000 of this amount shall be for the production activities of the SRBMD in the US and Israel.
  - ◇ \$66,220,000 shall be available for an upper-tier component to the Israeli Missile Defense Architecture
  - ◇ \$58,955,000 shall be for the Arrow System Improvement Program including development of a long range, ground and airborne, detection suite
- These funds for the production of missiles and missile components may be transferred to appropriations available for the procurement of weapons and equipment, to be merged with and to be available for the same time period and the same purposes as the appropriation to which transferred.

- This transfer authority is in addition to any other transfer authority in this act.

### **Asia Pacific Regional Initiative Program (Section 8086)**

- Up to \$15,000,000 in funding appropriated under Operation and Maintenance, Navy may be made available for the **Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) Program** for the purpose of enabling the Pacific Command to execute Theater Security Cooperation activities such as humanitarian assistance and payment of incremental and personnel costs of training and exercising with foreign security forces.
- This funding made available for this purpose may be used, notwithstanding any other funding authorities for humanitarian assistance, security assistance, or combined exercise expenses.
- None of this funding may be obligated to provide assistance to a country that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law.

### **Global Security Contingency Fund (Section 8089)**

- During FY2012, an amount not to exceed \$200,000,000 may be transferred from the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide to the Department of State **Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)**
- No less than thirty days prior to making transfers to the DOS GSCF, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the defense committees in writing with the source of funds and a detailed justification, execution plan, and timeline for each proposed project.

### **Non-Support of Military Training or Operations that include Child Soldiers (Section 8128)**

- No funds made available by this Act for IMET, FMFP, EDA, assistance IAW section 1206, P.L.109-163, issuance [of export licenses] for DCS of military equipment, or PKO for the countries of **Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burma** may be used to support any military training or operations that include child soldiers as defined by the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, Title IV, P.L.110-457, 23 December 2008.
- No waiver authority is provided.

### **Title IX, Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation and Maintenance**

#### **Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide**

- An additional amount of \$9,252,211,000 for O&M, Defense-Wide
  - ◊ Of which not to exceed \$1,690,000,000 to remain available through FY2013 for payments to reimburse key cooperating nations for logistical, military, and other support, including access, provided to US military operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and post-operation Iraq border security related to activities of the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq, all notwithstanding any other provision of law.
    - » Such reimbursement payments may be made in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), may determine, in his discretion, based on documentation determined by the Secretary of Defense to adequately account for the support provided, and such determination is final and conclusive upon the US accounting officers, and fifteen days following notification to the appropriate congressional committees.
    - » These funds may be used for the purpose of providing specialized training and procuring supplies and specialized equipment and providing such supplies and loaning such equipment on a non-reimbursable basis to coalition forces supporting US military operations in **Afghanistan**.
    - » A fifteen-day advance notification to the appropriate congressional committees must be provided with required quarterly usage reports of such authority.

#### **Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)**

- \$400,000,000 to remain available through FY2013 for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) to be available for infrastructure projects in Afghanistan to be undertaken by the Secretary of State, unless the Secretaries of State and

Defense jointly decide that a specific project will be undertaken by DOD.

- Infrastructure projects are to be in support of the counterinsurgency strategy requiring funding for facility and infrastructure projects including, but not limited to, water, power, and transportation projects and related maintenance.
- The projects are to be jointly formulated and concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense.
- Funding may be transferred to DOS for such projects and considered to be economic assistance under the FAA. Any unexpended funding shall be transferred back to the AIF
  - ◊ The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than fifteen days prior to funds transfers to or from the AIF or obligations from the Fund. The appropriate committees are to include both armed services, appropriations, and foreign affairs committees.

#### ***Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)***

- \$11,200,000,000 to remain available through FY2013 available to the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, or the Secretary’s designee, to provide assistance with the concurrence of the Secretary State to the **security forces of Afghanistan**.
  - ◊ This assistance may include the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction, and funding.
  - ◊ This authority is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign nations.
  - ◊ Not fewer than fifteen days prior to obligating from this appropriation, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of details of any such obligations.

#### ***Other Department of Defense Programs***

##### ***Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense***

- An additional \$456,458,000 to remain available through FY2013.

#### ***General Provision—This Title***

##### ***AIF and ASFF Administrative Costs (Section 9003)***

- Supervision and administration costs associated with a construction project funded with O&M appropriations available for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) or the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provided in this Act and executed in direct support of overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan may be obligated at the time a construction contract is awarded.
- For the purpose of this section, supervision and administrative costs include all in-house government costs.

##### ***Commander’s Emergency Response Program (Section 9005)***

- Not more than \$400,000,000 of Army O&M appropriated under this title may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to fund the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for enabling military commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements.
  - ◊ No project is to exceed \$20,000,000.
  - ◊ Any project exceeding anticipated cost for completion of \$5,000,000 is to be notified to the congressional defense committees not less than fifteen days prior to making funding available.

##### ***Coalition Force Support (Section 9006)***

- DOD O&M funds may be used, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, to provide supplies, services, transportation, including airlift and sealift, and other logistical **support to coalition forces** supporting military and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

##### ***Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (Section 9009)***

- No funds provided for Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) may be obligated prior to the approval of a financial and activity plan by the DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC).
  - ◊ The AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any services requirements

in excess of \$50,000,000 annually and any non-standard equipment requirements in excess of \$100,000,000 using ASFF.

- The AROC must approve all projects and the execution plan under the Afghanistan Infrastructure (AIF) and any project in excess of \$5,000,000 from the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).
- DOD must certify to the congressional defense committees that the AROC has convened and approved a process for ensuring compliance of this Section and an accompanying report language for the ASFF, AIF, and CERP.
- The AROC was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 3 August 2011 to oversee the use of CERP, AIF, and ASFF within DOD at a senior level. The initial plan is for the AROC to meet quarterly with working groups meeting on a weekly basis to oversee ongoing planning, execution, and oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction resources. The major reference is a joint statement by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L and the Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, before the SASC, subcommittee on Readiness and Management, on 19 October 2011, Subj: "Transforming Wartime Contracting Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Contracting."

#### **Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (Section 9012)**

- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, up to \$150,000,000 in title IX, O&M, Army for Overseas Contingency Operations, may be obligated and expended for purposes of the **Task Force for Business and Stability Operations** subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to carry out strategic business and economic assistance activities in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
- Not less than fifteen days before making funds available pursuant to this Section for any project with a total anticipated cost of \$5,000,000 or more, the Secretary shall submit a written notice to the congressional defense committees containing a detailed justification and time line for each proposed project.

#### **Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (Section 9013)**

- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, up to \$524,000,000 in title IX, O&M, Air Force for Overseas Contingency Operations, may be used by the Secretary of Defense to support US government transition activities in Iraq by funding the operations and activities of the **Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq** and security assistance teams, including life support, transportation and personal security, and facilities renovation and construction.

#### **Reduced Appropriations (Section 9014)**

- Reflecting reduced troop strength in theater, \$4,042,500,000 is reduced within title IX (Overseas Contingency Operations) of this act. The reduction shall be applied to the military personnel and operation and maintenance (O&M) appropriations.

#### **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011**

- HR1540 was introduced in the House on 14 April 2011 to be later reported out of the HASC on 17 May 2011 with H.Rpt. 112-78. A supplemental report was filed by the HASC on 23 May 2011 as H.Rpt. 112-78, part II. The House almost immediately passed the bill on 26 May 2011.
- S981 was introduced in the Senate on 12 May 2011 but it never was reported out of the SASC. A follow-on S1867 was introduced and reported out of the SASC on 15 November 11 without a report. S1867 was incorporated into H1540 as an amendment and passed by the Senate on 1 December 2011. A conference was held and reported out on 12 December 2011 with H.Rpt. 112-329. The conference report was agreed upon by the House on 14 December 2011 and the Senate on 15 December 2011.
- HR1540 was enacted on 31 December 2011 as P.L.112-81 with Division A being the Department of Defense authorization for FY2012.

**Division A—Department of Defense  
Authorizations**

**Title I—Procurement**

**Subtitle E—Joint and Multiservice Matters**

**Limitation on Availability of Funds for  
Aviation Foreign Internal Defense Program  
(Section 142)**

- Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for FY2012 for the procurement of fixed-wing non-standard aviation aircraft in support of the aviation foreign internal defense program, not more than 50 percent may be obligated or expended until the date that is thirty days after the date on which the Commander, US Special Operation Command submits a report not later than 15 March 2012 to the congressional defense committees to include:
  - ◊ Overall description of the program, including its goals and proposed metrics of performance success
  - ◊ Analysis of alternatives and efficiencies reviews for contracts awarded,
  - ◊ Assessment of advantages and disadvantages of procuring new aircraft, procuring used aircraft, or leasing aircraft,
  - ◊ Comprehensive strategy outlining and justifying the overall projected growth of aviation foreign national program to satisfy the increased requirements of the GCCs, and
  - ◊ Examination of efficiencies that could be gained by procuring platforms such as those being procured for light mobility aircraft.

**Authority for Exchange with the United Kingdom of specified F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft (Section 147)**

- Authorizes the exchange, to include title, of one US F-35 carrier variant acquired by the US for the USMC for one F-35 short-take off and vertical landing configuration being acquired on behalf of the United Kingdom.

**Title V—Military Personnel Policy**

**Subtitle B—Reserve Component  
Management**

**Leadership of National Guard Bureau  
(Section 511)**

- Amends 10 U.S.C. 10502(d) so that the **Chief of the National Guard Bureau** shall be appointed to the grade of general.

**Membership of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
(Section 512)**

- Amends 10 U.S.C. 151(a) with a new paragraph (7) adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as a member of the **Joint Chiefs of Staff**.

**Title IX—Department of Defense  
Organization and Management**

**Subtitle A—Department of Defense  
Management**

**Qualifications for Appointments to the  
Position of Deputy Secretary of Defense  
(Section 902)**

- Amends 10 U.S.C. 132(a) so that the **Deputy Secretary of Defense** shall be appointed from among persons mostly highly qualified for the position by reason of background and experience, including persons with appropriate management experience.

**Memoranda of Agreement on Identification and Dedication of Enabling Capabilities of General Purpose Forces to fulfill certain Requirements of Special Operations Forces (Section 904)**

- By not later than 180 days of enactment of this act, and annually thereafter, each secretary of a military department shall enter into a memorandum of agreement with the Commander, USSOCOM, that identifies or establishes processes and associated milestones by which numbers and types of enabling capabilities of general purpose forces under the jurisdiction of such secretary can be identified and dedicated to fulfill the training and operational requirements of special operations forces under USSOCOM.

## **Title X—General Provisions**

### **Subtitle B—Counter-Drug Activities**

#### **Extension of Authority for Joint Task Forces to provide Support to Law Enforcement Agencies conducting Counterterrorism (Section 1004)**

- Amends section 1022(b), NDAA for FY2004, as amended, P.L.108-136, 24 November 2003, extending the authority through FY2012 for a joint DOD task force to provide support to law enforcement agencies conducting counterterrorism activities. Any such support is only to be provided in the geographic area of responsibility of the joint task force.

#### **Three-Year Extension and Modification of Authority of Department of Defense to provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Other Governmental Agencies (Section 1005)**

- Amends section 1004, NDAA, FY1991, as amended, P.L.101-510, 5 November 1990, allowing DOD to provide support for counter-drug activities by other government agencies through FY2014.
- Also amends section 1004 allowing such support to Indian tribal law enforcement agencies.

#### **Two-Year Extension and Expansion of Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Certain Foreign Governments (Section 1006)**

- Amends Section 1033, NDAA, FY1998, as amended, P.L.105-85. 18 Nov 1997, allowing DOD to provide additional counter-drug support for up to \$100,000,000 annually through FY2013.
- Also amends Section 1033 to include the following thirteen additional governments:

Benin	Ivory Coast
Nicaragua	Cape Verde
Jamaica	Nigeria
The Gambia	Liberia
Sierra Leone	Ghana
Mauritania	Togo
Guinea	

#### **Extension of Authority to Support Unified Counter-Drug and Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia (Section 1007)**

- Amends section 1021, NDAA, FY2005, as amended, P.L.108-375, 28 Oct 2004, allowing DOD support of the counternarcotics and counterterrorism campaign in **Colombia** through FY2012.

### **Subtitle I—Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations**

#### **Authority for Assignment of Civilian Employees of the Department of Defense as Advisors to Foreign Ministries of Defense (Section 1081)**

- Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to assign DOD civilian employees as **advisors to foreign country ministries of defense** or security agencies serving in a similar defense function in order to:
  - ◇ Provide institutional, ministerial-level of advice, and other training to personnel of the ministry to which assigned in support of stabilization or post-conflict activities, or
  - ◇ Assist such ministry in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense-related processes.
- This authority expires at the end of FY2014
  - ◇ However, the assignment of such US employees may continue after FY2014 using funds available for FYs 2012–14.

#### **Use of State Partnership Program Funds for Certain Purposes (Section 1085)**

- Subject to section 1210, NDAA, FY2010, P.L.111-84, 28 October 2009, of the funds made available to the National Guard, the Secretary of Defense may use up to \$3,000,000 to pay for travel and per diem costs associated with the participation of US and foreign civilian and non-defense agency personnel in conducting activities under the **State Partnership Program (SPP)** of the National Guard.

## **Subtitle J—Other Matters**

### **Expansion of Scope of Humanitarian Demining Assistance Program to include Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance (Section 1092)**

- Amends 10 U.S.C. 407 to also include assistance in the **clearance of stockpiled conventional munitions** in addition to demining assistance.
- The term “stockpiled conventional munitions assistance” as it relates to the support of humanitarian assistance efforts, means training and support in the disposal, demilitarization, physical security, and stockpile management of potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance, and includes activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to explosive remnants of war, and the disposal, demilitarization, physical security, and stockpile management of potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance.

## **Title XII—Matters relating to Foreign Nations**

### **Subtitle A—Assistance and Training**

#### **Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan (Section 1201)**

- Authorizes the use of up to \$400,000,000 in funds made available during FY2012 for DOD Operations and Maintenance for CERP in Afghanistan.
- Any one project is not to exceed \$20,000,000
- The Secretary of Defense is to notify the congressional defense committees fifteen days prior to obligation of any project that is to exceed \$5,000,000.

#### **Three-Year Extension of Temporary Authority to use Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements to lend Military Equipment for Personnel Protection and Survivability (Section 1202)**

- Amends section 1202, NDAA, FY2007, as amended, P.L.109-364, 17 October 2006, extending the authority to **no-cost loan certain significant military equipment** for up to one year using the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing

Agreement (ACSA) to now expire at the end of FY2014.

- Additionally amends section 1202 to only include loans to coalition forces participating in operations in Afghanistan.

#### **Extension and Expansion of Authority for Support of Special Operations to combat Terrorism (Section 1203)**

- Amends section 1208, NDAA, FY2005, as amended, P.L.108-375, 28 October 2004, authorizing the provision of support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaging in supporting or facilitating ongoing US special forces operations to combat terrorism to now an annual value of \$50,000,000 to expire now at the end of FY2015.

#### **Modification and Extension of authorities relating to Program to Build the Capacity of foreign Military Forces (Section 1204)**

- Amends section 1206, NDAA, FY2006, as amended, P.L.109-163, 6 January 2006, authorizing up to \$350,000,000 annually in equipment, supplies, and training assistance through now FY2013 to building the capacity of a country’s national military force to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which US armed forces are a participant. Also used to build the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism.

#### **Two-Year Extension of Authorization for Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery Capabilities (Section 1205)**

- Amends section 943, NDAA, FY2009, P.L.110-417, 14 October 2008, authorizing the annual use of up to \$20,000,000 in DOD-wide Operations and Maintenance funding for support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals to facilitate the recovery of DOD/USCG military or civilian personnel or other personnel who become separate or isolated during US military operations and cannot rejoin their units without such assistance.
- The recipient entities are to also include those conducting activities relating to operational preparation of the environment.
- This authority is extended through now FY2013.

### **Support of Foreign Forces Participating in Operations to Disarm the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Section 1206)**

- Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide up to \$35,000,000 in logistics support, supplies and services annually during FYs 2012 and 2013 for foreign forces participating in operations to mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army to include to:
  - ◊ The national military forces of Uganda, or
  - ◊ The national military forces of any other country determined by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to be participating in such operations.
- No US armed services personnel, civilian employees, or civilian contractor personnel may participate in combat operations except in self-defense, or in the rescue of any US citizen.
- The Secretary of Defense may not use this authority to provide any type of support other is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law.
  - ◊ Likewise, the Secretary may not use this authority to provide support for the national military forces of a country determined to be eligible for such support until the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the eligibility of the country for such support.
  - ◊ The meaning of logistics support, supplies, and services in this authority is that as defined by 10 U.S.C. 2350(1) which generally includes only non-lethal services, logistics support, and part parts but specifically not military equipment designated as significant military equipment (SME) IAW section 38(a), AECA.

### **Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) (Section 1207)**

- Authorizes the establishment of this account in the US Treasury.
- Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than sections 620A [no support of international terrorism] and new 620M [Leahy vetting], FAA), this fund shall be available to either the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State to provide assistance to countries designated by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, for the following purposes:

- ◊ Security Programs: To enhance the capabilities of a country's national military forces, and other national security forces that conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces to:
  - » Conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism operations, and
  - » Participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with US foreign policy and national security interests.
- ◊ Justice Sector and Stabilization Programs: For the justice sector to include law enforcement and prisons, rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country in cases which the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that conflict or instability in a country or region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers for such assistance.
- Assistance for Security Programs may include the provision of equipment, supplies, and training.
  - ◊ These programs shall be jointly formulated by the Secretaries of State and Defense with such programs to be carried out to be approved by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, before implementation.
- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall formulate the Justice Sector and Stabilization Programs with such programs to be carried out be approved by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, before implementation.
- The contribution of the Secretary of State to an activity under this authority shall not be less than 20 percent of the total amount for such activity while the contribution of the Secretary of Defense to such activity shall not be more than 80 percent of the total amount required.
  - ◊ Section 8004, S/FOAA, 2012, division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, authorizes the Secretary of State to use up to \$50,000,000 in FY2012 INCLE, FMFP, and PCCF to be transferred to GSCF during FY2012.

- DOD appropriations for O&M Defense-wide may be transferred to the GSCF with the amount in any one year not to exceed \$200,000,000.
  - ◊ Section 8089, DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, provides for this transfer during FY2012.
- GSCF funds shall remain available through FY2015 except that amounts appropriated or transferred to the fund before 30 September 2015 shall remain available for obligation and expenditure after this date for activities under programs commenced before this date.
- Personnel from other US agencies may be detailed, with or without reimbursement, to the Department of State to carry out the GSCF program.
- Specified congressional committees are to be notified fifteen days prior to any transfer of funds or initiating any GSCF assistance program.
- Likewise, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall notify specified congressional committees fifteen days after the date on which all necessary guidance has been issued and processes for implementation of this GSCF authority are established and fully operational.
- Section 1207(n) of this Act provides a **GSCF Transitional Authority** for the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary State, to provide equipment, supplies, and training plus minor military construction assistance only during FY2012 until the GSCF program is determined and reported by the Secretary of State being operational as follows, to enhance the:
  - ◊ Capacity of the national military forces, security agencies serving in a similar defense function, and border security forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and al-Shabaab.
  - ◊ Capacity of national military forces participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and al-Shabaab,
    - » This assistance for Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and the African Union Mission participants may not exceed \$75,000,000 during FY2012.
- ◊ Ability of the **Yemen Ministry of Interior** Counterterrorism forces to conduct counterterrorism operations against the al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula.
  - » This assistance for the Yemen Ministry of Interior may not exceed \$75,000,000 during FY2012.
  - » This Transitional Authority *and* the section 1206, NDAA, FY2006, as amended, may not be used for **Yemen** until thirty days after the Secretaries of State and Defense jointly certify in writing to the specified congressional committees that the use of such authority is important to the US national security interests to include (1) the reasons for the certification, (2) justification for such assistance, and (3) acknowledgement that the government of Yemen as assured to both secretaries that any provided assistance will be used in a manner consistent with such authority.
- The specified congressional committees include both armed services committees, both foreign relations committees, and both appropriations committees.

**Subtitle B—Matters relating to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan**

**Extension and Modification of Logistical Support for Coalition Forces Supporting Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Section 1211)**

- Amends section 1234, NDAA, FY2008, as amended, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, authorizing up to now \$450,000,000 through FY2012 in US-provided **logistics support to coalition partner** countries in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**One-Year Extension of Authority to Transfer Defense Articles and Provide Defense Services to the Military and Security Forces of Iraq and Afghanistan (Section 1212)**

- Amends section 1234, NDAA, FY2010, as amended, P.L.111-84, 28 October 2009, extending the authority to transfer excess US defense articles located in Kuwait and Iraq as 28 December 2008 to the governments of Iraq or Afghanistan not later than now 31 December 2012.

**One-Year Extension of Authority for Reimbursement of Certain Coalition Nations for Support Provided to US Military Operations (Section 1213)**

- Amends section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, as amended, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, authorizing reimbursement to **coalition countries** during FY2012 for overseas contingency operations. Also increases the value of reimbursement to \$1,690,000,000 with the reimbursement specifically to Pakistan extending through FY2013.

**Authority to Support Operations and Activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (Section 1215)**

- Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to support USG transition activities in Iraq by providing funds for operations and activities of the **Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq** and also of security assistance teams in Iraq.
- The funding is not to exceed \$524,000,000 in FY2012 with funds coming from the FY2012 Air Force Operations and Maintenance account.
  - ◊ Section 9013, DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, division A, P.L.112-74, 23 Dec 2011, provides for the use of up to \$524,000,000 in FY2012 Air Force, O&M, for the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq.
- The President is to ensure that FMS sale offers after enactment of this Act includes, consistent with section 21, AECA, charges sufficient to recover the costs of O&M and activities of security assistance teams in Iraq in connection with such sale.

**One-Year Extension of Authority to use Funds for Reintegration Activities in Afghanistan (Section 1216)**

- Amends section 1216, NDAA, FY2011, P.L.111-383, 7 January 2011, extending the authority for the Secretary of Defense annual use of \$50,000,000 in O&M through 31 December 2012 to support the **reintegration of former terrorists** into Afghanistan society.
- Section 1219 of this Act prohibits not more than 50 percent of FY2012 funding for this program may be used until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of

State, determines and certifies to Congress that women in Afghanistan are an integral part of the reconciliation process between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

**Authority to Establish a Program to Develop and Carry Out Infrastructure Projects in Afghanistan (Section 1217)**

- Amends section 1217, NDAA, FY2011, P.L.11-383, 7 January 2011, authorizing the use of \$400,000,000 in DOD FY2011 O&M through now FY2012 for the **Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)**.
- In the case of new DOD funds for the program during FY2012, the funds are to remain available through FY2013.
  - ◊ Title IX, DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, provides an additional \$400,000,000 in FY2012 funding for the AIF.

**Limitation on Availability of Amounts for Reintegration Activities in Afghanistan (Section 1219)**

- Prohibits the use of 50 percent of FY2012 funding for the previous section 1216 reintegration of former terrorists into Afghanistan society until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines and certifies to Congress that **women in Afghanistan** are an integral part of the reconciliation process between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

**Extension and Modification of Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) (Section 1220)**

- Amends section 1224, NDAA, FY2010, as amended, P.L.111-84, 28 October 2009, authorizing the use of DOD funds within the **Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)** through FY2012.
- However, not more than 40 percent of such funds may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on a strategy to use the funds with metrics used to determine progress with respect to the fund, and a strategy to enhance Pakistani efforts to counter improvised explosive devices.

- ◇ For this report, the appropriate congressional committees include the foreign relations and armed services of both houses.
- ◇ This report is to be updated and submitted annually at the same time as the annual budget submission.

**Title XIII—Cooperative Threat Reduction Funding Allocations (Section 1302)**

- Of the \$508,210,000 in funding authorized to be appropriated for FY2012 DOD funding, the following may be obligated for the **Cooperative Threat Reduction** purposes specified:
  - ◇ \$63,221,000 for strategic offensive arms elimination,
  - ◇ \$9,804,000 for chemical weapons destruction,
  - ◇ \$121,143,000 for global nuclear security,
  - ◇ \$259,470,000 for cooperative biological engagement,
  - ◇ \$28,080,000 for proliferation prevention,
  - ◇ \$2,500,000 for threat reduction engagement,
  - ◇ \$24,001,000 for activities designated as Other Assessments.

**Limitation on Use of Funds for Establishment of Centers of Excellence in Countries Outside of the Former Soviet Union (Section 1304)**

- Not more than \$500,000 of FY2012 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended to establish a **center of excellence** in a country that is not a state of the former Soviet Union, until fifteen days after the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report that includes:
  - ◇ Identification of the country in which the center will be located.
  - ◇ Description of the purpose for which the center will be established.
  - ◇ The agreement under which the center will operate.
  - ◇ A funding plan for the center to include:
    - » The amount of funds to be provided by the government of the country in which the center will be located, and
    - » The percentage of the total cost of establishing and operating the center in which the host government will provide.

**Title XV—Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations**

**Subtitle A—Authorization of Additional Appropriations**

**Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide (Section 1508)**

- Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the DOD for FY2012 for expenses, not otherwise provided for, for **Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.**

**Subtitle C—Limitations and Other Matters**

**Availability of funds in Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (Section 1533)**

- Funds available to the DOD for the **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)** for FY2012 shall be subject to the conditions contained in sections 1513(b) through (g), NDAA, FY2008, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, as amended by section 1531(b), NDAA, FY2011, P.L.111-383, 7 January 2011.
- Assistance provided using the ASFF may include literacy instruction and training to build the logistical, management, and administrative capacity of military and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, including through instruction at training facilities of the **NATO mission in Afghanistan.**

**Division B—Military Construction Authorizations**

- Entitled Military Construction Authorization for Fiscal Year 2012, did not include any material of significant security cooperation interest.

**Division C—Department of Energy National Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations**

- Did not include any material of significant security cooperation interest.

**Division D—Funding Tables**

- Includes funding tables specifying dollar amounts authorized for a project, program, or activity. The obligation and expenditure of the specified dollar amount for the project, program, or activity is hereby authorized, subject to the availability of appropriations.

### **Title XLI–Procurement**

- Section 4101–Procurement
- Section 4102–Procurement for Overseas Contingency Operations

### **Title XLII–Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation**

- Section 4201–Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
- Section 4202–Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for Overseas Contingency Operations

### **Title XLIII–Operation and Maintenance**

- Section 4301–Operation and Maintenance
- Section 4302–Operation and Maintenance for Overseas Contingency Operations

### **Title XLIV–Military Personnel**

- Section 4401–Military Personnel
- Section 4402–Military Personnel for Overseas Contingency Operations

### **Title XLV–Other Authorizations**

- Section 4501–Other authorizations
- Section 4502–Other Authorizations for Overseas Contingency Operations

### **Title XLVI–Military Construction**

- Section 4601–Military Construction

### **Title XLVII–Department of Energy National Security Programs**

- Section 4701–Department of Energy National Security Programs
- Division E–SBIR and STTR Reauthorization
- Entitled SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011. Did not include any material of significant security cooperation interest.
  - ◊ SBIR is Small Business Innovation Research.
  - ◊ STTR is Small Business Technology Transfer Research.

### **Conclusion**

This article for FY2012 included a summary of three pieces of legislation that impacted US international programs especially those of security assistance and security cooperation. Any funding allocations were taken from the State Department provided congressional budget justifications for FY 2013 which included country and program funding levels for FY2011 and FY2012. Both the S/FOAA and the DOD appropriations act incorporated the use

of Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) to fund global counterterrorism operations, and operations and assistance in Southwest Asia.

The S/FOAA funding for FY2012 security assistance remained at a high level to be extended into FY2013 at a similar level. The congressional requirement for pre-consultation, determinations, certifications and reporting remain ever presentation especially with the congressional appropriations committees. The three significant items in the FY2012 S/FOAA were the authorized use of FMFP funding for security forces, the funding and reestablishment of the special defense acquisition fund (SDAF), and redesignating the “Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces” to now section 620M, FAA .

DOD appropriations for FY2012 likewise continued at a high level but with no additional funding for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). However, \$524,000,000 in Air Force O&M is identified to support the operations and activities of the new Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq.

The NDAA for FY2012 extended and funded most security cooperation programs into FY2012 or beyond. The act also established three new temporary programs:

- Support of forces participating in operations to disarm the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
- The joint DOD/D)S managed and funded Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to also include a FY2012 transitional program until GSCF is determined operational.
- Provision for the assignment of DOD civilians to duties as advisors to foreign country ministries of defense.

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### **About the Author**

Ken Martin has been at DISAM for over twenty years as an associate professor for the management of security assistance. In addition to teaching, his duties include being the legislation and policy functional manager and a contributing author for the annually republished DISAM “Greenbook,” *The Management of Security Assistance*. He is a retired US Navy surface warfare officer. His education includes an undergraduate degree in the field of economics from the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago and a master’s degree in administration from Central Michigan University.



# Security Cooperation Initiatives

By Greg Sutton

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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By now, many of you are likely well aware that the training of the Department of Defense's security cooperation and security assistance workforce has drawn attention at the highest levels of the US Government (USG). A Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to all USG Departments and Agencies stated in part:

Over the next several months, OMB will work with Congress, interagency management councils, experts in Federal management policy, Federal employees, and other key stakeholders to craft a broad management and performance framework that will achieve near term priorities and overcome long standing management challenges. This effort will include addressing the high-priority performance goals [of each USG Agency].and will impact budget decisions.

Though this was an Executive Office Memorandum, when the DOD identified security cooperation training as one of their high priority performance goals, it matched very well with the current Quadrennial Defense Review.

The above, plus a synopsis of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, February 2010, was provided to the community about a year ago in our *DISAM Online Journal*. So...

## **Where are we Today?**

The information provided above was drafted in December of 2010 and since that time, DSCA/ DISAM has collected position, personnel, and training information on over 10,000 security cooperation billets and personnel in both US and OCONUS organizations (SCOs and GCCs). This data is contained in the the Security Cooperation Workforce Database (SCWD), maintained by organizational administrators and originally designed to provide a "measuring stick" on progress from a workforce initially measured in the 50-60 percent "trained"

category to the DOD goal of 95percent trained by the end of FY 2011. The goal was met in September 2011 with over 97 percent of the SC workforce determined to be trained to the desired level established by their organizations. To say this was a monumental achievement may be an understatement. DISAM, as the DSCA executive agent for the effort, could build a database—a combination of assigned personnel and contractor support—but it took the MILDEPS and combatant commands to provide positional, incumbent, training level requirements and other requisite information to populate the system. DISAM course managers/directors needed to evaluate training capacities to ensure adequate training opportunities were available once those personnel deficient in training were identified. Also, they were tasked with determining the optimal training methodology and courses to meet their needs—online, in residence, and at off campus venues. In the roughly two years effort, DISAM trained over 22,000 students in resident, on-site, and distance learning venues. Recall, many of our SC workforce members were determined by their organizations to need more than one or two courses to meet their desired training level—hence why the number of students trained exceeds the number of personnel in SC billets. We also needed to account for the new entries to our security cooperation community and the additional effort to educate and train them as they assumed their responsibilities.

After the analysis was complete, DISAM determined that, at a minimum, we needed to double the number of training opportunities for our SAM-C (CONUS) course. So, that's what we did—in fact, we nearly quadrupled them—from an average throughput of approximately 260 students per year to over 950 trained from the last quarter of FY 10 to the end of FY 11. In order to meet our goal, we restructured the course from a lecture-based, two-week resident course, to a forty-hour distance learning (online) prerequisite combined with a one-week resident

course utilizing hands-on exercises. Not only were we able to increase the number of opportunities, but also, based on student and instructor feedback, we enhanced the overall learning experience by getting the facts online and using that knowledge in the resident component exercises. As a cost-saving measure, DISAM was also able send three to four instructors to locations where a large number of personnel were in need of training—we conducted twelve SAM-CX classes (X designating onsite at the student’s facility) with over 650 students graduated. The CX course also utilized the principle of online knowledge in conjunction with classroom exercises and discussion.

We also nearly doubled our throughput of the Security Cooperation Overseas course (SCM-O). This course is required by DOD Instruction 5132.13 for all personnel assigned SC positions within our security cooperation offices overseas. Analysis of the SCWD data indicated a significant number of personnel assigned to SC positions in the SCOs had not received this required training. To remedy that problem, senior officers became increasingly involved with GCCS and established working sessions with the then DSCA Director VADM Wieringa. Soon, we realized that this involvement created the desired, albeit challenging result—an onrush of students attempting to register for the SCM-O course. Class sizes needed to be nearly doubled to address the need, so we double taught SCM-O—for each class, e.g., SCM-O2-11, there was a concurrent SCM-22-11 class. This was the case for more than half of the FY 11 SCM-O courses. DISAM also identified overseas locations where conducting a SCM-O course could provide the most “bang for the buck” in terms of correcting training deficiencies. Working with the GCCs, DISAM’s faculty and staff were the heroes of this effort—people took on the extra teaching and support requirements with a vigor and cooperation that had not seen in several years. Another challenge included the significant number of vacant billets in both the staff and faculty when we first started the HPPG push. The needs had been identified and our parent organization DSCA provided the authorization and funding. As many are aware, the hiring process is not rapid, nor is transforming a newly hired individual into a maximally productive employee, or instructor in this case. Both the “old heads” that did the training and load carrying, and the “new folks” who jumped in with both feet made it happen. We could not be

more proud of our DISAM staff and faculty—just in case you didn’t notice.

### **Now That We’ve Met the DOD Goal, What’s Next?**

We intend to keep the database relevant with enhancements and updates of positional and incumbent information, and we plan to sustain the training levels directed by DOD. Shortly after achieving the DOD goal, we held a meeting of organizational administrators to map out the way ahead. We identified and implemented systemic enhancements desired by users, and we identified how to avoid returning to the days when so many workers found themselves without the proper training for their job. We have recently implemented the first round of those enhancements to include the ability for organizational administrators to add new information data fields to meet the needs of individual organization, MILDEPs, or GCCs. We have added columns to track all completed DISAM courses and dates so the organizations may get a better total picture of the training specific individuals have completed. There are more to come, and we will keep you posted. DISAM has begun to work with other DOD training activities to validate specific training courses as meeting a specific SCWD training level. As that effort grows, we will keep the community advised via the SCWD administrator’s newsletter, posted on the DISAM website ([www.disam.dsca.mil](http://www.disam.dsca.mil)) and the *DISAM Online Journal*: [www.disamjournal.org](http://www.disamjournal.org). Keep up with these efforts and if you have questions, drop us an e-mail at: [hppg.scwd@disam.dsca.mil](mailto:hppg.scwd@disam.dsca.mil).

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### **About the Author**

Gregory W. Sutton is currently the Director of Research at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He has over twenty-two years experience in the SC/SA arena serving in an SAO (now SCO)—the US Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia, and the Air Force ILCO (AFSAC), while on active duty as an AF Officer. As a contract FMS advisor, he was involved in several major international FMS system sales. He joined the faculty at DISAM in 1994 and was appointed Director of Research in 2001.

# Are You Ready to Kick Some “ACSA?”

By Ron Yakkel

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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Around the globe, US Armed Forces and many of our allies and partners are taking advantage of the ever-increasing flexibility offered by Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, or ACSAs for short. An ACSA may also be called a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement or a Logistics Support Agreement, depending upon which partner country the agreement is with.

As Shakespeare once wrote, “A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” In other words, the name of the agreement does not matter (different name but all the same), just the fact that each represents a bilateral agreement between our DOD and a foreign military defense establishment.

So how did ACSAs evolve into what they are today? During the 1970s, troop reductions in Europe led to an increased reliance on NATO forces for logistics support. In 1980 the NATO Mutual Support Act (NMSA) was passed to provide simplified authority for acquiring NATO support. In 1982, NMSA morphed into ACSA and over time significantly expanded its benefit, making it a tool of choice for commanders operating around the world.

What’s the big deal? Why is an ACSA important? First and foremost, it provides our forces with the “legal authority” to mutually exchange logistics, support, supplies, and services (LSSS) with partner forces on a reimbursable basis. Believe it or not, DOD must have legal authority to engage in mil-to-mil buying, selling, loaning, and reciprocal provision of support to another country. An ACSA is comprised of both Acquisition Authority (allows us to buy LSSS) and Cross-Servicing Authority (allows us to provide LSSS on a reciprocal basis), two distinct legal authorities under 10 U.S.C. subchapter 1 to chapter 138 (10 U.S.C. 2341 and 10 U.S.C. 2342). Although US Forces may contract for acquisition of support under other statutes, the ACSA authorities provide a simplified acquisition process for LSSS as a number of contracting requirements do not apply

to ACSA transactions. Similarly, although LSSS can be provided to partner countries through other authorities, including authorities in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, ACSAs provide a simplified approach to fill discrete LSSS requirements that can be implemented quickly and at relatively low levels.

In some cases, Acquisition Authority may be all the US Commander needs to support a particular operation. An ACSA is not a prerequisite for this type of authority and may be attained at the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) level. The Acquisition Authority provided by 10 U.S.C. 2341 is only used to acquire LSSS to support US Forces deployed outside the US and is implemented via contracts or international agreements; however, the statutory authority provides that certain requirements of standard DOD contracts do not apply to such acquisitions (See 10 U.S.C. 2343).

You may be wondering how an ACSA is used. Simple, the ACSA allows US Forces and Partner nations to mutually exchange LSSS using one of three methods of reimbursement: cash, equal value exchange, or replacement in kind. What sort of LSSS are we talking about? A broad range of items from food, transportation, fuel, billeting, security services, maintenance, port services, to ammunition, loan of fire-fighting equipment, construction, and laundry and storage services to name a few. Items that cannot be provided under an ACSA include major weapon systems, other major end items, guided missiles/kits, “initial” spares, and chemical, biological and nuclear ammunition.

In recent years, section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, as amended, known as “Enhanced ACSA,” was added and allows GCC to loan certain Significant Military Equipment (SME—like MRAPS) for personnel protection and survivability to coalition partners in, Afghanistan, and in UN peacekeeping missions


in which the United States is participating. Section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 was later added to support coalition partners further by loaning of certain SME (like MRAPS) for training prior to deployment to Afghanistan so that partner forces would know how to use the equipment they would be provided in combat or for the peacekeeping mission before they deployed into theater.

Although obtaining an ACSA is not an overnight process, GCC ACSA Managers are well equipped to negotiate an agreement and navigate the approval “waters” that flow through Joint Staff, OSD, and DOS. The entire process, to include eligibility determination, Congressional notification, concluding negotiations, obtaining signatures, and all the legal reviews, may take up to 120 days. Is it worth the effort? Yes, and the ninety-six ACSAs shown in the figure below are a good indicator of their value.

What are the benefits to having one of these agreements? In short, an ACSA enhances operational readiness, provides cost effective mutual support (neither side makes or loses money in a transaction),

reduces the logistics tail, provides flexibility to the commander, affords global coverage, and increases interoperability. While there are numerous examples of ACSAs paying enormous dividends, one worth noting is the US-Australia Talisman Sabre Exercise, where ACSA transactions have grown (over three iterations of the exercise) from satisfying 5 percent of the logistics requirements for US Forces to nearly 85 percent, saving tremendous transportation costs and significantly reducing the logistics tail for the exercise.

This article was intended to “wet your whistle” regarding the benefits of having an ACSA with a Partner Nation. It is also important to note that while these agreements provide huge benefits, they’re limited to logistic support, supplies, and services, and do not provide a “total package approach,” and therefore are not intended to replace the Foreign Military Sales Process. For more information on the benefits of ACSA, visit the Joint Staff ACSA Wiki Site at [https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Acquisition\\_and\\_Cross-Servicing\\_Agreements\\_%28ACSA%29](https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Acquisition_and_Cross-Servicing_Agreements_%28ACSA%29).



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### ***About the Author***

Ron Yakkel was born in Cleveland, Ohio and earned a commission through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program in August of 1982. He was a career logistician and served nearly twenty-nine years before retiring as Colonel from the United States Air Force. His career included assignments in supply, aircraft maintenance, and logistics units worldwide, and he commanded at the Squadron, Group, and Regional levels. His deployments include Kabul, Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM); Tuzla Eagle Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation JOINT FORGE); and Al Dhafra Air Base, the United Arab Emirates (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH). His last four years of service were at United States Pacific Command in Hawaii where he served as Chief, Multinational Logistics and Technology Division. Colonel (ret) Yakkel is currently an instructor and Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar Director at the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management located at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.





for Security Studies, “Folks who were trained felt that RCPAMS was very user friendly, uncomplicated, more than exceeded their expectations and very flexible to our GCMC needs.” Other benefits of the RCs moving to a shared platform include cutting the redundant system administration effort and risk associated with hosting four separate systems (two of the five RCs shared one system). RCPAMS reports can be created by one RC and used by all, or can be run by DSCA directly without any need to reconcile disparate data from different management systems. Also, RCPAMS merges participant data from each RC to build a common profile and history of each person covering events they attended from all RCs.

While RCPAMS is now the system of record for events, enrollments, persons, and most operations and reporting purposes, the RCs still have autonomy to devise standard operating procedures and business rules that match their preferred practices. Furthermore, RCPAMS was built with enough flexibility to accommodate additional DOD schoolhouses interested in configuring the system to meet their functional, reporting and interface needs.

DSCA competed this work among the 8aSTARS government-wide acquisition contract (GWAC) vendors; Staff Tech Inc (STI) offered a compliant and complete proposal that met all the requirements within the price of the Independent Government Estimate. STI, as systems integrator, assembled a small team of senior staff from its partners Tesseract (technical architecture lead, data migration, and systems interfaces), Lexnet (configuration of the Sage software, custom coding and licensing) and Cimperman, LLC (project management and requirements/functional lead). In addition to an expert staff, STI presented verifiable past performance with all technical and management aspects of designing and deploying complex management support IT systems.

### **Keys to Success**

- **Program Management:** RCPAMS has a strong program manager, Suellen Raycraft, who provided the top-down message that RCPAMS is to be the system of record, and to find the right balance between a centralized system and the appropriate level of RC ownership, responsibility, input and autonomy to arrive at a single usable system accepted by all. Ms. Raycraft kept the “battle rhythm”

strong and communication channels open by working with vendor project manager, Rob Cimperman, and Senior Engineer David Bergert to co-host weekly meetings with all RC representatives throughout the one year scheduled for requirements gathering and development (despite there being no convenient time for Hawaii, Germany, and Washington, DC, participation was consistent). She also actively promotes collaboration between the RCs, which now, more than ever, can benefit from sharing lessons learned, best practices and improvement ideas.


- **Requirements:** DSCA and the five RCs collaborated on functional and technical requirements for the initial vendor solicitation. The STI team did not simply build to the initial 100+ requirements in the statement of work; instead, the team visited each RC for a week in to gain an understanding of the intent of each, their process context, and all data migration implications for each RC’s legacy system. This resulted in nearly 250 documented requirements for the target system.
- **Procurement:** DSCA commissioned a feasibility study to narrow down the field of software products based on the initial requirements as input to the implementation contract, but the implementation contract had the STI team make the final software selection. This two-step procurement approach let the STI team perform a detailed product comparison of the two finalists, SageCRM and Microsoft Dynamics, after fully understanding the RCs needs. They found SageCRM best met functional, security and architectural requirements, and had the lowest lifecycle cost and speed of configuration. It also had the most positive opinions expressed in interviews with five current public sector customers of each application.
- **Development:** STI selected LexNet, as an authorized SAGE reseller and a company with deep experience in SageCRM. Lexnet used an iterative development methodology for each assigned subtask. In addition to the STI team and DSCA gaining insights into requirements during the on-site visits to the RCs, they also built relationships with the numerous functional experts at each site. They reviewed

the prototype formally with the RCs, and also communicated openly with the various experts as questions arose during development and testing.

*A particularly useful feature for describing the international student population is the dropdown tables for users to choose from the valid service branches for 159 countries, and then from about 4500 military ranks associated to each.*

- **Data Migration:** The STI team member Tesseraic migrated historical data from four source systems (two RCs shared a system) into the new RCPAMS system by building four sets of scripts to translate data and pull it into a staging table, which then was loaded into RCPAMS as each RC was ready to go live. Part of the one-week requirements review involved walking through every data element requested to be in RCPAMS with a cross-functional team of functional and data subject matter experts to determine whether that data existed in the previous system and whether historical data was important to carry forward (e.g., was that data kept clean enough to be useful? Does it have value after the event, or is it only needed while an event is occurring?)

- **Data Integration:** To reduce duplicate entry of data into multiple systems, Tesseraic built an interface to pull events, enrollments and person data into RCPAMS directly from a system called the Security Assistance Network (SAN) that is already integrated with DSAMS. Then RCPAMS sends progress messages back to the SAN throughout the enrollment lifecycle, which updates DSAMS. This dataflow avoids the potential conflicts and update loops associated with two-way updates. The STI team also built a table outside of RCPAMS to present incoming data for users to review and confirm before any values in RCPAMS get overwritten by different (possibly outdated) data from the SAN for the same person. The STI team is also building an interface to accept nominations via a form separate from the SAN interface. This will accommodate self-nominations, US students and other use cases that do not involve an SCO entering nominations through the SAN. Furthermore, the STI team is collaborating with the team that supports GlobalNet (formerly known as Regional International Outreach System), which enables international outreach and collaboration among alumni of the students and



**Figure 2.** Overview of dataflow

alumni of the RCs, DSCA and the School of International Graduate Studies. RCPAMS will share information with GlobalNet to establish and maintain user profiles and facilitate nominations for event participation.

- **Training:** The STI team provided instructor-led on-site training over a one-week period at each location. The week was broken out into two sessions of the twelve-hour functional overview class, plus additional sessions for administrators and privileged users, and an executive overview. The training was most effective when the RCs provided their own real-world scenarios as the exercises to work through as cross-functional teams in class. It was also effective to have some more specialized groups of users, like Resource Management, to have their own condensed session tailored to their unique system functions.
- **Hosting:** During rollout, the presumed home for the application defined in the request for proposals left gaps in certification and accreditation compliance. To close those gaps DSCA tasked STI with locating a qualified hosting center. With one month of research STI recommended a data center a few miles from DSCA Headquarters that met all C&A requirements for this application to be granted interim authority to operate, and full ATO is anticipated by January 2012.

This article is not an endorsement by DOD of the US Federal Government, of Staff Tech, Inc., its subcontractors or team members, or the products and processes they employ. The article does not indicate any preferential treatment for Staff Tech. The views of individual DOD employees do not necessarily represent the views of DOD or its components.

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### **About the Author**

Rob Cimperman (robc@cimperman.com) is the president of Cimperman, LLC and project manager for the STI team on the DSCA RCPAMS project.

For more information about RCPAMS, contact Suellen Raycraft, DSCA Centers Management Office (CMO), at [suellen.raycraft@dscamilitary.com](mailto:suellen.raycraft@dscamilitary.com) or by calling 703-601-3654.

Staff Tech is available at 916-932-1234. Ask for Dan Kohnke or [dan@staff-tech.net](mailto:dan@staff-tech.net).

Tesseraic is available at: 703-266-1737. Ask for David Bergert or [david.bergert@tesseraic.com](mailto:david.bergert@tesseraic.com).



Figure 3. Screenshot of RCPAMS person summary screen.



Figure 4. Screenshot of RCPAMS event summary screen.



# SCWD for SCWDiots

By Dr. Bob Weber

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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The Security Cooperation Workforce Database (SCWD—pronounced “squid”) is a tool created to monitor the level of training earned by the Security Cooperation (SC) workforce around the world. The SCWD is a web-based tool that performs two separate but interwoven functions. First, it identifies all the SC-associated positions globally and the required level of training for each position, and second, it identifies the personnel occupying the positions and their current level of training achieved. With these pieces of information, it is possible to compute the percentage of people who are trained to the appropriate level. In addition to these two functions, the SCWD also provides data to allow the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) to better plan course offerings for the future.

## Overview

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) identified several High Priority Performance Goals (HPPGs) for the Department of Defense, one of which was to “Enhance the Security Cooperation Workforce.” The intent of this goal was to determine the required training level for personnel in the SC community and to determine if the workforce is sufficiently trained to that level. The actual goal statement reads, “By the end of 2011, Department of Defense (DOD) will increase the percent of incumbents that have been trained in security cooperation in positions that require such training to 95 percent or greater.”

## Identifying Security Assistance Positions

In order to meet the goal, it is necessary to have a tool in place that gathers data and determines the training level of the workforce. DISAM worked with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to create such a tool now known as the SCWD. The database was ready for initial operational capability in May 2010, but DISAM and IDA continue to make improvements to it. After May 2010, DISAM pushed to populate the SCWD by gathering as much

position and personnel data as possible. The number of positions topped off at around 12,000. After some validation, the number stabilized at about 10,000 positions, but slight growth is expected over the next couple years.

The SCWD application has three primary tabs for the majority of its administrators:

1. *Add/Edit Workforce*—the grid that contains all the position and personnel data
2. *Metric Overview*—the grid that shows the training status of the workforce
3. *Requirement Report*—the grid that lists the number of personnel in each organization that need DISAM courses

Higher level administrators also have two additional tabs to help manage SCWD users and the hierarchy of organizations. The information in these two tabs affects what each user can see and how the totals roll up for the organizations. These tabs may or may not be visible to users depending on their level of permissions.

## Identifying Personnel and Training Achieved

As the positions were added to the Add/Edit Workforce tab, the personnel occupying them were also added. Currently, approximately 95 percent of the more than ten thousand positions are filled. To enable the calculation of training level achieved, the architecture of the SCWD includes a data feed from the DISAM student database that passes all DISAM training records to the SCWD. The SCWD then identifies the training level achieved by each person in the SCWD. Here are some current facts from the SCWD:

- 7221 (72 percent) persons can be matched to DISAM student records
- 97.1 percent of security cooperation personnel are sufficiently trained
- 512 need DISAM resident training
- 268 need DISAM online training

A recent addition to the SCWD includes the concept of a “grace” period. As an organization gains new personnel, it requires some time to train all of their people, especially for in-residence training. The SCWD allows new personnel 180 grace days before it counts them as deficient. This grace period also includes personnel who move to a higher training-required position. Currently, there are 501 personnel within the grace period.

**Other Features**

The Add/Edit Workforce tab also includes the following features that are available to SCWD administrators in each organization:

- *L3 trng req'd and L4 trng req'd*—These two columns identify which level 3 or level 4 courses an individual requires for their position. This helps training managers identify personnel to register for courses offered by DISAM, and it helps DISAM project existing training requirements when they schedule future course offerings.
- *Registered column*—This column lists any course for which the individual is registered. Administrators can use this column to quickly tell who is scheduled for training in their organization.
- *Remarks*—In this column, SCWD administrators can enter notes about personnel and positions for everyone to view. This can help administrators remember pertinent facts about various personnel and positions.
- *Training Report*—If a SCWD administrator wants to know which DISAM classes a person took, they can click to highlight that person’s record in the grid, hover over the person’s name at the bottom of the screen, and click the button that appears. See figure 1 below.

You can also open this information in a PDF file from the pop-up box. See figure 2 on the following page.

Note that this is not an official transcript; the DISAM Registrar is responsible for maintaining training records and providing official transcripts. This report provides SCWD administrators detailed information about the DISAM training recorded in the SCWD.

**The HPPG Metric**

The data in the Add/Edit Workforce tab supports the HPPG metric in the Metric Overview tab. The Metric Overview lists all organizations and their statistics including total positions, total personnel, number of sufficiently trained personnel, number of deficient personnel, total personnel in a grace period, and most importantly, the percentage of personnel sufficiently trained. It also breaks down the deficient number by those who need online training and those who need resident training. The Metric Overview tab also includes subtotals by organization and totals by funding source.

**Planning Course Offerings**

As noted above, DISAM schedulers can use the Requirements Report tab to identify which courses they need to offer when planning for the upcoming fiscal year. The table under this tab lists each organization in the SCWD and their training requirements by course. Knowing the class size maximums, DISAM can identify how many offerings of each course they need in the next fiscal year.

**Future of the SCWD**

So where does the SCWD go from here? There are two major additions currently planned for the SCWD. The first is to enable it for use as a worldwide roster. The roster is difficult for the Defense



**Figure 1.** SCWD Metric Overview tab. After you click the name, a box pops-up that lists any course they have registered for and its status (C = complete, S = scheduled, and N = not completed). See Figure 2.

Course ID	Course Title	Status
SAM-OC-OL-1-08	SAM-Orientation (Online)	C
SCM-O-5-08	SCM-Overseas	C

As of: May 31, 2011, 1:38 pm

PDF Close

**Figure 2.** Pop-up training report.

Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to keep up-to-date as personnel changes frequently around the world. With the entire SC workforce listed in the database, the addition of some data fields can enable the community to use the SCWD as a world-wide roster as well as a training tracking tool. SCWD users could identify certain positions as world-wide roster billets, and those positions would then appear in a world-wide roster report. This capability exists, but the database needs to be updated with the appropriate information for the world-wide roster.

Secondly, the SCWD will evolve to become a storehouse of experience information helping the geographic combatant commands and military services to identify personnel with the qualifications to fill certain positions. The SCWD will retain who filled which positions, and the database will identify personnel who could fill a particular position based on their specific skills or experience matching the requirements of that position.

### **Summary**

The SCWD was created to identify personnel in the SC workforce and to calculate the percentage of personnel trained sufficiently. Through the efforts of people throughout the Department of Defense, the SCWD does this. In addition, it provides more information to training managers and enables them to better slate personnel for training. It also provides training requirement data to DISAM that enables them to project course offerings needed for the upcoming fiscal year.

For more information about HPPG, go to <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/hppg>.

For more information about the SCWD, refer to the SCWD User's Guide available on the Security Assistance Network (SAN) at

<https://www.idss.ida.org/san/>: After you sign on, select Libraries, click SCWD, click List Items in SCWD Library, click the title for the SCWD User's Guide, and click the Download link to open the most recent SCWD User's Guide.

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### **About the Author**

Dr. Bob Weber is an Associate Professor of Security Cooperation with the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). He is Project Manager for the Security Assistance Network (SAN), and IT Developer for the Security Assistance Automated Resource Management Suite (SAARMS) and the Security Cooperation Workforce Database (SCWD). Dr. Weber retired from the Air Force after twenty years as a communications officer and logistician. He holds a PhD in computer and information science from the University of Minnesota.



# Strengthening Security Cooperation Through Force Management

By Major Michael DeCicco  
United States Army

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## **Vignette**

A geographical combatant command (GCC) country desk officer is asked by the Deputy Chief, Security Cooperation Office (SCO) Chief assigned to a United States Embassy for assistance in opening a medical equipment excess defense article case to increase medical capabilities of the host nation during peacekeeping missions. The desk officer, the command's medical planners, and the SCO initialize the case by submitting a host nation-written Letter of Request (LOR) to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the appropriate military department (MILDEP). The easy part is done.

What lies ahead are years of coordination to receive the equipment, integrate it into the host nation military, and maintain it with a long-term sustainment cycle. Is the desk officer prepared? Has the medical staff prepared the host nation military for this equipment with familiarization and training? Have any assessments been completed to specifically identify what capabilities are needed in the country's military medical directorate?

The train-integrate-sustain process will subsume reactive responses as the command prepares its partner nation to accept the case. An enhanced, proactive approach would be the GCC analyzing the foreign medical directorate's capabilities while convincing the host country to submit their LOR after this analysis is complete and long-term execution and assessment plans are developed. In the interests of peace, security, and stability, a mutual commitment to a sustainable year over year engagement plan addressing existing shortfalls would better serve the United States (US)– host nation security cooperation (SC) relationship.

## **Introduction**

Since World War II, the US has been an international leader in shaping partner nation capabilities and capacities through security cooperation so partners

can meet their own security challenges. Terrorism, violent extremist organizations, ungoverned spaces, illicit trafficking, insufficient economic stability, humanitarian issues, and undemocratic governance significantly challenge partner nations to make lasting contributions towards stability and security. With the recent resource-conscious US defense guidance rebalancing the Department of Defense (DOD) focus from heavy, land-based organizations to leaner forces, regionalized maritime force projections, and advanced niche technologies, the means to oppose such challenges are becoming constrained in places such as Africa, Latin America, and Southwest Asia—even with the full support and cooperation of our interagency and traditional international alliances.

As the pace of Joint combat operations in Asian theaters decrease, the need for security cooperation is increasing. The Joint Staff (2012) defines SC as “all Department of Defense [DOD] interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation” (p. 296). The Secretary of Defense empowers combatant commanders to invest American resources in building partner nation institutional and organizational capabilities to meliorate regional security and stability. GCCs annually program and execute hundreds of millions of dollars towards accomplishing those objectives via diverse SC engagements, including Security Force Assistance, Military-to-Military events, and annual training exercises. Moreover, GCCs widely interact vis-à-vis the Interagency, synchronizing, assisting, and influencing programming in DOD agency resources, namely 1206 and 1207 funding, and even other US government agency resources, such as International Military and Education (IMET), Peacekeeping

Operations (PKO), and Foreign Military Financing funding. Every investment seeks to limit destabilizing influences posed by global security challenges.

**“The United States remains the world’s preeminent power, even as a growing number of state and non-state actors exhibit consequential influence...There are global and regional powers exhibiting nationalism and assertiveness that tests our partners’ resilience and US leadership.”**

General Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Unfortunately, as current fiscal realities necessitate significant funding and personnel reductions, our Department of Defense must increasingly prioritize US military equipment development and training programs, which will inevitably impact our abilities to reach out to partner governments through SC. Therefore, SC managers will be required to implement more efficient and effective methods to facilitate engagement that rationally and systematically analyze partner capabilities and focus limited resources on prioritized, critical, and mutually-recognized needs. This article presents one such method calling for DOD to stand up Security Cooperation Force Management (SCFM) divisions within all GCCs. Supporting this presentation, this article identifies the problem, envisions how to solve it, describes solution enablers, and prescribes how the new divisions would achieve the solution. Further, this article draws upon precedents from recent operations and proposes other efforts to be combined for maximizing security cooperation’s potential effects.

## **Problem**

The 2011 Budget Control Act obligates DOD to decrease future departmental expenditures by approximately \$487 billion over the next decade. FY2013 funding will feel the brunt first as the department requests \$525 billion, compared to nearly \$750 billion in recent years, already \$32 billion less than FY2012. A particular problem will be the mismatch between tasks and available manpower. Personnel reductions due to civilian hiring freezes, temporary duty restrictions and diminished funding, and service end-strength cuts will all have an impact. Simultaneously, the weapons systems key to building capabilities are becoming increasingly complex and expensive—not only in terms of purchase prices, but also in terms of initial training, support equipment, facilities, continuing maintenance, and other costs. In turn, GCCs must refocus their SC investment priorities to engage only where US strategic priorities are tangibly and positively affected. However, this is possible as long as SC managers have the means to precisely define requirements and project solutions into long-term engagement planning.

## **Vision**

A combatant commander must have a cadre with diverse skill sets. Strategic and planners, foreign area officers, logisticians, communication specialists, intelligence analysts, resource managers, and force management officers are essential to increase the commander’s range and depth to execute the lines of effort (LOE) prescribed through the theater campaign plan. Adding to the GCC a SC Force Management division staffed with officers and enlisted possessing the right expertise, education, and skills, would have tremendous multiplying effects on GCC missions as they progressively focus more on SC than on contingency operations. This staff, possessing a mix of planning or interagency experience coupled with Level III Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) education, would perform long-term capability gap analysis, integrate solutions, and continually assess international partner capacities using a DOTMLPF framework. The Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Training, and Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework provides a familiar, yet appropriate tool to drive the development of international partners just as successfully as it drives the pursuit of US Joint capabilities introduction, improvement, and expansion

## **Enablers**

Each GCC staff directorate has a primary function, and security cooperation is typically planned and programmed within the J5. The GCC J5 organizational construct consists of Strategic Plans, Regional Engagements, Security Cooperation Programs, and International Engagements divisions. The J5 also normally performs direct management of the SC field-level execution through the assigned Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO) embedded in US embassies. Strategic Plans designs and develops the GCC's theater campaign plans, regional campaign plans, and additional contingency plans varying in length between sixty days to five years. Campaign plans identify the commander's theater security objectives and lines of effort to achieve end states prescribed in the DoD Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) manuscript. These end states envision a steady-state where nations align their progress toward good governance, security, stability, and professionalism. Nested into these strategic goals are various regional campaign and country work plans (CWP). Regional Engagement divisions (RED) provide information, analysis, guidance, and recommendations on political-military matters and policy. They collaborate with SCOs and senior Defense Attaché Officers in the embassies to devise CWPs to intertwine investments in operations, exercises, security cooperation engagements, and interagency programs focused on campaign plan objectives. The Security Cooperation Programs division develops and manages funding lines and authorities used to support SC activities. Programmers directly interface with the interagency to push proposals through the approval process between DoD and the State Department (DoS). The fundamental security cooperation lynchpins are the SCOs at the embassies. They are primary interlocutors between GCC and DoS (which funds DoD-executed security assistance programs that are considered security cooperation) and the partner nations who host them. GCCs rely on SCOs for their local knowledge and relationships to acquire permission and access through dialogue with sovereign institutions in preparation to conduct the mutually advantageous SC engagements. The SC enablers consistently present the GCC commander with ideas to achieve theater security cooperation objectives and are the principle facilitators to ensure those ideas come to fruition.

## **Why Add A Security Cooperation Force Management Division (SCFM)**

Each US military service performs Force Management (FM). The Army has professionalized FM as a career field with over 260 military personnel assigned. They are distributed throughout GCCs and Army headquarters to strategically analyze, organize, build, equip, train, and develop US forces with the right capabilities needed for accomplishing national defense priorities. Force Management is the professional mechanism to transform an organization into the type its leaders visualize for the missions leaders assign to it.

The Army might take five years designing and equipping new infantry brigades to match designated capabilities, but a GCC might spend less than twenty percent of that time doing the same thing for its international partners. Security cooperation managers are often in a time crunch from the moment they receive authority to propose a solution to the expiration of that authority. Thus, for about a year, the GCC is in a reactive mode, complicated further by high turnover rates of staff officers who are often not SC or programming experts, and have to devote their time to other labor intensive tasks within the scope of their professional duties. As leaders consider amounts of money being invested in partners' capabilities, particularly as resourcing is constrained, it would benefit them even more and bring GCCs closer to their end state to implement Security Cooperation Force Management divisions for deliberate and patient capability-based planning using the DOTMLPF framework.


# Security Cooperation Force Management Division

**Mission:** Perform capability analysis of international partner military and governmental institutions through a DOTMLPF framework in concert with engagement planners, program managers, and the Interagency, integrating long-term solution sets into campaign plans for Security Cooperation, with the objective of increasing partner nation capacities to improve security and stability.

## Functions

- Prioritize partner nations to engage in analysis
- Develop an engagement plan and assessment criteria for conducting the analysis
- Integrate and manage solution set glidepath into individual country work plans IAW theater and regional campaign plans.
- Assess partner nation improvement
- Collaborate with Interagency subject matter experts, including Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Energy, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Treasury, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to acquire analysis of non-DoD centric functions, but require solutions within a particular nation

FAO = Foreign Area Officer  
 FMO = Force Management Officer  
 SNCO = Senior Non Commissioned Officer  
 - - - = Coordinating authority with agency



## How It Works


A SCFM division in each GCC J5 would perform capability-based planning to identify suitable solutions for a wide range of challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework that necessitates hard choices. Upon analysis of international partner military and defense institutions through a DOTMLPF framework in concert with engagement planners, program managers, and the interagency, SCFM divisions integrate long-term security cooperation solution sets into individual country work plans through the respective country desk officers in the Regional Engagement divisions (see figure 1). Below are the division's five primary functions:

- Prioritize partner nations to engage in analysis
- Develop an engagement plan and assessment criteria for conducting the analysis

- Integrate and manage solution set glidepath into individual country work plans in accordance with theater and regional campaign plans.
- Assess partner nation improvement
- Collaborate with Interagency subject matter experts including, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Energy, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Treasury, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to acquire improvement metrics and analysis of non-DoD centric functions, but require solutions within a particular nation

In short, these functions attest to selecting nations to work with based on a number of criteria, namely the GCC commander's priorities, making plans to help build their capabilities, addressing a wider set of applicable Interagency needs, and assessing results of investments to ensure the GCC is on the correct glidepath towards SC objectives.

## **Employment of the Security Cooperation Force Management Division**



The division is headed by an O-6, preferably a Foreign Area Officer, for his or her proficiency in international relations building and cultural awareness. Under the chief is one deputy O-5 or GS-14 and two to five regional teams led by an Army O-5 Force Management Officer with skill identifier 50A (See figure 2). Regional teams comprise a core group with a senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), who brings training, NCO development, and advisement expertise, and a logistics, a communications, an intelligence, and two operations/training subject matter experts. For many developing and under-resourced partner nations whom the US government engages, particularly in Africa, these core personnel possess the functional knowledge that DOD seeks first to build capacity through security cooperation. Within the SCFM division itself, but not assigned to a specific regional team, would be other personnel with human resource, finance, civil affairs, medical, aviation, special forces, engineer, and military police skill sets. Excluding the core, the division would have ten personnel; each core team would consist of seven. Ranging between two to five teams, a division can have between twenty-four to forty-five personnel. Certain skill sets, such as 50A, would require service

personnel commands to groom more officers into those positions or transfer them from other billets. Though this article does not propose from where each service would assign these billets, the issue is plaguing because several skill sets represent high demand, low supply specialties. Overcoming shortfalls in such personnel situations requires a greater organizational prioritization, possibly including growing new billets in those niches, at the expense of larger group skillsets.

Strengthening the SCFM division also means ensuring the core personnel are trained in security cooperation. Attending the three week Defense Institution for Security Assistance Management Security Cooperation Overseas Course would be mandatory. Completing mid-career level command and staff planning education would also be important. These professional development pedagogic tools would successfully prepare these personnel for missions they would perform within various partner nations.

The first step to achieving success is gaining access into the partner nation's military structure. The regional teams need collegial relationships with each foreign Chief of Defense and/or their representatives. Diplomacy up front will gain better access into each organization and functional area the teams plan to analyze. Once the team is organized, the second step is to travel on temporary duty orders for as long is reasonable and cost effective over a period of one to two years meticulously identifying the capabilities the GCC needs help with in obtaining security and stability. For example, if the shortfall is countering piracy and maritime illicit trafficking, the team researches how organizations performing those missions might prevent those activities. Since the core team does not have a maritime planner, it could borrow one from either the GCC maritime planning staff or from the Naval or Marine component command. The DOTMLPF framework allows the division to pinpoint where the shortfalls exist.

After thorough analysis, the third step is to synchronously link capacity building efforts with a time-phased plan for all the engagements relating each identified shortcoming according to the function within the framework. To counter illicit trafficking, might recommend equipping the partner's Navy with a patrol boat unit, a pier, a maintenance facility, maintenance team with equipment, and appropriate doctrine. The engagement solutions themselves must conceptually fit into the GCC's campaign plan lines of efforts, and include combinations of military to military events, foreign military financing projects, training exercise participation, 1206 train and equip proposals, region-specific funded train and equipment packages, and much more. The division works with the country desk officers to integrate these plans into country work plans.

From that point, the CDO can realistically synchronize each engagement inside the partner nation in the short term, six to twelve months ahead. The CDO maintains another two years of conceptual engagement plans, to be validated each year with the country itself through the SCO. Furthermore, as each fiscal year defense budget offers special SC funding authorities, the DOTMLPF analysis and integration would provide a rational and substantive basis for the GCC proposals to be forwarded to congress for approval. The GCC would not have to send ad hoc teams on immediate deployment to conduct analysis surveys in hope of trying to gain a good understanding

of all the partner nation requirements. Under the SCFM division, whatever capability is needed would have been researched and vetted over the past year, followed by a three to five year SCFM integrated solution set. This powerful combination provides new desk officers in high turnover environments to concentrate on short term engagement execution, while still trying to learn about the job itself.

With SCFM divisions also comes SC engagement discipline. Recipients of the US government (USG) SC solutions may not realize all the efforts that go into planning and distributing just a million dollars worth of equipment and training. There is a feeling that if the GCC and country agreed to an engagement plan last year, it would not be disingenuous to ask to cancel those capacity development events in favor of what the country wants this year. Granted, sovereign nations have full rights to request what they would like to see in their country, and as long as the USG continues to offer its services, it will do its best to support its partners to the exact specifications regarded by partners. However, for USG's own processes and methods, such as when congressional notifications are published for support packages, last minute changes and frequent requests can disrupt a nested sequential security cooperation plan. The underpinning foundation for all these efforts is advancement of US national interests. With SCFM divisions, GCCs have a supportive structure to integrate capability development and maintain discipline needed to keep the organization on track with appointed objectives.

Security Cooperation, whether in the form of Mil to Mil, FMF, 1206, should consider the level of technology, education, training, and facilities within the targeted host nations. In addition, many partner nations have much smaller defense budgets, industrial capacities, and other complex problems affecting quality development of their armed forces. As US forces undertake their own new roles harnessing highly specialized capabilities, (e.g. networked special operations, cyber domain management, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), GCCs will have to leverage innovative engagement ideas so partners are not left behind in collaborative efforts to improve security and stability. Any other way would arguably overburden the host nations with DOTMLPF solutions they cannot absorb.

## **Precedent**

The proposed SC planning method and organizational concept has precedent in Iraq during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN. From the earliest phases of security and stabilization efforts, the US military created ad hoc and formalized training teams to assess, prioritize, develop, and integrate basic needs for Iraqi security forces. A positive result of these efforts is a large pool of trained, combat-experienced officers and NCOs skilled in advising and mentoring partner nations on their stability and security capacity building activities. Army Force Management Officers are an institution themselves, having stood up cells at the highest echelons of theater commands whose missions were to advise new democratic partners' militaries how to design and build force structures, equipment tables, training plans, doctrines, and ministerial capabilities. Fighting land and maritime-based insurgents in protracted tactical combat is not a 21st century end state we seek. The US is safer when it uses its own national security assets to develop self-sufficient security forces and institutions among partner nations who have just as much interest in protecting themselves from the common threats to peace and stability. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (2010) precisely articulated this sentiment stating, "Helping other countries better defend themselves or fight beside us—by providing equipment, training, or other forms of support—is something the United States has been doing in various ways for nearly three-quarters of a century. It dates back to the period before America entered World War II, when Winston Churchill famously said, "give us the tools, and we will finish the job."

## **Future**

The US remains an international leader to build capacities and assist where it can, how it can, around the globe. Each nation's citizenry, from the Central African Republic to Turkmenistan to Colombia seek fair governments engaged in peacefully protecting their own ways of life, while allowing enough freedom to feel they can enjoy the fruits of their labor without the threat of violent conflict. What draws many nations back into a vicious pattern holding back their growth is corruption, lack of resources, opaque governance, and general abuse of power. Geographic combatant commands, efficiently advancing American interests in conjunction with partners,

can open the door to larger avenues of change by integrating other transformational institutions.

One such avenue is DOD's Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program. Pairing US senior defense civilians with partner nation ministry officials, this program fills gaps in institutional reform that SC activities could not impact due to the overwhelming time and manpower requirements requisite in building military capacity. While a partner nation's armed services acquire a brand new equipment fleet and provide personnel to operate them, if ministerial bureaucracies cannot budget funding, replace or pay personnel, or even sustain the hardware investments, all those SC gains will be lost to continued ineffective governance. Secretary Gates (2010) addressed the same issue arguing, "The United States has made great strides in building up the operational capacity of its partners by training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field. But there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term."

A second approach for the future is teaming up with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) program called Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI). DSCA, a financial management and synchronization clearinghouse for DOD, DOS, and GCC engagements must manage and implement the funding to achieve activity objectives. In 2009, it tasked the Naval Post Graduate School Global Center for Security Cooperation (GCSC) creating DIRI to help partner nations countries evolve accountable, professional, and transparent defense institutions to manage, sustain, and employ their forces and the capabilities developed through US security cooperation programs. DIRI would make an invaluable team asset to the GCC security cooperation repertoire for its complementing phased efforts to build partner capabilities through the institution sector.

The US military teaches its own leaders throughout their careers about the mission-leveraging effects from unity of command and economy of effort. For the future, the USG should consider expanding DIRI and MODA to enhance GCC security cooperation programs, especially as the US defense strategy turns toward smaller scale operations coupled with resource constraints. Once SCFM divisions operate and MODA and DIRI expand, GCCs can harvest

the tripartite to fully engage all aspects of partner nations' military capacities.

### **Conclusion**

As GCCs promote engagements to advance US interests, partners share in those advancements. It is to each GCC's advantage to ensure willing and accessible partners have the capabilities to work alongside the US and have capacity to sustain themselves in those efforts. The current security cooperation planning staff stands to benefit by creating an organization focused on wholly DOTMLPF analysis and requirements development. By integrating these requirements into long term country work plans and allowing Regional Engagement Divisions to harness near term execution synergies, GCCs will have a synchronized and accurate glidepath for building partner capabilities. As these abilities mature, the GCCs can take the next step in combining efforts with new DOD enabling initiatives carrying out similar objectives.

Defense policy instructs combatant commanders to treat security cooperation as an important national security tool and an integral element. The GCC mandates security cooperation activities to be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DOD activities. They must boldly manage security cooperation to confront the global security challenges using tools, organizations, and skill sets available throughout the government and military. Enhanced, proactive analysis integrated with long-term engagement planning will increase the DOD's ability to positively affect security and stability and thus, further project the US legacy in partner nation development.

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### **About the Author**

Major Michael DeCicco is currently the Uganda Country Desk Officer at US Africa Command, J5. He is an Army Force Management Officer (50A) and has worked in the HQDA G8 Force Development Directorate analyzing and programming equipping requirements. Before that he was a logistics and infantry officer, serving as an advisor in Iraq and commanding a Cavalry Forward Support Company in Korea. He holds bachelor's degree in economics and a master's degree in homeland security.

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# Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams

By Susan McClure  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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## **Introduction**

In today's dynamic and unpredictable security environment, the United States must increasingly rely on partnership and cooperation with our Allies and other nations. This can pose a dilemma when our Allies and partners lack the skills and equipment necessary to effectively meet their security needs, especially in a coalition environment. By necessity, US security cooperation objectives evolved from a traditional peacetime emphasis on "influence and access" to incorporate a more contingency based focus that builds capacity of partner country security forces.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stresses that the ability to develop alliances and partnerships is critical to achieving our National Defense Strategy objectives. In fact, the QDR identifies building partner capacity as one of the Department of Defense's (DOD) six key mission areas. To help address the challenges inherent in building partner capacity, former Secretary of Defense Gates established the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force (SCRTF) in the fourth quarter of FY2010. The SCRTF was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of DOD's internal security cooperation processes and to provide recommendations conducive to quick implementation. Though the SCRTF's Phase I report to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) included numerous findings and associated recommendations across the security cooperation spectrum, only those relevant to Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams (ERGTs) are referenced in this article.

## **The Issues**

In the context of this changing security cooperation environment, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) recognized the need to improve and manage performance across the entire timeline of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. A key finding by the SCRTF was that security cooperation planning

at the country level in the early stages of a program is mostly reactive and generally initiated in response to a formal Letter of Request (LOR) from the partner. A comprehensive LOR that clearly communicates the partner's needs is absolutely essential in that it sets the stage for effective implementation and execution of a program. DSCA's schoolhouse, the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) at Wright-Patterson AFB, dedicates a significant amount of instruction time to discussions about the LOR. And in coordination with DISAM and the military departments, DSCA disseminated a March 2011 memo to all Security Cooperation Offices (SCOs) informing them of various references and tools available to assist partners with developing complete and actionable LORs.

Producing a "good" LOR is a significant challenge in today's fluid security cooperation landscape. Too often requirements definition focuses on acquiring a specific piece of equipment or weapon system instead of viewing the potential acquisition in terms of developing a partner capability that mutually supports US and partner security objectives. The additional planning and coordination associated with capability building efforts, as well as a lack of experience with the specific equipment or system to be delivered, makes it difficult for in-country SCOs to adequately identify and address country requirements. This adversely impacts the effective and timely development of partner capabilities and can result in failure to plan for long term sustainment requirements.

The SCRTF report also concludes that FMS is a slow process. It is decentralized in nature with dependence on numerous key stakeholders and built in checks and balances that are often cumbersome in practice. The traditional FMS system is generally effective in supporting the routine defense requirements of partner countries. However, the current processes are just not equipped to respond to

unplanned urgent requirements that provide partners with a critical capability in an operational contingency based security environment. In response, the security cooperation community is forced to hand massage the current FMS process or to develop ad hoc procedures, placing additional stress on resources already taxed by the dramatic increase in recent years' FMS sales.

To address these issues, the SCRTF proposed a two pronged approach. The first prong involves transitioning the security cooperation system from a reactive to a more deliberative posture that emphasizes the pre-LOR planning stage. The second prong focuses on tweaking current processes or implementing new processes to help enable quicker delivery times. In broad terms, what is needed is a more anticipatory system with fast-track processes in place that facilitate rapid delivery of defense articles and services in response to urgent partner requirements.

### ***The Birth of ERGT***

Achieving a more anticipatory posture requires significant upfront planning. The SCRTF reports that there are no standard or formal processes in place for accomplishing "capability package planning" that takes into account such factors as production timelines, availability of people and resources, construction of infrastructure, training requirements, and sustainment. Additionally, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and SCOs may not always have the in-house resources, experience, or technical expertise to conduct such an extensive planning effort. As a result, the SCRTF recommended the establishment of ERGTs. The intent of an ERGT is to deploy a DSCA-led team of security cooperation subject matter experts to a partner country to assist GCCs and SCOs with quickly defining partner capability requirements and identifying defense articles and services that can potentially satisfy those requirements.

Based on preliminary recommendations from the SCRTF, DSCA deployed two pilot ERGTs in March 2011, one each to Uzbekistan and Bulgaria. The Uzbekistan ERGT consisted of fourteen personnel representing eight agencies across the security cooperation community, and the Bulgaria ERGT included thirteen personnel from nine different organizations. Because every country has different needs, no two ERGTs will look alike as this will be tailored to the specific country needs. In general, the

core team members of an ERGT should be the DSCA team chief; regional/desk officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) as well as from the Department of State; and GCC personnel (to include component commands if required). To be effective and credible, an ERGT must also include the right mix of technical and operational experts accompanying the core team. Despite disparate country requirements and unique team compositions, both the Uzbekistan and Bulgaria ERGTs conducted capability planning that successfully achieved the same goal—producing LORs that addressed mutually-agreed upon objectives that were complete enough for DOD to prepare a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) that accurately reflects the requirements. These two ERGTs generated a combined total of thirty-three actionable LORs for country consideration. As of August, fourteen of those LORs have been officially submitted for LOA development, of which four have been implemented.

With the success of the Uzbekistan and Bulgaria pilot teams, DSCA formally implemented the ERGT concept in DSCA policy memo 11-18 (31 March 2011), titled "Interim Policy for Deployment of Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams (ERGT) to Augment Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) Staff and Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO)." DSCA will coordinate any future GCC request for an ERGT with the requesting GCC, military departments, DOD agencies, and interagency stakeholders to organize and deploy an ERGT, as appropriate. ERGTs will focus on assisting SCOs with partner nation requirements assessment across the Ministry of Defense or military service level and developing solutions and options through comprehensive "capability package planning" leading to actionable LORs. Consideration for ERGTs will focus on: (1) new partners; (2) current partners seeking a first time major or complex FMS program; or (3) urgent requirements for coalition partners engaged in contingency or combat operations. While DSCA funded the two pilot ERGTs, policy memo 11-18 states that subsequent teams will be funded by the applicable agencies involved.

DSCA plans to issue a follow on policy directive that details ERGT request procedures and team formation and deployment processes. In the interim, inquiries about ERGT or requests for ERGT support should be forwarded to the DSCA Principal Director for Security Cooperation Operations.

## **Conclusion**

On 25 July 2011, SECDEF approved the SCRTF Phase I report and directed to implement the report's recommendations in accordance with applicable law, regulation, and policy. The SCRTF, under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, will oversee the implementation of the task force recommendations. The ERGT concept, as one of the key recommendations to come out of the task force, potentially has far-reaching impacts across the security cooperation community to include DISAM. DISAM personnel were afforded the opportunity to participate in both the Uzbekistan and Bulgaria pilot ERGTs to reinforce key concepts for producing complete LORs and to gather data for the establishment of lessons learned and best practices database.

Based on the preliminary SCRTF findings and the two pilot teams, DSCA's implementation of the ERGT program in March 2011 represents a significant step toward establishing the anticipatory posture necessary to effectively accomplish capability planning to satisfy partner security requirements. After two successful pilot ERGTs in March 2011, DSCA is currently coordinating the deployment of two more ERGTs within the next few months. To keep up with developments, DISAM is adapting its curricula by incorporating information and procedures pertaining to ERGTs (as well as other recommendations to come out of the SCRTF) in order to provide the best possible security cooperation education in today's contingency-based coalition environment.

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## **About the Author**

Susan McClure has been an Instructor of Security Cooperation Management at DISAM since January 2009. She is currently the Functional Coordinator for FMS Process, and also teaches Financial Management. In addition to DISAM, her thirty years of Security Cooperation experience include five years at the Air Force Security Assistance Management Center (AFSAC), eighteen years at the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA), and four years at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Prior to working for the government, Ms. McClure taught junior high school English for four years. She holds a bachelor of science degree in education and a master's degree in public administration, both from the University of Dayton.



# Foreign Military Sales Observations in USCENTCOM

By Major James Swift  
United States Army

USCENTCOM Security Cooperation Practitioners Require an Enterprise Resource Tool  
That Allows True End-to-End Visibility Throughout the Foreign Military Sales Process

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Security Cooperation and Security Assistance initiatives often rely heavily on the capabilities acquired through the formal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. At the Department of Defense level, there are a variety of organizations and tools already in place to manage the FMS process. These tools include the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS), the Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS), the Defense Integrated Financial System (DIFS), and the Security Assistance Network (SAN) to name a few. But what is missing is a responsive common operating picture for all of the shareholders that depicts the entire process including: requirements determination, requirements prioritization, Letter of Request tracking, case writing milestones, contract award milestones, and case closure milestones. An enterprise resource system (ERS) could go a long way in establishing that common operating picture.

To be fair, some USCENTCOM FMS customers have mechanisms in place to help see through blind spots in the current network of information systems. Two examples of this are the Egyptian Budget Management Information System (EBMIS), an information system designed and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Letter of Request (LOR) Tracker developed by the Office of Military Cooperation–Egypt (OMC-E). EBMIS is a good start in that it is a programmatic tool used to load all prospective LORs, including planned Price and Availability requests; into a format that forecasts payment schedules and other critical case information. EBMIS also pulls updates from DSAMS and incorporates manual inputs from DFAS. But EBMIS falls short in providing a status of the FMS case once the US military department Implementing Agency accepts the LOR and again between the time the customer signs the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) and subsequent contract award. Systems like

the LOR Tracker mentioned earlier are excellent tools for managing dozens of LORs simultaneously but lack the functionality to prioritize requirements and have no connectivity to the larger DOD security cooperation information network. The salient point here is that systems like EBMIS and the LOR Tracker were developed internally out of sheer necessity and are not DOD solutions. Although FMS customers' requirements for such systems vary based on their budget, the fact that these systems were developed at all highlights the need for better visibility across the entire FMS process.

Many of the blind spots are hard-wired into the system; blind spots are most prevalent in the seams between organizations. The first of five examples is the seams among the Implementing Agency (IA), the life-cycle management commands, the security cooperation activity in the host nation and the DSCA. The Implementing Agency is organized geographically around FMS customers. The life-cycle management commands (TACOM, AMCOM, NAVSEA, etc) are built around functional hardware lines such as helicopters, tanks, or ships because they have to interface with the larger military departments' supply chains. The security cooperation activity in the host nation usually reports back through the Geographic Combatant Commander, which is organized around geographic considerations. Although the DSCA has oversight over the entire process, they are organized by FMS customer—meaning by country. DSCA relies on the security cooperation activity (i.e. Offices of Defense/Military Cooperation) and the IA for much of the information before the case is implemented. Once a case is implemented and the contracts have been awarded, the DSCA and the IA are in the best position to report on the status of the case, especially the financial status of the case. The security cooperation activity and the FMS customer are often the least knowledgeable about which requisitions have been paid and how


much money is left on specific lines within an implemented case because neither has access to the IA's financial system. These two organizations are also the least knowledgeable on the statuses of amendments and modifications to existing cases because neither of these organizations has access to the case development milestones.

The FMS customer receives daily electronic updates from the military departments from their respective supply chains via: the Centralized Integrated System for International Logistics (US Army), the Management Information System for International Logistics (US Navy), and the Security Assistance Management Information System (US Air Force). FMS customers are often task organized in a different fashion than their US counterparts (see figure 1) which only complicates how they interface with the US agencies (see figure 2).

The second blind spot is cost estimation outside the formal Price and Availability (P&A) request process. Requests for P&As are informal pricing estimates that try to account for future costs based on a given quantity and have a specified expiration date. P&As are program office cost estimates and are not necessarily on specific vendors or sources of supply.


Substantial reductions in cost over time are possible due to leveraging the timing of other FMS customer buys of like articles but the reverse is also true. FMS customers and security cooperation activities are often forced to estimate future costs in the out years based on historical expenditures of similar items and normalized by personal experience. Some FMS customers can and do use inflation indices to forecast costs with success but not all FMS customers demonstrate the sophistication required to accurately predict costs in the out-years. This not only creates discrepancies in what programs are budgeted for in the short term but introduces uncertainty in the long-term acquisition strategy by using inaccurate cost estimates for future programs. Using the formal P&A request is a method worthy of sustaining. It keeps the FMS customer from diverting valuable life-cycle management command manpower away from managing FMS requisitions and requirements to a potentially endless parade of queries from the FMS customer. But there has to be a more responsive way to identify a rough order of magnitude cost for planning purposes. A formal P&A is typically valid for about ninety days.

### **National FMS Customer Task Organization**



**Figure 1.** Notional FMS Customer Task Org Chart

## US Security Cooperation Framework Snapshot



**Figure 2.** US Security Cooperation Framework Snapshot

A third blind spot is case writing and case development milestones. The service security assistance commands (USASAC, AFSAC, NAVIPO, etc.) and DSCA write FMS base cases as well as amendments and modifications. FMS cases vary in complexity from relatively low-cost straightforward cases like military uniforms all the way up to very complex cases costing hundreds of millions of dollars with countless lines and notes as in the F-16 example. Cases often understandably spend months in development before the case is offered via the LOA with no apparent change in status. It is not uncommon for case development to be stalled awaiting a specific answer from a subject matter expert only to find out weeks or months later that the question was never answered. From the performance metric and critical path perspectives, there is no clear time to expect the case writing task to culminate given the broad range of case complexity mentioned earlier. Adding an expected case writing completion date to the ERS would help the developing FMS case stay on track.

The fourth blind spot in the USCENTCOM FMS arena is visibility of contract award after an FMS case has been implemented. An FMS case is essentially an agreement between the US government and a US provider of defense articles or services. The US government (DSCA, USASAC, security cooperation activity, etc) acts on the FMS customer's behalf. Once the LOA has been signed and the case implemented, there is usually a period for contract award. Based on the complexity and scope of the requirement, there can be several contracts spanning billions of dollars. There is currently no formal mechanism for any security cooperation activities or the FMS customer to know when the contracts are awarded. These contract award data have to be "pulled" by the FMS customer on a case-by-case basis from CISIL, MISIL, or SAMIS rather than "pushed" from the implementing agencies. As with case writing and case development milestones, contract awards can be stalled for long periods waiting on additional information or clarification. Adding contract award

parameters to the ERS would help make execution of a new FMS action more efficient by informing the shareholders when the contract was awarded but could also flag stalled cases that have exceeded their planned contract award thresholds.

Not all FMS cases require contracts. If the case does not require manpower and if the case is for materiel which is already available in stock, then a contract may not be necessary. Those cases that require contracts are often for items that must be procured through the services' procurement systems, both non-standard and otherwise. This is another reason why visibility on contract awards is so difficult—each of the three US military departments uses different procurement automation systems to manage the necessary procurement actions. Across all three military departments, there are four common reasons for delays in awarding the contract: statement of work incorrect; the contract failed the audit performed by Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA); protests by contractors; and, using Direct Commercial Sales verbiage in an FMS contract. These reasons, coupled with an acute shortage of experienced contracting officers, often result in lengthy delays in awarding FMS contracts.

The fifth and final blind spot is political “releasability.” There is a host of US strategic policy documents and US law that pertain to security cooperation. Some of these documents naturally create inconsistencies when carried to their logical conclusions. US presidential administrations change with a greater frequency than the refresh rates of some of the policy documents. And many of the mid-level functionaries in the Defense and State Departments are not particularly sensitive to changes in administration. What this means is that official US departmental positions on arms export control, technology transfer, or political release are often more dated than one would think for countries in the USCENTCOM AOR. And given the lengthy process and substantial staff work required to change a position, one can easily see how the status quo becomes the most tenable bureaucratic option. Anecdotally, many requests for new defense capability in the FMS purview tend to be given a preliminary, informal inter-agency staffing attempt too often followed by a restatement of the agency's last official position. The final decision for release of US weapon systems rests with the National Security Agency, which uses the inter-agency staffing process

to collect the relevant information to make the decision.

In other words, many prospective FMS cases are culled without ever having been formally declined. This assertion is relevant to the matter at hand because barring the most cutting-edge US defense articles, there seems to be no readily available information as to why a weapon system is not releasable to a particular FMS customer and when that assessment is expected to change. Adding a rational political release status, justification, and expected release date of US defense articles to the ERS would improve the responsiveness of the security cooperation activities, codify the results of the inter-agency staffing process, hopefully entice the inter-agency to examine political release more regularly, and help the FMS customer program funds in the appropriate year in anticipation of a political release.

The Exception to the National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) process is the deliberate system of determining whether or not a US defense capability can be released under the auspices of security cooperation. Release of weapons systems is a complex bureaucratic process involving various elements of the US government, including the services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State and Congress. Not all USCENTCOM countries use the formal ENDP. The ENDP codifies the results of the NSA release decision. Some strategic partners prefer to use the Letter of Request (LOR) process to determine a weapon system's political “releasability.” Using an LOR to request release of a weapon system is sometimes seen as preferable to the formal ENDP process. This is because an ENDP decision persists to a degree that an LOR decision does not. A “no” using the ENDP process, while more deliberate and well-documented than the LOR method, is unlikely to be reversed anytime soon. But a disapproved LOR can be re-submitted without the same sense of finality an ENDP decision. It is easy to see why not all countries want to subject themselves to the ENDP process.

In July 2008, DSCA and the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) partnered to develop what has now become known as the Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution (SCES). If this solution works as designed, it will go a long way in reducing the blind spots mentioned earlier. SCES is currently in the contract award phase. Security cooperation operators could see SCES online as early as June 2011.

In closing, it is important to state that the current system of managing FMS cases in the USCENTCOM AOR works, in spite of its numerous blind spots. It is certainly not broken. But it is fraught with convoluted lines of communication that unnecessarily hinder synergy. An enterprise resource system that could help determine and prioritize requirements (LORs); outline case development milestones; notify the FMS customer when the contracts have been awarded; clearly articulate a given weapon system's political release status; and provide responsive rough order of magnitude costing data for planning would streamline the execution of the FMS process. As the US shapes its footprints in Iraq and Afghanistan, responsive security cooperation initiatives could play an ever-increasing role in our nation's foreign policy relative to the USCENTCOM AOR. An FMS ERS would improve a host nation's ability to quickly and efficiently dispense its national funds or Foreign Military Financing funds toward domestic and regional security interests.

In today's context, advocating yet another "box" to put on one's desk in the spirit of efficiency should be viewed with ample skepticism. But that's not what is being proposed here. What is being suggested is access to existing information in ways that provide timely situational awareness across the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) security cooperation environment. It is a tall order, but one worth filling if we hope to bring the security cooperation into the twenty-first century.

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### ***About the Author***

The author would like to thank the teammates at DSCA, USASAC, US Embassy-Cairo, OMC-E, and USCENTCOM for their thoughtful review of this manuscript prior to its publication. Major Swift is assigned to USCENTCOM with duty as a Security Cooperation Officer in the Arab Republic of Egypt. He is a 2009 graduate of the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM). Major Swift is a Logistics Corps officer.



# The Impact of Diminishing Manufacturing Sources on FMS Logistics Support

By Barton D. Chess

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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Our international partners purchase and operate a variety of weapon systems from the United States Department of Defense (DOD). Some of those systems are no longer in the United States DOD inventory, but our international partners still require support. Some of that equipment will one day be phased out while our international partners will continue to operate the older version of the system. The *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) states:

C4.3.3. Logistics Support. The Department of Defense considers the support of US origin defense articles critical to the success of the Security Assistance program. Systems in use with US Forces are supported through the DOD procurement system. Support items that are stocked, stored, and issued due to common application with end items in use, should be provided even though the end items may have been acquired commercially or system support buyout is complete.

C4.3.3.1. When a system is to be phased out of the DOD inventory, countries that have acquired the system under FMS are given the opportunity to determine item requirements and to place final orders designed to maintain system capability through its service life. These orders are consolidated to ensure economic buys.

C4.3.3.2. The Department of Defense shall take reasonable steps to support systems that are not used by US Forces including items that were never adopted by US Forces. Support is provided for these items when mutually satisfactory arrangements are made with the country involved and supply sources are available. Effort is made to support non-standard items, whether acquired commercially or through FMS, when this effort serves US interests.

Phasing out equipment without notifying our international partners who still operate that system could lead to a public relations nightmare and create mistrust between governments. This begs the questions of how we make sure our international partners are still able to get support when we are in an environment of Diminishing Manufacturing Sources (DMSMS) or obsolescence.

You will hear the terms obsolescence and DMSMS used interchangeably. In fact, obsolescence is the lack of availability due to statutory changes, process changes, DMSMS, new designs, etc. DMSMS is the lack of sources or materials. The problem of DMSMS affects all categories of materials. These issues impact not only US forces but also our international partners who are operating US equipment.

DMSMS can occur in any stage of a product life cycle, but it has the greatest impact on our international partners during the phase-out stage, at which point the US is using a new technology but the older technology is still in use by our international partners. It is vital that the US government program managers are cognizant of the risk associated with DMSMS and be proactive and have an active risk management plan in order to continue support for those FMS purchasers. Some of the keys to a successful program include a program centered on having a predictive tool and a knowledgeable team, bill-of-material (BOM), management commitment, and ensuring the international partner has the financial resources available. We must also have a long range plan for every system that establishes when and what will be replaced or redesigned in order to forestall future problems. DMSMS cannot be done in a vacuum, as both sides have a major role. Working together, we have to conduct an operations impact analysis to determine what effect DMSMS will have on a country's operational readiness, the failure and replacements rates of components, and number of spares in a system, for example.

There are a number of guidance and reference sources that can steer a DMSMS program in the right direction. A good place to start is the DMSMS Center of Excellence website, [www.dmsms.org](http://www.dmsms.org), which is sponsored by the DOD. Additional sources include but are not limited to (1) the Defense Supply Center Columbus, [www.DSCC.dla.mil](http://www.DSCC.dla.mil), which is a gateway for technical assistance with access to specifications, drawings, and qualified lists and (2) the Government Industry Data Exchange Program, [www.GIDEP.org](http://www.GIDEP.org), which has an outstanding library and links with weekly listings of discontinued parts.

Probably the most important resource is the *Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) Guidebook*. This DOD guidebook is a compilation of the best proactive practices from across DOD services and agencies for managing the risk of obsolescence. With material extracted from various DOD DMSMS management documents, the guidebook provides the DMSMS program manager (PM) with a central repository of best practices. Additionally, it identifies assorted measurement tools that may be useful in analyzing and tracking the effectiveness of DMSMS Programs.

There are numerous logistic tools available, both government-owned and commercial. They include WebCATS, <http://www.dscr.dla.mil/procurement/CATS/cr.html>, which retrieves supply data on Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) aviation managed items and provides a snapshot of logistics posture of a DLA managed item of supply, and Haystack, <http://www.ihs.com/products/product-design-sourcing/component-supplier-data/haystack-military-government.aspx> which provides data from over forty sources and updates quarterly.

There are also subscription based tools such as Q-Star, (<https://www.qtec.us/>) which can assist in determining the status of parts on your BOM and other features such as life cycle projections, lifetime buy notices, availability predictions from eight to twenty years (depending on which website you use), and information on potential substitute parts. The website, Windchill Quality Solutions (formerly Relex) (<http://www.ptc.com/products/windchill/quality/index-v2.htm>), can assist in determining component reliability and mean time between failure. Of course, the program manager's first stop should be the DOD DMSMS Center of Excellence (<http://www.dmsms.org/>).

The program manager is guided by certain laws and regulations when dealing with DMSMS and support to our international partners. *US Code* Title 10, chapter 131, section 2213 prohibits buying more stock than will be consumed in two years. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 23-1, *Requirements and Stockage of Material*, implements DOD 4140.1-R and serves as a bridge to AFCEI 23-103. AFCEI 23-103, *Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages Program*, lists the DMSMS responsibilities and appoints AFCEI as single manager. Army Material Command Pamphlet (AMCP) 5-23, *Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages*, implements DOD 4140.1-R and describes the Army program. Navy Supply (NAVSUP) Instruction 4800.6A, *Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages*, states Navy Supply Systems Command (Code 05) has the lead responsibility.

There are various barriers in providing support to our international partners in an environment of DMSMS and obsolescence, including short deadlines, lack of communication from vendors and original equipment manufacturers, and issues of releasability of information. The bottom line is that our international partners use platforms long after the United States Government has retired them. When the Letter of Offer and Acceptance is signed, they expect a certain level of commitment from the US in terms of service and support.

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### **About the Author**

Barton D. Chess, Sr. is an instructor of security assistance management at DISAM with a concentration on FMS logistics and finance. He is level III International Affairs Career certified. His experience includes an assignment as a Security Cooperation Officer in Amman Jordan, a Command Country Manager for the continent of Africa at the Air Force Security Assistance Center, and currently an instructor at DISAM. He is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel logistician. He was awarded a master of science in administration from Central Michigan University and a bachelor of science in management from Wright State University. He has been awarded the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and three Meritorious Service Medals, among other awards.

# A Primer for the United States Air Force: International Engine Management Program

By Forrest Smith and Barbara Beaty-Johnson  
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center

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“Total Package Approach (TPA). A TPA ensures that FMS purchasers can obtain support articles and services required to introduce and sustain equipment. The complete sustainability package must be offered to the purchaser when preparing Price and Availability (P&A) data or LOAs. In addition to the system itself, other items to consider in a total package include: training, technical assistance, initial support, ammunition, follow-on support, etc.” (SAMM C4.5.4)

This article provides a long overdue discussion on the workings of the International Engine Management Program (IEMP) and the Component Improvement Program (CIP). It is designed to answer queries by our students and international partners who must work with extremely complex engine maintenance issues on a daily basis. The information presented in this article is the result of the combined effort of the Fighter and Specialty IEMP Chiefs, their staffs, and AFSAC/XPO, the United States Air Force (USAF) TCP/IEMP Coordinator. (Editor’s Note: Formerly two terms were used, the International Engine Management Group (IEMG) and the IEMP. With the 15 February 2011 revision of AFMAN 16-101 International Affairs and Security Assistance Management, the term IEMG was discontinued). This article reflects the organizations as they were structured on 1 March 2011.

## Introduction

Tinker Air Force Base, an Air Force Materiel Command base located in Oklahoma, is home to many operational and support missions, with the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) serving as the host organization.

The center is the worldwide manager for a wide range of aircraft, engines, missiles, software,



avionics, and other components to support the B-1, B-2, B-52, C/KC-135, E-3, and 25 other Contractor Logistic Support aircraft. The center manages over 23,000 jet engines that range from Korean conflict vintage to state of the art. Many of these engines are in the inventories of our international partners. Both the Fighter and Specialty Engine International Engine Management Program offices are located on Tinker AFB.

For the United States, “Foreign policy is a complicated tapestry whose intricate pattern is woven with US goals, ideals, needs, and aspirations.”<sup>1</sup> “One of the primary methods used to carry out US foreign and national security policy has been, and still remains, the transfer of defense articles, defense services, military training, and economic assistance.”<sup>2</sup> The IEMP is a separate organization dedicated exclusively to the service of the foreign purchasers of military engines. Engine technology has come a long way since the Wright Flyer’s four cylinder model was built in 6 weeks by Charles Taylor in 1903. The Fighter Engine IEMP manages the F110 and F100 engines, while the Specialty Engine IEMP manages the T56, J85, J69, TF33, J79, and F108. Combined member engine inventories today total more than 8,900 engines, and maintaining these engines requires a great deal of technical expertise. The current IEMP mission is supported by specialized engineering, technical, and related logistics support organizations at Tinker AFB.

The Wright engine was a little crude, even by the standards of the day, but it was designed to fulfill a specific purpose and nothing more. It had four horizontal inline cylinders. The 4-inch bore, 4-inch stroke, cast-iron cylinders fitted into a cast aluminium crankcase that extended outward to form a water jacket around the cylinder barrels. The engine was cooled by water from a narrow vertical water reservoir mounted on a forward wing strut.



Source: [http://www.griffwason.com/wright\\_flyer\\_engine-info.htm](http://www.griffwason.com/wright_flyer_engine-info.htm)

Currently, forty-one countries are members of the IEMP including Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.

### **Formation of the First International Engine Management Group**

In 1984, the original IEMPs were established at the two engine Air Logistics Centers, Tinker AFB, OK, and Kelly AFB, TX, under the respective Propulsion Division leadership of Mr. George Davis and Mr. Don McFall at Tinker, and Col. Jim Peterka and Mr. A. Bruce Richter at Kelly. The Tinker IEMP, identified organizationally as OC-ALC/MMPMA, was located within the Propulsion Operations Branch and headed by Ms. Joyce Woods. Mr. Jim Kirk was the original IEMP chief at Kelly, where the organization was a branch of the Propulsion Division known as SA-ALC/MMPI. Mr. Ed Brewer of Kelly AFB added the "I" in the office symbol, representing "International," and that naming convention continues.

As a result of a 1995 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) decision, Kelly AFB was closed and the Kelly AFB IEMP moved to Tinker AFB in September 2000. At that time the two IEMPs were realigned, placing the fighter engines and specialty engines together. The current Fighter Engine Chief is Mr. Gregory Broadt, OC-ALC/GKGIA and the Specialty Engine Chief is Ms. Barbara Beaty-Johnson, OC-ALC/GKGIC.



Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allison\\_T56](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allison_T56)

The T56 military turboprop and its commercial version, the 501-D, are the leading large turboprop engines in the world with over 18,000 engines produced and more than 200 million flying hours. The engine has been in production since 1954 and operates in nearly seventy countries worldwide. The success of the T56 engine is unrivalled and it is anticipated that operation will continue beyond 2020.

### **Benefits of IEMP Membership**

The IEMP is a unique cost-sharing program that applies to AF-managed engines and to partner countries that choose to participate in the program. Funded entirely by member countries, the IEMP works exclusively for the international partners, and provides no service to USAF or non-member partners, with the exception of safety notifications.

The IEMP provides a single point of contact (POC) on all engine related issues and acts as intermediary between the FMS partners, USAF, other DOD agencies, and contractors. FMS partners have direct and frequent contact with their respective IEMP POCs. The IEMP has direct access and interface to the US supply system, bases, depots, support contractors, and management personnel. The IEMP also provides repair and return service upon request.

The IEMP does not provide the following functions or services:

- Increased basic engine performance beyond that found in the engine model specification (for example, thrust, specific fuel consumption, and weight)
- Labor beyond that necessary for CIP service evaluation testing, unless specifically funded in the LOA
- Engineering support for the engine production process
- Data necessary for the manufacture of engines or changes to them



International Engine Management Program CIP Conference, 9 May 2011, Lynn, MA. Courtesy of OC-ALC/OC-ALC/GKGIC

- Inspection activities of any kind
- Training requirements
- CIP data for non-IEMP members
- TO status information

The Component Improvement Program (CIP), a contract between the USAF and the original engine manufacturer (OEM), funds follow-on engineering efforts to improve engine safety, reliability, maintainability, and serviceability. CIP benefits are available only to IEMP members. The cost is shared between the USAF and all IEMP member countries based on an engine fair share rate. Annual CIP conferences provide members with an opportunity to present their issues and attend briefings related to maintaining and supporting their engines. General meetings allow for the discussion of items of interest to all. Side meetings on specific topics are held between individual country representatives, the IEMP, and USAF/OEM technical and engineering personnel. These conferences provide forums for direct communication/interaction with representatives from other member countries, USAF, OEM, Navy, and multiple other agencies that impact the entire engine community. The most recent T56 IEMP/CIP Conference was held December 2010 in Indianapolis, Indiana in conjunction with Rolls Royce, and the J85/J69 Conference sponsored by General Electric (GE), occurred May 2011 in Lynn, Massachusetts. The F110 CIP Conference was held March 2011 in Evendale, Ohio in conjunction with GE. Tinker AFB along with Pratt & Whitney hosted the F100 Conference in May 2011.

## **IEMP Reviews**

Two types of program reviews are available to IEMP members. CONUS (within the continental United States) reviews include CIP conferences, Logistic Management Reviews (LMRs), and Program Management Reviews (PMRs). All members are invited to attend USG-sponsored reviews. LMRs and PMRs are conducted based on partner requirement/request. (AFMAN 16-101, para.7.4.11)

In-Country Reviews (ICRs) are held in the partner's country when requested. The ICR includes a review of the member's program, case financial status, common technical problems, and potential improvements. IEMP personnel provide information on current and upcoming engine issues and any new engine developments such as proposed engine modifications and upgrades. Any country-specific problems or concerns are addressed, and the IEMP technical personnel are available to troubleshoot engine problems.



Photo provided by IEMP, Fall 2010

IEMP personnel discussing T56 and F100/F110 issues with partner representatives at OC-ALC—front row left to Right are Mr. Larry Waite IEMP J79/TF33 Program Manager, Ms. Diane Carkhuff IEMP T56 Program Manager, Mr. Terry Stine IEMP F100 Program Manager, Ms. Consuelo (Connie) Contero IEMP T56 Program Manager, Mr. Luis Camacho IEMPTF33/F108/J85 Program Manager. Back row left to right Capt. Torstein Bjora'/Norway EPG, Capt. Erik De Wael/Belgian EPG, Adjutant Erik Van Gaal/Belgian EPG, Mr. Fernando Zepeda IEMP F110 Program Manager, Capt. Elvis Pinto Teixeira/Netherlands EPG, and Mr. Manford Thompson IEMP F100 Technical Lead.



### **IEMP Home Page**

Members of the IEMP gain access to the IEMP website by contacting the IEMP Program Manager or by filling out the on line User Request Format <https://apps.tinker.af.mil/iemp/>. The website is an essential communication tool in providing users with program and engine related information.

### **FMS Cases In Support of the IEMP**

Membership in the IEMP is for a minimum of three (3) years. As noted earlier, the IEMP is a cost sharing program; therefore, membership must be stable to ensure maximum benefits to all members. Furthermore, multi-year memberships ensure uninterrupted support. The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for participation in the IEMP is typically a Technical Service (G) case. However, these services may be provided as line items on other types of cases such as a Major Aircraft System Sale (S) case or Specialized Follow-on Sustainment Support (Q) case. The LOA is prepared with the assistance of the IEMP, and is implemented and administered by the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC).

The IEMP provides services to our international partners through the following LOA implemented lines:

- Line 001-Contractor Services
  - ◊ Component Improvement Program services
- Line 002-Internal Services:
  - ◊ IEMP Salaries
  - ◊ Supplies and Equipment
  - ◊ Benefits and CONUS Travel
    - \* Engine Working Group Establishment
    - \* Key Personnel participation (Maintenance, Operations & Budget)

- \* USAF expertise/best practices (engineering/technical, MPWG, budgeting for maintenance requirements, etc.)
- \* USAF managed repair contracts
- \* IEMP Website
- \* Forum for technical distribution (ITCTOs, RACs, OEM/USAF Position Papers, Maintenance Awareness Messages, etc.)
- \* Conference Opportunities (Worldwide/CIP Conferences)
- \* Expedite critical item requisitions/kit deliveries
- \* Represent members' concerns and priorities

- Line 003: Overseas Travel (Optional):
  - ◊ Funds travel for the IEMP member to and from the country to conduct engine business, e.g., IEMP reviews in country
- Line 004: Contract Services (Optional):
  - ◊ Engineering or technical assistance that exceed the IEMP internal capability, which may include contractor travel to technically augment the IEMP
  - ◊ Services such as engineering or technical investigation
  - ◊ Printing and reproduction of data may also be funded under this line



OC-ALC/GKG personnel and Republic of Korea officers after taking a scheduled tour of OC-ALC Maintenance area. Left to right Mr. Greg Broadt, Section Chief GKGIA, Mr. David Haas, Branch Chief GKGI, Mr. Greg Hughes former Division Chief GKG, Brigadier General Sung Ryong Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force, Major Alex Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force, Major Mansik Hur, Republic of Korea Air Force, Mr. Steve Goss, J85 IEMP Program Manager. Photo provided by IEMP. Date unknown.

## Final Thoughts

For nearly twenty-seven years, the IEMP and USAF have been supporting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Security Assistance (SA) programs. The International Engine Management Program fulfills a vital role in supporting our international partners, as a member's single point of contact for technical and logistical sustainment support.



F-110-PW-229 Engine<sup>3</sup>



Powers the F-15 Aircraft<sup>4</sup>

## Acknowledgements

A special mention is required for Mr. Bradley Smith, AFSAC/XPO, TCG Program Coordinator, and Ms. Lana Brooks, IEMP Program Management Support, OC-ALC/GKGIC for their assistance in completing this article.

Data was gathered from historical summaries and reports submitted by the IEMP. Additional program information was extracted from AFMAN 16-101, International Affairs and Security Assistance Management, the Tinker AFB Home Page, the IEMP Home Page and various briefings prepared for the December 2010 and May 2011 IEMP/CIP Engine Conferences and listed sources within the article.

## Notes

1. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 21st Edition, June 2001, p.3
2. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 21st Edition, June 2001, p.5
3. Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratt\\_%26\\_Whitney\\_F100](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratt_%26_Whitney_F100)
4. Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Engine.f15 arp.750pix.jpg>

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## About the Authors

Mr. Forrest "Ed" Smith is currently an Associate Professor of Security Assistance Management at DISAM. He has also held positions as a Logistics Analyst for DSAMS Training and Field Support; Chief, Arabian Programs Branch, Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC); and Chief, Cost Sharing Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff (J-4), Yongsan, Korea. He was awarded a master of science in logistics management from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a bachelor of business administration in business and finance from the University of Massachusetts.

Ms. Barbara Beaty-Johnson is currently the International Engine Management Program Section Chief for Specialty Engines at Tinker AFB. She has been an engine Item Manager, Program Manager, Systems Analyst, and TCTO manager for the TF30, TF33, J79, F100 and F110 engines. She was the lead for FMS F100/F110 Organic Repair Return before assuming her current position. She has Level 3 certification in international affairs, is a graduate of Air Command Staff College, and she received her master's of business administration from Oklahoma City University, Oklahoma.



# Technology Acquisition Policy and Value Efficiency Analysis on Offsets in Defense Trade

By Choon-Joo Lee, Korea National Defense University  
Won-Joon Jang, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade  
Bong-Kyoo Yoon, Korea National Defense University

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## Introduction

“Defense offset” is a form of defense procurement and it provides the recipient with some degree of industrial involvement to establish the channel of technology transfer, R&D, and production of the system being procured. It has been growing in practice as a common feature of international arms trade since the Cold War came to an end in the early 1990s with the Berlin Wall dismantling and the former Soviet Union collapse.

Offset is pursued when a buyer negotiates primary contracts of defense articles to exploit some sort of leverage to obtain compensatory benefits in the case of high value off-shore purchases by forcing the seller to undertake well-designated activities for international cooperation and parts export that can promote the infrastructure in appropriate domestic sectors.<sup>1</sup>


It is estimated that offsets and related forms of counter-trade constitute 5 to 30 percent of global trade, and more than one hundred countries use the offsets in their arms contracts.<sup>2</sup> Business and trade analysts put the exact volume of defense offsets at a global level of over \$5 billion each year.<sup>3</sup> Since offsets are pursued while the contractual arrangements of arms trade are negotiated, the large arms exporters like the US, France, and Italy are obviously big providers of offsets. In 2007, the United States signed nearly \$3.76 billion worth of offset contracts with more than eighteen companies located in thirty different countries. The actual value of the offset transactions from 1993-2007 was \$45.73 billion.<sup>4,5</sup>

The environment of the US defense market is characterized by near monopolistic hegemony, which was created through the Ministry of Defense policy and political pressure for defense firms to consolidate in response to post-Cold War economic realities.<sup>6</sup> Offsets are defined in several terms depending on market size and the scope of offset. The main purposes of buyer-through-offsets arrangements are

to ensure competitiveness of technology for domestic industry, promote exports, and build infrastructure. In addition, sellers want to exploit further chances of business interests.<sup>7,8,9</sup> Thus the definition of an offset is different for sellers and buyers of defense articles and services.

Even though there are a number of different definitions and practices for offsets depending on the amount of trade, offsets can be considered the opportunity of industrial development and international cooperation accompanying defense trade. Considering that the type of offsets includes mandatory coproduction, licensed production, subcontractor production, technology transfer, countertrade, and foreign investment in defense offsets, these may provide potentially more flexible freedom for the importers to pursue their future opportunities as exporters in the world’s defense markets.<sup>10,11</sup>

Figure 1 shows the classification of offset transaction categories. Offsets are subdivided into direct offsets and indirect offsets. Direct offsets are offset transactions that are directly related to the defense items or services exported by the defense firm. These are usually in the form of subcontracting, coproduction, technology transfer, overseas investment, licensed production, counter trade, training, and miscellaneous other forms. Indirect offsets are offset transactions that are not directly related to the defense items or services exported by the defense firm. Indirect offsets include purchases, technology transfer, overseas investment, licensed production, counter trade, training, and miscellaneous other offsets. Therefore, the common type of offsets that work for direct and indirect categories includes technology transfer, overseas investment, licensed production, counter trade, training, and miscellaneous other offsets.



**Figure 1.** Classification of Offsets Transaction Categories

Defense technology acquisition through offsets is important in terms of strategic context for the trade contractual arrangement, defense economics, and management of technology. First, it is strategically viable in trying to acquire the core technologies through offsets using the leveraging power of primary contracts. Core technology is prohibited or controlled through various regulations or appropriability such as MTCR, ITAR, EAR99 or Intellectual Property. Even if the buyer wants to pay for the technology and is actually prepared for the payment, the core technology will be denied transfer.<sup>12</sup> As noticed from the statistics of US provided offsets, each nation considers offsets when negotiating defense contracts on a regular basis. Therefore, offsets are considered a means to obtain core technologies through the purchasing power of defense contracts.

In addition, as an exception of the WTO government procurement article to the general prohibition of offsets, it should be noted that exceptions from the obligations of the Agreement are also allowed for developing countries in certain situations (Article V) and for non-economic reasons such as to protect national security interests; improve public morals; provide public order or safety; improve human, animal or plant life or health; or protect intellectual property.<sup>13</sup> As a country advances to the major defense exporters' group, it is required to be prepared for offset arrangements not only as a

recipient but also as a provider. Almost every nation systematically considers offsets in the acquisition decision making process.

Second, the market size of offsets in defense trade was as large as 4 percent of world GDP in 2008. The economic dimension of offsets in defense trade suggests that offsets become more important as defense trade grows. For example, the defense budget for Korea shares 18 percent of the national fiscal year budget. Around 50 percent of the defense budget is allocated to defense force capability building programs. When defense decision makers are constrained by procurement time and the limited technology development infrastructure, direct buying from advanced countries is the only option that they can choose. In fact, this is true for developing countries including the Republic of Korea. It is ranked sixth among major importers in the world defense market as of 2008 and considers offsets as an important channel for defense trade and international cooperation.

Third, in the aspect of technology acquisition, offsets provide the opportunity to obtain high-technology because the defense industry of advanced countries is usually categorized as the high-technology industry, such as the aerospace industry, engineering and electronics. The developing countries confront this with a lack of technology and experience, political barriers, and a high risk of

investment to enter the high tech area. Also, various offset programs like bank credit, coproduction, and FDI can provide some bridging measures to cope with the valley of death and cross the sea of Darwin to reach a market.

The roles of offsets can be categorized into the following major issue areas.<sup>14</sup> First, they provide opportunities to contribute to both national security building and to economic development at the same time. Second, they are a mechanism to promote international exports and cooperation of the defense industry under the exceeding openness and competitive environment. Third, they are a channel to acquire the high-technology of advanced, complex systems of defense equipment in the situation where the advanced countries prohibit core technology transfer. Fourth, they provide incentives for defense firms to invest in R&D in order to achieve the technological advancement in the technology based acquisition system. Fifth, they promote the development of indigenous defense research, development and production capabilities for self-defense. Sixth, they enhance the long-term international relationship among nations that share common security, economic, and strategic interests. Finally, they open new paradigms of innovation, as they allow countries to cross the nations' and firms' managerial boundaries in terms of products, technology, services, intellectual property, banking credits, and know-how through the various types of offsets transactions.

This paper unfolds as follows. The next section describes the world trends of defense offsets. Section 3 explains the defense offset policy and the importance of value efficiency for the major countries in the world. Section 4 measures the offset

efficiency performance with DEA and derives some policy implications on defense offset management followed by conclusions.

### World Trends Of Defense Offsets

#### Offsets As A Regular Procurement Process

It is worthwhile to review the offsets trend provided by the US considering that there is no comprehensive data source of offsets statistics, and the US provides the largest number of offsets. Figure 2 shows the US offset trend in terms of actual offset value and number of countries that participated from 1993 to 2007. It is estimated that the actual offset value has averaged 45 billion dollars since 2003.<sup>15</sup>

According to US DOC, in 2007, eighteen US firms finished 589 offset transactions in thirty countries, and in 2006, fifteen US defense contractors reported 653 offset transactions in twenty-nine countries. During 1993-2007, a total of fifty-three US firms reported 9,249 offset transactions in forty-eight countries. The offset transactions from 1993-2007 have increased as defense trade increased, on an average, from 34.3 percent in 1993 to nearly 125 percent in 2003, before decreasing to some 71 percent in 2006.<sup>16</sup>

The use of offsets in international trade is widespread, and more than 130 countries practice it in different forms. Offsets and related forms of countertrade account for about 5 to 30 percent of world trade. The volume of offsets and its greater percentage applicability in arms contracts is quite large.<sup>17</sup> Table 1 summarizes the title of offsets policy, the designated agency, and the status of offset decisions in formal procurement procedures of the major offset countries.<sup>18,19</sup> Most countries accept the offsets decision as a formal procurement decision procedure and apply policies codified by the designated agency.




Figure 2. US Offset Trends in its Actual Offsets Value and Number of Countries (1993-2007)

**Table 1 Offsets Decision as a Formal Procurement Decision Procedure**

Countries	Title of Policy	Agency Designated	Formal Procurement Decision Procedure	Multipliers
Australia	Australia Industry Involvement Programme	Department of Defense, Defense Material Organization	Yes, for military procurement	Yes (none in policy)
Canada	Industrial & Regional Benefits Policy	Industry Canada under the Ministry of Industry	Yes	Yes (none in policy)
Denmark	Industrial Cooperation Program	National Agency for Enterprise and Construction, under the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs	Yes	Yes (none in policy)
Greece	Policy of Offsets Benefits	Hellenic Ministry of National Defense/General Armaments Directorate, Division of Offsets	Yes	Max 10
Israel	Industry Cooperation Program	Industrial Cooperation Authority, Ministry of Trade and Industry	Yes	1–1.5
Italy	Not Codified	National Armament Directorate, Ministry of Defense	Yes (Armed Services)	Max 3
Netherlands	Industrial Benefits and Offsets Policy	Ministry of Economic Affairs–Commissariat for Military Production	Yes	1–5, 5–10, 10–30
Norway	Establishment and Implementation of Offsets in Connection with Defense Procurements	Ministry of Economic Affairs–Commissariat for Military Production	Yes	0–5
Republic of Korea	Korean Defense Offset Program	Defense Acquisition Program Administration	Yes	Yes (Determined by DAPA)
Spain	Policy of Armament and Material Agency	Ministry of Defense–General Direction of Armaments and Material; Industrial Cooperation Agency of Spain	Yes	2–5
Switzerland	Swiss Offset Policy	Armasuisse	Yes	Max 2–3
Taiwan	Industrial Cooperation Program	Ministry of Economic Affairs	No	1–10
Turkey	Industrial Participation / Offset Directive	Undersecretariat for Defense Industries	Yes	1–5
United Kingdom	Industrial Participation Policy	Industrial Participation Unit, Defense Export Services Organization, MoD	No	Yes (No multipliers for IP credit)

Offset trade is negotiated in terms of valuation.<sup>20</sup> This puts both buyer and seller in a complicated situation. Naturally, the value gap between offset providers and recipients makes it troublesome to negotiate offset transactions. Technology acquisition is different from product procurement in the sense

that the technology itself is not the ultimate purpose of the procurement. That is, the technology acquired by offset trade should be applied to products, business, or technology transfer for promotion of economic and strategic performance. Therefore, the agency for defense technology acquisition is responsible

for establishing the system for the identification, valuation, implementation, and absorption of core technologies that are acquired by offsets. In this manner, offsets provide the options of offset transactions like technology finance and products commercialization, for the defense procurement agency to pursue technology acquisition. Most advanced nations establish the information system that provides the technical information, like DTiMS in Korea, and Internet information access service available (except for Italy among the countries considered in table 1).<sup>21</sup>

Offset minimum value and multiplier work as the leverage for offsets value gaps between provider and recipient. The buyer side has different utility on offsets. Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), Republic of Korea, recently revised the key performance indicators to manage the absorption capability of offsets and promote the offset execution level as shown below in table 2.<sup>22</sup>

Offset participants pursue open innovation to incorporate these different positions in terms of technology management. Scopes of offsets are different in each county. However, they tend to be more flexible and open to the civilian sector. For example, Korea formally accepted the defense sector for offsets, but allowed the products of the mid-sized firms and widened the scope of the FDI offsets in 2009 aiming to achieve the key performance indicators as shown in table 2.<sup>23</sup> Defense sector offsets are accepted by Korea, Australia, Italy, and UK and both defense and civil sectors are accepted by the US, Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Taiwan, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.

Korea is transitioning from the unbalanced consumer to potential provider of offsets. Korea is preparing to get ready to provide offsets as the defense trade balance becomes positive in the future

because there will be increasing pressure for the compensating actions to exporting defense goods. This will force every participant in defense market to open the sectors of technology, industry, and service.

There have been changes other than just a position change. For example, today China can buy defense equipment from the EU or NATO countries, and Korea buys equipment from Russia, the EU, and the US. This complex market requires managing the defense programs in the open innovation manner. That is, in the case of Korea, it is required to encompass the offsets trade with more flexible and wider windows to promote the international defense cooperation and defense exports. India allows private firms to fully participate in the defense sectors and raised the FDI ceiling from 26 percent to 49 percent starting in 2009.

As the largest offset provider, the US offers various types of offsets including coproduction, purchase, FDI, technology transfer, and subcontractors, and it is noticeable that the transactions in coproduction, FDI, and purchase have increased for the last ten years in offsets trade. The recipient countries set offset priorities and reveal their utility by means of multipliers. Multipliers are determined by the procurement authorities who care about the defense acquisition program. It is noticeable that most countries allow multipliers within some range depending on the bottom line and the ceiling.

A multiplier is defined as a factor applied to the actual value of certain offset transactions to calculate the offset credit value.<sup>24,25</sup> Foreign governments use multipliers to provide firms with incentives to offer offsets in targeted areas of economic growth.

**Table 2 Korea's Key Performance Indicators of Offsets**

Offsets Type	Key Performance Indicators	Common Indicators
R&D Technology	Upgrade the level of technology, technology and equipment to help developments	Technology Network, Technology Report, Future area of applications
Parts Export	Operation hours, input manpower, technology and equipment to help developments	Technology Network, Technology Report, Future area of applications
Logistics Support	Logistics support frequency, performance upgrade	Technology Network, Technology Report, Future area of applications

## Defense Offsets Policy And Value Of Defense Offsets

### Defense Offsets Policy

Table 3 shows offset policies of the major offset countries in terms of minimum value of contract, offset sector, minimum offset of contract value, multiplier, and main focus.<sup>26</sup> Israel requires the minimum threshold of offset value for defense contracts be US \$0.5 million and is well below that of the major offset countries. In Europe, the relatively advanced and industrialized countries such as the

UK, Denmark, and Italy prefer only defense related offsets. These countries tend to set the minimum offsets level high. As for the minimum offset level on contractual arrangements, Israel, Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey set it around 40 percent, and other countries like Canada, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and the UK set the minimum near 100 percent. Australia, Denmark, Israel, Switzerland, and UK countries focus on international cooperation and others on promotion of high-tech development as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3 Offsets Policies of the Major offset**

Countries	Min. Value Contract	Offset Sector	Min. Offset (%)	Focus
Australia	\$3.75 million	Defense	No specification	Long-term partnership with an emphasis on operational requirements, life support systems, and R&D—all defense related
Canada	\$1.7 million	Defense, Civilian	100	Investment in high-tech sectors of economy
Denmark	€3.3 million	Defense	100	Enhance tech. level, market access and coop. with foreign suppliers
Greece	\$10 million	Defense	100	Upgrade production and technology infrastructure, reinforce armed forces, reduce procurement costs
Israel	\$.5 million	Defense, Civilian	35	Development of close, long-term working relationship
Italy	€5 million	Defense, Civilian	70–100	Provide export opportunities for Italian defense companies
Netherlands	€5 million	Defense, Civilian	100	Tech. innovaton, marketing support for innovative products
Norway	\$6.7 million	Defense, Civilian	100	Strengthen and maintain the technical capability of Norwegian Defense Industry
Republic of Korea	\$10 million	Defense, Civilian	30–50	Defense core technology, parts production, logistics support
Spain	N/A	Defense, Civilian	100, vary	Technology similar to product purchased, improve armed forces and defense-related industry, increase R&D, increase employment
Switzerland	\$17 million	Defense, Civilian	100	Swiss manufacturing industries, technology transfer, and cooperation with universities
Taiwan	\$10 million	Defense, Civilian	Min. 40	Upgrade industries and industrial infrastructure, stimulation for domestic investment, introduce high-tech and core technologies, support export growth
Turkey	\$10 million	Defense, Civilian	50	Increase Turkish defense exports, compensate deficit of balance of payments, strengthen defense industrial infrastructure, expand investment and R&D cooperation
UK	\$17.2 million	Defense	N (Target 100)	Competitive and leading-edge domestic industry and added overseas business

### Value matters in Defense Offsets

Defense offset valuation becomes important when sellers and buyers negotiate the offset trade. Figure 3 shows that transactions with multipliers are kept well under 20 percent of total transactions and are not the usual US provided offsets trade.

It is interesting that there was a great increase in transactions with multipliers in the periods of 1993–1994, right after the Cold War ended, 1997–2001 after economic crises, and again starting in 2007.




Figure 3. Trends of US Offsets Transactions with Multipliers (1993-2007).





Figure 4. Number of US Offered Offsets with Multipliers (1993-2007).

Figure 4 displays the number of US offered offsets with multipliers between 1993 and 2007. Purchases, technology transfer, and subcontracts occupy the largest portion of the transactions. Buying nations either put their weight on purchases for the first priority or utilize it as the most prevalent offset practice among buying nations as well as selling countries.

Figure 5 illustrates the trends for multipliers applied to US offset transactions between 1993 and 2007, and the multipliers for indirect and unspecified

transactions are, on average, higher than the direct transactions. This means that offset transactions not directly related to the defense items or services are well accepted by the buying countries as well as the sellers. The kinds of offsets that may be considered indirect include purchases, technology transfer, overseas investment, licensed production, counter trade, training, and miscellaneous other offsets. This matches with the status of US offered offsets with multipliers as shown in figure 4.



**Figure 5.** Trends of Multipliers for US Offsets Transactions (1993-2007).

## Offsets Efficiency Performance Measures

### Data and Terms

Table 4 shows the data set used to estimate the value efficiency of offset trade for the major offset countries. Offset data are officially available only from US DOC.<sup>27,28</sup> Therefore, countries presented in Table 4 represents part of the offset trade market players. Even though most developing countries and Asian countries are not included in this list, it is meaningful to analyze the data of the major offset countries because the number of transactions of the major offset countries occupies more than half of the offset trade.

The data represents the aggregated amount of offset value in US\$ from 1993 to 2007. Contract award is the value of a defense trade contract that is required to consider the offset arrangement. And offset agreement is a contract specifying what percentage of the total sale is to be offset, the forms of industrial compensation required, the duration of the agreement, and the penalty clauses, if any.<sup>29</sup> When offset agreements are executed actually, the market value of the offset transaction measured in US dollars is called the actual value of offset transactions. Credit value of offset transactions is the value credited for the offset transaction by application of a multiplier or other methods. Therefore, the credit value can vary from the actual value of the offset.

**Table 4 Offsets Data of the Major offset Countries**

Country	Contracts Award (\$)	Offset Agreement (\$)	Actual Value (\$)	Credit Value (\$)
Australia	3,499,462,000	1,603,885,000	1,641,061,283	1,693,122,110
Canada	4,627,362,694	4,488,332,872	1,986,149,155	1,956,089,447
Denmark	874,619,000	874,629,000	628,353,693	764,035,467
Greece	7,464,342,343	8,522,872,271	2,311,057,718	4,610,889,808
Israel	4,356,730,606	2,102,176,627	4,203,586,252	4,356,583,424
Italy	2,680,257,000	2,515,257,000	2,423,539,035	2,443,539,287
Netherlands	2,149,566,176	2,522,126,176	2,335,085,015	2,641,820,923
Norway	1,347,751,824	1,372,651,824	1,002,126,424	1,289,495,728
Republic of Korea	9,215,188,892	5,386,723,454	2,841,206,220	3,155,189,170
Spain	1,955,992,588	1,743,813,004	1,237,986,175	1,484,175,543
Switzerland	2,557,612,040	2,017,612,040	1,381,467,504	1,387,122,885
Taiwan	11,391,270,700	2,510,242,030	1,115,984,683	2,033,425,228
Turkey	3,860,043,000	1,837,850,000	1,128,587,322	1,189,401,253
United Kingdom	12,812,901,286	10,509,292,643	7,247,637,813	7,114,246,409

**Value Efficiency Measures**

There are two typical types of methods that can be used to incorporate value judgments in DEA. One is to apply restrictions on the DEA weights, called weights restrictions, and the other is to change implicitly the comparative set of DMUs. If the unit price of output is known, the revenue model gives the same results as with the weights restrictions method.<sup>30</sup> The revenue DEA model, assuming constant returns to scale, can be driven as follows:<sup>31</sup>

First, obtain the optimal solution  $(y^*, \lambda^*)$  from equation (1).

$$py^* = \max_{y, \lambda} py \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

s.t. 
$$\begin{cases} x_0 \geq X\lambda \\ y \geq Y\lambda \\ y \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

where vector in  $(x, y, \lambda)$  in  $R^n$  space,

$$p = (p_1, p_2, p_3, \dots, p_z)$$

the common unit price vector for the output  $y$ . Second, obtain revenue efficiency by calculating

$$\text{Revenue Efficiency} = \frac{py_0}{m^*} \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

This equation is applicable for constant returns to scale; however, variable returns to scale can be easily considered by adding the additional constraint to (1), where a row vector with all elements equal to 1. Though measuring value efficiency is the objective of this paper, technical efficiency measures can be useful substitutes for it because prices are not available to make good use of technical efficiency. In offset trade, the multiplier is the only measure of the willingness to pay for the offset goods available in public. The basic DEA models are readily available from the textbook level references.<sup>32</sup>

Table 5 defines the input-output variables. The aggregated data of inputs and outputs are used due to the non-availability of quantities of inputs and outputs and their prices, and also to the contract award and offset agreement as input variables with net actual value for the output variable. The multiplier is used as a proxy for output unit price considering that it is the revealed preference of offset recipient, and credit value is based on it. Value efficiency measured by revenue efficiency is considered in terms of two cases as shown in table 5. An offset's contractual value efficiency (VE1) is estimated with contract award as input and actual value as output. An offset's execution value efficiency (VE2) is estimated with offset agreements as input and actual value as output. The multiplier represents unit output price.

**Table 5 Definition of Efficiency Estimates**

Efficiency Estimates	Definition	Data Input	Data Output	Unit Output Price
VE1	Offsets Contractual Value Efficiency	Contract Award	Actual Value	Multiplier
VE2	Offsets Execution Value Efficiency	Offset Agreement	Actual Value	Multiplier
TE1	Technical Efficiency	Contract Award	Offset Agreement	N/A
TE2	Technical Efficiency	Offset Agreement	Actual Value	N/A
TE3	Technical Efficiency	Actual Value	Credit Value	N/A
TE4	Technical Efficiency	Offset Agreement	Credit Value	N/A

Table 6 shows the possible determinants of efficiency gaps considered. S&T infra stands for the science and technology infrastructure index by the IMD 2009 world competitiveness yearbook. The World Economic Forum (WEF) provides the data for the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and Technological Readiness Index (TRI) as of 2009.

S&T infra, GCI, and TRI are considered proxy variables for the absorption ability of offset transactions. NATO membership is considered because often defense contracts are decided under the strong influence of political considerations. Offset percent and offset scopes are the policy options of offset recipient countries and can rule as the determinants of efficiency gaps between competitive countries.

**Table 6 Possible Determinants of Efficiency Gaps Consideration**

Countries	S&T Infra	GCI	TRI	NATO	Offset Percent	Offset Scope	Offset Focus
Australia	19.71694	5.15	5.39	No	0.60	Defense	Cooperation
Canada	23.09689	5.33	5.63	Yes	1.00	Defense, civilian	Tech Transfer
Denmark	19.85346	5.46	5.92	Yes	1.00	Defense	Cooperation
Greece	7.196802	4.04	3.86	Yes	1.00	Defense	Tech Transfer
Israel	24.39729	4.8	5.11	No	.35	Defense, civilian	Cooperation
Italy	7.98906	4.31	4.5	Yes	1.00	Defense	Tech Transfer
Netherlands	20.00935	5.32	6.02	Yes	1.00	Defense, civilian	Tech Transfer
Norway	14.81757	5.17	5.81	Yes	1.00	Defense	Tech Transfer
Republic of Korea	17.24659	5	5.5	No	.30	Defense, civilian	Tech Transfer
Spain	9.36811	4.59	4.77	Yes	1.00	Defense, civilian	Tech Transfer
Switzerland	22.96472	5.6	6.01	No	1.00	Defense, civilian	Cooperation
Taiwan	20.92689	5.2	5.43	No	.40	Defense, civilian	Tech Transfer
Turkey	6.133007	4.16	3.83	Yes	.50	Defense, civilian	Tech Transfer
United Kingdom	19.57196	5.19	5.79	Yes	1.0	Defense	Cooperation

## Results

Figure 6 shows the technical efficiency estimates of the major offset countries. First, TE1 measures the relative level of the achievement of offset agreements from international defense contracts. The higher the level of offset agreement, the more efficient under the condition that the offset arrangement is considered as the normal procedure in the regular procurement process. Second, TE2 compares the market value obtained from the offset agreement. A high level of efficiency score means that the offset agreement is well conducted after the offset trade was agreed upon between both sides. Third, TE3 compares the levels of satisfaction of the offset recipients. Therefore, the matches of offset goods with the recipient's preference will determine the efficiency score. Finally, TE4 measures the efficiency of the whole process of offset activities from offset arrangement to credit value accounting. The Netherlands has placed highest in the technical efficiency measure. Israel shows good performance in TE2 as much

as it influences the overall rank shown at the TE4 score. Greece shows poor performance in TE2, but is excellent at obtaining the credit value among the actual value.

Figure 7 shows the efficiency scores that are calculated in terms of offset contractual value efficiency and execution value efficiency for the aggregated data of offset transactions provided by the US from 1993 to 2006. The trends for efficiency scores measured over countries look consistently steady for VE1 and VE2, with some fluctuations for Greece, Australia, and the Netherlands, i.e. the Netherlands ranked at 1st place for VE1 and at 4th place for VE2, Australia jumped up to 2nd place for VE2 from 9th place for the VE1 score, and Greece moved down to 14th place from 11th place. Further analysis was conducted to see the differences between groups of S&T infra, offset percentage, and offset scope shown in Table 6. Rank-sum statistics on value efficiency scores showed no difference between groups with 10 percent significance level.





Figure 6. Technical Efficiency Estimates of the Major offset countries



**Figure 7.** Value Efficiency Estimates of the Major offset Countries

### Conclusions

This paper reviews the offset trends of the major offset countries and measures the technical and value efficiencies of offsets with the use of DEA. The paper also provides an analysis on the efficiency gaps among nations to derive policy implications.

First, the paper is meaningful for analyzing the offset technical and value efficiencies using the Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) technique which has been accepted as an efficiency index for the first time in offset fields. With the current offset dataset from US DOC, the value of efficiency is different among the major countries in the world, and this could affect their offset policies and priorities in the near future.

Second, it also shows the offset trends in the world today with some concrete datasets. It also presents the importance of offset values between the buyer and seller, and the value is crucial to trade-offs between two bodies. The buyer should consider his offset value, not only the credited value but also the performance value, with its smart usages in his country. The seller should also understand its importance as a leverage tool to increase his main contract acquisition. Finally, it contributes to the wise use of defense offset policy and its processes with some meaningful quantitative performances and outcomes.

There are limitations of the study that need to be acknowledged and addressed. With the shortage of datasets, there are limited countries which deal with the defense offset as their mandatory prerequisite for the acquisition of weapon systems. Especially many of the non-European countries are not considered in this study mainly for the same reason. Also, the use of the aggregated data for the efficiency measures could dampen the effect of environmental changes, e.g. offsets policy changes in offset percent and scope.

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### About the Authors

Professor Choon-Joo Lee has received his PhD in techno-economic policy Program from Seoul National University, Republic of Korea. He graduated from the University of California, Berkeley in 1997 with an MS degree in Nuclear Engineering. And he also graduated from KDI School of Public Policy and Management in 2005 with an MPP degree in International Relations. He works for the Department of Weapons System at Korea National Defense University. His research interests include R&D management, technology transfer, weapons acquisition policy, network-based defense robots operation, and performance management methodologies.

Dr. Won-Joon Jang has received his PhD in economics from the Seoul National University, Republic of Korea. He has graduated from the US Air Force Institute of Technology in 1998 with an MS in logistics management. He has served for a defense offset program manager in the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality (DTAQ) from 2006 to 2008. He is now an associate research fellow at Defense Industry Team, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), Seoul. He is also a board member of Korean Society for Innovation Management and Economics and an editorial board member of Korea Association of Defense Industry Studies since 2009. He has published numerous papers and reports for defense offset domestic and abroad. His major interests include defense offset, technology valuation, open innovation, technology transfer, performance evaluation, priority selection, and RAM/ILS.

Dr. Bong-Kyoo Yoon has received his PhD in industrial engineering from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Republic of Korea. He provided consultancy on financial management and cost innovation to various global companies at IBM BCS. He has been working for the Department of Operations Research at Korea National Defense University (KNDU) since 2006. His major interests include logistics optimization and performance innovation.



# A Perspective on FMS System Acquisition

By Greg Sutton  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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The significant growth of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) over the last several years has accounted for a growing interface between our Acquisition community and our FMS/Security Cooperation community. This interface has provided our International partners with significant benefits in terms of capability and has been equally supportive of US foreign policy. Each community is staffed by dedicated professionals, but many have little experience working in the other's areas of expertise. A graphical display would show our unique workforces as circles with an intersection where both communities play a cooperative role to meet mission requirements.

As with the functional areas of finance, logistics, training, and nearly all areas where the USG and specifically DOD is involved in providing goods and services for international partners, acquisition of major weapons systems does not provide a separate workforce or infrastructure, but rather utilizes the efficiencies gained by already in-place and functioning DOD acquisition processes—contracting by USG personnel in accordance with the FAR and DFARs, assignment of specific program managers within a System Program Office (SPO) already established with technical expertise available, etc. Acquisition as a topical area is so broad encompassing local or “in-theatre” contracting, acquisition of follow on support and services, cooperative acquisition (such as the JTF/F-35), that a treatise that attempted the “cover the waterfront” could easily become a life's work and comprise volumes—much like the FAR. The purpose of this treatise is much narrower and will focus upon some of the recent lessons learned in major weapons systems acquisitions of in-production end items for the international partner.

The days of old (more than ten to fifteen years ago) when international customer involvement in systems acquisitions was minimal, generally, tell the USG/DOD what it is you want, provide the funding, and then sit back and let us “drive the train” is no

longer viable for a number of reasons and led to problems of communication between the ultimate user, the USG/DOD and the contractors involved in producing the end items. When DSCA introduced the concept of “transparency” and provided the customers a much more active role in source selection, program determination, and progress reporting; this was viewed with some degree of skepticism and downright resistance from some members of both the acquisition and security assistance/cooperation communities. It has evolved from resistance, to grudging acceptance, to an acknowledgement that there are many more positive results than problems associated with a fully knowledgeable partnership between the DOD and international purchaser.

This has resulted in not only improved international cooperation, but also a more robust interaction between the Acquisition Community where policy and training are primarily provided by DOD-AT&L and DAU respectively, and the SC/SA community where policy and training are primary functions of DSCA and DISAM. The collaboration by the two policy makers and the two “schoolhouses” has resulted in numerous joint efforts to the benefit of all concerned—acquisition and SC/SA communities and our international partners. Just to mention a few of these collaborations—DSCA, DISAM, AT&L, and DAU jointly collaborate on policy and training issues via both a steering and working group structure, which allows for coordinated policy issuance and training activities. At the working group level, DAU and DISAM have been collaborating on course material for both communities for several years now —the DAWIA structure now includes “Core+” training requirements for SPO personnel involved in acquisition in support of an international customer. This training, often conducted jointly with DAU and DISAM faculty, acknowledges the need for a greater understanding of unique aspects as they apply to agreements (generally, the Letter of Offer

and Acceptance [LOA]), and the standard terms and conditions of those LOAs. Conversely, DAU faculty members with a plethora of knowledge and experience in the aspects of acquisition—program management, contracting, initial establishment of logistics capabilities, etc.—provide input in curriculum development and guest lecturers to DISAM courses. These efforts have been developing for nearly ten years, with increasing cross-flow of information and personnel every year since. So, what motivated this “cooperative environment” in the first place?

As is often the case, the impetus to begin came about from a recognition by the parent organizations—DSCA and AT&L—that a significant blunder in a major acquisition in support of an FMS sale demanded a greater level of understanding between the two communities. We needed to ensure the participants knew what was required to achieve the goals of each. Since the effort was modest at first, there continued to be blunders (let’s call them Lessons Learned as a more acceptable/polite term) but with lesser frequency and consequence. Just as DISAM and our collaborators at DAU were beginning to congratulate ourselves for how far we had progressed, we got a reminder that there is still a way to go in the effort.

For the purposes of this writing, suffice it to say that our most recent Lesson Learned pointed out that members of the acquisition and security assistance/security cooperation community did not adequately consider and communicate the relationship of activities by one group acting independently upon the other to the detriment of the international purchaser. The good news is that the problem was solvable. The bad news is that it required unprecedented involvement and actions at the senior DOD level (to read General/ Flag Officer and Undersecretary Level) to solve. More good news—this activity helped spur the establishment of a Lessons Learned/ Best Practices data base—brought online via the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) to all USG CAC holders with a SCIP account. Further, this Lesson Learned is being incorporated in the curriculum of both educational institutes to further the training environment of both communities. Within the next few weeks, a team research project, spanning more than four months and delineating the entire issue alluded to above, will be published on that Lessons Learned/Best Practices data base

within SCIP. So, if you have a CAC but do not have a SCIP account yet and you want the details, go to: <https://www.scportal.us/home/registrationInfo.asp> and establish a SCIP account. The LL/BP database is accessible on both the “Corporate” and “SCO/ COCOM” community pages. Not only will you be able to access the subject LL, but you also may find the numerous other entries helpful to avoid problems in your current and future professional activities. Look forward to more information of this nature in the *DISAM Online Journal* [[www.disamjournal.org](http://www.disamjournal.org)] and *DISAM Annual* articles—these are available in the public domain and require only knowledge of the URL to get there. It is our fervent hope that this information will prove to be not only of interest, but of benefit as you pursue your career aspirations.

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### **About the Author**

Gregory W. Sutton is currently the Director of Research at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He has over twenty years experience in the SC/SA arena serving in an SAO (now SCO)—the US Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia, and the Air Force ILCO (AFSAC), while on active duty as an AF Officer. As a contract FMS advisor, he was involved in several major international FMS system sales. He joined the faculty at DISAM in 1994 and was appointed Director of Research in 2001.

# In SAARMS' Way

By Dr. Bob Weber

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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## Overview

The Security Assistance Automated Resource Management Suite (SAARMS) is a set of three applications designed to enable Security Assistance personnel to manage their budgets and property. Budgets are managed through the Budget Preparation and Budget Execution applications, and the Property Management application is an automated form of the Army Property Book. Getting “in SAARMS’ way” is a great way to keep track of all security assistance resources.

### Budget Preparation

The Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) uses the SAARMS Budget Preparation application, hereafter referred to as Budget Prep, to submit their requirements to their geographic combatant command (GCC). Budget Prep is a web-based application, accessible through the Security Assistance Network (SAN) portal website (<https://www.idss.ida.org/san/>). This allows for all budget submissions to be available to the GCC and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as soon as the SCOs save their data.

The application is broken into five major sections:

1. Set-up—provides the capability of uploading a commander’s statement. This statement should delineate the major issues in the budget and not each individual line item.
2. Direct charges—provides entry screens for each object class in the SCO’s budget. This is the portion of the budget submission over which the SCO will have execution authority.
3. Indirect charges—provides entry screens for additional budget items that are not included in the SCO’s budget for execution, but that will be monitored by the SCO during the execution year. These items are paid for out of DSCA’s budget and include International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Foreign Service National Separation Trust pay, and Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM).

4. Special exhibits—provides additional items that are of interest to the SCO, but paid for by DSCA. The SCO has no mandatory entries in these exhibits.
5. Reports—provides ten reports for the SCO, including budget reports, unfunded requirements, and vehicle and computer inventories.

Each GCC is given a funding target ceiling, which is broken down into targets for each of the SCOs within the GCC. This target is the basis for the direct charges portion of the budget. This target, when the budget is finally approved, becomes the annual funding program total in the execution of the budget.

## Budget Execution

The resource management application for executing the Security Assistance (SA) portion of the SCO budget is SAARMS Budget Execution, hereafter referred to as Execution. This application must be used by the SCO to track SA funds but can also be used to track non-SA fund types.

Each fiscal year, the SCO creates a new SA funds account. The appropriate GCC then assigns a portion of their SA funds to each SCO’s account. This allowance is loaded into Execution either by the SCO or the GCC, and is the SCO’s Obligation Authority/Funds Certification Authority (OA/FCA), the SA funds ceiling for obligation documents for the SCO. The GCCs provide OA/FCA on a quarterly basis with interim adjustments provided on an as-needed/if-available basis. The OA/FCA amount is further distributed within Execution to one or more management categories (MGTCAT) that are specified by the GCC. To prevent Anti-Deficiency Act violations, Execution does not allow the SCO to obligate more funds than are available at the time of obligation. The SCO then creates obligations and records payments in Execution for local management of the funds; obligations will then be

passed to the official accounting system, known as “BQ”, which is located at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indianapolis Center (DFAS-IN) in Indianapolis, Indiana.

As a feeder system to the DFAS-IN, SAARMS Budget Execution is a resource management information system; BQ is the official accounting system. Execution currently passes obligation data to BQ via a twice-weekly update process started by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) and completed by DFAS-IN. Processes on SAARMS compile the obligation data and format it for transfer to DFAS-IN via the Security Assistance Network (SAN). DFAS-IN retrieves the data file and then pushes it to BQ for processing. The next day, DFAS-IN compiles an Open Document Listing (ODL), which is posted to the SAN, where the data is available to SAARMS for reconciliation purposes. The ODL contains dollar totals for both obligations and disbursement (payments) for each open document in Execution. A special code is assigned to Defense Travel System (DTS) obligations, which allows Execution to not pass these records to BQ, since they are passed directly to BQ from DTS.

It is important to note that payments are entered into Execution by the SCO as soon as the data for the payment is available. This information is not

passed to the BQ system, since it is coming from other feeder systems, primarily the Department of State (DOS) Momentum accounting system. When the SCO enters an obligation, the paperwork is usually given to the Embassy accounting office, to allow them to disburse funds to pay for the goods and services for which the obligation was created. The Embassy accounting system then passes a request for reimbursement to the BQ system and BQ creates the reimbursement. This information is then recorded in the ODL and passed to SAARMS in the ODL.

Two applications are available to the SCO to check the status of obligation documents, the Consolidated Overseas Accountability Support Toolbox (COAST) and the Commander's Resource Integration System (CRIS). COAST is a State Department application that allows users to query the DOS Momentum accounting system and retrieve the vouchers that were created from the input of their obligations in the Momentum system. CRIS is a DOD system used to run queries on the BQ data, as mentioned above. SCOs can contact the Embassy’s Financial Management Office for access to COAST, and can contact their GCC to request access to CRIS.

Figure 1 shows the interaction among the various IT systems.




Figure 1. Interaction among various IT systems

## **Property**

The SAARMS Property module is a stand-alone Microsoft Access-based database, modeled after the Army Property Book. The application can track property purchased with different funds, maintain Table of Allowance authorizations, record property held in multiple physical locations, and print hand receipts. It also contains reports on nearly all data fields.

## **Future of SAARMS**

Over the next couple years, the SAARMS Budget Execution and Budget Preparation applications are being rewritten to improve their performance, enhance their usability, and improve their maintainability. During this time, SCOs should feel free to inform their GCCs of any changes they would like to see made to these applications.

## **Summary**

The web-based applications, Execution and Budget Prep, can be accessed via the SAN, provided the GCC has granted the SCO member SAARMS access. The Property module and installation instructions can be downloaded from the SAN Budget Library. In regards to resource management, SAARMS is a valuable suite of resource management applications, all designed to make the SCO's life easier.

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## **About the Author**

Dr. Bob Weber is an Associate Professor of Security Cooperation with the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). He is Project Manager for the Security Assistance Network (SAN), and IT Developer for the Security Assistance Automated Resource Management Suite (SAARMS) and the Security Cooperation Workforce Database (SCWD). Dr. Weber retired from the Air Force after twenty years as a communications officer and logistician. He holds a PhD in computer and information science from the University of Minnesota.



# “So, you’re going to be a SCO Director of Training..”

By Roger Scott

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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## **Background**

The United States military offers tremendous education and training not only for US military and civilian personnel, but also for our international partners. After working for a year with our friends in the Bandarian Air Force (BAF), I have a few observations and lessons to share about international training management.

## **Teamwork**

First, you can’t do this job in a vacuum. The outstanding training I received at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) (especially the Training track in the third week of the SCM-O [overseas] course) in March 2008 set me up for success. Second, the two outstanding USAF noncommissioned officers working with me provided fantastic on-the-job training, which amplified what I was taught at DISAM. Third, the Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron was our main “headquarters” organization within the Air Force implementing agency, and I talked to them every single day. Their guidance and support was phenomenal. I couldn’t have done the job without them. Fourth, my Bandarian counterparts also worked extremely hard to try to get as many BAF members trained as possible. I worked about five hours every day downtown at the BAF HQ with a Maj Gen (BAF/Director of AF Training [BAF/DAFT] for the entire country of Bandaria), a Major, a Captain, and two civilians, and then I would come back to base to work another eight hours typing invitational travel orders (ITOs) and amendments and answering a plethora of questions and e-mails. The weekends were also a great time to get caught up on ITOs and amendments, because I did not have to travel downtown to the BAF HQ on those days.

## **Mission**

I worked as the Director of Training for the SCO’s Air Force Division. Although it seems obvious, it was crucial to remember that we worked for the Chief of the Air Force Division and for the Chief of the SCO. We worked for the US government to advise and assist BAF, providing them customer service, but not at the expense of our rules, regulations, instructions, or policies. Our main job was to help BAF get their members qualified (English Comprehension-Level [ECL] testing, medical/dental exams, visas, etc.) to go to the United States for formal training. We advised and assisted them in filling their quotas for US classes and avoiding class cancellations if at all possible. We sent them to many different types of training, including pilot, navigator, leader development, enlisted technical, officer-management-related, and in-country training. Was the position rewarding professionally? Yes, definitely! I think I taught my counterparts how to be more organized, how to work harder, how to be professional, and I represented how kind and professional Americans can be. Also, this position is considered a strategic relationship by our President, the State Department, and Congress, which illustrates its importance. I had a sense of satisfaction every day. I also knew that every Bandarian I sent to the States would become a friend of the US; they loved going to the US, and they returned praising America and Americans. The BAF members I interacted with were all just trying to do their best for their countrymen and train as many individuals as possible. This is what I was trying to do as well.

## **Specific Focus and Tasks**

Some of my primary goals as the Director of Air Force Training were to improve BAF members’ English-language skills; assist BAF with their long-range planning and execution, thereby decreasing class cancellations; continuously improve our strategic partnership and BAF-USAF relationship;

produce hundreds of amendments and Invitational Travel Orders (ITOs) in a timely manner; administer an English language test to 1,500 BAF members a year, and process and deliver approximately 800 visa applications to the US embassy.

### **The Process**

I would pore over the Standardized Training List (STL) and testing roster every day to help BAF determine whom to test first. Then, we would take those who scored the highest and turn in their visa applications to the US embassy. While waiting for their visas to come back, we would get their security, medical, and dental clearances from BAF. Once we had their visas, BAF would give us their flight itineraries, and we would produce the final ITOs and send an arrival message to DLI.

In September, we would remind BAF to contact the bases throughout Bandaria to find out what type of training they would need for the next two upcoming fiscal years. Around 1 December, we would receive their training plan and scrub it to ensure they were asking for legitimate, necessary courses that were in fact listed in the Training Military Articles and Services List (T-MASL).

In early January, I would submit a Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP) to AFSAT. In March or April, one of our NCOs would go to the Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG—formerly known as Training Program Management Review [TPMR]) in Tampa FL, and he, along with the representative from the AFSAT Bandaria team, would attempt to get all of the classes requested in our CETPP and other documents.

In late July or early August, we received the STL of classes that BAF received for the upcoming fiscal year. We gave a hard copy of the STL to BAF every two weeks. We also gave them a list of which Worksheet Control Numbers (WCNs—used to track a student assigned to a course or courses) to test first because of the soonest upcoming courses. We always tried to test everyone 105 days before their first class report date (couldn't test them any earlier than that, or their ECL test would expire), giving us plenty of time to get their visas back.

After they tested, we checked the Defense Language Institute–English Language Center (DLIELC) wheel, the number of weeks of English they had programmed on the STL, and determined if

they scored high enough to fill the WCN. I did this with one of my main BAF counterparts. We found a quiet room at BAF where we wouldn't be disturbed, and we went through every single test score to see if the BAF member scored high enough to go to training.

For instance, on 8 September 08, they could have tested seventy-five people but only fifty arrived for testing. Of those fifty, only twenty-seven scored high enough to be submitted for the WCN. That no-show rate and the poor ECL test scores were two of the reasons why they had cancellations, and I am sure many non-English speaking countries face the same challenge. I gave a letter to the BAF/DAFT showing the testing results each time.

### **A Closer Look at SCO Training**

It was very hectic; we had to keep up with hundreds of planning ITOs, final ITOs, and amendments—all while talking to a multitude of people each day and answering an endless number of questions, often while handling many other hot issues. I did not have time to get any reports, letters, ITOs, amendments, or e-mail answers done downtown at BAF HQ. I was too busy engaging with about ten people every day, not to mention the other twenty or so who would stop me in the hall or office to ask me a question about training, visas, etc.

Downloading the Training Management System STL and T-MASL took nearly an hour every day, due to the slow Internet connection. Also, on days we had testing, three of us (the two NCOs and I) went downtown to manage that huge event—setting up, administering, grading, importing into excel, and sharing the results with BAF/DAFT.

### **Testing**

Per, DLI, we could only test twice a month, and testing had to take place on certain days. On test day, we tested at 0800, 0915, and 1030—twenty-five people in each session, seventy-five people total—a different test version for each of the three sessions. They had to be on the list provided to us by DAFT in order to be tested. Of course, we had to ensure we never left a booklet or answer sheet unsecured, which would have resulted in a test compromise. Once again, after they tested, we had to determine if they scored high enough to go to training, and if so, DAFT would provide visa applications and security clearances for them so we could cut their planning

ITOs. If they did not score high enough, they had to wait thirty days to test again using a different version of the test.

### **Visas**

Unfortunately, we somehow got roped into the visa business. This only added time and frustration to the process—adding an unnecessary middleman. I think a previous SCO thought it would be a great customer service for us to take visa applications to the US embassy for the Bandarians and that we could possibly help hustle the embassy along. I think the idea was good in theory. However, in practice, we had no clout with the embassy, even though BAF members thought we did. We would tell BAF members that they needed to submit visa applications three months prior to the formal training, and if they did that, they had a 95+ percent chance of getting their visa in time. If they submitted it in less than that time, they had no one to blame but themselves. We were just the couriers; we took the applications to the embassy, and when the embassy was done with them, we brought the passports with visas back to BAF/DAFT. BAF members were constantly complaining about how long it took for them to get a visa, and I understood their pain; however, once again, we were just the messengers.

### **Reports**

When DLI sent their monthly report of how the hundreds of BAF students were doing in English-language training at DLI, I would share these reports with BAF/DAFT. He would have his Major call any student who was stagnating or regressing in their scores and tell them to shape up and study harder or he was going to bring them home and cancel their follow-on training. I really respected him for holding his students accountable like that. I would have done the same thing in his position. He also wanted a weekly report on every single one of his students in the States. However, our training centers weren't staffed to provide weekly reports on 300+ students (not to mention the thousands of students from other countries, too).

### **Cancellations**

We worked tirelessly and endlessly to help BAF bring down their cancellations by ensuring that they tested people 105 days before class report date, by confirming that they turned in visa applications after testing (if they scored well enough), and then once

they received their visas, by having BAF submit their medical clearances and flight itineraries so we could cut the final ITOs. We kept track, throughout the year, of which WCNs had been cancelled and why. The overwhelming majority of the cancellations were because they couldn't find someone to go to the class, couldn't get someone to score high enough on the ECL, or submitted visa applications too late. With our help, though, they did a great job of dramatically reducing cancellations.

### **Take-Aways**

Planning, planning, and more planning is crucial. It is vitally important to use the STL daily to determine who needs to test next, to test 105 days in advance, and to fill up all of the WCNs as soon as possible to minimize cancellations. It is also important to have your counterparts use the STL daily. You and your counterparts have to do a training gap analysis to anticipate what training will be needed and how to fill it. "Flexibility is the key to airpower": while the Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training publication states that SCO training managers are supposed to send arrival messages to the International Military Student Officers (IMSOs) in the US schoolhouses sixteen days before the student is going to arrive (or thirty days prior if the student is bringing his or her family), sometimes we don't receive the visas until one or two days before the report date. We are working our tails off to get this done much sooner, but only so much is in our control. Another lesson learned: lean heavily on the outstanding people at AFSAT, NETSAFA, SATFA, SATMO, MCSCG, CG-DCO-I, and DLI. They have a plethora of experience and are extremely helpful. Make sure you attend DISAM before you arrive in-country. Otherwise, you will have an extremely difficult time understanding what is going on, what you are supposed to do, and where you fit in. Remember, you work for and represent the US government. Work well with your international counterparts and remember that building and improving upon that strategic relationship is one of the most important goals for your job.

### **Author's Update**

It has been several months now since I wrote this article, and I wanted to revisit it to ensure it was still applicable. The good news is the information is

still on target and helpful to you, as SCO Training Managers (TMs). While I have this opportunity though, I'd like to add a few more important points. First, I have added a checklist to help you do your job more effectively. Second, I wanted to remind you to complete the mandatory Leahy vetting, which can be coordinated through your embassy in-country. Third, I'd like to remind you not to send dependents to schools unless they are listed in SAMM, Table C10.T3. This is because those other schools and their respective bases and posts are not set up to handle dependents (e.g., there isn't enough billeting). Fourth, please ensure you review the medical and dental forms turned in to you, so the country isn't sending a student to the US with active tuberculosis, etc. Fifth, you need to give a thorough pre-departure briefing to the students so they are well-prepared when they arrive at the schoolhouse. Sixth, since this article was originally published, we have gone to TMS 8, which is a web-based version of TMS. As a result, you no longer have to download TMS to your desktop and then upload it at the end of the day. This will save you a lot of time and frustration. In summary, there are a multitude of steps to complete each day as a SCO TM, and it is an extremely hectic job. Please ensure you do not skip any steps, or it can cause major problems when students arrive to the schoolhouse, and people in the US, and the students, have to suffer the repercussions.

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### **About the Author**

Roger Scott is an assistant professor of Security Assistance Management at DISAM with a concentration on the FMS process, training, logistics, end-use monitoring, and cross-cultural communications. His experience includes working one year as the Director of Air Force Training for the SCO in Saudi Arabia, and eighteen months as an instructor at DISAM. He is a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel who taught Air Force ROTC at Indiana University on two different occasions, for five years total. He also taught and commanded at the US Air Force Academy Preparatory School and was the Military Equal Opportunity Chief at Tyndall AFB, FL, among other assignments. He was awarded a master of arts in human resources development from Webster University in St. Louis, MO, and a bachelor of science in communications (journalism emphasis) from the University of Southern Indiana in

Evansville, IN. He also completed Air War College by correspondence and earned the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, and four Air Force Commendation Medals, among other awards.

# Training Process Checklist

- September: As the SCO Training Manager (SCO/TM), you advise your host nation (HN) to identify training they will need for the next two years; they may use the T-MASL in I-SANweb (if they have access to I-SAN) to determine courses available. Also, you ask your HN for any inputs you need to complete the Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP), which you will input using the SCO-T web
- 1 January: HN turns that list of training needs and also CETPP inputs in to you (SCO/TM).
- 1 February: After analyzing/scrubbing the list, complete the CETPP and submit to the COCOM. Also, identify course requests to the MILDEP training organization (i.e., AFSAT, SATFA, NETSAFA, SCETC, or CG-DCO-I) counterparts/country program managers to be programmed into the STL.
- March–June: You attend Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG) that your COCOM hosts. At the SCETWG, you will discuss the requested courses with the MILDEPs, DSCA, and State Department. Also, invitational courses (e.g., Army War College) requested in the CETPP will be discussed and justifications made.
- After the SCETWG and throughout the year, the MILDEPs will adjust training line status in the STL as needed.
- Throughout the year: HN requests courses, as needs arise, in addition to what they already have on the STL.
- You send the request to the MILDEP with the T-MASL number, quarter/year desired, and funding source (e.g., IMET, FMFP, CTFP, or FMS)
- MILDEP puts the class on the STL (Programmed [P] or Scheduled [S] status) and requests the class from the schoolhouse
- Once the schoolhouse confirms that your country has a seat, the MILDEP marks the training as confirmed (C) on the STL and puts dates of the class on the STL (However, you can't cut a final ITO yet, until the MILDEP loads funds against it/gives you the ITO Line Authorization).
- Once dates of the class are on the STL, ask the HN to identify a student for the class
- English comprehension level (ECL) test the student 105 days or less prior to the class start date—give yourself plenty of time to complete human rights vetting, visa, etc.
- Have the student fill out the visa application forms, and they should turn their visa applications in to the US Embassy right away.
- Type up the planning ITO in TMS (you may even have to submit this with the vetting request)
- The HN gives you a security clearance letter and the medical and dental forms. Pre-departure medical examinations (conducted within three months preceding the departure of the IMS and authorized accompanying or joining dependents) are required prior to issuance of the ITO. Required medical examinations will be recorded in English on DD Forms 2808 and 2807-I.

- If the student is going to a course that requires it, give them a physical fitness test
- When you have the security clearance, medical/dental, an ECL score of 55 or more, student vetting results, and a copy of the student's passport and visa, make the flight arrangements, if IMET or CT. If FMS, the country makes their own flight reservations for the student and gives you a copy of the flight itinerary. If a Regional Center is paying for the training (i.e., case ID IIC), contact them to determine who makes flight arrangements.
- Cut the final ITO and arrival message (both are in TMS) and upload to the SAN.
- Do pre-departure briefing with the student and give them printout of the location information for the schools they will be attending, as well as Course Description and International Notes.
- While student is in training, if you get any academic progress reports on them, you may want to share with HN. For example, if the student is struggling or slacking, you may want to let your HN know, so they can tell him to shape up and work harder, or he's going to get pulled from the training by the HN.
- When they return from training:
  - Give them the retainable instructional materials (RIM—e.g., books) that the schoolhouses shipped back to you
  - Get feedback from the student on how they did, what they liked, what they didn't like, what could have been better about the whole process
  - Check their utilization (i.e., are they applying/using their training)
  - If IMET or CT, file the travel voucher

# Advancing Security Cooperation Training Through Technology and Advanced Instructional Strategies


By Christopher Burns  
 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

## Introduction

DISAM has had a long standing reputation of having a talented cadre of instructors and dedicated leadership with vision for the training needs of security cooperation professionals across the government. DISAM has been working tirelessly to address the growing needs of the security cooperation community by harnessing leading edge technologies and advanced instructional strategies to provide the most effective training for our students. This article will outline where we have come from and where we are headed in terms of instructional enhancements.

DISAM started offering courses in 1977 with 95 students in the first year and has grown to over 12,500 students in FY11. We began offering online classes in 2002 with just over 200 students and have grown to accommodate 8685 online students in FY11. Figure 1 below depicts the steady growth in both online and resident student numbers over the years.

Because of the influx of individuals requiring security cooperation (SC) training, limited classroom space, and the requirements for specific types of SC training, DISAM has had to look beyond the classroom for ways to meet the training needs of the SC community. In the last five years at DISAM, there has been a gradual shift toward enrollment in courses delivered online. Although DISAM has offered online training since 2002, it is now looking to expand the ways in which it uses the Internet and other advanced technologies to disseminate training, education, and provide performance support.



## Current Research and Industry Trends

DISAM has been closely monitoring current research and industry trends to prepare a five-year strategic plan for distance learning and instructional technology. Some of the more interesting research provides insight into the effectiveness of new technologies and trends in:


- Mobile Learning (mLearning)
- Performance Support Tools
- Implementing Simulations and Games
- Integrating Scenario-Based Training
- Implementation Strategies for Synchronous eLearning (live-online)
- Rapid eLearning Authoring Tools
- Learning Management Systems
- Blended Learning (hybrids of classroom and online asynchronous and/or synchronous)

Some industry leading experts have said that the World Wide Web has caused the biggest change in education and learning since the advent of the printed book. Government and business leaders understand that change is happening faster than ever before and new information is flowing at a much faster rate than can be consumed. Skills and knowledge required for consistent performance are changing rapidly. There is a continuous but steady shift from training to performance. Newer methods that encourage

learning in the workplace are increasingly gaining traction. The early days of instructional design for the military followed the format of:

- Introduction—“tell them what we are going to tell them”
- Content/Lecture—“tell them”
- Summary—“tell them what we told them”

Although this strategy is still sound design in some respects, there are additional instructional strategies that can be integrated to build upon this foundation which can greatly improve learning retention. With the recent SECDEF goals for training the Security Cooperation Workforce, there has been increased emphasis to ensure that our personnel have SC professional development and training. DISAM is not only meeting and exceeding the SECDEF goals but focusing on improved retention of the knowledge gained in the courses. Educational research shows that learning retention can be greatly diminished after two weeks of the training session. The instructional strategies being used in the design of a course directly impact the learning retention of the student. The diagram of Edgar Dale’s “Cone of Learning” in figure 2 illustrates the fact that we retain more of what we experience or do within “active learning” strategies and retain less of what we learn through “passive learning” strategies such as reading or lectures. For



this reason DISAM is actively working to integrate more experiential learning exercises across the entire curriculum that will provide opportunities for students to apply new knowledge gained in our courses. We are doing this by integrating advanced instructional strategies such as:

- Scenario-based exercises
- Immersive learning simulations
- Game-based learning
- Problem-based learning
- Engaging vignettes

Each of these instructional methods is on the leading edge of what industry leaders are incorporating into their training and education programs.

There is an increasing interest in delivery methods that provide live, online, just-in-time learning opportunities and performance support. DISAM is analyzing how such solutions can help the SC community, what options are available, and how the use of these technologies can aid us in delivering effective learning and support in the workplace.

### Online Courseware Fidelity Enhancements

DISAM is working diligently to upgrade the overall fidelity of its online courseware. The courseware enhancements that we are implementing are evident in several areas. The whole interface has undergone a facelift and we have integrated more synchronized audio with multimedia animations that improves comprehension of the content. The courses will now include much more interactivity, more variations in assessment types, and more media types being utilized within the courseware. There has also been increased emphasis on incorporating immersive learning simulations and complex scenarios in which to apply new knowledge gained within the course.



These enhancements have been implemented in the new Security Cooperation Familiarization course scheduled to be online March 2012. DISAM is also beginning experimentation to deliver all online courses through alternative devices such as tablets, phones, and televisions.

### Blended Learning Initiatives

Traditional blended learning combines face to face classroom instructional methods with computer mediated instruction to form an integrated instructional approach. Blended learning approaches can combine teaching strategies as well as delivery media. Essentially, blended learning seeks an approach to course design to will leverage that which is best done in person in combination with that which can be more effectively done online. DISAM has experimented with blended learning for a few years but has more recently utilized it in a larger scale. The new SAM-C (CONUS) course uses a blended approach to shorten the required classroom time for students that work in CONUS. The original two week resident course was redesigned to have two components: one week of web-based training and one week of resident classroom training. During the week of online training students build core knowledge of security cooperation before attending the resident portion of the course. The classroom component of the course is designed to be very hands-on with extensive use of exercises, scenarios, learning games, and the like.



This approach to active, experiential learning is extremely popular with the students and is achieving better results. This strategy also allowed DISAM to effectively quadruple (from about 270 students in FY09 to 970 in FY11) the number of SAM-C students between resident and on-site offerings with our existing staff and classroom facilities. This approach proved to be a key element in facilitating the achievement of the High Performance Priority Goal (HPPG) of having 95 percent of the Security Cooperation workforce trained by FY2012, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the future, this restructure will enhance DISAM's ability

to use its calendar more effectively as additional courses are added to the schedule. It will also allow DISAM to better accommodate the expansion of the SCM-O course which is now four, vice three, weeks in duration as we began FY12.

DISAM is implementing a hybrid blended learning approach within the new four-week SCM-O (Overseas) course to include the integration of immersive learning simulations as well as web-based training modules. The course now contains a three-week core followed by a one-week group of tracks that students attend based on the need of their positions overseas (some do not stay into week four). This blended learning approach utilizes a different strategy from the traditional blended approach. The goal of this new approach is merge the best aspects of both classroom and computer mediated instruction. Students of the new SCM-O course will receive traditional classroom training during their three to four weeks at DISAM. However, the course will also include complex multimedia scenarios that may be experienced in three different modes: individually, in small groups, or as a class (figure 5). The scenarios will allow students to go through experiential learning activities that will engage students, provide simulated experience, generate meaningful discussions, improve knowledge retention, and allow students to actively apply new knowledge gained in the course. This approach falls in line with the concepts outlined in Edgar Dale’s “Cone of Learning” summarized earlier in this article.

Another hybrid blended learning approach that DISAM is beginning to experiment with is the blend of synchronous learning or Webinar technology with either classroom training or traditional asynchronous web-based training. In this case synchronous webinar

sessions can occur before during or after classroom or web-based training sessions. This option can help enhance DISAM’s course delivery options by enabling the following possibilities:

- Allow instructors or guest speakers to present to classroom students without traveling to DISAM
- Allow DISAM instructors to provide advanced training sessions to students after attending DISAM resident training
- Blend “live” online sessions within traditional web-based training curriculum
- Research has shown that some of the advantages of implementing blended learning can be very beneficial to learner experiences to include:
  - Increase student flexibility and training options
  - Access to materials while retaining a sense of community
  - Cost efficiency of delivering and receiving training
  - Reduced “seat time” in resident classroom setting
  - Eases facility issues—limited classroom space
  - Early evidence of positive impact on learning outcomes

The reality is that we all live and operate in a blended environment consisting of a face-to face world and an online world so why shouldn’t our learning strategies include the same mix?

### **Performance Support**

One definition of performance support states that it is a repository of information, processes, and perspectives that can be easily accessed to aid workers in performing a specific task or function more efficiently. The idea behind performance support is that valuable information and training is available at the “point of need” of the student. This point of need



is when the individual needs to “apply” knowledge that they may no longer have access to in the recesses of their memory. This is when refresher training or just-in-time training is extremely valuable. Security Cooperation is a field that often requires specific training in an area of specialization. Some important tasks occur only once a year and may need refresher training. DISAM is working to provide innovative performance support tools for our students to aid them at their moment of need when they need to perform critical tasks. We plan to broaden our approach from the traditional classroom and online training to include other formal or informal training methods that can help our students to improve their overall performance on the job. Performance support tools can provide additional informal learning paths to compliment our more traditional learning paths or courses. In our efforts to integrate performance support into our overall learning strategy, you will see new tools offered by DISAM that could take the form of mLearning applications, webinars, online refresher training, and job aids.

### **Mobile Learning (mLearning): Landscape and Trends**

DISAM is working on an mLearning Strategy, which will articulate how we plan to integrate mobile learning within our overall curriculum and learning architecture. Our position is that although mLearning is not yet a mainstream mechanism for training delivery, it is definitely coming fast and is possible now. Since companies like Google are now designing their products to be primarily deliverable for mobile devices first, we believe that it is crucial that we include mobile learning as part of our strategic plan to play a part in future training and performance support. DISAM is analyzing how our culture is using mobile devices and how we can best leverage the massive growth that is occurring in this technology field. mLearning encapsulates not only mobile phones but the influx of many others mobile devices such as eReaders, (Kindle, Nook, etc.), media players (iPod, etc.), tablets (iPad, Android, etc), and gaming platforms (Xbox, Playstation, and Nintendo). Many of these devices are very sophisticated and have expanded capabilities such as GPS, cameras, web cams, video capture, and PDA capabilities as well as countless apps that may also run on these devices. In addition, many of these devices have expanded connectivity and access to multiple networks such as

Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and mobile networks GSM/CDMA (Verizon, Sprint, etc.).

Mobile learning should not be considered a replacement for traditional web-based training. Rather, it should augment and enhance other forms of training delivery and performance support. As such, DISAM is beginning experimentation for future deployment of mLearning applications.

### **Current Accomplishments and Future Plans**

The five-year strategic plan for Distance Learning and Instructional Technology was developed to create a vision and blueprint for distance education and instructional technologies at DISAM. Its purpose is to realize the potential institutional growth that exists by continued investment in the distance education, curriculum design, and professional development programs at DISAM. The strategic plan was developed after a careful analysis of how industry leaders are using leading edge technologies and advanced instructional strategies to provide meaningful learning experiences for the workforce. The analysis also took into consideration the training and performance support needs of the SC community.

DISAM’s distance learning mission is to provide robust online training solutions to supplement DISAM’s traditional classroom training in order to meet the expanding security cooperation training needs of the Department of Defense (DOD). Another goal of the strategic plan is to identify potential solutions that extend the reach of DISAM beyond existing boundaries.

During the execution of the first year for the strategic plan (FY11), DISAM accomplished the following initiatives:

- Customized the Blackboard Learning Management System to accommodate the specific needs of DISAM and the SC Community
  - ◊ Customized the LMS user interfaces
  - ◊ Enabled CAC login
  - ◊ Created interfaces between Blackboard databases and the DISAM student database
  - ◊ Improved distribution of course completion certificates to students
- Upgraded courseware fidelity and overall quality of our online courses
  - ◊ Developed a courseware style guide

- ◊ Established standards for interactivity, usability, interfaces, and graphical treatments
- ◊ Developed new assessment strategies to enhance learning retention
- Established the capability to deliver synchronous “live online” webinars
  - ◊ Explored the potential of delivering advanced topic webinars
- Procured advance authoring tools and templates to develop interactive courseware
- Developed and integrated new Instructional Systems Design (ISD) processes
- Developed the capability to easily record classroom presentations to be delivered across the web

During the second year of the strategic plan (current/FY12) DISAM is focused on:

- Continuing to upgrade our online curriculum with the new format and enhancements established in FY11.
- Developing blended learning applications for the SCM-O course, specific lessons include:
  - ◊ Computer based training covering “Civilian Diplomatic Attire” basics
  - ◊ Computer based training covering “Protocol”
- Developing individual, small group, and large group scenarios for the SCM-O course
- Integrating more Game-Based Learning into the DISAM classroom courses to provide engaging assessments and lesson summaries
- Integrating an Audience Response System into DISAM classroom in order to poll students and monitor learning progress
- Experimenting with delivering computer based training, reference materials, text books, and manuals on android tablet devices for the SCM-O course
- Developing advanced topic webinars/course to be delivered “live online”
- Making online refresher training available to DISAM students
- Expanding the use of blended learning techniques
- Exploring the development of SC functional area portals on the DISAM corporate website
- Exploring offering subscriptions to functional area newsletters and/or blogs
- Experimenting with mLearning applications



### **Curriculum Review 2012**

During DISAM’s recent annual Curriculum Review, several new instructional technologies were unveiled along with other future initiatives that have been outlined earlier in this paper. In addition, attendees were provided a “sneak peek” of the new Civilian Diplomatic Attire CBT and participated in an evaluation of the new SC Familiarization CBT (figure 6). Further discussions with attendees focused on a synergy of efforts and resources with other DOD schoolhouses who are conducting training relevant to Security Cooperation. As a result of these discussions, DISAM made a number of its Security Cooperation courseware initiatives available to the Defense Acquisition University in support of an effort to incorporate Security Cooperation lessons into a new online course for the acquisition workforce.

DISAM is actively working to build relationships with other organizations that could benefit from DISAM’s curriculum and faculty expertise. DISAM is encouraging close dialogue with these organizations to provide assistance in developing SC training and to ensure that both the instructional content and media are kept up to date and accurate. DISAM regularly sends its faculty members to other organizations as guest speakers and provides expertise in conducting formal curriculum reviews of instructional content used by these other organizations. We certainly believe that in these times of financial constraints, organizations should be pooling their talent and resources to avoid “reinventing the wheel.”

## **Conclusion**

DISAM is working on several fronts to ensure that it is keeping up with industry leading trends but more importantly, DISAM is carefully selecting advanced instructional strategies that can extend its reach to more students, more often, and best accommodate the needs of the SC community. Our aim is to reach out to students on a regular basis using various forms of formal and informal training to provide continuous educational opportunities for our students throughout their SC careers. For more information on DISAM's courses and the approaches to each in terms of distance and resident learning, information on all of our courses and module is available at our website at <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/>.

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## **About the Author**

Christopher Burns is a senior instructional technologist for the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He has been involved in the design, development, and management of DOD distance learning programs for over twenty years. He has an undergraduate degree in computer and information science from the University of Maryland and graduate degrees in library and information science and instructional systems technology from the University of Central Arkansas and Indiana University, respectively. His research interests are in the areas of instructional design, immersive learning simulations, interactive video, augmented reality, and performance support tools.




# DISAM Expands Curriculum and Courses for the SC Community

By Gary Taphorn  
 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

In October 2011, DISAM took an unprecedented step in broadening its curriculum with the introduction of an expanded “overseas course,” formally known as Security Cooperation Management-Overseas (SCM-O). This initiative, which was coordinated carefully with DSCA and the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), was the result of the increased importance of the security cooperation (SC) mission and the role of SC organizations (SCOs) over the last few years. The era of SCOs (formerly security assistance offices or SAOs) focusing primarily on security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Financing is increasingly outdated. The advent of numerous new authorities and funding streams to DOD since 2001 has required that SCO personnel become familiar with a much broader suite of “tools” beyond those in traditional security assistance. Additionally, the requirements articulated in the “Guidance for Employment of the Force” (GEF) are driving the GCCs and SCOs toward a more comprehensive, efficient, and integrated approach to security cooperation planning. The

stand-up in 2008 of United States Africa Command, with its many partner nations reliant on US security cooperation support, has also been a factor. Finally, the SECDEF approval in July 2011 of the Security Cooperation Reform Phase 1 Report Force mandated improvements in DOD “training, education, and workforce development” across the board.

DISAM has seen the need for an expanded “overseas” curriculum for a number of years. At its annual curriculum reviews in 2009 and 2010, a broadened SCM-O curriculum was a major topic. Perhaps the major limiting factor was DISAM’s lack of instructor staffing (and/or expertise) to develop new areas of curriculum. This was exacerbated by a dramatic surge in through-put (compare 237 resident students in 2001 with 660 in 2011), which caused DISAM to split, or “double-teach” about half of the annual offerings in recent years. However, in early FY 2011, DISAM received the authority and O&M funding to hire five instructors who would focus on the security cooperation mission, as opposed to traditional security assistance, starting with the



**Figure 1.** Note the surge in SCM-O students beginning in 2008, which is a function of several factors, primarily the establishment and growth of SCOs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The entry for FY 2012 represents only input to date.

SCM-O course. As part of the overall hiring scheme, each new hire has come with regional experience which qualifies the new instructors to manage one of DISAM's five regional seminars. As this article goes to press, four of the five new instructors (Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Africa) are on board and the fifth (Latin America) is expected by summer 2012. Already, these instructors are making an impact by both improving the quality of regional seminars and helping develop new blocks of instruction.

The expansion of the overseas course entails the addition of one week of mandatory curriculum, increasing the former two-week core by a third full week. The optional "specialized training" for SCO personnel, previously offered during the third week, is still offered following the end of the core curriculum, thereby making SCM-O a four-week course on the DISAM calendar. Students still receive a thorough grounding in Foreign Military Sales (FMS), logistics, finance, acquisition, international training, and several other subjects. However, the curriculum has broadened in several areas. No area has received more attention than security cooperation planning. The previous curriculum, consisting of a 1.5 hour overview, has been expanded to a suite of four blocks of instruction totaling seven hours and including a small group practical exercise. Students are introduced to the planning process through the block of instruction entitled "National Guidance Documents," from the president's National Security Strategy down through the GEF. Then, in "SCO Planning Tools," students see the four planning processes available to them at the SCO level and their upward submission and coordination through both State and DOD channels. Additionally, this block incorporates and juxtaposes the two annual forecasting documents required by Congress: the Javits and FMS Forecasting Reports. In the third block, "Capabilities-Based Planning," DISAM presents a methodology for executing the planning process at the country level, consistent with current doctrine and other DOD guidance, which itself is still evolving. Finally, a practical exercise entitled "Country Needs Assessment" places student groups in a notional SCO, complete with overarching guidance such as a country campaign plan, an embassy mission strategic resource plan, etc. Given a scenario involving an emergent threat to the host nation, the students must use existing guidance, resources, and the planning process to identify tasks, activities and funding sources to address the

problem. This suite of planning blocks is DISAM's interim answer to the major deficiency identified by the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force in 2011, when it noted that "DOD...does not assess, anticipate, prioritize or address partner requirements as well as it should." In the four iterations of the expanded course to date, this exercise has been well received by students and it continues to evolve as more "sets of eyes" examine the problem.

A second area of new emphasis is the use of DSCA's Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). The previous single practical exercise, in which students accessed only the Case Information Community within SCIP, has now been expanded to three exercises. The additional blocks of instruction expose students to four other communities of value to SCO personnel – SCO/COCOM, case execution, SCMS, and end-use monitoring. Additionally, personnel assigned to SCOs are now receiving their permanent SCIP accounts while in residence at DISAM. Previously, the SCIP accounts issued by the Defense Security Assistance Development Center (DSADC) to SCM-O students were temporary, expiring upon their departure from DISAM. This necessitated SCO personnel having to apply for SCIP accounts essentially "from scratch" upon arrival in their country of assignment. As SCIP users are well aware, the registration process is both laborious and complicated. With the streamlined procedures recently developed jointly by DSADC and DISAM, SCO access has become significantly easier and faster.

SCM-O now also addresses in much more detail a number of well-recognized challenges related to the execution of FMS. For example, DSCA has recently placed more emphasis on the importance of receiving complete letters of request (LORs) from partner nations. To this end, DISAM has created a new block entitled "Actionable LORs." In this lesson, students learn about the various tools available to ensure a "total package approach" and they also critique a number of sample LORs for completeness. On a parallel track, DISAM has begun to introduce the "pseudo" FMS process for title 10 appropriations within a separate block of instruction, rather than as an "add-on" to traditional FMS. This new approach, combined with requirements in the SCIP practical exercises, is helping students to better understand the differences between normal and "pseudo" FMS and how the role of the SCO changes accordingly.

The expanded course also offers a suite of blocks totaling six hours on the topics of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Although this has been a core DSCA mission for many years, the overseas course had previously given it only minimal attention, due to lack of time and instructor expertise. The new blocks utilize a holistic approach and address the role of non-DOD entities, especially the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and even non-USG entities, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Ongoing consultation with DSCA and USAID should make the HA/DR curriculum stronger and more relevant in the coming months.

Also offered for the first time in SCM-O are a number blocks related to the operational and administrative environment of the SCO. As examples, the students now receive lessons on the management of DOD visitors, embassy crisis action, SCO ethics, and protocol. These blocks were coordinated with DISAM's sister institution, the Joint Military Attache School (JMAS). Finally, two blocks of instruction specifically related to traditional GCC programs have been added—one on the combined exercise program and a second on military-to-military engagement programs.

Not all the changes in the overseas course are related to formal academic blocks in the classroom. One change of significance is that, effective with the start of FY 2012, locally employed staff (LES) of SCOs are no longer in attendance. To better accommodate their training needs, DISAM has developed and initiated a two-week course specially tailored for them, entitled the Security Cooperation Management-Locally Employed Staff Orientation Course (SCM-LO). The absence of LES personnel (or foreign service nationals, to use their traditional name) from the overseas course also allows for a greater degree of candid discussion among the US students and their instructors.

A second non-academic change, prompted by DSCA, was the incorporation of "Consultations and Briefings" (or C's and B's) into the course. This consists of a series of video teleconferences (VTCs), organized by theater and country, between DISAM students and their various desk officers in the National Capitol Region. Coordinated on the Washington end by the DSCA Strategy Directorate, all DISAM students a period of time to become acquainted with both desk officers and major issues pertaining to their

country. Participating organizations include OSD, the Joint Staff, the military departments, State PM and, of course, the appropriate DSCA country director. The C's and B's are currently being executed during the students' lunch and study hall period at mid-day. Although they require an extraordinary amount of coordination, they are being generally well received by students.

The guest speaker program is also enhanced with the new course. The traditional guest speaker program, not including speakers for specific regional seminars, has been comprised of five blocks:

- The Defense Attaché Office, presented by DIA or the Joint Military Attache School (JMAS)
- Human Rights, presented by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
- The Vendor Perspective, presented by a representative of a major defense contractor through the American League of Exports and Security Assistance (ALESA)
- The SCO Perspective, presented by a sitting or recently departed SCO chief or SDO/DATT
- The Executive Perspective, presented by a senior military officer or USG civilian typically representing a DOD organization, such as a combatant command or a military department.

These five speakers have now been augmented by three others, which have helped to expand the scope of the course. They include:

- State Political-Military Affairs, presenting an orientation of how State Department complements the DOD role in security assistance and integrates it into foreign policy.
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), presenting information on the Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) program which is applicable and beneficial to most SCOs around the world.
- Finally, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which provides an orientation on how SCOs can benefit from the variety of authorities and funding unique to the special operations community.

As a final point, the expanded curriculum is being developed with a new emphasis toward on-line learning. Although SCM-O, as currently presented, is still almost entirely instructor-led, plans are well underway to transition some blocks of instruction to computer-based training (CBT). The first candidate block is Civilian Diplomat Attire, which should transition to CBT status in the next few months.

Other blocks will follow and a particular emphasis is being placed on a security cooperation planning scenario to be presented at least partly through the CBT approach.

As mentioned above, the unique training requirements of locally employed staff within the SCOs has driven DISAM to create a course specific to their needs. Likewise, DISAM has seen the need to generate a second new course targeted at security cooperation “action officers,” primarily field grade officers in the joint world such as GCCs and their component commands. This course, entitled Security Cooperation Management-Action Officer (or SCM-AO) is now in development and prototyping and will be fully available in FY13. The requirement to develop the SCM-AO course is another result of the SCRTF Phase 1 report which specifically recommended that “DSCA develop training/education programs that enable DOD to grow expertise in security cooperation/security assistance authorities, funding, and roles of DOD and DOS.”

The SCM-AO course will be one week in length and will be offered six times annually—once at each GCC headquarters (less NORTHCOM) and once in the NCR. It will be open to DOD personnel assigned to OSD, JS, MILDEP Headquarters, GCCs, DOD component commands, other DOD entities (includes training and education institutions), and other USG interagency staffs who have a role and/or responsibility in security cooperation/security assistance. The course will focus on providing action officers a functional knowledge of security cooperation/security assistance planning considerations, authorities, funding and roles of the DOD, DOS, and other members of the USG interagency. As can be imagined, it will draw heavily from the newly developed SCM-O curriculum. SCM-AO will also rely on GCC/HQ staffs to provide practical application narratives and/or presentations specific to the organization hosting the class. The course will not include regional seminars, nor will it present detailed instruction on the traditional security assistance processes (FMS, logistics, and finance) or SCO responsibilities. DISAM is currently in discussions with the GCCs and other organizations to refine requirements and scheduling.

In summary, DISAM has significantly expanded the scope and relevance of training for SCOs and other security cooperation personnel with the advent of the new overseas course and its two new

companion courses. Other changes will follow, the most important of which is the transition of SCO classrooms into a classified environment (expected by FY 2014) which will allow greatly facilitated access to a variety of sensitive documents and data. DISAM looks forward to continued collaboration with DSCA, the geographic combatant commands, and other organizations to maintain a first-rate training product for security cooperation personnel.

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### **About the Author**

Mr. Gary Taphorn is a DISAM Assistant Professor and a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel. As a Middle East foreign area officer, he served tours of duty in two SCOs, USCENTCOM, and the OSD staff. He has managed the Middle East Seminar for DISAM, served as the functional coordinator for SCO Operations, and functioned as the SCM-O course manager since 2006. With the publication of this article, he hands over the reins of the expanded SCM-O course to two new and energetic DISAM faculty members, Mr. Ron Yakkell and Mr. Tim Burke.

# 2011 Distance Learning Survey Results

By Joanne B. Hawkins, PhD  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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If you completed an online course with DISAM between October 2010 and July 2011, you may have received an invitation from me to participate in an online survey of your distance learning preferences. The survey was part of a larger study on distance learning effectiveness in workforce development, and distance learning acceptance by learners in the workplace. The study was an independent doctoral research study, not commissioned by DISAM or any other defense organization. DISAM graciously permitted me to contact students enrolled in a distance learning course during that ten-month period to assess learner acceptance of distance learning, and their learning preferences. This article reveals the findings of that survey.

## **The Purpose of the Survey**

The focus of the study was the civilian workforce engaged in Security Cooperation (SC) activities. The SC workforce consists of approximately 10,000 people (DISAM, 2011). There are nearly 7,200 civilian employees and nearly 2,000 military personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The workforce is supported by over 800 civilian support contractors who also must be trained in SC concepts and programs. According to a 2011 Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service report, the level of education among civilian employees varies widely, with many employees having only a high school education. The average age of the DOD civilian employee is fifty-eight, and nearly one-third of the civilian workforce is eligible to retire this year (CPMS, 2011; GAO, 2009; GAO, 2007).

In 2009, the Secretary of Defense mandated an immediate improvement in SC workforce education and training by the end of fiscal year 2011. To meet the needs of an increased number of learners, DISAM reorganized its introductory two-week resident CONUS course (SAM-C) into a two-phased hybrid

course. Since February 2011, the SAM-C course consists of the Security Cooperation Orientation Course (SCM-OC) done through computer-based training (CBT), followed by five days of classroom instruction. The classroom discussions and practical exercises reinforce the basic education from the CBT, to develop a deeper understanding of SC programs and procedures. The SCM-OC also serves to educate SC civilian, military and contractor personnel whose position requires only basic knowledge of security cooperation programs and procedures. DISAM's computer-based training products helped fill the training shortfall and completed the requirement to have 95 percent of the SC workforce trained by the end of September 2011 (DISAM, 2011). DISAM continues to develop computer-based training courses and learning modules for various areas of specialization that are exportable to a growing workforce.

As a course developer and instructor, I questioned the effectiveness of computer-based training in preparing employees in basic skills and concepts necessary for effective job performance. My skepticism of learning effectiveness stemmed from numerous negative comments DISAM students provided in discussions and in course surveys about course design and content. One of my reasons for wanting to research the acceptance of CBT in workforce development was the frequent complaint from DISAM students that they were uncomfortable learning through the computer. Numerous research studies have pointed out that comfort with the method of delivery, and comfort with the learning environment, significantly impacts on the ability of the adult learner to absorb and retain information (Brown, 2001; Calvin and Freeburg, 2010; DeTure, 2004; Frankola, 2001; Hairston, 2007; Hornik, Johnson and Wu, 2007; Moore, 1997; Saade and Kira, 2007). I was curious if younger civilian employees were more receptive to learning through

a computer than older adults, and whether one's level of education had any impact on acceptance of self-paced computer-based training. One of my hypotheses was that older adults would be less willing to engage in computer-based training because distance learning requires a change in study habits and adaptation to a new learning environment. A second hypothesis was that employees with less than a college education would not perform as well with self-paced computer-based training because they had not had the opportunity to develop study habits that are necessary to be successful in distance learning.

The data from the survey did not support either hypothesis. There was no significant difference in attitude toward distance learning based on age or level of education. However, the survey data revealed that employees in general lacked organizational support for distance learning. Employees were often pressured to complete their training on their own time because their work environment did not provide the time or resources to engage in computer-based training for workforce development. This result was surprising, given that the requirement for completing the training was mandated by DSCA in support of the SECDEF's workforce improvement initiative. An earlier study by DISAM in 2000 revealed similar results. At that time, employees complained of a lack of time for distance learning in the workplace, and a lack of organizational support to provide an environment conducive to distance learning (Hawkins, 2001). In terms of distance learning support, my recent research shows that little has changed in a decade within the SC community. This finding is disappointing because distance learning has evolved into a major method of workplace skills development in both government and industry.

In both the private and public sector, it is not considered time or cost-effective to train employees more than once to learn basic job skills and concepts. Corporations and government agencies have turned to distance learning as a means of replacing or supplementing traditional classroom instruction (ASTD, 2011; Brown, 2001; Dobbs, 2000; Dobrovolny, 2006; Hairston, 2007; O'Dell, 2009; O'Lawrence, 2006; Stone, 2007; Strother, 2002). The amount spent on distance learning by corporations and government agencies in 2010 was estimated to be around \$171.4 billion. In terms of learning hours, approximately 63 percent of formal workplace training continues to be conducted

through face-to-face classroom instruction while the remaining 37 percent of workplace training is done through some technology-based delivery system (ASTD, 2011).

Distance learning is defined as any form of instruction in which learners and instructors are separated by space. It ranges from video teleconferencing, which is delivered synchronously, and web-based instruction, which may be delivered synchronously, to asynchronous instruction, in which learners and instructors are separated by both space and time. Distance learning also includes instruction that is delivered by electronic means to one person at a time. In short, distance learning is a substitute for traditional classroom learning. One widely used form of distance learning in academic institutions is web-based synchronous or asynchronous online learning in which learners interact with one another and with an instructor or facilitator. This interactive form of distance learning usually involves specific timeframes for online participation, submission of assignments, and course completion. Another form of distance learning is instructional content delivered by computer either through a CD or DVD, or by a computer network or the Internet. This type of learning product is often referred to as distributed learning, computer-based instruction, or computer-based training (CBT). This self-paced method of learning provides no course facilitator or instructor, and allows no interaction between learners. CBT is often used to provide instruction in a corporate or government setting. The course content may be repeated as often as necessary to reinforce learning. Learning resources are embedded in the courseware or are accessible from the Internet. Learners evaluate their own performance through embedded multimedia content. Most CBT produced today for individualized self-paced learning includes multimedia elements to stimulate interest and enhance learning by providing audio and video in addition to text and graphics. My study focused on this latter form of distance learning, CBT, that is, the non-interactive, self-paced instruction that is delivered by computer network or digital media.

A limited number of studies have examined the effectiveness of different types of distance learning programs in a corporate environment (Dobbs, 2000; Dobrovolny, 2006; Frankola, 2001; Hairston, 2007; O'Dell, 2009; O'Lawrence; Stone, 2007; Strother, 2002). Their findings suggest that employees who

have limited computer skills, or those who lack time and support in the workplace for online learning are the most disadvantaged by the implementation of CBT for workforce development. Employees who are not motivated to learn on their own time are also disadvantaged. These studies show that older workers are less receptive to using technology, although their performance results are as good as those of younger workers.

My desire to survey the learning preferences of the SC workforce was driven by the limited research of the effectiveness of CBT for employee training. Since research shows that learning styles are as important to the learning process as are the environment and method of delivery, I believe it is important to survey learning preferences before a large investment of time and manpower is spent to develop more distance learning products. The survey portion of this research study examined employees' attitudes toward computer-based training and employee characteristics that may contribute to or limit their ability to learn through CBT.

### Survey Participants

Invitations to participate in the survey were sent to 1,650 individuals. The online survey was hosted by SurveyMonkey™, a commercial survey host. The participants consisted of 306 DOD civilian employees, 47 military personnel, and 52 civilian support contractors for a total of 405 respondents (24.5 percent). Survey responses from military personnel were excluded from this study because their demographic data was significantly different in terms of age, level of education, and distance learning experience, from the demographic data of civilian personnel. However, the survey responses of military personnel are addressed separately at the end of this article. The survey data were collected between October 2010 and July 2011 from students enrolled in the Security Assistance Management Online Course (SAM-OC), the Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course (online) (SCM-OC), the Security Cooperation Familiarization Course (online), the International Programs Security Requirements Course Online (IPSR-OL), or the Security Assistance Management Logistics Support Online Refresher Course (SAM-CS).

### Data Collection

The survey consisted of fifty-four questions in five sections and was based on a combination of two previously developed instruments used in educational research. The sections were (a) a notice of informed consent, (b) employee demographics, (c) employees' impressions of the CBT course, (d) employees' learning preferences, and (e) employees' assessment of their work and training environment. The email invitation provided the participant with information about the purpose of the survey and it provided assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. Informed consent was assumed granted when the participant chose to take the survey.

The survey was designed so that participants were required to respond to each item, and no question could be skipped or left blank. This structure may account for some rather high percentages of "no opinion" responses. Participants were able to provide comments at the end of the survey regarding their learning experience. This section was not required, yet 93 participants (26 percent) chose to provide comments.

### Participant Demographics

Data for the study consisted of the responses from 306 DOD civilian employees and 52 civilian support contractors for a total of 358 respondents. Their age groups and level of education are shown in tables 1 and 2 respectively. Participants self-disclosed their occupation or position, shown in table 3.

**Table 1. Participant Age Groups (N = 358)**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Under 25	18	5%
26 to 34	48	13%
35 to 44	50	14%
45 to 54	140	39%
55 to 64	96	27%
65 and over	6	2%

**Table 2. Participant Levels of Education (N = 358)**

Category	Frequency	Percent
High school or equivalent	16	4%
Some college, no degree	46	13%
Associate's Degree	86	24%
Bachelor's Degree	142	40%
Master's Degree	65	18%
Doctorate Degree	3	1%

**Table 3. Participant Occupations/Positions (N=358)**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Country Manager or Country Desk Officer (DSCA, NIPO, SAF/IA, USASAC–Huntsville, other)	23	6%
FMS CASE Manager (ILCO or training activity)	27	8%
Contracting Officer or Contract Administrator	41	11%
Transportation Coordinator or Manager (DCMA, DLA, ILCO, TRANSCOM, SDDC, AMC, Freight Forwarder, Support Contractor or Service ICP)	9	3%
Supply Technician or Supply Specialist	39	11%
Foreign Liaison Officer or FMS Customer	5	1%
Overseas Security Cooperation Office, Defense Attaché or Embassy (Military, Civilian, or Locally Employed Staff)	3	1%
Financial Manager or Financial Analyst	61	17%
Security Cooperation Policy Analyst	21	6%
Instructor (DISAM, DAU, DLA, Service School, Regional Center)	18	5%
FMS Case Writer (CWD, ILCO or Program Office)	4	1%
IT or Automation Systems Support/Developer	2	1%
Foreign Disclosure Officer, Security Specialist, or Export Licensing Official	22	6%
Other	12	3%

Two-hundred thirty-nine participants (67 percent) had less than two years of work experience in Security Cooperation, with the remaining 119 participants (33 percent) having between two and five years’ work experience in the field. Three hundred and forty participants (95 percent) were in non-supervisory positions, while the remaining eighteen participants (5 percent) indicated they were supervisors. All participants had completed a required introductory course through a stand-alone CBT between October 2010 and July 2011.

Of the fifty-four survey questions, the responses to four survey statements were analyzed in detail with regard to the respondents’ age and level of education. The four survey statements are

1. I enjoy taking courses through the computer.
2. I can learn equally well through computer-based training as I can in a face-to-face classroom environment.
3. I think learning through the computer is a frustrating process.
4. Working through the computer-based training module was an unpleasant experience for me.

The range of scores was 1-5 based upon a Likert scale. Participants rated each statement on a scale from 1 = Disagree to 5 = Agree for all questions. The results are shown in Tables 4 through 7.

For the item “I enjoy taking courses through the computer,” the mean score was 3.65 (SD = 1.27);

the median was 4 and the mode was 4. Seventy-one percent of all participants indicated that they agreed or somewhat agreed that they enjoyed taking courses through the computer, regardless of age or education.

**Table 4. I enjoy taking courses through the computer (N=358)**

Rating	Frequency	Percent
Disagree	34	9%
Somewhat Disagree	43	12%
No Opinion	27	8%
Somewhat Agree	154	43%
Agree	100	28%

For the item “I can learn equally well online or through computer-based training as I can in a face-to-face classroom environment,” the mean score was 3.09 (SD=1.42); the median was 4 and the mode was 4. Participants were almost evenly divided among those who disagreed or somewhat disagreed that they could learn equally well with either CBT or traditional learning (46 percent), with those who agreed or somewhat agreed (51 percent), regardless of age or education.

**Table 5. I Can Learn Equally Well Through Computer-Based Training as I can in a Face-to-Face Classroom Environment (N = 358).**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Disagree	59	16%
Somewhat Disagree	106	30%
No Opinion	12	3%
Somewhat Agree	111	31%
Agree	70	20%

For the item “I think learning through the computer is a frustrating process,” the mean score was 2.31 (SD = 1.32); the median was 2 and the mode was 1. The majority of participants (68 percent), regardless of age or education, responded that they disagreed or somewhat disagreed that computer-based learning is a frustrating process.

**Table 6. I Think Learning Through the Computer is a Frustrating Process (N = 358)**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Disagree	136	38%
Somewhat Disagree	107	30%
No Opinion	28	8%
Somewhat Agree	61	17%
Agree	26	7%

For the item “Working through the computer-based training module was an unpleasant experience for me,” the mean score was 2.18 (SD = 1.32); the median was 2; and the mode was 1. Again, the majority of participants (67 percent) responded that they at least somewhat disagreed that their CBT experience was unpleasant, regardless of age or education.

**Table 7. Working Through the Computer-Based Training Module was an Unpleasant Experience for Me (N = 358)**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Disagree	158	44%
Somewhat Disagree	81	23%
No Opinion	46	13%
Somewhat Agree	45	13%
Agree	28	8%

I further analyzed the data using a series of one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to determine if there was any relationship between age, level of education, and participants’ perceptions about their

ability to learn through computer-based training. The data revealed no significant differences between age or level of education and willingness to engage in CBT.

### **Learning Style Assessment**

One portion of the online survey included the commercial learning style assessment “Is Online Learning Right for Me?” used by many schools and universities to help students determine their readiness to engage in distance learning. The questions address learner schedules, learning style, and learner personality. Each question has three possible responses, with the first response in each category corresponding to a characteristic most appropriate for distance learning. The second response is less desirable for distance learning, but not an indicator of incompatibility with distance learning, and the third response reflects a characteristic incompatible with distance learning. Thus by scoring each response in the survey with a 1, 2 or 3, learners with an overall score ranging between 10 and 16 are candidates who have characteristics that are indicators of good distance learners, those between 17 and 23 have some characteristics that are suitable for distance learning, but those who scored between 24 and 30 are less likely to be comfortable with distance learning. Of the 358 participants, 183 (51 percent) scored between 11 and 16, indicating many characteristics suitable for distance learning. The remaining 175 participants (49 percent) scored between 17 and 23, reflecting fewer characteristics of successful distance learners. No participant scored above 23. This outcome suggests that regardless of age or level of education, all of the participants could be successful distance learners. The ten question survey, however, is most applicable to distance learning done through facilitated interactive courses. When I examined responses to individual questions, three questions in the areas of learner personality and learning style reflected a higher preference for social contact in learning. Sixty-seven percent of survey participants indicated that feeling that they are part of a class, engaging with other students, is very important to them. Seventy-two percent indicated that classroom discussions are important to them. These two aspects of social learning are missing in computer-based training in which the employee learns in isolation, and could reduce learning effectiveness. Alternatively, 72 percent of survey participants responded that they

preferred to follow directions on their own and be responsible for their own learning. Only a minority of participants (2 percent) expressed an aversion to using technology, and only 2 percent indicated that they were slow readers. Good reading skills and the ability to navigate through various web screens and computer applications are essential to being able to learn well through computer-based training.

### **The Learning Environment**

The learning environment impacts the amount of attention the learner focuses on the topic. Distractions, interruptions, and lack of time impede the learning process, as well as a lack of employer support. Six questions in the survey targeted the learning environment. These included one question from the learning style assessment that indicated that the majority of participants (86 percent) completed the CBT because it was required for work. The remaining five questions were

1. My supervisor is interested in my training needs.
2. My supervisor gives me time at work to take work-related computer-based training courses.
3. My supervisor has established a training plan for me and a timetable to follow.
4. If I try to conduct training at work, I experience frequent interruptions that make learning difficult.
5. My work obligations make it difficult for me to conduct training or continue my education during work hours.

Nearly 83 percent of participants agreed or somewhat agreed that their supervisor had an interest in their training needs. Yet, only 44 percent of survey participants indicated that their supervisor established a training plan and timetable for the employee to follow.

Sixty-eight percent of participants indicated that their supervisor did not give them time at work to engage in computer-based training, which is supported by 53 percent who agreed or somewhat agreed that their work obligations make it difficult to conduct training during work hours. Seventy-six percent of participants agreed or somewhat agreed that they experienced frequent interruptions while conducting training at work. Despite this apparently inadequate learning environment, 73 percent of survey participants responded that they would like to take more computer-based training courses to

use for initial or refresher training in the workplace, but expressed a preference (56 percent) for taking a scheduled web-based course which included student and instructor interaction over self-paced CBT without student and instructor interaction. Fifty-three percent of participants agreed or somewhat agreed that they would be willing to take an online course which required posting graded assignments to an instructor.

Lack of time is one of several reasons why corporate distance learners fail to complete a computer-based training course (Frankola, 2001). Many workers have distractions and interruptions by coworkers and supervisors who insist that a task has to be done right away. Frankola reported that online course completion in the corporate environment was dependent upon whether supervisors and managers tracked employee progress and whether the employee received positive reinforcement for the worker's participation in the online course. When employees are pressured to complete an online course without being given adequate time or the environment to learn, learning retention decreases. The employee skips learning tasks to complete the course quickly or tries to learn in a distracting environment, which reduces the quality of the learning process and the learning outcome.

### **Discussion of Participant Comments**

Ninety-three survey participants chose to provide comments at the end of the survey about their CBT learning experience. I analyzed these comments for common themes and key words in a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is interpretive, in which the researcher makes a personal assessment of a situation or occurrence based on interviews, observations, survey comments or documents.

I grouped the survey comments into four categories: Organizational Support, Learner Interaction, Information Relevance and Technology. Many participants' comments fell into more than one category, so total numbers of responses exceeded 93.

**Organizational Support.** The largest number of survey comments fell into this category. Thirty-two participants responded that their organization did not give them time at work for computer-based training. Participants complained that frequent interruptions at work made it difficult to absorb and retain information, that they felt rushed if they attempted to conduct training during business hours.

Many commented that they had to conduct training outside of work hours or outside the workplace because of the lack of time or because of a poor learning environment at the workplace. Several participants suggested that organizations provide a training center or a location away from the job site for employees to conduct training during business hours. Despite these negative comments concerning organizational support for computer-based training, the lack of organizational support appears not to have made learning through CBT a frustrating experience, as indicated by the findings in table 6. One comment seemed to sum up the issues that fell into the category of organizational support:

If training the workforce is so important, and organizations are required to meet a SECDEF workforce development goal, then why aren't supervisors giving time to employees to do the training? My entire division had to complete two distance learning courses in a matter of a few weeks, but none of us were given time at work to get it done. The training required at least a couple of hours each day for two weeks to really understand the material, but "the mission" was too important to make the time...Most of us had to do it at home after work, or stay late, or come in on the weekend. Then it was a fire-hose of information and it was really hard to absorb. I understand training budgets are getting cut and facilities are limited for holding classes, so computer learning is the replacement. But you can't expect people to do the training alone on their own time and get anything out of it.

The recurring themes in this category of Organizational Support are shown in table 8.

**Table 8. Organizational Support**

Theme	Frequency
No time to train at work	32
Interruptions and distractions	29
Trained during personal time	13
Feeling rushed	6
Prefer training away from job site	5

**Learner Interaction.** The second category to receive several comments concerned learner interaction with others. Participants expressed a preference to learn by sharing ideas and experiences with other learners. Some expressed a need for feedback from an instructor and suggested that learning in an environment that included study groups and an ability to meet others was preferential to the isolated CBT environment. Several participants acknowledged the cost benefit of delivering instruction through the computer, but recommended delivering training through a synchronous or asynchronous web-based course in which learners had contact with other people, instead of the static CBT. While several participants expressed a preference for face-to-face classroom learning, others enjoyed learning through the computer as long as they had contact with other learners. One participant explained:

Classroom learning is still the best. Online learning is ok if there is contact with an instructor and other students, and everyone is required to participate. Self-paced online learning without contact with an instructor or other students is tedious and boring. I have taken online college courses where everyone was required to post information and assignments and I enjoyed it a whole lot more than this. I don't think people should be expected to learn new requirements by themselves. It might be ok for reviewing things you might have forgotten. I learn a lot from other people, so if I have to learn through the computer I want to have contact with other people online.

Table 9 shows the recurring themes in the comments pertaining to interaction with other learners. The comments in this category support the survey responses in which at least half the participants indicated a preference for online learning involving other participants.

**Table 9. Learner Interaction**

Theme	Frequency
Need to share ideas and experiences	34
Prefer synchronous/asynchronous	18
CBT feels isolated/impersonal	11
Prefer face-to-face	9
Need instructor feedback	7
Enjoy study groups and networking	7

**Information Relevance.** Another area that drew comments from participants was the relevance of the training to the employee. Themes that emerged in this category are shown in table 10. Twelve participants indicated that the majority of information in the CBT they took had little or no relevance to their job, but they were required to take it for certification or recertification. Alternatively, some participants expressed appreciation at having helpful information immediately available. Some commented that the material was difficult to comprehend, requiring them to go back and repeat lessons, and they did not understand how the training was relevant to their job.

**Table 10. Information Relevance**

Theme	Frequency
Training was required but information did not apply	22
Information was useful/appropriate	16
Information was immediately available	4
Information was too detailed	4
Information was learned through experience	4

**Technology.** The fourth noteworthy category of participants' comments centered on the CBT design and the technology used to deliver the course. Some participants experienced difficulty with logging into the Blackboard™ learning system. Some participants complained about the slowness of connection speeds and timing-out while downloading course materials. A few participants complained of complex layering and branching of lesson material, and losing track of where they were within the course lessons. Others complained that the lessons were tedious and boring, and time was wasted while clicking through screens in order to finish quickly. A few participants appreciated the ability to repeat sections of lessons to reinforce learning, and several participants commented that they enjoyed using technology for self-paced learning. These comments support the survey data that participants expressed a preference for online and self-paced training courses for initial or refresher training.

**Table 11. Technology**

Theme	Frequency
Login difficulty	14
Enjoy learning through technology	11
Boring course design	9
Complex course design	6
Appreciate ability to repeat sections	6
Slow connectivity	4

**Summary and Discussion of Survey Results**

The responses to the survey provided some interesting data on the learning preferences of employees and factors that facilitate or inhibit their participation in distance learning.

The data revealed that neither age nor education appears to be a factor in the acceptance of CBT in the workplace. The data support previous educational research that age or education do not impact on acceptance of technology and computer anxiety (Dobrovolny, 2006; Jennings and Onwuegbuzie, 2001; Park and Choi, 2009; Willis, 2006). On the contrary, only 2 percent of employees participating in the survey indicated an aversion to learning to use new technology.

However, organizational support does appear to be a factor in the acceptance of distance learning in the workplace. Participants expressed more frustration with the lack of time their organizations gave them to engage in compulsory distance learning, than with the CBT products themselves, or with the style of learning. Several participants also commented on experiencing an unfavorable learning environment when attempting to learn at work. Research shows that frustration during learning can lower performance and attitudes toward learning (Bandura, 1986; DeTure, 2004; Dobrovolny, 2006; Frankola, 2001; Gagne, 1985; Knowles, 1989; Moore, 1997; Ormrod, 2008; Park and Choi, 2009). An environment that is not conducive to learning limits both the learning outcome and knowledge retention.

While most participants appear to accept CBT for workforce training, a majority of participants indicated a preference for a form of learning that includes contact with other learners, either in a face-to-face classroom environment, or through a synchronous/ asynchronous online course.

I analyzed the research data to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in learners' perceptions concerning their ability to learn through

CBT relative to their age or relative to their level of education. The result of the data obtained from the online survey indicated that there were no significant differences in either category, although learners without at least a bachelor's degree were somewhat more frustrated with the CBT learning process than those learners with a college degree. These results support previous educational research that suggests that age has no bearing on learning outcome, but time on task and learner attitude has a major impact on learning outcome (Knowles, 1989; Ormrod, 2008; Park and Choi, 2009). Park and Choi's research revealed that the learning environment was the greatest factor in online learning completion and learner satisfaction.

The overall frustration with the CBT learning process was low (24 percent) among all the survey participants. The slightly higher frustration level expressed by learners without a college degree may be related to limited metacognitive skills that are often developed through continued education, but it also may be caused by other factors. Since the survey did not ask participants to identify what was frustrating about the CBT learning process, I could only rely on the comments provided as part of the survey from those who chose to provide additional information.

The findings of this research study support previous studies that age and education have no bearing on distance learning course completion. There is a general acceptance of distance learning for workplace training, although the environment under which the learning takes place appears to need improvement. Previous research has shown that the learning environment has an impact on learner satisfaction, which contributes to the learning process and knowledge retention. The learning in this study was compulsory for most participants. It is unknown how many employees would not have enrolled in the CBT or who would have dropped out of the CBT if they had been given a choice.

### **Limitations to the Study**

There were some limitations to this research study that may have affected the results. The survey consisted of closed-end questions and required participants to select a response. The large number of "no opinion" responses in several questions may be due to participants' lack of experience in that category, or refusal to disclose their opinion.

It may be beneficial to replicate this study using a survey with open-ended questions for participants to identify what it was that caused them frustration or helped them through the learning process. A further limitation of the survey was that it was only available online. Employees who may have experienced connectivity problems or who had aversions to using computers may have chosen not to participate for those reasons. Had they participated, the responses to many of the survey questions may have resulted in different levels of satisfaction.

### **Responses from Military Participants**

This study surveyed the civilian Security Cooperation workforce. This study did not take into account the survey responses from military personnel. I excluded military participants' responses because the military participants generally had more experience with various forms of distance learning, since distance learning is widely used in military training. Additionally, most military personnel in the SC community have at least a bachelors' degree, and have a more limited age range (25-45). Nevertheless, the responses of the forty-seven military participants are noteworthy. All of the military participants had a college degree, with 89 percent having a master's degree. Ninety-one percent of military participants were in the age range of 35 to 44, and the remaining 9 nine were in the age range of 26 to 34. Overall, the responses of military survey participants to the four primary research questions were more positive than their civilian counterparts.

For the item "I enjoy taking courses through the computer," 82 percent of all military participants indicated that they agreed or somewhat agreed that they enjoyed taking courses through the computer, compared to 71 percent of civilian participants. Ninety-five percent of military participants responded, "I can learn equally well online or through computer-based training as I can in a face-to-face classroom environment," compared to 51 percent of civilian participants. This higher preference by military personnel may be due to their increased experience with distance learning for their military and civilian education.

The majority of military participants (87 percent) responded that they disagreed or somewhat disagreed that computer-based learning is a frustrating process, compared to 68 percent of civilian participants. Ninety-one percent of military participants disagreed

or somewhat disagreed that working through the CBT was an unpleasant experience, compared to 67 percent of civilian participants. Nine military participants expressed a preference for asynchronous online courses in which they could interact with other learners and receive instructor feedback.

### ***The Future of Distance Learning***

Computer-based training offers numerous advantages that appeal to corporate and government organizations. Training can be delivered to geographically dispersed individuals as needed. Computer-based training requires no special facilities or equipment, other than a computer, and perhaps an Internet connection. There is no requirement to travel to a training site. Employees conduct training at times that are convenient to them and learn at their own pace. For large organizations that have frequent and standard training requirements, CBT is cheaper to produce and distribute than is bringing employees to centralized training locations for face-to-face instruction.

Several Defense organizations including the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Acquisition University, the Army Logistics Management College, and the Air Force Institute of Technology, are expanding their distance learning course offerings and products to keep pace with a rapidly changing, geographically dispersed workforce. To support the security cooperation community better, DISAM is considering developing additional CBT modules to provide just-in-time training on specialized skills, as well as more online courses. The feedback received through this online survey indicates that employees accept distance learning and are willing to use it for workforce development.

The results of this independent distance learning online survey may assist DISAM in developing instruction that meets the learning style preferences of the SC workforce. However, the educational products alone will not adequately train the workforce without improvement of the environment in which the employee is expected to learn. As distance learning continues to grow as a method of training the workforce, so must the organizational support to the employee to ensure that adequate learning and knowledge transfer takes place.

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### **About the Author**

Dr. Joanne Hawkins is a professor with twenty-five years of teaching experience. She is a retired Army logistician and is the coordinator of all logistics instruction at DISAM. She also instructs in the topics of Security Cooperation programs, technology transfer and export controls, the FMS process, FMS finance, legislation and foreign policy. She holds a doctorate degree in education from Capella University, Minneapolis.

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# Winning Hearts By Broadening Minds:

## Measuring the Impact of International Military Education Assistance at the National Defense University

By Adam Jungdahl and Paul Lambert  
National Defense University

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### **Introduction**

The International Fellows (IF) Program at the National Defense University (NDU) is a one year fellowship for senior-level military officers and defense agency officials from around the globe. On average, some fifty different nations are represented at two of NDU's senior Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) colleges: the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College. The selection process starts with a letter from the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff to his counterpart in invited nations, indicating that participants should be senior level officers with significant command experience. Attendees are then selected by their respective militaries based on their potential for future advancement and their desire to continue their academic and professional studies abroad. Historically, over forty percent of the Fellows go on to make flag officer or equivalent rank<sup>1</sup>, including several who go on to fill the highest positions in their country's military and civilian defense agencies, including 42 Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Defense, and Service Chiefs.

During their time at NDU, the Fellows receive a broad, strategic level introduction to national and international security strategy. The international students learn side by side with their American counterparts from the US military and government agencies. With over fifty military and civilian organizations represented at NDU, International Fellows are guaranteed exposure to a wide variety of perspectives and opinions in the classroom. Outside the classroom, Fellows are encouraged to meet and interact with both their American and international colleagues.

Beyond their academic studies, the Fellows also participate in outreach and cultural activities. These activities include a robust travel program throughout the United States that provides exposure to many aspects of United States (US) foreign and

domestic policy and American life, including the US commitment to human rights, American values, cultural events, American businesses, government institutions, the American legal system, and most importantly, exposure to American people. The blending of academic and cultural experiences is designed to present a fuller, richer picture of American society than could otherwise be had in the classroom. Ultimately, the primary objective of the International Fellows Program is to build lasting international partnerships by educating future foreign political and military leaders.

### **Background**

In order to assess how well NDU is accomplishing the objectives of the International Fellows program, the NDU Academic Affairs Office and International Student Management Office came together to design a study focused on student academic development and attitudinal changes. This collaboration resulted in a pair of complementary pre and post surveys delivered to the students upon their arrival in June 2010 and at the time of their departure in June 2011. The surveys included several quantitative questions regarding the IF's understanding of US political and social institutions, their perceptions of democracy and internationally recognized Human Rights in their home country, and a series of open ended questions dealing with their initial expectations and lessons learned from their time in the United States.

Within the larger goal of assessing the effectiveness of the International Fellows Program, there are two objectives for developing the survey and conducting this research. First, the project is an attempt to capture in a systematic fashion the feedback of our international students and their impressions of the United States and the National Defense University. For years, students and alumni have shared with our faculty and staff their appreciation for their experience at NDU. The students often comment on the value of

the lessons learned in the classroom, on travel, and in discussions with their fellow students. Comments like the following are not uncommon: "I truly derived inspiration from the teachings I received from NDU within the International Fellows Program, especially on Military Strategy. I applied my new knowledge and it was quite useful to me and the military."<sup>2</sup> Or, as another stated, "The education I received at NDU gave me new skills to better analyze events and make decisions. The knowledge I received allows me to better analyze every situation, critically think about problems and think strategically to find solutions with the collaboration of partners in the security community."<sup>3</sup> This survey tool allows us to collect this anecdotal evidence in a structured, quantifiable format in order to provide both program directors and academic advisors a better understanding of the elements of the international student experience that are having a measurable impact, and what areas require more attention.

Second, in an environment of increasing budgetary constraints, the United States must allocate its foreign assistance assets in the most efficient way possible. In order to do so, decision makers must have a clear understanding of the return on investment that comes from international education and training programs. A long-standing challenge in foreign assistance, and in education and training assistance in particular, is gathering useful, coherent data that expresses the value and worth of a particular program. As such, this study was driven by the need to establish both the level and type of value international students receive from their year at NDU. At the outset we hoped that the data gathered from this study would complement the wider scholarly work on professional military education and training assistance<sup>4</sup> and serve to highlight the most important aspects of the international student experience. As such, the results may be viewed as both an indicator of institutional effectiveness and a guide to overall programmatic improvement.

## **Method**

The desire to capture the effects of both the academic and cultural components of the international program influenced the design of the survey and its method of deployment. Early on we decided that pre and post evaluative surveys would be used to measure changes in student knowledge and perceptions. In the pre survey, comparison questions were mixed with


perceptual questions assessing student expectations for the upcoming academic year. The post survey included both the comparison questions and several broader, open-ended questions on potential program improvements. Roughly sixty percent of the survey questions were identical in the pre and the post evaluations. The analysis below focuses on these questions for comparison purposes but also includes a few illustrative comments from the qualitative portion of each survey.

The responses were aggregated for both surveys and are presented below on charts for visual comparison. 'Difference of means' tests were conducted on the scaled question responses. Given the relatively small sample size (n=46 and 34 on pre and post respectively), statistical significance was difficult to ascertain on certain questions though we feel the responses we received generally represent larger trends. We expect that as we gather more data from year to year, these trends will become easier to identify.

## **Results**

The survey results are arranged around three types of questions. The first set of responses required students to answer on a six point Likert scale the following question: "How confident are you that you understand the following items?" The question asked about confidence rather than level of understanding to avoid asking the students to rate understanding of subjects for which they would be receiving instruction that year. Asking an incoming student how much they understand prior to receiving instruction could be self-defeating as students are often unaware of what they do not know. Instead, students were allowed to self assess by indicating, in essence, how comfortable they are talking/writing/thinking about each subject.

Figure 1 compares the mean responses of the pre and post surveys for each subject area. First we find, perhaps not surprisingly, that students have varying degrees of comfort with different subject areas. Whereas respondents generally felt comfortable with the English language, they were more hesitant to assert their confidence in understanding the US health care and education systems. This is reasonable considering nearly all of the International Fellows are military officers focused on national security related issues and dealing only infrequently with domestic civilian institutions. As such, we see that beyond their confidence in the English language, the categories



**Figure 1.** Average response scores for pre- and post-surveys by subject area


in which they report the most initial confidence in understanding are US government institutions, US political process/democracy, US foreign policy, and US culture. Confidence in understanding the US judicial system lies somewhere between these two clusters.

Second, figure 1 shows confidence levels in all eight subject areas improved considerably from pre to post survey. The increases in the mean scores in all subject areas were statistically significant at the .05 level. Figure 2 shows the percentage increase in confidence levels over the pre survey. Among the subject areas the smallest increase was seen on English language (10.4 percent) while the largest increase was on US culture (31.1 percent). All other items displayed an improvement of 20 percent or more. We speculate that the high initial confidence on the English language made it difficult to improve upon the mean score given the scale maximum of six. This could have artificially limited the possible improvement in confidence with the English language.


The consistent improvements in all eight areas, and the especially large increase in confidence in understanding US culture may be attributable to the combined effects of classroom and travel experiences. The opportunity to traverse the country and be exposed to the pillars of American life such as American values, cultural events, American businesses, government institutions, and the American people appears to significantly increase

student understanding in these areas. This finding is borne out in the qualitative feedback from other program surveys specifically designed to assess the International Fellows' travel experiences. For example, one student wrote that "exposure to the American society has enhanced my knowledge on American culture, history and politics so that I am better able to understand how the United States sees the world." Another student noted that, "traveling throughout the United States has immensely helped me in knowing about the country, its people, its advancements, and its values."<sup>5</sup>


The second set of survey questions (figure 3) focused less on student understanding and more on student attitudes towards US institutions. The purpose of this section was to assess changes in the perception of the United States and its various civilian and military components. Survey respondents were asked: "Please rate your attitude towards/perception of the following items on a scale from 1 (Very Negative) to 7 (Very Positive)." Surprisingly, the results in the pre and post surveys to this section were quite similar and showed little statistical difference. As such, we were unable able to make any strong conclusions regarding student attitudinal change. We address this as a possible problem in the survey design in our conclusion.



**Figure 2.** Percentage increase in student confidence levels by subject area



**Figure 3.** Average response scores of student attitudes by subject area.



**Figure 4.** Student home country level of democracy

We did find, however, that student attitudes toward both the US military and the National Defense University were significantly higher than mean scores in the other categories. These high ratings for both NDU and the US military appeared in both the pre and post surveys. Student attitudes towards US foreign policy were lowest among the six listed items. Finally, IF attitudes towards the US political system, US civilian agencies, US culture, and the US commitment to human right lie somewhere in between these two clusters.


Finally, the survey included two questions dealing specifically with democracy and human rights practices in the students' home countries. The first question asked the students to rate their home country on a scale from very democratic to very authoritarian. The pre-test results show that 87 percent of students feel their home countries are at least somewhat democratic (See figure 4). The next question asked, "Compared to the rest of the world, how does your country rank in its respect for Human Rights?" Figure 5 shows a clear downward shift in the perceptions of the IF's home countries from the pre to post survey. This is also expressed in the change in mean scores from 3.83 to 3.68. In the pre survey a large majority of respondents indicated that their home countries were better than average in the realm of human rights (69.5 percent). In the post survey this dropped to 52.9 percent. For many IFs, it appears that the year at NDU may have provoked a more critical analysis of democracy and human rights in their home country.

## Conclusion

In the end, our findings indicate that the NDU experience is producing distinct learning outcomes in our international students. The survey results show a marked increase in student confidence in their ability to understand American social and political institutions. This seems to indicate that the IF program is achieving its goal of enlightening and educating students on the full range of political and security issues. It also implies that students are more adequately equipped to think strategically and speak confidently on issues of international security.

Particularly encouraging is the pre to post increase in student confidence regarding American culture. A vital component of the IF experience is the opportunity to meet and interact with American people outside of formal channels. Presenting American society as it really is rather than as it is portrayed in the movies and on the news is valuable in creating cultural, social, and political connections between our country and theirs. Ideally students will take back with them a more complete picture of American life; one they can share with their political and military leaders, colleagues, friends, and family members.

Unfortunately our results on attitudinal change questions were somewhat inconclusive. While there was little change from the pre to post survey, this does not necessarily imply that attitudinal change did not occur. Measuring an individual's opinion towards an abstract concept like "the American political system" is notoriously difficult. Using a survey



**Figure 5.** Student home country human rights ranking

to do so is problematic given the various outside factors that can influence one's mood at any given moment. Judging from the qualitative feedback and the comments made by past students we expect that the "non-finding" here may be a limitation of the method (survey research) rather than an indication of reality. For the upcoming academic year we intend to reevaluate the questionnaire design and explore alternative methods for collecting student feedback. Focus groups, for instance, may allow us to tease out more fully if and how foreign student attitudes and perspectives are altered over the course of the academic year.

The last portion of the survey is useful in giving a sense of how the international students approach human rights practices and democracy more generally. The results show that the vast majority of IFs at NDU come from what the students describe as somewhat or fully democratic countries. This indicates that, at least from the student's perspectives, many of their home countries are similar in political structure to the United States. For these students the democratic system and the American political-military relationship may not be quite as unique as we initially expected.

The results of the question asking how students' host countries rank on human rights are somewhat surprising. Here we find that their year of study at NDU may have changed several students' conceptions of human rights practices or at least their perception of their home countries' attitudes towards them. This is similar to the results of the previous question focusing on democracy where some IFs rated their home country as more authoritarian in the post-survey than in the pre-survey.

A cursory look at the chart (figure 5) appears to reveal a shift in viewpoint from pre to post-survey. This shift includes fewer students ranking their home countries as "Above Average" and more indicating "Average" or "Below Average." We speculate that the opportunity to witness American political and social freedoms first hand through field studies and as residents in the US, combined with scholarly discussions on human rights and liberal democracy topics, may have influenced their the international students' post-survey responses.

As noted previously, after thorough analysis of the survey tool and necessary modifications, we intend to continue this project and gather more data. We are eager to see if the trends we have identified

are repeated in future academic years. Whatever the result, we have much work to do in reporting further findings in our efforts to measure the effectiveness of the International Fellows Program and the larger efforts in International Military Education and Training. By seeking out what elements of the IF program work and what elements need attention, we can continually improve the international student experience while achieving larger US foreign policy goals. For now, however, we take heart in the fact that our data strongly suggests that the IF program is having an impact for good in the world.

### Notes

1. NDU International Student Management Office Alumni Database
2. Taken from a compilation of testimonials from alumni compiled by International Student Management Office at the National Defense University.
3. Taken from an alumni survey given at the National Defense University International Alumni Continuing Education Seminar at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 2011.
4. See "State Department and Defense Department Study on the Effectiveness of the IMET Program: 2007-2009" *Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management and the Air Force Institute of Technology* (March 2010).
5. See "Testimonials from NDU International Alumni," International Student Management Office, National Defense University, 2011.

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### About the Authors

Adam Jungdahl is a research associate in the Office of Institutional Research, Planning, and Assessment at the National Defense University. This office is charged with assessing the full range of academic programs at the university, developing strategic and academic planning documents, and collecting information on students, staff, faculty, and other personnel for external reporting. Adam holds a bachelor's degree in political science and history from Miami University and a master's degree from George Washington University where he is also a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department.

Paul Lambert is an assistant professor at the National Defense University and serves as the Academic Officer in the International Student Management Office. In this capacity, Paul oversees the academic objectives and assessment of NDU's international student programs. Paul holds a bachelor's degree in American studies from Brigham Young University and a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.



# The New Security Assistance Management-CONUS, SAM-C, Course

By John Smilek  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) leadership developed and implemented the largest change to the CONUS course in its 34+-year history. In fact, the course structure and presentation method changed more in the last two years than if had in the previous twenty! Why the change? Why now? What is the structure of the new course?

To answer these questions and others, we must understand the role the SAM-C course fills in the larger picture of educating the Security Cooperation (SC) workforce. The SAM-C is but one of a multitude of courses offered by DISAM. The number and diversity of courses—along with methods of teaching them—has increased in recent years with the growth of SC as a whole. With this growth came increased visibility of the need for all persons involved in SC to have some level of training which, with experience, should translate to a degree of expertise that would have a positive impact on our processes and practices. This led to the task of determining who should be trained, at what level, and finally, how many people were deficient in required training. This data was a driving force for changes to the SAM-C course. Changes in adult learning, a faster work pace, major growth in the number of students, the need for more flexibility, the expansion in complexity of the subject, and other academic factors demanded a revolution, not an evolution, in how the course was taught. This leads to a discussion of how the new SAM-C is offered, structured and taught.

Before we can answer the first big question of “Why the change?” you must understand where the SAM-C course fits in the full curriculum offered by DISAM to the very broad and diversified SC community. DISAM offers approximately seventeen different courses, some of which are taught in multiple formats and/or modified curriculum to fit the audience needs. For those working SC programs directly involving the transfer of military articles,

services, and training or supervising that work within the context of the CONUS support environment, the SAM-C course fits the bill as the cornerstone of their training. The SAM-C is a prerequisite for the advanced SC courses that concentrate on a specific part of the SC process. Think of it this way: a college student usually begins their education by completing an undergraduate program in a specified field, like engineering, business, or education. Consider the SAM-C course as your specified field and completion of the course as your bachelor’s degree in security cooperation. You go into the SC workforce and soon you realize that your specific job requires an expertise in logistics. You have completed your SCM-C undergraduate studies, so now it is time to complete your graduate level degree, which in our case is the advanced course in logistics management, SAM-CS. The same scenario applies for advanced training in case management (SAM-CM), case reconciliation (SAM-CR), case financial management (SAM-CF), and advanced training, (SAM-AT). There are other courses offered both by residence and distance learning that may be of value too. To find out more about all of the DISAM courses, visit the DISAM web page at <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/> and click on “Course Catalog/Registration” on the left side of the page.

Now that we know where SAM-C fits in the overall SC training regimentation, why change the course? The answer actually goes back many years. One of the biggest changes to the structure and method of teaching the course was the decision to teach half of it using Distance Learning (DL) while leaving the other half as a residence course. With the new century came the rapid growth in DL. One of DISAM’s first DL courses was the International Programs Security Requirements (IPSR) course. The IPSR was first taught by DISAM in 2002 and with the fresh course came the opportunity to add a DL version, which debuted in February 2004. During

the years since, the number of DL courses, and the DISAM staff to support this method of teaching, has experienced great growth. When the decision was made to convert the SAM-C into a hybrid DL-residence course in 2008 (and it had been considered for two or three years previously), the first part of the puzzle, the DL technology, was already in place. However, this still meant determining which pieces of the resident course could/should be placed online, and how to create modules to bring the online courses to fruition. Another reason for the change was the realization that the rise of PowerPoint in the 1990s, while still a good tool, was not the best way to teach adult learners. This is especially true if a student has to spend six to seven hours a day looking at slides, resulting in the often-stated term, “Death by PowerPoint.” While PowerPoint is still used sparingly in the new version of the SAM-C, exercises during the residence portion of the course take precedence. DISAM students are a well-educated, and in some cases, a well-experienced lot. Learning from each other in group exercises, when guided by scenarios and armed with the references like *The Management of Security Cooperation*, better known as “The Green Book,” makes for a more constructive learning environment. Another reason for the change of the course is the increasingly hectic pace of work.

Losing a valuable employee for two weeks of training is difficult not only for the supervisor but also for the employee who may return home to a huge backlog of work. With the addition of the DL portion of the SAM-C, the residence portion was reduced from ten days to five. Breaking the DL portion of the course into multiple modules gives students flexibility to complete the DL portion of the course over a two-month period prior to their arrival at the residence portion. This also gave DISAM the leverage to offer the SCM-C more times a year and to take the course on the road. This leads to the final reason for changing the course at this time: the large increase in the number of students!

So why the increase in students? Like many questions, there are multiple answers. The most basic answer is the rapid increase in the total amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in recent years. In just four years, Fiscal Years 2005–2009, the amount of FMS signed Agreements went from under \$10 billion a year to over \$30 billion (See figure 1). The amount of personnel needed to carry out those agreements did not triple, but it did go up significantly. Further, while the level of agreements has dropped slightly in recent years, it will still take many people many years to execute the cases and they all need to be trained.




Figure 1. Defense Security Cooperation Administration Historical Fact Book, September 2009.


This requirement alone did not demand the rapid change in the SAM-C, but adding DOD's High Priority Performance Goal/Security Cooperation Training Initiative (HPPG/SCTI) did. Late in 2009, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) reported to the Office of Management and Budget 10 High Priority Performance Goals, one of which directed a concerted effort on SC workforce training. An interim goal was to have 80 percent of the SC workforce trained by the end of FY10. The ultimate goal was 95 percent of the workforce trained to appropriate levels, as designated by their supervisory chain, by the end of FY11. DISAM's constituency organizations worked tirelessly since November 2009 identifying the workforce by billet, designating appropriate training levels, and providing this information, along with current incumbent information, to DISAM. This was a task never previously attempted because DISAM never had to account for particular billets. Specific training

levels and appropriate training is indicated in figure 2 below. For example, if a person requires Level 3 training, one way to achieve this is to complete the SAM-C course (noting that there are various Level 3 DISAM courses largely based on the audience.) More information on the HPPG/SCTI can be found at <http://www.disam.dscam.mil/hppg/>.

Once the research for the number of SC persons in each level was completed, it became obvious that many more persons needed Level 3 training and the SAM-C course in particular, than were previously anticipated. Still, the HPPG/SCTI 95 percent completion goal, set by the DEPSECDEF, did not change. This resulted in an all out effort to revise and implement the new SAM-C course format in time to facilitate the needed throughput of the course. The two-week format literally would have taken more time than was available. Having the new course ready in February of 2011 made for a very tight schedule. DISAM added five of the two-week SAM-C courses

Level	Position Details	Training Required	Website for Training
0	Positions with no substantive SC/SA involvement	No training required	N/A
1	Positions needing only an awareness of basic SC terminology or senior commanders and staff indirectly responsible for SC supervision	1-2 hour SC Familiarization	Security Cooperation Familiarization Course, or contact DISAM for CD
2	Positions needing only a basic understanding of SC terminology and processes or positions directly responsible for some aspects of SC, but for which extensive knowledge of SC programs is not required	Online SC Course (10-20 hours) plus International Programs Security Requirements Course	DISAM Online Learning
3	Positions working SC programs directly involving the transfer of military articles, services, and training or supervising that work	Requires Introductory SC Course (CONUS SA Management, OCONUS SC Management, Executive Training Officer, NG State Partnership Director, etc.)	Resident Training Information
4	Positions requiring advance understanding of SC/SA processes and policy	Requires Advanced SC Course (Case Management, Financial Management, Logistics Support, Advanced Training Management, etc.)	Resident Training Information

**Figure 2.** Training Levels



**Figure 3.** DISAM student registration data.

in FY10 in anticipation of the student number need which doubled the throughput of FY09, yet the FY11 student graduation rate was very impressive compared to past years. Figure 3 above shows the growth in SCM-C graduation over the last Fiscal Years.

Now that you can see all that drove the revision of SAM-C, let's answer the questions as to what changed and what must be done to complete the course. Actually, the course went through two phases. In FY10 there was a review of the course structure. Repetitive and lengthy administrative blocks of instruction were shortened or deleted. The daily start/end times of the course were slightly extended and standardized. This allowed the duration of the SAM-C to be reduced from ten to nine days. Small group exercises and scenarios were added along with a DL block to reduce the amount of power point instruction and foster group learning. This gave the DISAM course Manager and Subject Functional Coordinators an opportunity to see what new material worked and what needed to be modified or replaced.

Lessons learned in Phase I helped prepare for the major class structure changes implemented in Phase II. The second phase, which is the current structure of the SAM-C, consists of one prerequisite followed

by a DL portion of the course, which culminates in a one-week residence course made up of presentations and exercises. The prerequisite is the International Programs Security Requirements (IPSR) course. Since October 2000, the IPSR course material has been integrated into the SCM-C course. Much of the material was covered in the Technology Transfer block with other material in Legislation, Acquisition and Logistics. IPSR has had a DL version since 2004 and in Phase I of the course modification, four of the twelve lessons that made up the IPSR course were added as the first DL lessons of SCM-C. In 1999, John J. Hamre, then DEPSECDEF, signed a memo establishing the IPSR course. In the memo, Dr. Hamre states, "All DOD personnel responsible for negotiating, overseeing, managing, executing or otherwise participating in international activities shall successfully complete the International Programs Security course." To reinforce the need for this training, the following paragraph was added to DOD Directive 5230.20, "Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals." Policy, Part 4.12 states, "All DOD personnel responsible for negotiating, overseeing, managing, executing or otherwise participating in international activities shall successfully complete one or more of the courses required by Deputy

Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated October 22, 1999.” The DL version of the IPSR course is one of the authorized courses so it became the prerequisite for SAM-C. Any student enrolling in SAM-C that has completed the IPSR course previously need only send the DISAM Registrar a copy of their certificate of completion and the IPSR prerequisite will be waived. Having students take the IPSR course by DL accomplishes two things: (1) It satisfies the requirement stated in the Dr. Hamre Memo, and (2) it makes best use of the academic time in the shortened resident SAM-C course.

The first stage of the new SAM-C is now DL. The emphasis is on the facts, figures and structure of Security Cooperation. The lessons that make up the DL portion of the course are the same topics that will be covered in the residence portion of the course, but now the student comes in with a baseline of factual information to build on. In order to retain the concepts learned in the DL portion of the course, students may not start the DL lessons until seventy days prior to the start of the residence course, and they must be completed no later than ten days prior. The ten day leeway allows the DISAM Registrar to tabulate the data and confirm the student has a billet in the class at least one week before the start of the residence portion of the course.

The residence week consists of five days of academics that run between eight o’clock and four o’clock every day, including Friday. The classroom lessons include blocks of instruction that start with a fifteen to twenty minute PowerPoint overview of the topic followed by exercises that reinforce the online lessons and serve to simulate actual procedures, decision trees, work flows and problems associated with Security Cooperation. Topics addressed include US Government regulatory framework, technology transfer, FMS process, training, acquisition, logistics principles, financial management, introduction to the Security Cooperation Information Portal, and FMS and Direct Commercial Sales comparison. A complete syllabus for both the DL and Residence portion of SAM-C can be found at <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/disam1/external%20links/SAM-C.asp#syl>.

We accomplished a great deal in transforming SAM-C into its current format, which benefits both DISAM and our students and reflects a better use of all resources. First, and above all, we believe that it is a higher quality course than its predecessor. Second, we made the course easier for students to attend while

giving us the ability to surge throughput at the right time with less resident classroom requirements that take students away from their jobs. Also, it is easier to take a one-week course on the road than a two-week course, thus facilitating throughput at locations where there is a high/priority demand. Third, DISAM’s academic calendar and classroom space are at a premium as the schoolhouse is presented with greater challenges for additional courses.

The High Priority Performance Goal was met for FY11. That does not mean that the SAM-C course will stop evolving. There will always be new information to present and new methods through which it is presented. Through the work and dedication of the DISAM instructors and staff, along with feedback from the students, the course will continue to grow and improve. It is up to all of us to prepare the new SAM-C students so they can be trained and ready to take on the complicated, but rewarding, tasks that make up Security Cooperation Management.

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### **About the Author**

John Smilek is a DISAM Associate Professor for the management of Security Cooperation (SC). He is the Functional Coordinator for the Technology Transfer and International Programs Security Requirements academic field and is the course Manager for the Security Assistance Management CONUS (SAM-C) course. He is also an instructor in SC logistics, acquisition, process and foreign policy academic specialties. John has a bachelor’s degree in technical education from the University of Akron and a master’s degree in management and public administration from Webster University.



# Efficacy of International Officer In-Resident Professional Military Education Attendance on Building Partnerships:

## A Survey of International Officers Attending Air University PME Programs During Academic Year 2010

By Lt. Col. Clay Akaishi Benton, USAF  
33rd Fighter Wing, F-35 Academic Training Center

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### **Background**

I have always been interested in the education and training of international military officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), to include the role they might play in building partnership capacity and, more importantly, their link to our operational and strategic goals. While I was at United States Pacific Command (PACOM) my peers and I were tasked to prepare the commander for his annual congressional testimony. When doing this, we were always asked to provide background and talking points on the role foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), and international military education and training (IMET)—emphasizing how these programs performed in the larger context of theater security cooperation. The commander’s input to Congress would highlight the positive impact that programs like IMET have on establishing or maintaining our partnerships and alliances, but the words lacked supporting data to back them up. Other than the amount of money spent and the types of training provided, the input was not quantitative. It was generally accepted that IMET is a positive aspect of our engagement. After all, who could argue against shared experiences in education and training as a precursor to changing attitudes pertaining to the United States, democracy, human rights, and building enduring partnerships?

The US Air Force’s Global Partnership Strategy provides guidance to all Air Force organizations including the conduct or support of partnership activities for the combatant commander. The strategy states that the US Air Force must build, sustain, and expand relationships with partner air forces of all economic means and available resources. These foundational relationships are built upon, among other things, shared experiences in training and education. Shared experiences play a key factor in the formation of enduring relations between individuals and groups and are a necessary

component of partnering. Building partnerships is a specific joint capability area (JCA) and a US Air Force core function. JCAs and core functions drive the resourcing of how military departments organize, train, and equip forces to support joint and combined operations.

My assignment to Air University’s (AU) International Officer School (IOS), Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama presented a unique opportunity to directly interact with hundreds of international military students (IMS) and families from around the world. It also gave me a chance to gain additional insight into their views and opinions about attending professional military education (PME) in the United States. During the 2010–11 academic year, AU had 171 students from 78 countries attending various courses at Maxwell AFB. This number also includes attendees at the Senior NCO Academy (SNCOA) on Gunter (an annex of Maxwell), as well as students at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Almost three quarters of the international student population were officers attending year-long courses at the Air War College (AWC) and the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell. The remaining students attended the Squadron Officer School (SOS) at Maxwell, SNCOA, AFIT, and various short-duration professional continuation courses (PCE). Over 200 international students pass through the doorways of the various colleges, centers, and schools located at Maxwell each year. Counting AWC and ACSC students and the families who accompany them, more than 500 “internationals” call Maxwell and the Montgomery area “home” during some point of the year. With education as the medium, IOS lays the foundation for building partnerships with our international students and families.

International student attendance at AU is an opportunity to promote mutual understanding and to establish good working relationships with US

officers and civilians and officers from other nations. The international officers (IO) regularly interface with US personnel, and the personal relationships that develop enhance future military-to-military relations and provide a basis for future interaction with US leaders and policy makers. Also, AWC and ACSC students are encouraged to bring their families with them during the academic year, although some may be prohibited by their countries due to lack of funding or internal political issues. Bringing families provides a unique opportunity to present a positive image of the United States. Since spouses and children usually interact with different sets of peer groups in their home countries, they can also serve as conduits for relaying tangible experiential impressions about the United States and its people. Although tax dollars cannot be used for specific programs geared towards dependents, IOS does provide support to families through various volunteer supported programs or nonprofit private organizations. IOS's programs include the International Family Loan Program (IFLP), the International Family Orientation Program (IFOP), and the International Dependents English Course (IDEC).

IFLP is a private and voluntary organization affiliated with the IOS that provides international officers and their families the ability to use household items and car seats during their attendance at AU schools. The items are provided at nominal cost, and the IFLP does not make a profit. Money received as a result of the program is returned to the program. IFOP is a two-week; four-hour-per-day program focused on the families of AWC and ACSC international students and is wholly supported by volunteers. The program orients families to the local area and culture and eases the stress of relocating to a foreign country. Annual participation averages over 300 spouses and families; volunteers act as instructors for both children and spouses, and IOS personnel provide all planning, organization, and logistic and administrative support. IDEC focuses solely upon the spouses of the students. IDEC is a voluntary English language program that uses English as a second language curriculum for its program of instruction. The program is designed to help spouses learn and improve their English language skills. The overall goal of IFOP and IDEC is to make spouses and families comfortable enough to go out into the community and see and experience life in the United States.

FMS, in the context of providing military equipment, builds interdependency, while training and education programs, whether part of hardware purchases or a stand-alone program, are the bedrock for building enduring relations between people and countries. Until my assignment to IOS, I never had the opportunity to investigate and quantify this relationship. During my assignment I decided to collect data on IMS experiences and thoughts through a questionnaire.

### **The Questionnaire**

The survey was a seventeen-question anonymous questionnaire with an attached envelope that was provided to each IO attending AWC, ACSC, and SOS (see survey in annex A). If the IO did not bring a spouse or family, only the first twelve questions were answered. Prior to distribution, the survey's purpose was explained during group assemblies. The IOs were told that I was conducting research for a paper and that their honest feedback would be useful. I told them that their feedback would be anonymous and providing their country's name was not necessary but I would appreciate if they indicated their home region. They were asked to fill out the survey, place it in the envelope provided and drop it in a box located at the IOS.

Questions 1 through 3 were designed to see if there was any correlation between the amount of time the IOs had spent in the United States and their attitude and opinion of the United States. Questions 4 and 5 gauged attitudinal change. Question 6 asked their opinions about the other international students.

Questions 7 and 8 attempted to determine if there was any correlation between time spent outside the classroom environment in a purely social setting and the student's attitudes and outlook. The questions were born out of curiosity about group dynamics and the level of interaction or bonding between international students and their peers once they left the classroom. Adhering to a transactional model of IMS education and training, questions 9 through 11 got to the crux of determining the return on investment for the United States—an individual's inclination, based upon positive or negative experiences, to provide assistance if or when needed.

Question 12 was an attempt to gauge the desire among IOs to continue their AU experience once they leave and to solicit recommendations on ways this could be achieved. Questions 13 through 17 were for

those students who brought along a spouse/family. As with the questions directed towards the IOs, these questions sought to provide insight into attitudes and interaction.

### **The Respondents**

There were 145 potential respondents; 64 completed surveys were received, a 44 percent response rate. Over 200 IOs from more than 77 countries attend AU's schools annually. AU is a fully accredited university (accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools) and is the US Air Force's (USAF) institution for professional military education for all levels of a commissioned officer's development. PME occurs in three distinct levels of an officer's development—beginning (SOS), intermediate (ACSC), and senior level (AWC).

Through a highly competitive process, the countries represented at AU are invited by the US government and the Air Force to nominate junior-, mid-, and senior-level officers from their service to attend the schools as full participants in the USAF beginning, intermediate, and senior developmental education (BDE, IDE, and SDE, respectively) in-resident programs. Attendance at the schools serves as a key link for US foreign policy and for military interactions with other nations.

Students attending PME schools at AU are ranked as follows: O-1 (second lieutenant) to O-3 (captain), SOS; O-4 (major) to O-5 (lieutenant colonel), ACSC; and O-5 to O-6 (colonel), AWC, although an O-7 (brigadier general) occasionally attends. The majority of the attendees are typically rated (pilots, navigators & etc.) officers (80 percent). At AWC, most have senior-level command experience and come from influential positions within their militaries and return to positions of equal or greater responsibility. Approximately one-third of past international AWC graduates have reached general officer rank, and several have achieved the highest position within their country's respective service. Historically, 3 to 4 percent of the attendees at AU PME schools go on to attain the senior post within their military (chief of staff equivalent); most also attain influential positions within their governments after retirement.

### **The Responses**

Five respondents (7 percent) did not indicate whether this was the first time they had spent thirty days or more in the United States; however, twenty-six respondents (40 percent) had previously

been in the United States at least that long, while thirty-one respondents (48 percent) had not. Interestingly, I observed that of the twenty-two respondents whose attitude became more positive, over 70 percent had never been in the United States longer than a thirty-day period until they attended school at AU. Thus, it would not be a stretch to say that internationals who actually spend time in the United States tend to have a generally positive attitude toward it. This result also shows that there is no substitute for actually experiencing a culture firsthand. One African student noted, "I have been coming to US for some time now and I have positive attitudes towards America and Americans despite that most of the people in the part of the world I come from just make speculations" (note: all quotations from the surveys are transcribed exactly as they were written). Similarly, another African student expressed, "I have managed to debunk some myths about Americans, but reinforced the belief that Americans will always remain exceptional."

After their studies at AU, over 90 percent of the respondents either maintained a generally neutral or positive attitude towards the United States or saw their already-positive attitudes become even more favorable. Three respondents had a net decrease in their attitudes. The written input of one indicated that he or she experienced racism. Another found that Americans (which I interpreted to mean the local community) lacked interest in himself and his family. The third respondent did not provide enough written feedback for us to discern a particular reason(s) for the decrease in attitude. One respondent did not answer the questions related to attitudes.

### **Questions 1–5**

Questions 1–5 were not an attempt at affirmation for the United States, and not all the input was affirming. For example, a respondent from the Asia-Pacific region commented that "America has used its 'Democracy' as an agenda to dominate the world in terms of economic, political, and social. Most of the people outside USA see USA is a very dangerous country more than communist country." That respondent also said, "Generally the American people don't like war but their foreign policy makes them involved in war."

Many of the respondents acknowledged how the media had influenced their perception of the United States and its people. All respondents who

mentioned the media noted that the picture portrayed was generally not positive.

An IO from the Asia-Pacific region offered interesting input about attitudes before and after course attendance. Some had identified their attitude before arrival as neither positive nor negative; the aforementioned IO offered this explanation: “By stating ‘neither positive nor negative’ I meant the perceptions I had on the basis of ‘surfaced information.’ The surfaced information I had about US was mostly media and cyberspace based which were misleading mostly. On the same note, the perception made here (after course attendance) is on the basis of ‘believe in seeing.’ My limited experience in US, specifically within the ‘social imperative’ of US military provided very positive impressions which have removed the misleading perception I had earlier.” Whether these comments were seen as generally positive or negative is of little consequence. What is not lost is the importance of IO’s allowing experience to form the basis of their thoughts or opinions.

The following are various comments, based upon region, for questions 2 and 3:

### **Africa**

“I have a better understanding how domestic politics, interest group pressure the International policies of the US.”

“I am not concerned personally with USA issues and interests as long as they did not directly involve my country.”

“Base on the media coverage I had, I expected a bunch of arrogant people, totally full of themselves. I understood that most of their actions on the world stage had good intentions at the beginning, but the way they seemed to ignore everybody didn’t seem right to me.”

### **Asia-Pacific**

“Having seen the things with own eyes and experienced systems, institutions and processes working, I am having a positive appreciation and attitude towards the US There are some deficiencies therefore room for improvement.”

### **Europe**

“I come from a great country, and this is also a great country, except that politics suck in both countries as everyone would agree.”

“I like the American attitude how they managing problem solving. They have rules, regulations, checklist for everything. This is also disadvantage because it could be a reason to ignore individual thoughts.”

“I thought the US was about shooting people in the streets and sex. The reason were your movies.”

### **Mexico/Central/South America**

“Your society is like a huge laboratory that stands as a mirror on the future to the challenges mine will be confronting soon...very interesting!”

### **Middle East**

“I didn’t expect (for) so warm relationships with Americans.”

### **South Asia**

“As far as the people are concerned, I thought US is a very good nation for their country, but as for the US government is concerned. Their policies were always negative for the most of third world countries.”

If I did the survey over, I would refine questions 4 and 5. The intent was to see if the way students described what they thought of the United States before course attendance changed or stayed the same. The intent may not have been clear based on the wording of the questions, but the input is no less valuable. The following tables represent the “before” and “after” statements:

### **Africa**

<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>
“Insensitive” about the feelings and thoughts of other people especially those whose interests conflict with Americans interests. “Arrogant” in approach to securing their interest.	Proactive and Adaptive
Great	Still great, but not so knowledgeable about the world out there. Think being a super power makes you inward looking.
Arrogant	Cooperative and Caring

### **Asia-Pacific**

<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>
Very punctuate (timely) & kind	Not punctuate & arrogant
Blond, beautiful, anti-Muslim, racist, impatient, arrogant, extravagant, superficial, world police, materialistic, paranoid, show-off, and rude & open minded about sex.	Not all blond, big, overweight, individualistic, loud, can do mentality, patriotic, civic minded, like to volunteer, sincere, mostly conservative about sex especially those who have daughter and Americans are very much extreme either to the left or right. Either you are very fit or you are very big/fat most of the Americans including military students assume/generalize that all muslims are Arab; all Muslims are wither fundamentalist or very strict or religious. Islam is very tolerance or life and never condones any terrorist get. I’m glad that I’ve the opportunity to clear this matter out in my class. Not all Americans know that muslims are not Arabs or middle eastern.
Big city, people not much interaction with each other	Not whole country as in #4, but in Alabama people are very nice

### **Europe**

<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>
Hardworking, consumer oriented, polarized society (Dem X Rep - pres. Candidates), pro-neocon armed forces, superficial in cultural differences, patriotic, beautiful nature, same as the administration	Some are hardworking, differences in regions focus on state (not federal country), interpretation is very important and often changes, patriotic, realist - to - neoisolationist military, growing gap between people and politics(ticians)
Diverse, rich or poor, cowboys and Indians, capitalists, business as usual	Hard working, enduring, faithful to God and country, loyal, determined and opinionated. Have a big heart for other suffering
Acultural - Self Made	Religious - Individualistic - Self Made - Idea Driven – Generous

### **Mexico/Central/South America**

<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>
In general; arrogant!!! But professional	Now I cannot generalize the American people you can find arrogant but less that I though most American are very kind. People inside military are better than the normal population.
US Centric, Low level of culture awareness, materialistic, hard workers	Religion, Mission/Work oriented, direct, equality, impatient, diversity, social networks, US centric, technology, and individualism.
Self discipline, responsibility, honesty, freedom	Own space consciousness, personal friendship...official coldness, race, sex, religious tolerance

### **Middle East**

<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>
Not friendly	Not friendly, they concentrate on the task too much. They work for the whole week and have fun in the weekends; they have to eat too much.
Lonely people (not-engaging and caring)	Very Friendly and Open minded to other people and respectful to other attitudes.
Business oriented, maybe a little bit arrogance and cold.	Business oriented, warm, open to build relationships, military personnel is very high educated and professional.

### **South Asia**

<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>
Outspoken, Confident, Insensitive	Outspoken
Most of them have no knowledge about the events taking place in the world/out of the US	They have a strong belief to realize and maintain the US interests
Individual Pride, patriotic and have great respect for the people in uniform.	My perception has been validated.

### **Question 6**

Feedback on question 6 (“Based upon your interaction with your fellow internationals, can you describe a particular belief or view you held about them/their country which was either validated or dispelled?”) highlighted several things. Just as US Airmen will seldom, if ever, get an opportunity to interact with such a diverse international group, the same can be said of the IOs. Also, as much as we believe that we ultimately benefit from this interaction, the same is also true for the IOs. Every country benefits by sending their officers to AU, not just to learn from and educate their US counterparts but their international ones as well. The following comments highlight some of the benefits:

“It’s so interesting to learn a lot of things from different countries, culture, traditions...I’ve never had such an opportunity...I had it this year, it was awesome.”

I imagined Afghanistan to be a country of narcotics, Al Qaida and Taliban, and dangerous. However, my interaction with my fellow IO from Afghanistan, there is hope to overcome all this.”

“The IO’s who are sent here are supposed to be sharp, open-minded people. Thus I’m not surprised that they are able to adapt to all these new cultures they are facing. It’s extraordinary to see how this very diverse group could get along so well in such a short period of time. The sad thing, though is that they’ll most likely blend in their societies again when they go back home. I think the merit of the US is

to create this open atmosphere where Arab officers had no apparent problems openly talking to Jewish people.

“Europeans are staunch ally of Americans—Partly disputed partly validated—some disagree. Africans were not so smart—dispelled. Middle Easterners are no good, completely dispelled. Asians friendly, Validated.”

“I had not a good opinion about Serbs, especially after the war on Balkans. But after my stay here, I’ve changed my opinion absolutely.”

“Europeans are staunch ally of Americans - Partly disputed partly validated—some disagree. Africans were not so smart—dispelled. Middle Easterners

### **Questions 7 and 8**

When IOs attending PME schools arrive at AU, they go through a seven-week prep course. The course is conducted prior to the arrival of their US counterparts for the PME course. During the prep course, the IOs share common experiences, challenges, and opportunities to interact on a social level. At the conclusion of the prep course, they start their respective PME course alongside US attendees. By this time, IOs have established social bonds and friendships among themselves. Although the prep course classes are exclusively for IOs, once they join their PME course, there may only be one to three IOs in their classrooms. Does the prep course actually facilitate closer personal relationships among IOs, more so than with their US counterparts once they arrive? Questions 7 and 8 were attempts to provide insight on this issue. Based upon the responses and feedback, the relationships among IOs established in the prep course do not appear to suffer when they are integrated into a new peer group.

### **Questions 9–11**

Questions 9–11 could be considered the “money” questions. They provide insight as to whether international PME school attendance benefits the IOs’ countries and ours. We can look at the benefits from several perspectives—potential for attaining strategic goals related to PME school attendance; building partner capacity; establishing enduring relationships; and facilitating understanding between countries and cultures, thus reinforcing positive opinions or dispelling negative ones. The respondents were asked about their attitude toward either asking for assistance from or providing it to their US counterparts.

It is interesting to note that there is a greater inclination to provide assistance if asked than to ask for it. The respondent who disagreed was from a European country, and his comments indicated that he did not believe his US counterparts were willing to cooperate with his particular country. This was surprising because his country enjoys very good military, political, and economic relations with the United States. The respondents who strongly disagreed were from Europe, Africa, and Asia Pacific. Regrettably only the respondent from Africa provided any comment associated with his feedback. In that case as well, the feedback indicated that the United States had no interest in his country. Respondents who agreed at any level often would add the caveat to their comments that their inclination to reach out was bounded by whether or not it was authorized/approved by their government/military.

The responses serve as a reminder to be attuned to the needs for assistance among our current or potential partners and to possibly initiate contact. It is important in these and other cases to view the issues from differing perspectives: “I’d certainly be inclined to ask for help. I have reservations about whether they would be able to truly understand my problem from a non-US focused standpoint. I think they would genuinely like to help me. I’m just not sure they would know how to, or if their solution wouldn’t be worse. Despite the recent emphasis on cultural awareness, I think there’s still much to do.”

One hundred percent of the respondents to question 10 agreed they would be favourably inclined to assist if asked; this feedback could be viewed as validation of the worth of IO participation in PME. The comments include such feedback as the following:

“Again, one would be more inclined to go out the way and assist a US counterpart who has been close, and with whom I have established a bond. For others, one would definitely assist but not out of the way. So depends on relationships developed here in 1 year.” (Asia-Pacific)

“I appreciate the US people. I can understand their political leaders’ decisions, sometimes better than my US counterpart do. I’d be glad to help them whenever I’m in a position to do so. And I think it wouldn’t hurt the overall image of the US if they could be perceived as honestly requesting help in some areas instead of appearing to impose their views.” (Africa)

The similar distribution of answers to questions 10 and 11 should not be surprising since the US and international officers have so many shared experiences in the PME programs and the feedback from previous questions shows a high level of interaction between IOs and other IOs and between IOs and their US counterparts. As previously mentioned, these answers should also serve as validation to countries that either send or will consider sending officers to AU. The answers show one of many ways those countries reap the benefits of in-resident PME school attendance.

### **Question 12**

While working security assistance programs at the combatant command (COCOM), major command (MAJCOM), and the country level, with respect to military education programs, I noticed that we have never done a good job with the follow-up needed to cultivate the initial relationships that were begun at our various education and training facilities. I tried to capture the receptiveness our international officers have for extending their AU experience and define ways this could be done.

### **Questions 13–17**

International spouses and family potentially play a large role in imparting an understanding of the United States in their home countries based upon their personal experiences. Spouses and children have different peer groups, and it is reasonable to expect they will interact at many different levels socially and formally. No doubt their US and AU experience would be a topic of discussion. Because of restrictions on the use of funding to support spouse and family programs and because they are supported by volunteers, the ability of IOS to support such programs as IFOP, IDEC, and IFLP is always tenuous. These programs are specifically designed for acculturation, and they ease the shock of the international families' moves. The families' exposure to these programs occurs in the beginning of their transition, and they can immediately form the first lasting impressions. These programs, coupled with the entire year of living in the area, could have an impact on attitudes. Questions on these attitudes were included in the survey for the officers who brought their family along.

Twenty-one respondents (33 percent) indicated they did not have family with them during their course. Seven respondents (16 percent) did not indicate whether their family had ever been in the United

States thirty days or more. Twenty-one percent of the families had been in the United States thirty days or more, but, for 63 percent, this was the first time they spent thirty or more days in the United States. The range of responses on the survey goes from very positive (VP) to very negative (VN). Thirty-eight respondents reported their family's attitude toward the United States. Twenty-one respondents whose families had a positive (P) (seven respondents) or very positive (forteen respondents) attitude to the United States before coming here reported no shift in attitude. Some comments from this group include the following:

"My wife loved the IFOP program. She loved her staying here, my daughter too. You know what, I have to save money because she told me that the best present I could give her is to take her back to the US for a vacation."

"They want to stay."

"Especially my kids, they speak now English fluently. My wife established good relations with a lot of women (American and international)."

Fifteen respondents reported that their family's attitude became more positive—two slightly negative (SN) became neither positive nor negative (NPN); one slightly positive (SP) became very positive (VP); four NPN became P; one SP became P; seven P became VP. Of the fifteen respondents, ten (66 percent) indicated this was the first time they had spent thirty or more days in the United States. One additional respondent indicated this was not the first time his family had spent that length of time in the United States. He said his wife liked this stay but not their first one and further commented, "She is sad to leave 'Sweet Home Alabama' many friends inside military community as well as outside."

Some additional comments from this group include the following:

"Schooling was good and for spouse shopping was very good."

"Very favourable and positive due to the love and care provided by local volunteers."

"The Social environment and the freedom they had here doing nothing but socialize transformed my wife to like this place very much."

"They don't want to go home! What to do now!"

Not all attitudes remained or became more positive. One respondent went from P to SN, and one went from P to SP. The P to SN respondent indicated that issues related to US policy on healthcare

coverage for international spouses and families had an impact on his family's attitude. This officer said that his wife initially was more excited than he was about attending a course in the United States, and then they had issues with the medical policy: "My spouse could not stay for whole period because of 'insurance issue'—an issue which I think IOS and my country needs to work out very seriously. I accepted this one as my fate. It had serious implications on my study." Although the respondent categorized this as an IOS issue, any shortcomings with the policy will actually have to be resolved at a level much higher than IOS. However, this incident does illustrate an unintended impact on our ability to build lasting relationships with our partners. The P to SP respondent stated, "Americans, Esp. spouses, were not keen to engage IO spouses."

### **Recommendations**

The following recommendations are based not only upon the responses from the survey but also on my past experience in previous security cooperation/building partnership (BP) capacity jobs and on my daily interaction with IOs and their families. These recommendations are intended to further the Air Force's core function of BP and, more importantly, set the conditions for enduring relationships with our international partners. The recommendations reflect actions at both the strategic and operational levels.

1. Institutionalize a survey similar to this one and share the results. AU, as well as the other service PME/PCE schools, is a cache of data that could be mined, providing insight into ways of increasing cross-cultural competence and advancing the Air Force's BP mission. AU, however, is unique compared to the other services' schools because all its BDE, IDE, and SDE schools are in one location. A survey such as this provides what I refer to as quantifiable qualitative data. Although the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) does require students who attend AU's PME/PCE courses to complete an IMET survey, the ability to assess our effectiveness is limited because feedback is not received from every non-IMET attendee. Also, the IMET survey in its current form does not solicit the type of feedback that would be the most useful for those charged with operationalizing our BP mission. In all my time at PACOM, I cannot recall an instance when any results or analysis of the IMET survey

was shared with our directorate or any of the in-country security cooperation offices.

2. Develop legislative initiatives that allow the use of funds to support programs specifically designed for the spouse and families of international officers. Currently there are restrictions for using US government funds to support spouses and families. Because the impact families can have on perceptions and partnerships, at the Air Force and COCOM level, advocacy for change in the form of legislative initiatives should be developed. A combined Air Force and COCOM legislative initiative could have even greater effect due to the partnership and theater security cooperation benefits each derives from having families accompany the IO to in-resident PME schools.
3. Develop means to extend the AU/US experience for IOs and their families. This could be done through the wide use of alumni associations and the regular solicitation of IO alumni to provide articles or updates on their professional development. The key is to keep in contact and update IOs on "their" university. AU should continue to press the theme: as an alumnus, you are indeed different based upon your experience and accomplishment.
4. Line the academic circle with the flags of international partners. Because AU's academic circle is the home to SOS, ACSC, and AWC, flags of international partners should be displayed in the same manner as the flags of US states. Although each of the colleges does display international flags in its building, a better, more visible reminder of our international audience is required. Having worked with IOs, never underestimate the power of visual symbology. This display would punctuate the fact AU is a world-class institution of higher education.
5. Provide the ability to purchase standardized medical coverage to meet US government policy requirements. Much progress has been made by each of the individual services, but there should be a standard offering or review process among all services.
6. Work with in country Security Cooperation Office to track progress of IOs. Although the SCOs are required to keep track of IOs who have

completed training and education, this is usually a low priority compared with other duties. AU has a vested interest in keeping in touch with IOs because their AU experience can make a difference.

7. Incorporate enlisted members into the International Honor Roll. IOS is home to the International Officer Hall of Fame. For IO attendees at AU courses, those who have attained the highest position in their military or a prominent government position are eligible for induction to the hall. Because of the important role a professional enlisted corps plays, the same consideration should be afforded senior NCOs that attain their country's highest enlisted position, similar to the chief master sergeant of the Air Force.
8. Provide a separate welcome package for families. Although the IOs are provided a package of useful information upon arrival/in-processing, this information does not always make it into the hands of the spouses/families, and its purpose is different than that of a family packet. A packet of information designed to help ease the family's transition would do much to further the acculturation process.

### **Acknowledgement**

I want to thank Air University and International Officer School for allowing me to further the Air Force Building Partnership function; they truly do make a difference one international student and family at a time. To Air Force Research Institute for their invaluable assistance in editing this paper, and to every international military student and family—you came here to learn, but ended up teaching as well.

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### **About the Author**

Clay Benton is the International Military Student Officer (IMSO) and Foreign Affairs Specialist for the Joint Strike Fighter / F-35 Lightning II program and is assigned to the F-35 Academic Training Center, 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, FL. He is responsible for matters related to student administration for the programs international partner countries—UK, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, as well as other countries that will purchase the F-35 through Foreign Military Sales. Clay retired from active duty 1 April 2011; his last assignment was as Dean of Students and IMSO, International Officer School, Air University (AU), Maxwell AFB, AL. In that capacity he was responsible for the Air Force's largest population of international officers and non-commissioned officers attending professional military education, including their families. He has also served as Chief, Security Cooperation Programs at Camp Eggers Afghanistan and Chief, Security Assistance Programs for US Pacific Command. He is a DSCA/SAF IA Professional Level III and is a member of the Society for International Affairs. He can be reached at [clay.benton@eglin.af.mil](mailto:clay.benton@eglin.af.mil)

## Annex A

### **AWC / ACSC / SOS International Student Research Survey**

I am doing research for a paper and would like to have you fill out this survey. This survey is and will be anonymous, but I do ask you at least provide the region of the world you are from—this will be relevant to determine any attitudinal trends based upon what part of the world you are from. The survey includes an envelope so you can seal your survey in order to ensure your anonymity and privacy is protected. Please return your sealed envelope to the individual who provided you the survey, they in turn will ensure it gets to me. Please provide the answer(s) which best fit your thoughts/feeling. As with all things academically related, the rules of academic freedom and non-attribution are in force. Thank you very much.

Lt Col Clay Benton

(OPTIONAL) What country are you from? \_\_\_\_\_

If you do not want to provide your country, please provide what region of the world you are from (please circle)?

North America

Mexico/Central/South America

Europe

Middle East

Africa

South Asia

Asia-Pacific

1. This is the first time I have spent 30 or more days in the United States. YES NO
2. Before my course attendance, my general attitude toward the United States was:

VERY POSITIVE	POSITIVE	SLIGHTLY POSITIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE	SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	VERY NEGATIVE

Comments:

--

3. My current attitude towards the United States is:

VERY POSITIVE	POSITIVE	SLIGHTLY POSITIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE	SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	VERY NEGATIVE

Comments:

4. Before my course attendance, the word/words which best describe what I thought about the people of the United States is:

Comments:

5. After my course attendance, the word/words which best describe what I think about the people of the United States is:

Comments:

6. Based upon your interaction with your fellow internationals, can you describe a particular belief or view you held about them/their country which was either validated or dispelled?

Comments:

7. Outside of the classroom / academic environment, how much time did you spend interacting with your United States class counterparts?

NEVER	OCCASIONALLY (At least twice a month or less than 2 hours a month)	FREQUENTLY (At least twice a month or more than 2 hours a month)	VERY FREQUENTLY (At least once a week)
Comments:			

8. Outside of the classroom / academic environment, how much time did you spend interacting with your fellow internationals?

NEVER	OCCASIONALLY (At least twice a month or less than 2 hours a month)	FREQUENTLY (At least twice a month or more than 2 hours a month)	VERY FREQUENTLY (At least once a week)
Comments:			

9. Based upon my experience this past year, if I needed assistance related to my position in my countries military/government, I would contact one of my United States counterparts if I believed they were in a position to assist me?

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	N/A
Comments:						

10. Based upon my experience this past year, if I am in a position to do so, I am favourably inclined to assist one of my United States counterparts if they contacted me?

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	N/A

Comments:

11. Based upon my experience this past year, if I am in a position to do so, I am favourably inclined to assist one of my international counterparts if they contacted me?

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	N/A

Comments:

12. I am interested in staying in touch with events related to Air University and/or International Officer School?

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	N/A

Comments:

If you have a spouse and/or children who were with you 30 or more days at any time during your course attendance, please answer questions 13-17

13. This is the first time my spouse/children have spent 30 or more days in the United States?

YES                      NO

14. Before my spouse/children's stay in the United States, their general attitude towards the United States was:

VERY POSITIVE	POSITIVE	SLIGHTLY POSITIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE	SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	VERY NEGATIVE
Comments:						

15. The current attitude of my spouse/children towards the United States is:

VERY POSITIVE	POSITIVE	SLIGHTLY POSITIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE	SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	VERY NEGATIVE
Comments:						

16. How much time did your spouse/children interact with anyone they met from the United States?

NEVER	OCCASIONALLY (At least twice a month or less than 2 hours a month)	FREQUENTLY (At least twice a month or more than 2 hours a month)	VERY FREQUENTLY (At least once a week)
Comments:			

17. How much time did your spouse/children interact with any of their fellow internationals?

NEVER	OCCASIONALLY (At least twice a month or less than 2 hours a month)	FREQUENTLY (At least twice a month or more than 2 hours a month)	VERY FREQUENTLY (At least once a week)
<p>Comments:</p>			

# State Department and DISAM Study on the Effectiveness of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program

By Dr. Mark Ahles, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Dr. Michael T. Rehg, Air Force Institute of Technology and California State University, Chico

Mr. Aaron Prince, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Ms. Litsu Rehak, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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## Executive Summary

This paper analyzes the results of a survey administered to a representative sample of International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program graduates in 2007–2009 at US military schools. The survey focuses on questions related to the “purposes” of IMET as defined in US law: (1) effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; (2) improved ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and (3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights

All IMET students at a statistically-representative sample of schools completed an online questionnaire at graduation assessing their self-perception of any gain in knowledge and understanding related to IMET purposes. An analysis of the results of the surveys shows a strong increase in student understanding of the goals of international peace and security, utilization of defense resources, increased military capability, and improved understanding of internationally recognized human rights. Therefore the IMET program is achieving its Foreign Assistance Act mandated purpose.

This paper conducts further detailed analysis and makes four recommendations based upon this analysis:

1. The IMETP should continue. It meets its mandated purposes at very low cost to the US each year (less than \$100 million). Other studies show great benefit to the US forces and the rise of IMET graduates to positions of prominence in

their home nations. IMET offers great benefit to the US taxpayers and improves the perceptions of the US in the minds of graduates.

2. The IMETP should receive additional funding to increase student training in the United States. For over fifteen years, Republicans and Democrats have argued that IMET should increase to \$100 million. Inflation adjusted, this target value would exceed \$150 million since the \$100 million proposed as a long-term goal by President Clinton’s administration in the late 1990s. The proven benefits of this program justify such an increase along with an increase in international student capacity at US military schools.
3. IMET expansion should include maximum participation in US residence courses. Short duration mobile training teams likely would not have the same benefits as indicated in this study—but further research would need to be conducted to validate this opinion.
4. Professional military education courses should continue as the cornerstone of the IMETP. In every question category, graduates of PME returned more positive scores indicating greater benefit from their training. PME also permits the US to reach the “best and brightest” of our emerging partners.

“The IMET program is a great opportunity for military personnel around the world to develop their skills and better understand the US approach to dealing with issues worldwide. It builds connections that will hopefully facilitate diplomacy and peaceful resolution of crises.”—2008 US-trained international military student

## **Introduction**

The United States government conducts a wide variety of foreign aid programs. Significant among these are US security assistance programs. Security Assistance programs authorize military sales and fund the US State Department grants of military-related equipment, support, training, and services to friendly and allied nations. In addition, Congress has authorized and made funds available for the US military to provide military equipment, services, and training to allied nations under a variety of security cooperation programs. The vast majority of security cooperation and security assistance programs provide and supports military equipment. Although less financially significant, the US State Department and the Department of Defense also fund military education and training of recipient nations by the US military via a variety of programs.

Each year the US military conducts extensive training of our foreign military partners under security cooperation and security assistance programs—averaging approximately 75,000 total students each year. In 2006, for example, the US trained 77,100 students from 149 countries with a total training value of \$431.3 million.<sup>1</sup> These students represented every region of the world, military and civilian defense staff, and officers and enlisted soldiers. Training and education ranged from enlisted basic schools through senior officer professional military education.

The training for the majority of these students is funded directly by a relatively small number of more prosperous US friends and allies through the foreign military sales process. Most nations, however, do not have sufficient resources to fund training of their officers in the United States. To permit security assistance training with these nations, representing the majority of the world's nations, Congress authorized the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP or IMET) in 1976. Because IMET permits training and education with the 140 partner-nations (2008 numbers)<sup>2</sup> with whom the US military might otherwise be unable to partner (or would have limited options due to limited partner nation funds) it is an invaluable engagement tool for US international efforts. As previously stated, in 2006 the US trained with 149 partner nations. 107 of these nation's students were funded via IMET.<sup>3</sup> These students represent a wide range of military ranks—with many key senior leaders participating in

IMET funded training. Because of the breadth and reach of the IMET program, it is the flagship of US military training efforts.

The US Congress requires evaluation of all government programs regarding performance as related to program goals and measurements (Government Performance and Results Act of 1993).<sup>4</sup> The State Department meets this requirement in the annual Congressional Budget Justification by describing the broad IMET goals and specific country allocations and plans.<sup>5</sup> This performance measurement, however, does not indicate if the program is meeting the broader Congressional purposes of the IMET program. Until 2007 the US Defense and State Departments had never conducted a wide-spread analysis as to the effectiveness of the IMETP in meeting these Congressionally mandated goals. In 2007, the US State Department requested that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) assist in just such an evaluation of the IMETP. State Department designed a survey for IMET students. A long-term study analyzing of the results of this survey would be used to demonstrate IMET performance (or lack thereof) and potential areas for improvement in the execution of the IMETP.

This paper analyzes the surveys of IMET graduates in 2007, 2008, and 2009 to determine if IMET is accomplishing the legal goals of the program. Analysis of the survey results will also show areas for program improvement. The analysis will show that the International Military and Education Training Program does meet the congressionally mandated purpose for the program.

## **Background And Related Research**

Congress initially authorized the International Military Education and Training Program in 1976 with two purposes: (1) to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; (2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries. A third goal, (3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights, was added as a purpose in 1978.<sup>6</sup>

Due to the often contentious nature of international military training (not all recipient militaries have broad support in the United States), a number of American and/or international organizations have concerns with these programs (Amnesty International's *Report on Human Rights Violations in Countries Receiving US Security Assistance*,<sup>7</sup> for example) and cite anecdotes related to the IMET to demonstrate program failure, but they do not conduct analytic research to validate their broad concerns. The one in-depth book on the topic, Clarke, Connor, and Ellis's *Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and US Foreign Policy*<sup>8</sup> provides a comprehensive overview of US Security Assistance Programs and their relationship to National Security. The book is a broad exploration of the history and current execution (macro level only) of US programs—but not an evaluation of IMET.

A number of primarily military writers have analyzed aspects of the IMET program. US senior military school students have done a number of IMET papers and The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Journal provides a further wealth of such information. All of these papers typically are based upon a single writer's SA experiences and do provide excellent background material. Brewer ("United States Security Assistance Training of Latin American Militaries: Intentions and Results"<sup>10</sup>) and Crawford ("The Search for Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: An American Perspective"<sup>11</sup>), in their respective research, provide a good sample of Security Assistance research within the military. Calhoun, in his graduate thesis "Evaluating Security Assistance Programs: Performance Evaluation and the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) Program"<sup>12</sup> at the Naval Postgraduate School, proposes a method for evaluating the Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET), but Calhoun's proposed evaluation was never implemented. Other research (Cope,<sup>13</sup> Keeling,<sup>14</sup> Kratsas,<sup>15</sup> and Reynolds<sup>16</sup>) explore the IMET program's value in specific regions. Each of the studies demonstrates that the IMET program has value as specifically studied, and that the program provides and will continue to provide significant advantages to the US in foreign relations and military operations. Again, however, the research does not focus on the entirety of the IMET program, just specific countries or regions.

Congress has often asked questions of both the State and Defense Departments regarding the efficacy of foreign military training. The United States Government Accountability Office conducted a 1990 report designed to make general observations on the IMET program based upon a request by Senators Leahy and Graham in 1990. Specifically, the GAO attempted to determine "whether the Department of State and Defense had (1) complied with program policies and (2) met the US foreign policy objective of exposing IMET trainees to US values, including human rights."<sup>17</sup> In broad terms, they reported that the IMETP was exposing IMET trainees to US values and human rights. This was a beneficial finding, but not a broad validation that IMET was meeting its purpose as designed. For example, the 2002 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act stated in section 581 that "Not later than June 30, 2003, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations describing in detail the steps that the Departments of State and Defense are making to improve performance evaluation procedures for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the progress that the Departments of State and Defense are making in implementing section 548 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961."<sup>18</sup> The response was a report on the existing programs (not publically accessible) and a decision by the Political-Military Bureau of the State Department to further pursue a more comprehensive study.

The US Defense and State Departments have had numerous and valuable anecdotal stories of the success of IMET. Each year every embassy provides a list of IMET graduates in "positions of prominence" as part of their Combined Education and Training Program Plan. These success stories are similar to Amnesty International's report—they validate individual successes, but not broad program success. Specific school curriculum are also validated as to their content relationship to IMET. But until 2005, neither department had directed a broad attempt to demonstrate that the IMET program as a whole is accomplishing its legal purpose. Recognizing that both departments could improve IMET performance evaluation, the State Department and DSCA has recently funded two efforts to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of IMET.

One of the projects was conducted by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS). This study was conducted in 2007 and included interviews with US policy-makers, administrators, and US security assistance staff in-country, a written survey instrument administered to embassy security assistance staff, and a separate survey instrument administered by the CCMR research team to graduates of IMET programs in sixteen countries with an emphasis on graduates who had completed master's or doctoral degree programs.

This study concluded that “the findings from the analysis of the quantitative data are supported by nine findings from the qualitative data. The findings include:

- 94 percent of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat increased their knowledge within their specialty.
- 88 percent of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat increased their knowledge outside of their specialty.
- 95 percent of respondents reported increased knowledge of US systems and practices.”<sup>20</sup>

This study's results reflect very positively upon IMET, but are results primarily for senior officers attending graduate education. These officers are critical to IMET, but only represent dozens of the thousands of IMET graduates each year. So although extremely valuable, this study did not validate the performance of the entire IMET program.

## The “IMET Survey”

The second study, or the “IMET Survey,” is the subject of this paper's analysis. It began with a proof-of-concept in 2006. The questions for the survey were designed by a team of State Department staff experienced in surveys of international subjects. These questions (listed below) approached the goals of IMET from a variety of overlapping angles. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management was then asked to implement and analyze the results of this survey (the Air Force Institute of Technology has partnered with DISAM in the research).

Students were asked to provide a likert-scale response (value 1–4 relating to each question, using an even number designed specifically to force a positive or negative response with a “no comment” option which was not considered in survey results) to the following questions related to the FAA purposes of IMET:

*FAA IMET Purpose One: Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.*

*FAA IMET Purpose Two: Improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.*

*FAA IMET Purpose Three: Increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.*

	FAA Purpose One	FAA Purpose Two	FAA Purpose Three
How much did your training and other experiences in the United States improve your ability to successfully participate (as a member of a military organization in your own country) in a combined military activity with US forces or other multinational forces?	✓		
How much did you learn about US military terminology?	✓		
How much did you learn about equipment, tactics, and procedures of a US/multinational force?	✓	✓	
How much did you learn about US military command and control structure and planning?	✓	✓	
Before training, what is your view of the civilian control of the military?	✓		✓
After training, what is your view of the civilian control of the military?	✓		✓

Before training, what was your view of democracy in the United States?	✓		
After training, what is your view of democracy in the United States?	✓		
How beneficial was this training for your professional development		✓	
Before training, what was your understanding of international human rights standards?			✓
After training, what was your understanding of international human rights standards?			✓
Did the training meet your expectations?			
How valuable was this training for your professional development?			

In addition, narrative data was gathered to provide further details as to the students' learning under IMET and to permit an automated analysis of narrative responses in comparison to qualitative responses.

The survey method is similar to advertising focus group questions where corporations ask participants before/after questions on products. In this case the "focus group" questions are for IMET students and the product is US training. The result is the IMET students' perceptions of how well the US has achieved the purposes of the IMETP.

This technique relies heavily upon international relations theory to determine positive results for the US based upon the students' experiences in the US. For years, the primary measurements of the IMETP have been concrete, but limited: how many students trained and educated, how many IMET graduates in positions of prominence, and how well did the Departments of State and Defense execute the assigned budget. These are "real" measures. But these concrete measurements ignore the more important question of whether IMET impacts the behavior of the students and their governments (or military components of their governments). International relations "Realists" might argue that the key measures of success for IMET is related somehow to measures of the behavior of the IMET graduates governments as influenced by the graduates modified behavior (such as: after X IMET students, recipient countries are Y% more likely to participate in multilateral peace training exercises). Such measurements (which do not exist) could be an aid in evaluating IMET, but these measurements would be extremely difficult to determine and to control for outside interference.

Another approach would indicate that "Perhaps both material reality and perception are important."<sup>21</sup> The Constructivist school of international relations holds that "ideas, attitudes, and preferences really matter in international relations. Interests are not objective realities once and for all, like a rock or a tree, but what we "believe" them to be—with the "we" being the social groups to which we belong."<sup>22</sup> In the Constructivist theory of international relations, the US can determine that it will impact the behavior of its international partners by altering the people of the partner nation's perceptions of the United States. The "IMET Survey" attempts to measure the change in perspective of a critical group of that population, military leaders, by the most simple and direct method—measuring the IMET students' self described change in behavior. So if the first mandated purpose of IMET is to "Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries," then constructivism would hold that such relations should improve if we can alter the perceptions of the United States by foreign leaders (and their followers) in a positive direction. This, then, is the goal of the "IMET Survey"—to look for positive, or negative, changes in perception of IMET graduates based upon their IMET experience.

Thus an "IMET Survey" of a representative sample of all IMET graduates, not just a national or school subset, is critical to complete an evaluation of the value of IMET. The State Department's "IMET Survey" questions offer the opportunity for a complete analysis of IMET graduates as they complete their training and education in the United States. An analysis of the survey questions will also

permit multiple queries as to the conduct of IMET such as:

- Which type of training has the most positive impact upon students?
- What categories of students are impacted most positively by IMET?
- How can the execution of the IMETP be altered to enhance the benefits, or decrease the problems, of IMET?

Initial results of a prototype “IMET Survey” conducted in 2006 demonstrated that students were willing to answer the online questionnaire, that they were willing to give both positive and negative feedback, and that an analysis of qualitative responses (narrative feedback) validated the quantitative results. All that remained was to gather and analyze more results to have a large enough data set to draw

conclusions. In 2006, DSCA authorized full-scale implementation of the IMET Survey permitting the analysis which follows.

A group of schools were selected for the study which would match the demographics of the entire IMET population in world regions, military status, and type of training received. All intermediate and senior level officer professional military education courses were also included due to the high-interest in Congress in these programs. Participation in the study was mandated by the Department of Defense for the schools, but individual student participation was optional. Students were asked to complete the online survey during “out processing” at their final training installation as they prepared to return to their home nation.

### **Participating Military Schools**

*(The Army War College was also selected but it has been unable to coordinate student participation)*

San Antonio, Texas—Defense Language Institute English Language Center
Fort Benning, Georgia—Infantry School
Maxwell AFB, Alabama—Air University
Monterey, California—Defense Resources Management Institute
Yorktown, Virginia—Coast Guard Training Center
San Antonio, Texas—Army Medical Department Center and School
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Engineer School
Quantico, Virginia—Commanding General, Education Command
Fort Bliss, Texas—Sergeants Major Academy
Monterey, California—Naval Postgraduate School
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—Command and General Staff College
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Military Police School
Fort Bliss, Texas—Air Defense Artillery School
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio—Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Chemical School
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina—USMC School of Infantry (East)
Fort Benning, Georgia—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Assistance
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina—USMC Engineer School
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina—USMC Staff NCO Academy (East)
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina—USMC Combat Service Support School
Keesler AFB, Mississippi

Monterey, California—Center for Civil-Military Relations
Randolph AFB, Texas—12th Operations Support Squadron
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Centere for SEABEES and Facilities Engineering Detachment
Fort McNair, Washington DC—National Defense University (includes NWC, ICAF, and IRMC)
San Antonio, Texas—Brooke Army Medical Center
Camp Pendleton, California—USMC Staff NCO Academy (West)
Fort Bliss, Texas—USAMMC (Hawk training only)
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy
Inter-American Defense College
Fort Bliss, Texas—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—MANSCEN Army Training Center
San Antonio, Texas—Joint Medical Readiness Training Institute
San Antonio, Texas—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio—Air Force Institute of Technology
San Antonio, Texas—Defense Language Institute English Language Center
Fort Benning, Georgia—Infantry School

### **The “IMET Survey” Results**



The IMET Survey results have meaning in many dimensions. First, each individual question delves into a specific topic of interest for the Department of State in support of the Congressionally mandated purposes of IMET. Second, reviewing select subsets of data (different regions, different training types, etc) can influence decisions upon the future “best uses” of IMET.

Also meaningful are the narrative responses to the questions. The surveys have provided tens of thousands of written clarification of the survey results. In the discussion of the results below, select narratives assist in describing a subset of students’ perceptions of the questions.


The discussion of specific responses are grouped below into two broad discussions – questions on the value of the training and questions relating to an understanding of US democracy, international human rights, and civilian control of the military.

#### Questions relating to the value of the training and education received:

- How much did your training and other experiences in the United States improve your ability to successfully participate (as a member of a military organization in your own country) in a combined military activity with US forces or other multi-national forces? (Improved ability partic.)
- Did the training meet your expectations? (Met expectations)
- How valuable was this training for your professional development? (Profession develop)
- How much did you learn about US military terminology? (Learned mil terms)
- How much did you learn about equipment, tactics, and procedures of a US/Multinational Force? (Learned equip, tactics, etc)
- How much did you learn about US military command and control structure and planning? (Learned US C & C)
- How much did this training improve your understanding of US values? (Understanding US values)




In all cases, the average response indicated a moderate to great amount of value in the training received. Less than 10 percent of students indicated little to no value in any of the categories. Most of the low value responses related to courses of a very technical nature. For example, only 3 percent of students attending a “Professional Military Education” course indicated a low increase in their understanding of US Command and Control procedures, while 33 percent of students attending “technical training” indicated a low increase in understanding. Such results are predictable by the content of the course— Professional Military Education courses (such as the War and Staff Colleges, Captains Career Courses, Squadron Officers’ School, NCO development, etc) focus on high-level military skills, while technical courses (such as airborne (parachute) or electrician training) train on just a specific military skill set.



These responses are consistent across multiple years of data collection—further confirming the validity of the data.

Questions relating to democracy in the United States, the civilian control of the military and human rights:

- Before training, what was your view of civilian control of the military?
- After training, what is your view of civilian control of the military?
- Before training, what was your view of democracy in the United States?
- After training, what is your view of democracy in the United States?
- Before training, what was your understanding of international human rights standards?
- After training, what is your understanding of international human rights standards?



These responses also indicate that IMET training significantly alters student perceptions about civilian control of the military, democracy in the United States, and internationally recognized human rights. These changes are significant statistically and are even more meaningful when broken out by region on the following page.

**Student Narratives**

“I think that people need the right to speak freely in order to participate actively in the development of their countries.” – *IMET field-grade officer’s thoughts on protecting human rights*

“People are really free, there is nobody in jail because he expressed his political points of view.”

“I saw how people can express their opinion at any time without being afraid of any thing and this was my idea about US before i come but now it is more.” – *Two field-grade IMET students’ thoughts on US democracy*

**Student Narratives**

“People are friendly in the US and multiracial society works apparently good. Otherwise the US society might have explode if incinated from the outside—as it was in tsar’s Russia in year 1917!”

“Before coming here, I thought that USA is a mixture of nations without identity. While staying here, I changed my thinking completely and I can tell you that you have a strong identity and I like that the nationalism is a very important issue here.” – *Two IMET senior civilians’ thoughts on what they have learned about the US in training.*

### **Civilian Control of the Military, 2008 Data**

<b>Question (mean score)</b> <i>(1=very negative; 4=very positive)</i>				
<b>Region (N)</b>	<b>Pre-training view of Civilian control of military</b>	<b>Post-training view of Civilian control of military</b>	<b>Pre to Post difference</b>	<b>T value (significance—indicating high degree of certainty in all regions)</b>
Western Hemisphere	3.14	3.45	.31	4.3
European and Eurasian	3.21	3.44	.23	6.16
Near Eastern	3.03	3.53	.50	4.21
African	3.03	3.68	.65	8.36
South and Central Asian	3.11	3.61	.50	5.44
East Asian and Pacific	3.14	3.55	.41	3.75

The regional breakout shows meaningful difference in each region between pre-and post-training views on civilian control of the military. Regionally, the differences between pre and post values are also significantly different. European and Western-hemisphere nations, with a longer history of civilian control of the military, show a positive

change in understanding, but less than twice the difference of African nations—many of whom have historically viewed military control of civilians as a needed post-colonial reality on their continent. IMET training in the US influences significant numbers of these military members to have a much more favorable view of civilian control of the military.

### **Change in View of Democracy in the US, 2008 Data**

<b>Question (mean score)</b> <i>(1=very negative; 4=very positive)</i>				
<b>Region (N)</b>	<b>Q14. Pre-training view of democracy in US</b>	<b>Q15. Post-training view of Civilian control of military</b>	<b>Mean Difference</b>	<b>T value (significance—indicating high degree of certainty in all regions)</b>
Western Hemisphere	3.45	3.66	.21	3.35
European and Eurasian	3.42	3.53	.11	3.13
Near Eastern	3.58	3.69	.11	.94 (not significant)
African	3.47	3.78	.31	3.27
South and Central Asian	3.40	3.68	.28	3.27
East Asian and Pacific	3.57	3.70	.14	1.63 (low significance)

Again, the data shows significant regional differences – in this case the change in perception of democracy in the US. Once again, African students show the most improvement in perceptions of US democracy. They start with an average view of US democracy, and end training with the highest opinion of US style democracy. Of interest also is the improvement in Western Hemisphere and South/Central Asians from a lower view of US democracy (albeit still averaging very positive) to a predominantly very positive view. Finally, Europeans start with the second lowest view of American democracy and this view improves the least among surveyed IMET students. As this data was collected during the Bush years with negative perceptions of the US electorate which elected President Bush,<sup>23</sup> it will be interesting to view any possible changes in the 2009–2010 data.

### **Student Narratives On The Most Important Human Right To Protect**

“Freedom of speech, mobility and ownership of property—all this are link to security—free elections as well—also US should help countries like Zimbabwe either forcefully or not and not only oil rich nations. If you want to help Africa really.”

— *Government civilian*

“The right to work, study, speak, live happily.”

— *Junior enlisted*

“No human is more human than another human. All humans are equal and should be treated with respect, whether during war or peace time.”— *Junior officer*

“Life of the people, their right to live, as SAR [Search and Rescue] School says, always ready, that others may live.”— *Field grade officer*

“Based on my training and other experiences in the United States, the most important human rights to preserve and defend are freedom of speech, of movement.”— *General officer*

### **Change in Knowledge of International Human Rights, 2008 Data**

<b>Question (Question mean score and sample size for each region) (1=very limited; 4=extensive)</b>				
<b>Region (N)</b>	<b>Q17. Pre-training knowledge of international human rights standards</b>	<b>Q15. Post-training knowledge of international human rights standards</b>	<b>Mean Difference</b>	<b>T value (significance—indicating high degree of certainty in all regions)*</b>
Western Hemisphere	3.26	3.54	.28	4.75
European and Eurasian	3.27	3.63	.36	9.04
Near Eastern	3.17	3.72	.56	4.54
African	3.16	3.73	.57	8.99
South and Central Asian	2.98	3.58	.59	6.78
East Asian and Pacific	3.12	3.44	.33	3.31

\*All T values significantly exceed the threshold for statistical significance of difference

Once again, African IMET students show high improvement in another IMET focus area – international human rights. South and Central Asian, as well as Near Eastern, students also indicate a significant increase in self-perceived knowledge. Review of the narrative responses confirms that students have retained many of the key points of human rights instructions. As one student states, “Based on the background of the country (South Africa) that I am coming from, US is very much advanced regarding human rights. There is lot to learn from the US they way they do their things.”


### **Potential for Student Bias**

A weakness of the method of the “IMET Survey” is the high likelihood of student bias. The students have just received a full-expense-paid training experience in the US. A likely response is to complete this survey in a manner which reflects gratitude for the US (although such bias in itself indicates potential benefits to the US in paying for military leaders education in the US, it is not the rationale for IMET).


It would be very difficult to eliminate this bias, but one method to determine validity of the data in spite of this bias is to examine repeat IMET students. If students’ “pre-training” response in survey questions improves when returning to the US for additional training, then this indicates that the original benefit was valid; that improvements “stuck” to IMET graduates as is evident by improving pre-training scores.

The data, in fact, demonstrates that IMET benefits do “stick” to graduates.


### Views of Civilian Control of the Military



### Views of Democracy in US



### Knowledge of International Human Rights



In all three studied areas, returning IMET students showed a higher initial self-perception than their first-time IMET student peers. Thus it is demonstrated that IMET values “stick” to graduates after their IMET training in the US. The post-training values tend to cluster together, indicating less differential as training concludes, but the spread in pre-training perceptions of knowledge directly relates to the number of times the student has previously trained in the US and indicates a benefit to repeat training experiences.

### **Conclusions**

Every single question evaluated showed significant improvement in student understanding of topics related to the purposes of IMET, and these values exceed the statistical thresholds for random chance. The “IMET Survey” shows a positive benefit from IMET in all measured categories and all studied subgroups in questions relating to the purposes of IMET.

The IMET program is based upon a belief that educating militaries in the areas of IMET emphasis will change national behavior. Because any US IMET recipient nation receives only a small amount of training in any given year, measurements of change in national behavior due to IMET receipt is impossible (any change would be overwhelmed by uncontrolled factors). The Constructivism theory of international relations, however, argues that international relationships of a nation are “constructed” by the shared ideas of the society. As IMET attempts to change the ideas of the military, a measure of the change in the ideas of IMET students (as directed by the FAA purposes for IMET) provides a good measure as to the IMET program’s effectiveness in meeting FAA required purposes. IMET student attitudes as measured in the “IMET Survey,” in fact, demonstrate significant improvement after training. This relationship is validated further as returning students retain a higher belief in their understanding of these issues.

International Relations theory shows that such changes will impact the military/national behavior in IMET graduates’ organizations. This point has also been demonstrated by Atkinson in her study on military engagement and the socialization of states<sup>24</sup> . . . international military training programs demonstrate effectiveness in influencing military behavior. This analysis of the results of this data

demonstrates that the IMET program is meeting its mandated purpose.

### **Recommendations Based On This Research**

In addition to demonstrating that the IMET program meets its mandated purpose, analysis of the data permits the following recommendations.

1. The IMETP should continue. It meets its mandated purposes at very low cost to the US each year (less than \$100 million). Other studies show great benefit to the US forces and the rise of IMET graduates to positions of prominence in their home nations. IMET offers great benefit to the US taxpayers and improves the perceptions of the US in the minds of graduates.
2. The IMETP should receive additional funding to increase student training in the United States. For over fifteen years, Republicans and Democrats have argued that IMET should increase to \$100 million. Inflation adjusted, this target value would exceed \$150 million since the \$100 million proposed by President Clinton. The proven benefits of this program justify such an increase along with an increase in international student capacity at US military schools.
3. IMET expansion should include maximum participation in US residence courses. Short duration mobile training teams likely would not have the same benefits as indicated in this study – but further research would need to be conducted to validate this opinion.
4. Professional military education courses should continue as the cornerstone of the IMETP. In every question category, graduates of PME returned more positive scores indicating greater benefit from their training. PME also permits the US to reach the “best and brightest” of our emerging partners.

### **Student Narrative**

“There is clear freedom in presenting the point of views among people and American people can express their point of view without any fear or pressure...democracy has been conducted well in the USA.”—*IMET PME graduate*

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## About the Authors

The research for this paper was compiled by Dr. Mark T. Ahles of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, Dr. Michael T. Rehg of the Air Force Institute of Technology and California State University, Chico, Mr. Aaron Prince of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, and Ms. Litsu Rehak of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.

# Relationship Building Considerations for Security Cooperation Officers In the Middle East

By Dr. Carlos Braziel

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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Dr. Peter Bechtold, a professor at the Foreign Service Institute, once advised his student, future Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf about the importance of relationships in the Middle East. Dr. Bechtold said, “In the Arab world, your position gets you through the door, but your personal relationships get you commitments from the Arabs.” (Schwarzkopf and Petre 1992, 277)

## **Introduction**

Military security cooperation officers (SCOs) are on the frontline of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategy of building partner capacity in the Middle East. These diplomatic specialists are charged with promoting US security interests as well as gaining host nation access through the execution and oversight of security cooperation (SC). Their effectiveness and success not only lies in their technical capability, but it also lies in their ability to build long-term relationships by influencing and advising host nation counterparts. This article will attempt to explore the competencies SCOs need in order to develop military-to-military (mil-to-mil) relationships in the Middle East.

## **Security Cooperation’s Role in Relationship Building**

SC activities are designed to “build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation” (US Department of Defense 2004, GL-9). The benefits associated with SC relationships range from gaining deeper understanding of the Middle East region to developing support for mutual security interests. In fact, the formation of personal and professional relationships generated by SCO tactical engagements “have proven to be enduring and invaluable

throughout the subsequent regional turmoil” (McKenzie and Packard 2011, 103). For instance, some experts believe the SC strategy was integral in strengthening Egyptian military support for a democratically elected government during delicate regime transition period. Overall, SC relationships in the Middle East can open doors to unprecedented communication that secures US strategic access and strengthens and expands our network of partnerships across the region.

SCOs play a major role in the SC strategy because in some countries, they are the only US military presence on the ground. They are the host nation’s first point of contact for facilitating communication between their own military and the US military. Therefore, it is imperative that SCOs understand how the host nation’s values, norms, customs and decision-making processes shape and form the content of their interactions with host nationals. Accordingly, SCOs must have the ability to effectively understand what is being communicated during these interactions and implement appropriate behavior, which conveys an intended message of mutual trust. Failure for SCOs to understand the perspective of their foreign counterparts and appropriately respond to social interactions can often lead to misunderstood intentions and in many cases; negatively impact the relationship.

Learning to interact and build relationships with people of different cultural norms and beliefs can present major challenges for SCOs. For example, the ideas, behaviors, values, and norms of Americans and their host nation counterparts can cause “cultural friction,” potentially isolating them from future interactions (McFarland 2005). British Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as “Lawrence of Arabia,” highlighted this problem while serving as a military liaison officer during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turkish Empire during World War I. He explained that

military operations and national security decisions could suffer when military members lack sufficient knowledge of their host nation culture (McFate 2005). Lawrence's statement rings true today for US strategy in the Middle East. Thus, without an adequate level of cultural awareness and relationship building competency, SCOs can risk "alienating the people the people the US is trying to influence," ultimately eroding the nation's strategic legitimacy and credibility in the Middle East (Sargent 2005, 12).

Unfortunately, developing the expertise for relationship building in the Middle East could take years of experience and study; this is a luxury new SCOs do not normally have before starting their assignments. Despite the growing concern in DOD for the need for more cross-culturally trained military personnel, only a small percentage of SCOs receive formalized language and cross-cultural training. SCOs that do possess some type of in-depth cross-cultural awareness and language training normally come from the US Air Force Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) and US Army/Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) communities. Military members with FAO or RAS experience make up approximately one third of the current SCO population in the Middle East. The remaining SCO billets in the Middle East are comprised of military members from a variety of career fields.

For brand new SCOs with limited language and regional training, the experience of establishing relationships in the Middle East could be daunting. The cross-cultural training offered by DOD and other organizations are often too simplistic; focusing on a list of "do's and don'ts" that provide guidelines for behavior and etiquette. SCOs overwhelmed with these requirements may lose focus on their initial purpose of relationship building because they are too worried about offending their host nation counterparts. As well, SCOs are at a slight disadvantage when it comes to building relationships with Middle East counterparts. To put it frankly, SCOs view business and personal relationships as two entirely separate entities (Wunderle 2006). The SCOs' extremely task-focused, highly individualist culture makes it difficult for them to develop rapport with their Middle East counterparts, especially when the business can be completed in a matter of minutes. This Western business approach can often clash with the highly collectivistic, relationship-focused culture of the Middle East. Likewise, these differences can


create an initial barrier of distrust for SCOs working in a culture where the relationship drives the business.

By acknowledging the previous issues and taking the appropriate steps to address to them, SCOs can develop the skills and confidence needed to build the rapport and expand strategic partnerships in the Middle East. Therefore, it is recommended that SCOs develop an action plan to increase their cross-cultural awareness and relationship building competencies.

### **Cross-Cultural Awareness Competency**

The first step SCOs can take to maximize their intercultural experiences and ability to establish relationships is by developing their cross-cultural awareness. Cross-cultural awareness is defined as the act of understanding the need to consider the characteristics of a particular group, tribe, organization, and society in order to operate effectively in that environment (Skelton and Cooper 2004). This competency can facilitate understanding of one's own worldview while encouraging the ability to see beyond one's own culture; thus avoiding the ever-present danger of ethnocentrism.<sup>1</sup> The process of self-understanding begins with comparing and contrasting "culture differences or situations in which such differences exist" (Stewart and Bennett 1991, xii). Wunderle's (2008) book, *A Manual for American Servicemen in the Arab Middle East: Using Cultural Understanding to Defeat Adversaries and Win the Peace* provides a basic framework for SCOs attempting to undertake their cultural analysis. Wunderle offers a framework in figure 1 that facilitates the understanding and development of cross-cultural awareness through the evaluation of the following major components: cultural influences, cultural variations, and cultural manifestations.

Cultural influences are the major social or institutional factors that shaped the host nation's culture (Wunderle 2008). These factors are cultural commonalities that bind people together. Major factors such as history, heritage, traditions, language, and religion are instrumental in shaping the country's national identity and ethnicity. Cultural variations analyze culture from the differences or characteristics that define variations in a particular culture (Wunderle 2008). These characteristics include behaviors (the outward observable artifacts), values (the base judgments of good and bad common to a culture) and cognition (the preference based strategies used in decision-making, perception,



**Figure 1.**

and knowledge representation. Analyzing the host nation’s cultural influences and variations can help SCOs understand the reason or the “why” of their host nation counterparts’ actions. The final component of the framework, cultural manifestations, deals with “what” SCOs may witness as a result of the host nations’ cultural influences and variations. Factors such as the concept of *wasta*,<sup>2</sup> suspicion, and negotiation style are examples of Middle East cultural manifestations that may negatively impact relationship building if SCOs are not prepared.

SCOs are encouraged to use the above framework as a guide for undertaking “a more intensive and holistic analysis” of their own culture and culture of the host nation (Wunderle 2008, 41). By constantly working towards developing their cross-cultural awareness, SCOs may become more comfortable with the cultural differences and move towards the path of relationship building.

**Relationship Building**

Relationship building is the ability to establish respectful and responsive relationships with host nation counterparts. The cross-cultural leadership and expatriate adjustment literature highlights the “ability to create and maintain relationships with individuals in cross-cultural/global settings” as a key competency domain for global leaders (Mendenhall,

Stevens, Bird, and Oddou 2008, 9). The development of the following relationship building competencies may aid SCOs in their interactions with host nation counterparts:

- Relationship interest
- Interpersonal engagement
- Empathy
- Self awareness
- Social flexibility

**Relationship Interest**

The relationship interest competency “refers to the extent to which people exhibit interest in, and awareness of, their social environment” (Mendenhall et al. 2008, 10). Individuals with a high level of relationship “strive to understand the kind of people they are, what their cultural norms, are, and so on” (Mendenhall et al. 2008, 10). SCOs that rate high in this competency possess the desire to learn as much about the host nation’s cultural influences (i.e. language, history, geography, etc.). They learn about their foreign counterpart’s interests and ask questions about them during the “small talk” phase of their engagements. Also, when asked a question by their Middle Eastern counterpart, SCOs that rate high in relationship interest competency do not respond with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Socially skillful SCOs have the ability to turn the question into an opportunity to

develop rapport. For example, General Schwarzkopf explains that when your Middle East host asks, "How was your flight?" it is uncouth to provide a terse response such as, "Fine, thanks." General Schwarzkopf infers that military members serving in diplomatic roles should use this opportunity to exhibit their interest in the host nation and the surrounding environment by saying something like, "The trip took seventeen hours, and during that time it became difficult to tell night from day and my body was in turmoil. But now I am better, because I landed in your beautiful capital, and driving here from the airport I was able to see the sights and hear the sounds of your city, and I feel as though I'm home again." (Schwarzkopf and Petre 1992, 277). By demonstrating a sincere interest, SCOs can establish the rapport for building trust.

### **Interpersonal Engagement**

Interpersonal engagement refers to the degree to which SCOs "have a desire and willingness to initiate and maintain relationships with people from other cultures" (Mendenhall et al. 2008, 10). Individuals who step outside themselves and try to emotionally connect with host nationals are more prone to be successful at establishing long lasting relationships than those who do not (Mendenhall and Oddou 1985). Unfortunately, this competency can present a problem for SCOs who tend to be reserved and introverted. Interpersonal engagements in the Middle East could sometimes appear too intrusive and intense for SCOs. Middle East counterparts may ask SCOs probing questions like "How much money do you make?" or if you are unmarried, "Why are you not married?" If uncomfortable discussing these subjects, it is suggested that SCOs speak on these subjects in general. After sometime, the host nation counterpart will realize that you do not intend to give a substantive answer and will move onto another subject without losing face.

Another element of interpersonal engagement in the Middle East requires both the SCO and host nation counterpart to maintain the relationship with routine visits and phone calls. SCOs may feel overwhelmed with this practice; however to the Middle East counterpart, it is an obligation. The lack of frequent and timely interpersonal engagement may be misinterpreted by host nationals and may negatively impact the relationship. SCOs have to

understand sustaining relationships in the Middle East will require a lot of time and effort on their part.

### **Empathy**

The empathy competency is another common relationship building theme. This competency refers to the ability of "being participative and sensitive to others' needs and assumptions" (Jokinen et al. 2005, 207), while expressing genuine concern for them in the process (Gregersen, Morrison, and Black, 1998). The Middle East culture can be full of great emotion and sentimentality. As a result, host nationals take great care in considering the human factors of a situation such as relationship dynamics and personal feelings. These emotions may manifest themselves whenever conflicts arise or counterparts become frustrated with the complexities of a situation. In contrast, Western culture tends to place less emphasis on the human aspect of a situation. As a result, Middle East counterparts may feel that SCOs are too objective in their dealings and lack sensitivity toward people. In the host national's eyes, the lack of sensitivity prevents SCOs from seeing the situation from their perspective.

SCOs who rate high in the empathy competency attempt to understand how things may affect their counterparts. Even though they may not always agree with them, SCOs with a greater capacity for empathy accept the differences and verbalize their concern by stating, "I understand your frustration," or something to that effect. When SCOs train themselves to "see things as others do," they are less likely to misinterpret another's position; thus limiting spirals of exaggerated or mistaken hostility (Walt 2008).

### **Self Awareness**

Self awareness "refers to the degree to which people are aware of (1) their strengths and weaknesses in interpersonal skills, (2) their own philosophies and values, (3) how past experiences have helped shape them into who they are as a person, and (4) the impact their values and behavior have on relationships with others" (Mendenhall et al. 2008, 12). Successful SCOs are extremely aware of their own values, strengths and limitations, and behavioral tendencies and how they impact and affect others. SCOs with a high level of self awareness understand how to leverage their strengths and develop their weaknesses for relationship building purposes. SCOs that lack

self awareness tend to have little concern or interest in knowing themselves or how their actions affect their host nation counterparts. High self-awareness provides a foundation for strategically acquiring new skills, whereas low self-awareness promotes self-deception and arrogance.

### **Social Flexibility**

Lastly, the flexibility competency refers to an individual's ability and willingness to substitute his/her own personal interests with interests of the host nation culture in order to facilitate relationship building (Mendenhall et al. 2008). This competency involves the ability to perceive, learn, and respond appropriately in cultural settings. SCOs with high social flexibility are able to adjust their behaviors to fit the situation and make favorable impressions. For example, if a host nation counterpart prefers to sit on the floor, thumb his prayer beads, and listen to flute and drum music, the SCO should be adept at doing the same (Metrinko 2008). SCOs demonstrating the willingness to adapt to social situations and acting comfortable will speak volumes for their commitment to their relationships with host nationals.

### **Conclusion**

This article explored the essential competencies SCOs need in order to establish and maintain mil-to-mil relationships in the Middle East. The Middle East is a relationship-centered culture that has an unbounded window for relationship building. Thus, newly assigned SCOs need to understand the importance of the cross-cultural awareness and relationship management dimensions of their SCO toolbox and how to effectively master them. Therefore, it is highly encouraged they develop the skills and competencies for establishing personal rapport, mutual respect, and trust. Although this article mainly focused on the Middle Eastern culture, the framework for developing cross-cultural awareness and relationship building can be applied globally. As previously mentioned, Wunderle's (2008) framework is a good start for SCOs beginning the cultural analysis process. Also, it is recommended that SCOs develop a robust reading list that explores the political, social and historical cultural aspects of the Middle East. Bernard Lewis' (1995) *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*; Glen Fisher's (1997) *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*; Margaret K.

(Omar) Nydell's (2002) *Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Westerners*; and Raphael Patai's (2002) *The Arab Mind* are books SCOs should consider reading before their assignment to the Middle East.

### **Notes**

1. Ethnocentrism: Belief in the inherent superiority of one's own group and culture; it may be accompanied by a feeling of contempt for those considered as foreign; it views and measures alien cultures and groups in terms of one's own culture
2. Wasta: A Middle East cultural manifestation that encompasses anything from personal influence, networking, prestige and political power.

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### **About the Author**

Dr. Carlos Brazier is the Director of Middle East Studies at DISAM and a retired US Air Force officer. He served in a variety of operations and positions in the Middle East as an Air Force civil engineer and a US defense contractor. He holds a doctoral degree in organizational leadership from Indiana Wesleyan University.

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# South East Asia: Growing Security Cooperation?

By Lt. Col. Tom Williams, USAF  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense released a new strategic guidance document titled “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense.” At the front of this document was a letter from President Obama that stated the following:

This review has been shaped by America’s enduring national security interests. We seek the security of our Nation, allies and partners. We seek the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system. And we seek a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being.

The President emphasized the importance of human security, free market prosperity, and democratic reforms to achieve a more stable and safer world. Additionally, the chapters of President Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy have a similar emphasis with titles such as Security, Prosperity, Values & International Order.

This US foreign policy emphasis on greater human security, leading to greater economic prosperity, which in turn leads to more democracies and greater world peace, has been a standard US foreign policy goal for decades and has its roots in the Democratic Peace Theory. The Democratic Peace Theory promotes the idea that democratic countries do not go to war with each other. Therefore, the birth of more democratic countries in the world should lead to greater peace and stability. But how is the first step—greater human security—achieved? To answer this question, the US has promoted security cooperation and security assistance in many of its foreign policy initiatives. Security cooperation refers to all interactions between the US government and another nation’s government to improve US security and our partner nation’s security while increasing US access to that nation’s security forces and government.

Unrest from the Arab Spring in the Middle East is calling into question ongoing security cooperation programs in places like Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait—economic gains, increasing stability, and budding democratic movements in the countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are leading to growth in security cooperation and security assistance between the United States and Indochina. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are traditionally thought of as occupying the part of the world referred to as Indochina.

Vietnam is one of five countries in the world that practice a communist form of government, and the remaining four are China, North Korea, Laos, and Cuba. These five countries account for nearly 1.5 billion of the world’s population of 7+ billion, which means that at least one out of every seven people in the world are Asian and live under a communist regime. Communism as a political force did not disappear from the world stage at the end of the Cold War; it just became much less common in the West (Cuba being the lone holdout). With this in mind, is it really all that surprising that, with increased globalization in the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been growing economic interactions between the United States and China and a growing security dialogue between the US and the communist countries of Indochina? Under the general prohibitions of the Foreign Assistance Act, security assistance is not eligible for a nation that “Is a communist country.” However, a Presidential waiver can be granted when the President determines that it is in the US’s best interests do so. For Cuba, North Korea, and to a lesser extent, China, this communist country restriction holds true, but for the communist countries of Vietnam and Laos, these restrictions are being loosened. For instance, in FY 2011 the US provided Vietnam with \$450,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds and \$1,345,000 in Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) funds. For FY 2012, Vietnam was projected

to receive \$1,960,000 in FMFP and \$650,000 in IMET. How did a communist country, which was at war with the United States only forty years ago, get to a point that it now receives US security assistance?

In 1975, North Vietnam overran the South, and all of Vietnam became communist. Diplomatic relations between the US and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ceased. In 1995, President Clinton announced the formal normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Soon, diplomatic ties grew stronger and each country opened a consulate in the other. In fact, in 1997, President Clinton appointed US Congressman and former-POW, Douglas Peterson as the first US Ambassador to Communist Vietnam. Communist Vietnam, like its large northern neighbor China, has a poor human rights record and continuously suppresses freedom of political expression. However, unlike China, Vietnam has allowed greater freedom of religion. In 2006, because of Vietnam's passing of religious freedom legislation the year before, the US State Department determined that Vietnam was no longer a serious violator of religious rights for its citizens.

Economically speaking, Vietnam has also been making gains in changing its centrally-driven economy to one that is more decentralized and market driven. The first signs of this shift occurred in the 1980s, when the country abandoned collective farms in favor of private ownership. These collective farms were divided into separate plots and redistributed to individual families who were empowered to manage their land as they saw fit and sell their agricultural products in a domestic supply-demand free market system. Seventy percent of Vietnam's population still works the land, and the increased leniency in agricultural markets has led the country to become one of the world's leading exporters of rice, has brought inflation under control, has increased household incomes, and has greatly reduced hunger throughout the country.

This land reform also gave rural populations a stronger voice in local government and served as an economic model for liberalization in other aspects of the economy. Industrial production, investment, savings, monetary policy, and international trade policies have all been economically reorganized, resulting in relatively fast economic growth (taking into account the global recession of the past few years), and improved technical capabilities and infrastructure. For instance, Vietnam further reformed

state-owned enterprises when they joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, allowing private enterprises to invest and compete fairly. Like many centrally planned economic countries that are new to the WTO, Vietnam has been designated a "nonmarket economy" for the upcoming decade. As a result, they are given time to complete their transition to a market-based economy while protecting other countries from unfair advantages that state-owned enterprises may have at the beginning of the transition period.

The communist government of Laos has followed a similar path as Vietnam, when it comes to liberalizing their economy. They also are seeking admittance to the WTO but are years, if not decades, behind Vietnam. Unfortunately, their human rights record is even more dismal than Vietnam's and this is hampering their attempts at normalized diplomatic relationships and greater market liberalization. Diplomatic relations between the US and Laos never completely ceased after the end of the Vietnam War but they did deteriorate greatly over the years. Full ambassadorial relations were restored between the two countries in 1992 and In 2004 President Bush extended normal trade relations to Laos, culminating in a 2005 a bilateral trade agreement (BTA). In 2011 the US provided \$200,000 in IMET funds to Laos, mostly to support efforts to account for missing US serviceman from the Vietnam War.

Cambodia, unlike Vietnam and Laos, is not a communist country, and in the years following the Vietnam War, Cambodia saw a period of slow rebuilding but one of unimaginable horror. To put this in perspective, during this time period, the Hmong Civil War peaked in Laos (and is still sputtering on today) and Vietnam was invaded by China (border skirmishes are still taking place today). Both of these events were minor episodes compared to what Cambodia went through. In fact, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in an attempt to stop the carnage.

From 1975 to 1999, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, killed nearly 3 million people—approximately half the country's population. Almost every teacher in the country was killed, and all but forty of the nation's medical doctors and nurses were murdered. At the height of Pol Pot's reign, all forms of currency were abolished, all religious manifestations were destroyed, and the entire population of the country was forced into rural communes. For example, in the "class enemies" family extermination facility at Tuol Sleng, there were only seven survivors out

of the eighteen thousand women and children who were sent there. A slogan displayed in many of the farming communes at the time illustrates the horror in a way that statistics cannot: "To preserve you is no gain, to destroy you is no loss." In 1997, Pol Pots' nihilistic approach to governance came to an end when his devout followers and fellow rebels could no longer stomach their leader's brutality, and he was overthrown. He later committed suicide. By 1999, the last remnants of the Khmer Rouge ceased to exist.

Over twenty years of civil war have decimated nearly all of Cambodia's physical infrastructure, and Pol Pots' persecution of the educated populace has eradicated the intellectual framework necessary to rebuild the country. Those responsible for rebuilding the nation's civil, administrative, and economic structures are doing so without the requisite knowledge. As a consequence of losing nearly half the population a generation ago, the median age of Cambodia's population is only nineteen, and most of this age-group is uneducated. Further, this generation was raised under the shadow of the Khmer Rouge and has been traumatized to the extent that post-traumatic stress disorder is almost a universal condition in the country. The US has provided significant aid to Cambodia with the hope of rebuilding the country. In 2011, the State Department provided \$5 Million in Economic Support Funds along with nearly \$36 Million in development assistance (DA).

Currently, Cambodia is a multiparty liberal democracy under a constitutional monarchy that was established in the 1990s. However, the possibility of another civil war seems to be roiling just under the surface, ready to boil over at any given moment. The new civil war could be caused by renewed Khmer Rouge proponents, divisions in Cambodia society, or from rampant corruption. With this in mind, US security assistance has focused on efforts to improve training and education in order to improve Cambodia's border patrol and surveillance capabilities. In 2011, the US provided \$100,000 in IMET funds and \$1,000,000 in FMFP. In that same year, nearly \$3 Million in humanitarian demining (HD) was made available to help to remove the mines and booby-traps left behind from over two decades of civil war. Additionally, Cambodia was made eligible for Excess Defense Articles, mostly for communication and transportation to support IMET, anti-terrorism, and HD activities.

In addition to relatively small amounts of IMET and FMFP funds, these Indochina countries have received hundreds of millions of dollars over the last decade in various types of humanitarian assistance. For example, in the years from 2005 to 2008, Cambodia received \$113,508,000 in child survival and disease funds (CSH), \$30,442,000 in DA funds, and \$61,443,000 in economic support funds (ESF). Vietnam received \$1,200,000 in CSH, \$13,468,000 in DA, \$14,573,000 in ESF, and \$204,193,000 in Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) funds. Laos received \$16,744,000 in INCLE and NADR funds, which were focused on anti-terrorism and demining activities.

What about the other countries in South East Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma (called Myanmar by the existing government)? Thailand is an important US ally in the region and receives funds for domestic counterterrorism programs, border security, and IMET—whenever the military has decided not take over, that is. In response to the September 2006 coup in Thailand, the State Department suspended nearly \$24,000,000 foreign assistance. Aid resumed after the democratic elections of 2008. Malaysia is not a recipient of US DA but does receive IMET, INCLE, and NADR to help in antiterrorism and nonproliferation activities, mainly to counter regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. Now, what about Burma?

Over the past year, there have been surprising political changes in the country of Burma, starting in November 2010, when the democratic activist and Nobel Peace Prize-winner Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The changes have come quickly and unexpectedly—a partial end to censorship, return of exiles, freeing of political prisoners, privatization of some state companies, a mostly free and open election, and the halting of a major dam project as a result of public pressure toward the government. These changes are particularly surprising for a country that spent nearly fifty years living under a military dictatorship and was so isolated from the world, it resisted emergency aid even after the country was hit by Cyclone Hargis in May 2008, killing at least 138,000 of its people.

Burma's surprising political transformation has resulted in increased diplomatic interactions with the US. In December 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton traveled to the country and visited with both Aung San Suu Kyi and government

officials, becoming the first senior American official to visit the country in decades. At the time of this article's publication, there have been three separate delegations to the country, and there is talk of David H. Petraeus, the Director of the CIA, also visiting. The Obama Administration has announced that it is looking at upgrading diplomatic ties, appointing an ambassador, and relaxing restrictions on Burma. At this rate can greater security cooperation be far behind?

In November 2011, President Obama traveled to the Asia-Pacific region and became the first US President to attend the East Asia Summit. This distinction, in addition to other comments and events on his tour, drew attention to his administration's foreign policy concentration shifting from the Middle East to the Far East, which has been titled "rebalancing toward Asia." This rebalancing is not just empty words spoken for the benefit of 24/7 news channels; it has been followed by concrete steps—the removal of all combat troops from Iraq at the end of 2011; the US-Australia agreement to rotationally deploy US Marines to Darwin, Australia; and the release on 5 January 2012 of the new strategic guidance for the US Department of Defense (DOD) that stated, "we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region" (emphasis in the original). This new strategic guidance went on to describe the importance of expanding cooperation with emerging partners in the region and greater constructive defense cooperation.

It is still too early to determine if this rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific will be a success. US troops will be in Afghanistan for years to come, there may be a new presidential administration that chooses not to continue the Asia-Pacific rebalancing, and the Arab Spring has turned into the Arab Summer. Fall, winter, and spring part II are constantly drawing time, attention, and money away from US involvement in the Far East. In response to the ongoing unrest in the Middle East, the Obama Administration recently announced plans to help the Arab Spring countries with more than \$800 million in economic aid. When added to the \$1.3 Billion that was proposed for Egypt and the \$4 Billion for Iraq, the total surges to \$6.1 billion. By comparison, the total amount spent on four years of foreign assistance to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is \$0.46 Billion—7.5 percent of the proposed spending for Iraq and Egypt in FY 2013.

Also, it should be noted that the Arab Spring has yet to bring about a field of budding democracies. Several countries in the Middle East have successfully stopped the movement or are in the process of violently suppressing it. Bahrain, Iran, and Syria are prime examples. On top of that, just because a country gives its citizens a chance to vote does not mean that democracy will take root and grow. Iran, a religious theocracy, allows its citizens to vote for their president but only from a group of candidates approved by country's religious council of elders. Last year in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and a group of ultraconservative Islamists won 70 percent of the parliamentary seats with campaign promises to ban alcohol, enforce a dress code for women, and cover Egypt's ancient pharaoh statues in wax. In Yemen, people had a chance to vote for Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi or Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi for president. Outside of Tunisia, Jordan and Libya, it appears the Arab Spring is being stopped or turned into meaningless elections. When votes are counted, they are used to implement a "tyranny of the majority," denying minority populations the fundamental human rights of speech and expression.

If the US is going to continue its tradition of foreign policy initiatives to create more democracies and greater international stability through human security, free trade, and human rights, it might have a better chance of success with the countries of South East Asia. If this were the case, perhaps we could repeat the success that we had with the former Eastern Bloc countries of the Cold War. Still, in order for the US to successfully rebalance its focus, increase defense cooperation in the region, and help with democratic springs that have been peacefully building in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, a greater portion of the foreign aid budget should be directed to South East Asia, say 10 percent of the 2013 budget proposed for Iraq and Egypt.

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### **About the Author**

Lt. Col. Tom Williams is assistant professor and deputy director of research at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He spent over a year in Iraq managing Foreign Military Sales construction cases and currently teaches classes in FMS, security cooperation offices operations, and middle regional studies. He has a PhD in public administration.

# Iran and The Bomb: Options for the United States

By Jeffrey F. Fourman

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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When will Iran have the bomb? This is the question policy makers in the West are asking. More importantly, however, is what would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the first place. Answering this requires a deeper look at Iran's current capabilities and motivations, as well as the likely response from other countries with a stake in the situation. In short, we must understand what makes it unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapons program and what the impacts are to the US, its allies, and the international community as a whole. After gaining this understanding it is possible to analyze the available options for dealing with the situation and to suggest a course of action that will result in the best possible outcome for the US and its partner nations around the globe.

What most people do not know is that Iran's nuclear program actually began in 1959 under the auspices of the US when the Shah purchased nuclear reactors for peaceful research purposes.<sup>1</sup> The program came to a very abrupt halt in 1979 when revolution swept away the Shah and brought the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei to power. From most accounts, there was no active nuclear program until after the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Iran's program began in earnest under the current regime when Russian contractors took advantage of the weak post-Soviet Yeltsin Administration and began construction of two nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes in Iran.<sup>2</sup> Since that time, the Iranian regime has had ambitions for nuclear power and has what appears to be an on-again-off-again nuclear weapons program.

Based on Iran's official policy statements, it is unclear if there is currently an official nuclear weapons program. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and intelligence agencies around the globe have serious concerns about Iran's production of 20 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which is considered a major milestone in reaching weapons-grade 90 percent HEU. Combined with

Iran's existing Shabab-3 missile delivery system, with a range of nearly 1300 km, this would put Israel well within striking distance. Therefore, any step taken by Iran toward obtaining a nuclear weapon is very concerning for the US, Israel, and other allies who do not want to disrupt the balance of power in an already volatile region.<sup>3</sup>

Due to intelligence gaps, many countries, including some of the US's closest allies in Europe, are not convinced that Iran has a true desire to obtain a nuclear weapon. This is important to consider, because whether there is evidence of an official program will largely determine the support that the US will get from other nations when choosing military options. The rhetoric coming from Iran's regime is often conflicting. On one hand, Iranian Officials have publicly denounced their nuclear weapons ambitions by stating that they "consider the acquiring, development, and use of nuclear weapons Inhuman, Immoral, Illegal, and against our basic principles" and also stating that nuclear weapons "have no place in Iran's defense doctrine."<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the regime vehemently opposes giving up their Uranium enrichment efforts. In 2004, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that "Iran will not give up its enrichment program at any price," and in 2005 former Iranian President Khatami announced that ending Iran's enrichment program is "completely unacceptable."<sup>5</sup> Statements coming from current Iranian President Ahmadinejad are no less encouraging.

Domestic groups opposed to the current Iranian regime have also voiced their disapproval of nuclear weapons. In 2009, the late Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri issued a Fatwa that declared, "nuclear weapons are not permitted according to reason or Sharia."<sup>6</sup> Strong statements coming from the regime's opposition could indicate that they have first-hand knowledge about a clandestine nuclear weapons program and they are attempting to

differentiate themselves from the ruling party. One would think that an opposition statement would lend credence to the existence of a program, or at least the existence of true ambition within the current regime to obtain nuclear weapons. Either way, it is important to note that there are some large groups in Iran who do not want nuclear weapons.

Moreover, whether Iran has an official policy to develop nuclear weapons or not is of little consequence to the US in their opposition to Iran's nuclear program. The US still finds it unacceptable for Iran to even maintain a civil nuclear program that could provide a means to develop nuclear weapons. These fears are not unfounded, because Iran is currently operating a heavy water production facility near Arak, indicating that it could be looking for a way to reprocess spent nuclear fuel into fissile material for nuclear weapons. Likewise, the existence of Uranium enrichment facilities that are capable of producing 20 percent HEU indicates that Iran is also likely able to produce 90 percent HEU in time. While not necessarily a smoking gun, the US and its allies find the existence of such facilities and capabilities curious when it is not necessary to enrich Uranium beyond 5 percent for use in civil nuclear energy production. Compounded with Iran's history of negligence in reporting nuclear activities to the IAEA only after they are discovered by third parties, makes it a very real possibility that there are other unknown nuclear sites whose purpose and capability are undefined. In short, the uncertainty surrounding the true capabilities and intentions of Iran's nuclear program makes choosing an appropriate course of action very difficult.

The first option for dealing with Iran is to simply do nothing and allow Iran to continue its nuclear program under the assumption that their motivations are truly for peaceful purposes. However, the bottom line remains that without full disclosure of all nuclear sites and a guarantee that there are no clandestine nuclear weapon programs in Iran, there is no way for the US and its closest allies in the region to accept even a peaceful nuclear program.

If the US bets on a peaceful Iranian nuclear program and does nothing, there will be some very significant consequences if they are wrong. Although a very remote possibility, Iran could use their nuclear arms in an immediate attack on Israel or perhaps provide nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. Both of these scenarios are extremely unlikely, and

it is hard to imagine that Iran would simply turn over their nuclear weapons to terrorists after spending billions of dollars over several decades to develop. Moreover, if they did launch a nuclear attack on Israel, the retaliation on Iran would be merciless. Although these scenarios are extremely improbable, there is still more to pay than the US appearing weak and ineffective at stopping further nuclear proliferation if the US stands by while Iran gets nuclear weapons.

If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, a substantial and indefinite intelligence campaign would be required to monitor the threat and to ensure they do not transfer technology or fissile material to other non-nuclear nations or terrorist organizations. This alone would likely cost billions to successfully maintain. Further, the US would be required to develop partner nation's missile defense capabilities which would likely require a surge of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Given the relatively complex nature of missile defense systems and the existing international treaties banning anti-ballistic missile defenses, the simultaneous implementation of multiple FMS agreements would be very challenging, especially when some of the partner nations include former Soviet republics. Further, this would leave a window of vulnerability that Iran could exploit to further project their power throughout the region.

Allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon is also likely to trigger further proliferation throughout the region. Saudi Arabia has already publically announced that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, they would do the same, resulting in a regional arms race.<sup>7</sup> Other Middle East nations could also follow suit, and it is hard for anyone to imagine a positive outcome with multiple nuclear armed countries in a region as volatile as the Middle East.

Lastly, a nuclear armed Iran could embolden Hezbollah and other allies of the Shia Iranian regime. Hezbollah has already indicated that they would consider an attack on Iran as an attack on Lebanon, and it would be no stretch to assume that Hezbollah would come under the protection of an Iranian nuclear umbrella.<sup>8</sup> This would in turn limit Israel's ability to project its power throughout the region and protect its own borders. While it is unlikely that Iran would immediately use any small arsenal they obtain in a first strike on Israeli cities, Israel would still need to live with the possibility of a nuclear attack. Dr. Matthew Kroenig, a Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations summarizes the

“do nothing” option by claiming that “attempting to manage a nuclear armed Iran is not only a terrible option but the worst.”<sup>9</sup>

Because the Israelis are eager to do all the bidding, the US may not need to do much anyhow. Israel has far more to fear from a nuclear armed Iran than anyone else, and they have executed joint exercises for this scenario for a very long time. The biggest problem with allowing a unilateral preemptive strike from Israel is that in reality, it would not be a unilateral action. The Obama Administration has reiterated their resolve to stand by Israel, and defense cooperation with Israel is probably as close as it has ever been. At the recent AIPAC policy conference, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta became the first US Defense Secretary in twenty years to give a speech. This closeness is exemplified not only through public statement but also with increased security assistance. Secretary Panetta stated, “The cornerstone of this unprecedented defense cooperation is our commitment to maintain and expand Israel’s qualitative military edge.”<sup>10</sup> This year security assistance to Israel is likely to top \$3.1 billion compared to \$2.5 billion in 2009.<sup>11</sup> This includes \$650 million to fund missile defense systems that would defend against short, medium, and long range ballistic missiles and also includes the delivery of new F-35 Joint Strike Fighters that would make Israel the only country in the Middle East with this next generation tactical capability.<sup>12</sup>

An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would require cooperation from not only the US but also several other nations. In order to reduce the number of jets required to enter hostile Iranian airspace, Israel would need to arm their existing fleet of long range F-15I and F-16Is with the heaviest possible payload. The need to swap fuel pods for armaments combined with the distance from Israeli air bases to their targets would require mid-air refueling over other countries such as Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Although Israeli defense doctrine allows for refueling over hostile territory, permission to use neighboring airspace would make refueling en route much easier.<sup>13</sup>

The most immediate consequence of allowing Israel to act unilaterally with tacit support from the US would be a rally of the Iranian population around the current regime. In the aftermath of an airstrike, there would be little incentive for Iran to continue any diplomatic negotiations on the matter, and while

greatly delaying any progress of obtaining nuclear weapons, it would solidify the regime’s desire to have nuclear weapons in the long run. Any future development is most likely to occur exclusively in hardened underground facilities that are much more likely to survive future air strikes. Even a very limited “surgical” air campaign could have a severe backlash and endanger US citizens abroad. In a seemingly strategic move, Iran moved one of its Uranium enrichment operations from Tehran to a location near the Islamic holy city of Qom. Any airstrike that targets this facility could be viewed as a deliberate attack on Islam. As the recent accidental Koran burning incident in Afghanistan has shown, a perceived attack on Islam will certainly result in outrage among Iran’s Muslim supporters and could result in mass violence and acts of terrorism targeting US civilians and military personnel throughout the world. There appear to be few long term benefits of a preemptive air strike that can only delay Iran’s progress and make them even more determined to obtain a nuclear weapon. Barring any further action, an airstrike-only option would ultimately result in a very similar situation than if the US did nothing at all.

Although the precise actions are undefined, Secretary Panetta has outline “red lines” that if crossed will result in US military action against Iran.<sup>14</sup> First, there will be a military response if Iran actually obtains a nuclear weapon or there is credible evidence that Iran made a definitive decision to obtain one. Second, the US will act if Iran closes or attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz which nearly 20 percent of the global oil supply flows through. Finally, the US will act militarily if Iran continues to spread violence and supports terrorism abroad. If Iran crosses these lines, it will likely result in action by not only the US and Israel, but also by many partner nations around the globe. In fact, Japan is already debating whether to send minesweepers to help keep the Strait of Hormuz open as nearly 80 percent of their oil supply goes through it.<sup>15</sup>

On the extreme end of the spectrum, a full-scale invasion and occupation of Iran would certainly prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but may not be worth the cost and is not seriously advised. The rhetoric leading up to the Iraq invasion and the rhetoric surrounding the current situation with Iran is very similar. There is suspicion of hiding or developing weapons of mass destruction, and

there are credible accusations of state sponsored terrorism. In fact, a strong case can be made that Iran is much further along than Iraq was in pursuit of nuclear weapons and there is much more evidence of Iranian sponsored terrorism than there was with Iraq. In reference to the October 2011 bombing plot to assassinate a Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC, President Obama cited “slam-dunk proof that Tehran hatched the plan.”<sup>16</sup> However, on the heels of the Iraq drawdown and a continuing counter insurgent campaign in Afghanistan, the US is unlikely to pursue a full-scale invasion option as it would likely result in another decade long war and could spark further violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries that are already on the brink of civil war.

Moreover, there is truly little evidence that indicates Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon within the next year or two, which gives some time before purely military options are the only available solution. Assuming that Iran has made a definite decision to obtain a nuclear weapon, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate indicated that “Iran could develop a functioning nuclear weapon sometime in the 2010–2015 time frame, but is unlikely to develop one before 2013.”<sup>17</sup> This estimate was produced before a sabotage campaign was unleashed on the Iranian nuclear program that delayed progress significantly. In reference to the Stuxnet computer virus that Israel is suspected of releasing into the Iranian computer systems, the retiring Mossad Chief Mier Dagan told the Israel Knesset that Iran had run into “technical difficulties” that could delay the development of a nuclear weapon until 2015.<sup>18</sup>

Turning to some available non-military options, the first is to ratchet up diplomatic pressure and enforce sanctions. All parties with an interest in the matter, including the Russians, agree that Iran has been in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other UN Security Council resolutions.<sup>19</sup> To this extent, Iran has already taken steps toward isolating itself from the international community with a repeated history of non-disclosure of nuclear facilities until after the sites are discovered by third parties. However, China is currently the largest sanction violator with respect to Iranian oil exports, and they must stop purchasing Iranian oil for any sanctions to be effective. If China does not support sanctions, an Iranian oil boycott would do little more than drive up the price of oil in the West. Further, it would require other oil producing nations

such as Saudi Arabia to increase their oil production to help mitigate a global supply shortage. Although President Obama recently claimed that “sanctions are working” and “Iran is isolated as never before,” the most recent IAEA report on Iran states that “contrary to the resolutions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities.”<sup>20</sup> This shows that sanctions are ultimately ineffective and will do little to coerce the current regime. One would need to look no further than North Korea to see how sanctions and isolation do not prevent a regime from obtaining nuclear weapons if they are willing to let their own people suffer in the process.

Participating in multilateral diplomatic negotiations also has several problems. Following the framework of the NPT, most countries agree that Iran should not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons and should not be allowed to enrich their own Uranium or produce Plutonium. However, the US and Israel depart with the rest of the international community by not accepting even a civil nuclear energy program in Iran. In order for multilateral negotiations to work there must be an agreed upon end goal, and either the US must accept a civil nuclear energy program where a third-party such as Russia controls the nuclear material or the EU must be willing to take a harder stance and give up economic ties to Iran which amounts to nearly 25 billion Euros annually.<sup>21</sup> While the EU has put some pressure on the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the EU is not likely to budge much more, and the US is not likely to accept a civil nuclear program.

However, all parties involved are indicating a willingness to talk, and it is possible that the IAEA could facilitate effective negotiations if everyone sits down together. However, one of the largest roadblocks to effective negotiations is the media hype surrounding any talks that occur. Iran’s history of poor communication with the IAEA combined with the lack of regular negotiations makes it hard to meet without the media sensationalizing the event. Any meeting in the spotlight is very unlikely to produce any productive negotiations for Iranian’s fear of being embarrassed or “forced to comply.” If a diplomatic route occurs, it must be one that helps the Iranians convince themselves that obtaining a nuclear weapon is not beneficial for their regime. This can only happen if regular ongoing meetings take place with the IAEA on either a monthly, biweekly or even a weekly basis. Eventually the media will get bored

with the negotiations and finally all sides will be able to address the issues that matter most without the need to talk tough for the cameras. At a recent conference at the Stimson Center in Washington D.C., Ambassador James Dobbins said,

In my experience, these kinds of talks aren't going to make much progress until the press loses interest in them...I do believe that one of the most productive things that could come out of the current session would be an agreement to meet more frequently, to meet very frequently, to meet every week until we'd solved the problem...<sup>22</sup>

The US's hardline stance in opposition of civil nuclear energy in Iran is not without merit. Although Iranian President Ahmadinejad holds little political power and is essentially a figure head, he has stated on several occasions that Iran "will not yield to UN, US, or EU pressure to halt a peaceful nuclear program." Assuming Iran is a rational actor, there are only a few possibilities as to why Iran would snub the international community and not be swayed to forgo their nuclear ambitions. First, it is understandable that nuclear energy would allow Iran to more efficiently exploit their oil reserves and to capitalize on lucrative exports. The current regime has also cited their "right" to nuclear energy for medical research purposes as an explanation for producing 20 percent HEU. However, the most rational reason why Iran or any other state on the verge of regime collapse would want nuclear power is to ultimately develop a nuclear weapon and thus ensuring its survival. Coming to the negotiation table under these assumptions creates some very challenging problems.

Negotiating a peaceful resolution would require Iran to overcome their nuclear weapons ambition and for the US and Israel to accept a civil nuclear program in Iran. In order for Iran to give up their desire for a nuclear weapon they would need some guarantee of security for their regime. To accomplish this, the US could place more restrictions on the sale and use of major defense articles to Israel and require end-use monitoring agreements to ensure Israel does not use any security assistance provided by the US to defend beyond their current borders. Although this may seem unrealistic and very challenging, it would in theory help Iran be more comfortable with giving up their desire to have a nuclear weapon. In turn, the Russians could provide nuclear fuel for Iran's peaceful reactors

while the Iranians dismantle all Uranium enrichment and heavy water production facilities. To round out the agreement, IAEA inspectors must have a blanket mandate to access any facility at any time. Although an agreement that places limits on the US's closest ally in the region while encouraging the Russians to provide nuclear fuel to Iran is probably ludicrous, it is still a solution for policy makers to consider if all options are "on the table." However, there is still no way to guarantee that Iran or others do not renege on their agreement if tensions heighten in the future, and with spotty intelligence it is still hard to know what the Ayatollah's true intentions are as negotiations are on-going. While Iranian diplomats are hammering out negotiations in good faith, hardliners within the regime could continue to develop nuclear weapons covertly. Therefore, just as military action warrants hard evidence that a nuclear weapons program exists, good-faith negotiations require hard evidence that one does not and will never exist.

Somewhere between doing nothing and executing a full scale invasion of Iran there is a way forward. The facts surrounding the situation must guide the US to the correct course of action. Currently, the US knows that Iran would benefit from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and they know that IAEA has made clear that Iran has the capability to develop a nuclear weapon. They also know that EU, Israel, and other allies agree that a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable, while Russia and China are not as concerned about the threat. The US also knows that Israel could strike unilaterally at any moment, and would likely give the US very short notice if they do. Therefore, perhaps the best approach for long-term success is to maintain covert operations in the short run that focus on diminishing Iran's nuclear capability while at the same time providing support to popular opposition groups within Iran with an ultimate goal of regime change. The key to this approach is to convince Israel to not launch a preemptive air strike, but give them free reign and even support where necessary to continue any current covert operations. Israel has already proven they can disrupt and sabotage Iranian nuclear capabilities through the suspected assassination of Iranian scientists, the release of computer viruses, the introduction of impurities into centrifuge systems, and financial sabotage of funding and procurement for Iran's nuclear program. Meanwhile, the US can offer more support to the opposition leaders and populations within Iran who

are increasingly jaded by the current regime. For example, Iranian oil industry workers frequently go without pay. Just last year, oil refinery workers went on strike after not receiving pay for over six months.<sup>23</sup>

Covert action combined with support for opposition groups is the best available option because it is the most likely to succeed. Without a regime change in Iran, there is no guarantee that Iran will not eventually obtain nuclear weapons and there is no guarantee that nuclear weapons will not proliferate throughout the Middle East. Already, covert action has delayed Iran's progress by at least two years and continued efforts could delay it even further. Likewise, the recent toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya shows how quickly the tide can turn against an oppressive regime when the US and its partner nations throw their support behind an opposition movement. Coupled with Iran pushing the boundary of Panetta's red lines, and in some cases already crossing them with their support of terror plots on US soil, the US should easily find allies around the globe to support a new regime in Iran.

Although it seems as though the current regime may have an enduring grip on Iran, it is quite likely that they know their grip is slipping and that a sure fire way to bolster their domestic support base would be to draw the US or Israel into a limited military campaign. Therefore, the US must convince Israel to show restraint in not taking overt military action in order to allow time for popular uprisings to bubble up again. With the wave of uprisings and regime changes currently occurring in North Africa and the Middle East it seems like it is only a matter of time before the protestors appear again in Tehran as they did in 2009.

In conclusion, the US has a multitude of options available to deal with the situation in Iran, and all of them have implications that go well beyond Iran's borders. Only time will tell exactly how the situation will play out, but it is certain that the Iranian nuclear crisis will not end until the question of when will Iran get "the bomb" is answered by saying "never."

## Notes

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### **About the Author**

Jeffrey Fourman is an analyst and research consultant for the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He has a bachelor's degree in international studies from the University of Dayton and is a student in the International Comparative Politics master's program at Wright State University. He works on several security cooperation workforce initiatives, and his research focuses on the study of terrorism, European integration, and other US national security issues.

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# State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire

By Robert H. Van Horn  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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*State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire*, Stephen Glain  
New York: Crown, 2011  
496 pp, \$26.00

Stephen Glain has written what could have been an important addition to the discussion about the roles of the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD) in the development and execution of US foreign policy. The thrust of *State vs. Defense* is that State and DOD have been jockeying for preeminence in formulating and implementing US foreign policy since World War II. Glain contends that State lost the shoving match. As a result, US foreign policy has become more and more “militarized” over time, to the detriment not only of US interests, but to the rest of the world as well. Glain points out that DOD has State outnumbered and outflanked in every measurable area, including budget, personnel, access, and influence. He laments that the dominance of the military component in US foreign policy is “more consistent with an empire than a republic,” an empire that “not only sought dominion, it did so for its own sake.”<sup>1</sup> He asserts that this militarization goes against the most basic of American values, calling it “the worst betrayal of the nation’s republican ideals.”<sup>[2]</sup>

These are strong words, portending a lively and interesting discussion. Unfortunately, the book is rife with distracting errors which over time become as annoying as a mosquito in a bedroom.

A sampling:

- Glain states that General Douglas MacArthur dispatched Major General George S. Patton to suppress the Bonus March staged by unemployed World War I veterans in Washington, DC, in the summer of 1932.<sup>3</sup>

Patton was a major in 1932. He was not promoted to major general until April 1941.<sup>4</sup>

- Glain says that Harry Truman lost to Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 presidential election

because Truman had been “successfully portrayed as soft on communism” by followers of Senator Joseph McCarthy during the Red Scare of the 1950s.<sup>5</sup>

President Truman chose not to run for reelection in 1952. Eisenhower instead ran against Adlai Stevenson that year (and again in 1956).<sup>6</sup> Glain’s error is particularly perplexing because he correctly identifies Stevenson as Eisenhower’s opponent in 1952 later in the book.<sup>7</sup>

- Glain states that Elihu Root served as Secretary of State under Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt.<sup>8</sup>

Root served as Secretary of War under both McKinley and Roosevelt, from 1899 to 1904. He served as Secretary of State only under Roosevelt, from 1905 to 1909.<sup>9</sup>

- Glain identifies the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the US State Department during the build-up to the Korean War in 1950 as Edmund Chubb.<sup>10</sup>

The gentleman’s correct surname is Clubb. Oliver Edmund Clubb was one of the Department of State Foreign Service Officers known as the “China Hands” who were hounded out of office by Joseph McCarthy and his supporters during the Red Scare.<sup>11</sup>

- Glain refers to an announcement by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in 2009 that it was going to double the size of a chapter on humanitarian affairs “in its manual for flag officers advising foreign governments.”<sup>12</sup>

A review of the source Glain cites for this information reveals that the manual in question is DOD 5105.38-M: *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM).<sup>[13]</sup> DSCA does plan to update the SAMM, including chapter 12 which is currently entitled “Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action.” However, while the SAMM is an important, influential, and useful document, it can hardly be considered a “manual for flag officers.” On the

contrary, the SAMM provides basic policy guidance on the administration of US security cooperation. It is used widely by lower and mid-level government employees, most of whom are civilians, to administer such programs as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), grant transfers of excess defense articles (EDA), and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA). (The latter encompasses humanitarian assistance and mine action.) Note that the article Glain cites as his reference does not refer to the SAMM as a “manual for flag officers.”<sup>14</sup>

These errors detract greatly from Glain’s argument. One or two such slips might be understandable, but they become as grating as fingernails on a chalkboard as they continue to follow one after the other. To be fair, all of the errors pointed out above are only tangential to Glain’s main theme, but in some ways that makes them even more annoying.

This irritation is compounded by Glain’s tendency to snarkiness and hyperbole, such as his reference to distinguished public servant Paul Nitze as Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s “trophy wife”<sup>15</sup> or his assertion that an overeager, trigger-happy Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) posed a greater threat to US national security during the Cold War than did the USSR and other communist countries.<sup>16</sup> After a while, the reader can’t help but think to himself, “Oh, c’mon! Really?”

These flubs naturally cause the reader to question what else Glain has gotten wrong, misrepresented, or exaggerated. Take for example his depiction of DOD’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)<sup>17</sup>, which included provisions for a retaliatory strike in the event of a nuclear attack against the US, and about which I have only a dusting of knowledge. Glain’s assertion that the SIOP in 1962 called for massive retaliatory nuclear strikes against both the Soviet Union and China in response to a Soviet attack, whether or not the Chinese were a party to the initial attack, is startling and disturbing—Assuming, of course, that it is true.

All of this is unfortunate because *State vs. Defense* addresses an important topic and Glain has important things to say about it. There is no question that US foreign policy has a large military component and that it has grown in recent years. Even many foreign assistance programs that are ostensibly run by State, such as FMS, IMET, and Foreign Military Financing (FMF), are actually executed by DOD

and have been since their inception. Moreover, the last decade has seen a torrent of alternative funding streams under such rubrics as counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and train-and-equip that are administered directly by DOD and that tend to nudge State aside. Whether this is a good thing is a legitimate question.

Although the intensity of DOD’s involvement in foreign policy may have increased in recent years, the story Glain tells in *State vs. Defense* shows that it is not new. “Militarists” in the US government have been arguing since World War II for an aggressive and muscular foreign policy. Contrary to what one might expect, many of those Glain places on the “militarist” team are civilians, such as Nitze, Walt Rostow, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle. Glain notes that, “American militarism is unique for its civilian provenance.”<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, many of those who have advocated a less belligerent approach, such as Eisenhower, George Marshall, and Colin Powell, were military men. For example, Glain points out that Colin Powell spent the latter years of his public career “trying to stay the cavalier impulse among civilian leaders for military solutions to foreign policy challenges. He would not pander to the militarist instincts of civilian leaders, nor would he be seduced by their interventionist muse.”<sup>19</sup> This conflict between “militaristic” civilian officials and more cautious military officers was starkly on display during the Clinton Administration, when Powell, as Chairman of the JCS, cautioned against US intervention in the Balkans, only to be taken to task by then UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who asked, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”<sup>20</sup>

This aggressive “militarist” attitude, according to Glain, has been the cause of virtually every military confrontation the US has found itself in since 1941, from Pearl Harbor and Korea, through the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam, to the 9/11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He notes that although the US may not have struck the first blow in many of these conflicts, “acts of aggression are rarely unprovoked, a fact that complicates tidy narratives of victimhood and redemption.”<sup>21</sup> I disagree with much of Glain’s postulation, but that really does not matter. The hypothesis that the world would be a better place if the US had, in the past, just implemented a kinder, gentler foreign policy has the advantage of

being untestable. What has happened has happened and there are no do-overs allowed. I think it is fair to say, however, that there have been—and still are—people, organizations, and countries in the world whose interests are antagonistic to ours and many of them have wished us ill. Therefore, a strong military and the willingness to use it when required is an essential element to any viable foreign policy the US may bring to bear.

There is no doubt that DOD has experienced mission creep. As Glain points out several times, the DOD overseas mission set now includes tasks not traditionally considered within the military's purview, such as building roads, schools, and other development projects; training domestic security organizations; providing health care; mitigating climate change; disaster relief; and instituting economic, legal, and political reform. However, this has not always been the result of deliberate power grabs by DOD. Often, these responsibilities fall to the military by default because in many contexts it is the only organization with the wherewithal—money, manpower, and other resources, not to mention attitude, leadership, and culture—to get things done. For example, State has had difficulty in the past getting enough volunteers to fill billets in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, even if every Foreign Service billet in every US embassy around the world were filled, that is no guarantee that military influence would diminish. Foreign Service Officers, especially those in the career cones of Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Public Diplomacy, are not known to be doers. Instead, their jobs require them to collect information, analyze, debate and discuss, write, and report. Most of them do this quite well and provide a great service to their country in the process. However, if there is a US program producing a tangible result in a country (e.g., lower infant mortality rates, higher agricultural output, professionalized police forces, expanded educational opportunities), there is a good chance someone besides the Department of State is executing it. That “someone” is often the US military. As one officer explained to me during a discussion of US military efforts at stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq, “We had to step up. There was no one else there to do it.” This challenge still exists in many ways.<sup>22</sup>

That said, it is appropriate to examine the degree to which defense overshadows the other components in a policy that rests on the “3 Ds” of diplomacy, defense, and development. If nothing else, the dire budget straits in which the US finds itself will drive a reevaluation of what our military can and should be doing. This will have significant foreign policy implications. What purpose does NATO serve now that the Soviet Union is but a distant memory and many members of the defunct Warsaw Pact are NATO members? Do we really need US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, and Germany when these countries seem to be perfectly capable of looking after their own defense needs? What are the foreign policy implications of a US withdrawal from NATO or from one or more of these countries? Could State step in to fill whatever vacuum may result if DOD leaves? Does Iran's nuclear program warrant a military response? Is the People's Republic of China really the new enemy on the horizon, as the Obama administration seems to be implying? Could US actions make this a self-fulfilling prophecy? Should the recent announcement of American intentions to station Marines in Australia be seen by China and other Asia-Pacific nations as engagement or provocation? What type of military presence, if any, should we maintain in the Middle East or Southwest Asia? Where should it be based? What would it do? Under what conditions? What are the military and foreign policy implications of the Arab Spring? Should there be a military component to counternarcotics programs in Latin America, and if so, what should it be? How do we deal with whatever may happen in North Korea? In Africa?

Stephen Glain provides an interesting and needed perspective to this discussion. It's just too bad he didn't hire an intern to spend a couple of weeks on Google checking his facts.

## Notes

1. Stephen Glain, *State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire* (New York: Crown, 2011), x.
2. *Ibid.*, 4.
3. *Ibid.*, 25.
4. “George Patton,” Biography.com, <http://www.biography.com/people/george-patton-9434904>. “George S. Patton,” Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George\\_S.\\_Patton](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_S._Patton).
5. Glain, *State vs. Defense*, 75.

6. "Presidential Elections, 1789-2008" Infoplease, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781450.html>.
7. Glain, *State vs. Defense*, 154.
8. *Ibid.*, 78.
9. "The Nobel Peace Prize 1912: Elihu Root," Nobelprize.org, [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/1912/root-bio.html](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1912/root-bio.html). "ROOT, Elihu (1845-1937)", Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=r000430>.
10. Glain, *State vs. Defense*, 108 and 163.
11. "O. Edmund Clubb is Dead at 88; China Hand and McCarthy Target," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1989, <http://writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/clubb-obit.html>. O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The "Great Game."* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. iv (author biographical blurb).
12. Glain, *State vs. Defense*, 399.
13. <http://www.dsca.mil/samm>> As of this writing (January 2012), DSCA expects to release a new version of the SAMM within the next several months. It should include updates to chapter 12.
14. Fawzia Sheikh, "DSCA Revamping DOD Manual's Humanitarian Assistance Guidance," *Inside the Pentagon* 25, no.16 (April 2009).
15. Glain, *State vs. Defense*, 85. On the other hand, I did enjoy some of the swipes Glain took at others, such as his description of the "upwardly bound failure" as, "a species that is not unique to Washington but is certainly overrepresented in it." (195) Perhaps one man's snark is another man's wit.
16. *Ibid.*, 340.
17. *Ibid.*, 137-140.
18. *Ibid.*, 3.
19. *Ibid.*, 345.
20. *Ibid.*, 354. Powell recounted this incident in his memoirs. See Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995).
21. *Ibid.*, 322.
22. For a discussion of the challenges and obstacles to expanding the US government's civilian presence overseas, see Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009).

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### About the Author

Robert Van Horn has been an instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management since August 2004. He served in the US Army from 1973-1994 as an Armor Officer and a Foreign Area Officer (China). While in the Army, his security assistance tours included Chief, Army programs, Office of the Defense Representative, US Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan, and Chief, Performance Evaluation Group, Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate (J44), Headquarters, US Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. After retiring from the military service in 1994, he worked for a short time as the Director, Trade Development, Kansas Department of Commerce and Housing in Topeka, Kansas. In July 1997, he joined the security assistance office in the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), located in Taipei, Taiwan, where he served till July 2004. His academic degrees include an MBA from the University of Kansas, a master's degree in political science from the University of Arizona, and a bachelor's degree in economics from Iowa State University.

# ***The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace***

By Lt. Col. Tom Williams, USAF  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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*The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace*  
Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor  
New York: PublicAffairs, 2010  
256 pp, \$25.95

Shannon Beebe, an Army Lieutenant Colonel who served as a senior Africa analyst at the Pentagon and Professor Mary Kaldor, Director of the Centre for Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, wrote this book. These two individuals, from very different backgrounds, came together to argue that the traditional concepts of national security that focus on State on State conflicts are inadequate in addressing the complexity of current conflicts. They argue that “Human Security,” which concerns itself “about the everyday security of individuals and the communities in which they live”<sup>1</sup> is the best way to prevent violence to said individuals and to increase overall security. They propose six principles of Human Security: “(1) the primacy of human rights, (2) legitimate political authority, (3) a bottom-up approach, (4) effective multilateralism, (5) regional focus, and (6) clear civilian command.”<sup>2</sup> To support how an emphasis on these six principles can lead to less violence to the individual in this age of persistent conflict and constant upheaval, the book discusses some growing twenty-first century risks such as increasing economic disparity (the dark side of globalization) and the fracturing of societies into more dispersant groups that traditional national security approaches have not been able reverse. With that in mind, they then go on to discuss the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and argue that if Human Security is not addressed in these countries then stability and peace will remain elusive.

Following chapters further expand on Human Security, discussing how it is made up of sustainable security, sustainable livelihoods, sustainable

governance, and sustainable development. Unfortunately for those readers who are already familiar with the concepts of sustainability, peak oil, and environmental security this section of the book is covering familiar ground. In chapter 6, the authors propose the concept of “Engagement Brigades,”<sup>3</sup> a hybrid military/civilian structure that not only provides security but can help with local economic development, respond to public health concerns, and help with establishing legitimate local political governance. Like the chapters before, the concept of Engagement Brigades echoes an earlier concept and call (from the military) for active duty “Civil Affairs” brigades to help with building local civil authority.

In the second-to-last chapter of the book, the authors talk about how addressing their Human Security principles by fielding their Engagement Brigades could make a significant difference in the lives of Africans. This is the best part of the book where their arguments and examples come across most clearly and convincingly. Near the very end, the authors state that “many will take offense to this book...some will blame us for wanting to beat swords into plowshares.”<sup>4</sup> Beebe and Kaldor were absolutely right. If you put yourself in the Realist camp of international politics, which believe that there is no international order and that nations are constantly trying to position themselves to achieve the greatest gain, guided solely by self-interest (insecurity just being part of doing business in Realist international order)—you will not like this book. However, if you lean toward liberal intuitionism, which proposes that nations working together on issues like international trade, disease prevention, and environmental issues can lead to long-term mutual cooperation and gains—you will find the principles of Human Security to be welcomed arrows that you can add your conceptual quiver of solutions to the world’s ills.

On a sad note, on 7 August 2011, LTC Shannon Beebe, who was then serving as an Africa specialist in the Europe and Africa division of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, died in a private plane accident in Warrenton, VA. On page 201 of his book, Beebe mentioned that both of his grandfathers lived to be almost one hundred, and he hoped to do the same. Unfortunately, he couldn't meet that goal, but he did succeed in challenging people to think about how they could make the world more secure place.

### **Notes**

1. Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace*, 5
2. *Ibid.*, 8–9.
3. *Ibid.*, 119.
4. *Ibid.*, 202.

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### **About the Author**

Lt. Col. Tom Williams is assistant professor and deputy director of research at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. He spent over a year in Iraq managing Foreign Military Sales construction cases and currently teaches classes in FMS, security cooperation offices operations, and middle regional studies. He has a PhD in public administration. He has served as an assistant professor at Air Command and Staff College and as an instructor and adjunct professor at the Air Force Institute of Technology.

# ***Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military***

By Robert H. Van Horn

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

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*Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military*, Derek S. Reveron  
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2010  
224 pp, \$29.95

The US military has always done more than fight wars. Humanitarian assistance and civic action, disaster relief, providing equipment and training to foreign militaries, and myriad other activities that fall under what is now called “security cooperation” have long been among tasks performed by military personnel. In the past, these missions were done largely, but not solely, by special operations forces. They were not considered to be in the mainstream.

The aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 brought increased emphasis to security cooperation activities. Many threats to US interests today come not from peer competitors with traditional military forces, but rather from weak or failing states that provide sanctuary to subnational and transnational actors. These threats cannot be addressed solely, or even primarily, through combat operations. Instead, US strategy stresses using security cooperation tools to “build the capacity” of other countries so that they can counter local and regional threats themselves, thus supporting “stabilization and reconstruction.” This requires more than just tanks and planes, guns and bullets. Programs that address public security in a particular country may have to address concurrently such disparate needs as health, clean water, and sanitation; professionalization and reform of law enforcement, correctional, and judicial systems; fighting trafficking in persons, piracy, and drug smuggling; and infrastructure development for education, communications, and transportation. US military teams around the world dig wells, build schools, develop programs to prevent HIV/AIDS and other diseases, conduct training on protecting fisheries, and hold conferences on the implications

of climate change. Security cooperation is no longer a secondary mission for the Department of Defense (DOD). It has moved to the forefront.

For a security cooperation strategy to be effective, DOD must also work in close concert with other US government agencies through a “whole of government” approach, so that military and non-military programs are mutually supporting or at least not in opposition to one another. This change in emphasis has even affected the way DOD is organized. For example, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established explicitly as a security cooperation organization with interagency coordination as part of its DNA. Even before AFRICOM stood up, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) morphed from a traditional combatant command headquarters to one focused on security cooperation, with interagency coordination also integral to its make-up. Other combatant commands have created staff directorates that have the expressed responsibility to promote interagency and non-governmental coordination (e.g., US European Command (EUCOM) ECJ9: Interagency Partnering Directorate, and US Pacific Command (PACOM) J9: Pacific Outreach Directorate).

Not everyone in the US supports this shift. Some lament the loss of focus on traditional military missions. They see security cooperation as a distraction and a drain on manpower, acquisition, and other resources. Other detractors see DOD’s emphasis on security cooperation as usurping the roles of the Department of State and other civilian government agencies. They see this as DOD mission creep and the militarization of foreign aid.

Derek Reveron of the US Naval War College (NWC) disagrees. On the contrary, he argues in his book *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military* that DOD’s turn toward security cooperation and interagency coordination is not only

appropriate, it is necessary. Security cooperation is a principal means by which the US engages with most other countries around the world. That being so, Reveron stresses, “it is imperative for the military to develop concepts and capabilities appropriate to work with partners outside of combat zones in permissive environments.”<sup>1</sup> He stresses that since the goal of security cooperation is to enable partner nations to meet their own security challenges, and thus by implication obviate the need for US forces to do it for them, security cooperation missions are “arguably more important and more likely for the US military than combat.”<sup>2</sup>

Reveron notes that even the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve much more than combat operations. They too have a huge stabilization and reconstruction component. Iraq and Afghanistan prove that military victory and strategic success are not the same. Defeating an enemy force may really be only the first and easiest step in achieving strategic objectives. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts that follow military victory may be the greater and more important challenge.

Reveron argues that rather than being the militarization of foreign aid, security cooperation is merely the government using the military in civilian applications. He responds to those who favor the primacy of economic and other non-military aid by pointing out that “security and stability are essential to socioeconomic development.”<sup>3</sup> For example, reliable seaport and airport security, modern air traffic control procedures, and professional and trustworthy immigration and customs officers can have significant impacts on trade. Thriving markets and political liberalization may be possible only when citizens feel reasonably safe.

Reveron makes a strong case defending security cooperation and the military’s role in foreign aid. DOD has more people, money, and other resources than any other agency in the US government. Moreover, its culture promotes an action-oriented “can do” spirit, so projects that otherwise might get bogged down are pushed forward when run by DOD. The military has stepped up to assume responsibility for political-military programs, civic action projects, and even economic development activities in many places either because the local security environment was not safe for civilians, or an insufficient number of qualified civilians were willing to go where the need is, or often just because

civilian agencies did not have the wherewithal to implement viable programs. Reveron cites as an example the Department of State’s efforts to be more assertive in the security arena through its Office of Coordination for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS). While S/CRS’s efforts have been stymied in part by its limited success in recruiting staff, even with its full complement of people, it could not supplant a “modest” DOD civil affairs effort such as Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, calls for State to do more in the area of security cooperation often assume competencies that are not there. As Reveron notes, just because diplomats are civilians does not mean that they are any more prepared to rebuild countries than are their counterparts in the military.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, while military-managed programs may not be the cure for what ails a country or society, the same may well be said for civilian aid programs that State can bring to bear.

Not surprisingly, given his affiliation with the NWC, Reveron presents US Navy security cooperation as a case study to support his argument. I found this the most enjoyable part of the book, if only because my own Army background has not given me much exposure to Navy programs. His discussion of such activities as Global Fleet Station, maritime partnerships, and the East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Initiative illuminates the breadth and depth of Navy security cooperation. He notes, “Piracy, illegal fishing, and illegal trafficking by sea have forced the US Navy to adapt its mission and think beyond major warfare with another maritime power. Instead, maritime civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief are becoming core competencies.”<sup>6</sup> Not only are activities like these key to US security, the US Navy is the only US government organization that has what it takes to pull them off, even though “these are very different missions from those for which warships are designed.”<sup>7</sup>

As well as Reveron makes his case, I think even he would caution that we should not support increased emphasis on security cooperation without some caveats. First and foremost, the US military must not lose sight of the fact that its *raison d’être* is to fight our nation’s wars. Of all the organizations in the US government, only the military can conduct combat operations. DOD must strike a fine balance between security cooperation on one hand and fighting or preparing for war on the other. This is certainly true

in Iraq and Afghanistan. While building schools, drilling wells, and drinking the requisite “three cups of tea” are important, as has been noted elsewhere at some point in a counterinsurgency you have to counter the insurgent.<sup>8</sup> When a rifleman is training to perform a security cooperation mission, he is not training to use his rifle, which is and must be his primary core competency.

This is not only true with regard to current conflicts. Even though there is now no peer competitor that poses a threat to vital US interests, DOD must still plan, equip, and train to meet one should it arise, no matter how unlikely that may be. Given the lag time for funding, acquisition, and train-up, this cannot wait till such a threat clears the horizon. While it is certainly healthy to debate the type of force that may be required to meet possible future threats and the flanks on which those threats may appear (e.g., cyberspace), in my opinion it would be a mistake to give these threats short shrift in favor of current security cooperation efforts.

Another important caveat is that to be successful, security cooperation must have a long-term perspective. Security cooperation aims to change attitudes, earn trust, and gain access. This takes time and repetition. It cannot be “one and done.” Furthermore, sustainability must be an integral part of the plan for any security cooperation program. It does not serve US interests to provide capabilities that begin to decay as soon as US forces leave. For example, in his discussion of the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), Reveron notes that although the US supports dozens of peace operations training centers around the world, the true measure of success for GPOI will be whether partner nations sustain the training centers and actually participate in peacekeeping operations when the US eventually curtails its involvement.<sup>9</sup> Providing a capability without also providing the wherewithal to maintain it may be worse than providing nothing at all. As Reveron notes in another discussion, at a minimum, where projects are not sustained “investment will fall short of expectations.”<sup>10</sup>

By the same token, security cooperation projects normally should not involve a permanent US presence. The goal of any security cooperation effort should be for the partner nation eventually to “graduate” and become self-sufficient. There is always the danger that the US military will get overly

invested in a project or country, becoming tied down indefinitely.

Finally, it remains to be seen how long DOD will continue its emphasis on counterinsurgency in general and security cooperation in particular once the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan draw to a close. Those of us of a certain age can recall how the US military jettisoned its counterinsurgency experience at the end of the Vietnam War, settling comfortably into a collective amnesia. We turned our attention back to the Fulda Gap almost as if Vietnam had never happened. It is possible that once operations in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, security cooperation will again be pushed to the background and traditional concerns will once again become paramount. Should this happen, military professionals who have bought into security cooperation may find themselves shunted aside. Even the Secretary of Defense has questioned whether military personnel systems will adequately recognize and reward those who fill security cooperation assignments, which are “still not considered a career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers.”<sup>11</sup> In my opinion, slighting security cooperation in the future would be as big a mistake as ignoring other possible future threats in favor of security cooperation. Again, there has to be a balance between security cooperation that tamps down current threats to prevent them from flaring into conflagrations, and preparing for whatever awaits us over the next rise.

Posing these few qualifications is not meant to denigrate Reveron’s work in *Exporting Security*. To be fair, Reveron acknowledges each of the issues raised above, at least in passing. All in all, he has provided a welcome addition to the discussion about the proper place of security cooperation in the array of strategic tools available to DOD. His chapters providing an overview of select security cooperation programs and discussing implications for US force structure and doctrine are especially useful. I recommend this book to anyone who is working in or wants to understand security cooperation.

## Notes

1. Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military*, 145.
2. *Ibid.*, 145–146
3. *Ibid.*, 42.

4. Ibid., 58–59.
  5. Ibid., 171.
  6. Ibid., 139.
  7. Ibid., 123.
  8. John T. Bennett, “Olson: Counterinsurgency Ops Should ‘Involve Countering the Insurgents,’” *Defense News*, 26 May 2010, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4643956&c=LAN&s=TOP>.
  9. Reveron, op. cit, 115.
  10. Ibid., note 62, 143.
  11. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no.1 (January/February 2009), 37.
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### **About the Author**

Robert Van Horn has been an instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management since August 2004. He served in the US Army from 1973–1994 as an Armor Officer and a Foreign Area Officer (China). While in the Army, his security assistance tours included Chief, Army programs, Office of the Defense Representative, US Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan, and Chief, Performance Evaluation Group, Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate (J44), Headquarters, US Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. After retiring from the military service in 1994, he worked for a short time as the Director, Trade Development, Kansas Department of Commerce and Housing in Topeka, Kansas. In July 1997, he joined the security assistance office in the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), located in Taipei, Taiwan, where he served until July 2004. His academic degrees include an MBA from the University of Kansas, a master’s degree in political science from the University of Arizona, and a bachelor’s degree in economics from Iowa State University.



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Mr. Ronald M. Yakkel	Asia-Pacific Seminar Director	5700
Mr. James P. Toomey	Instructor	6335
Mr. Timothy S. Burke	Instructor	6330
LCDR William L. Scarborough, USN	Instructor	8183
Mr. Aaron M. Prince	Instructor	8186
Dr. Robert J. Weber	Associate Professor	8158
Mr. Robert Van Horn	Assistant Professor	8302
Mr. William E. Rimp	Assistant Professor	8187
Mr. James G. Taphorn	Assistant Professor	1101
Mr. Richard C. Rempes	Associate Professor	3899
Mr. Ferrelle R. Smith	Instructor	4-8379
Ms. Jill K. Ramey	Instructor	8188
Mr. Gary R. Kinder	Distance Learning Student Intern	4-4475